C.S., Plaintiff, v. III (2026)

This decision has been redacted for publication. The names of the parties, their children, non-party individuals, counsel, financial institutions, employers, and account identifiers have been omitted or generalized, as have the particulars of the parties' medical and psychiatric histories. The unredacted decision is on file with the Court.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR 2219 [a]

This matrimonial action was recently assigned to the undersigned. The Court has reviewed the entirety of the submissions on this application anew.

Pursuant to CPLR 2219 [a], the following papers, numbered as indicated, were read and considered upon Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, Motion Sequence No. 001, seeking pendente lite maintenance, relief compelling disclosure, and an award of interim counsel fees:

1. Order to Show Cause, signed February 11, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 53), with the Attorney Affirmation of Plaintiff's counsel, dated January 5, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 32), the Affirmation of Plaintiff, dated January 5, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 33), the Affirmation of Good Faith of Plaintiff's counsel, dated January 5, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 31), and the exhibits annexed thereto (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 30 through 54); 2. Affirmation of Service of a process server, dated February 11, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 55); 3. Affirmation in Opposition of Defendant's counsel, dated February 19, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 56); 4. Affirmation in Opposition of Defendant, dated February 19, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 57), together with the exhibits annexed thereto, including Defendant's Updated Statement of Net Worth (NYSCEF Doc. No. 61) and the documentation of claimed expense reimbursements (NYSCEF Doc. No. 63); 5. Reply Affirmation of Plaintiff, dated March 30, 2026, and the exhibits annexed thereto (NYSCEF Doc. No. 64); 6. Attorney Affirmation in Reply of Plaintiff's counsel, dated March 30, 2026, and the exhibits annexed thereto (NYSCEF Doc. No. 65); and 7. Attorney Certification (NYSCEF Doc. No. 74).

Upon the foregoing papers, and after due deliberation, the motion is determined as set forth below.

II. Findings of Fact

A. The Parties, the Marriage, and the Relief Sought

The parties met in 1994 while both were employed at the same federal agency, and they were married in the State of Maryland on September 28, 1996. Plaintiff was then twenty-seven years of age and Defendant was twenty-nine. Two children were born of the marriage, a son born in 1998 and a son born in 2001. Both are college graduates employed in the investment banking and finance sector, and both are emancipated. The younger son resides with Plaintiff in the former marital residence, a cooperative apartment in New York County purchased by the parties in 2013.

The parties resided in Maryland until 2010, where Defendant held senior positions at that federal agency and thereafter at a capital advisory firm. Plaintiff was employed at the same agency until 2001, after which she held a contract position with a staffing company and other short-term, project-based roles. In 2010 the parties relocated to the tri-state area upon Defendant becoming a Managing Director at an investment bank. Plaintiff had ceased working outside the home in 2009. In 2011 she founded a music therapy based voice studio, which she closed in 2016. From 2013 forward the parties rented homes while owning and remodeling the cooperative apartment and paying for the storage of their furniture, intending to purchase a home when their sons completed college.

By Order to Show Cause signed February 11, 2026, Plaintiff seeks four items of relief: an award of pendente lite maintenance in an amount of no less than $15,000 per month, retroactive to the date of commencement of this action; an order compelling Defendant to respond to Plaintiff's First Notice of Discovery and Inspection by serving a formal response signed by counsel in compliance with 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 and CPLR 3122 [a] [1], and producing outstanding documents that should be within Defendant's possession, custody, or control; an award of counsel fees pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 [c] in an amount of no less than $90,000; and such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. The good faith affirmation required by 22 NYCRR 202.7 [c] accompanies the application (NYSCEF Doc. No. 31).

B. The Commencement of the Action and Defendant's Relocation

On February 13, 2025, after twenty-eight years of marriage, Defendant advised Plaintiff by electronic mail that he was leaving the marital residence for Texas, and did not know whether or when he would return. Plaintiff retained her first firm the following day and filed a Summons with Notice on February 14, 2025 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 1). The Summons with Notice contained a request for spousal maintenance. Defendant departed the marital residence on February 15, 2025. He was served with the Summons with Notice and the Automatic Orders on March 12, 2025, at a hotel in Texas (NYSCEF Doc. No. 5), and filed a Notice of Appearance and Demand for Verified Complaint on March 19, 2025 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 6).

On February 14, 2025, Defendant transmitted to Plaintiff an electronic mail message in which he undertook the following:

I will not make any changes to our current money situation whatsoever, including any changes to the direct deposit (or any other forms of payment) for my paycheck unless and until there is some other decision made jointly by me and [Plaintiff] about such matters on or about April 1st, 2025. I will not take any money whatsoever from my retirement account unless and until there is some other decision made jointly by me and [Plaintiff] after April 1st, 2025. My expectation is that she will not make any such changes either unless mutually agreed upon. I will not alter the amount of my bonus whatsoever which includes splitting the amount that I am to be paid in any secret way which I will not disclose to [Plaintiff]. My bonus is currently expected to be approximately $500,000 (before taxes) and will be deposited on or around March 9, 2025.

Plaintiff states that in December 2024 Defendant had represented that his bonus from Defendant's employer would be approximately $800,000, and that on February 14, 2025 the figure was revised downward to approximately $500,000. Defendant denies ever having represented an $800,000 figure and asserts that the documented gross commission he received in March 2025 was approximately $482,200, yielding a net of approximately $281,512.

On March 10, 2025, Defendant furnished Plaintiff with a proposed budget seeking approximately $77,000 for his residence, furniture, and computers, in which he wrote that he would use the a national bank account for one-time expenses totaling approximately $32,000, would establish a new account for living expenses and transfer $45,000 to it, would continue depositing his paycheck into the a national bank account, and would take no money from the retirement plan. Plaintiff declined to agree.

Defendant leased a four thousand square foot house in Texas, at a monthly rent of $4,240, and purchased an automobile on March 20, 2025. Plaintiff is advised that the Texas lease expired on September 30, 2025. Defendant appeared virtually from Texas for the Preliminary Conference held July 7, 2025, and virtually from Maryland for the conference held October 7, 2025, having asserted an inability to travel by reason of residence in another state and hip surgery. As the January 5, 2026 conference approached, Defendant's counsel again requested leave for a virtual appearance, representing that travel from Defendant's then residence in North Carolina was cost prohibitive. Defendant's Updated Statement of Net Worth reflects a North Carolina address.

C. The Movement of Marital Funds Following Service

On March 14, 2025, two days after service of the Summons with Notice and the Automatic Orders, Defendant transferred $85,000 from the joint checking account to a checking account in his sole name, and transferred $10,902 from the joint savings account to a savings account in his sole name, a total of approximately $96,000. Neither the checking Defendant's individual checking account nor that savings account was disclosed on Defendant's original Statement of Net Worth, although the a national bank statement for the joint checking account for the period February 15, 2025 through March 18, 2025 reflects that both accounts were in existence as early as February 18, 2025.

Defendant candidly acknowledges the transfer of approximately $96,000, explaining that upon learning that Plaintiff had initiated this proceeding he was afraid she would take the entirety of the funds. On the same date, Plaintiff transferred $65,000 from the joint checking account and $14,095 from the joint savings account into an account held jointly with the parties' son. Plaintiff states that she did so on the advice of prior counsel after learning of Defendant's withdrawals, and that she thereafter froze the marital credit cards on or about March 17, 2025 because Defendant had charged in excess of $8,000 between March 12 and March 17, 2025.

Plaintiff further asserts that in August 2025 Defendant withdrew $31,250 from his his employer's 401(k) plan, receiving a net payment of $25,000. Defendant deposited $2,375 into the joint checking account on March 28, 2025 without explanation. No further deposit was made thereafter. Plaintiff states that she was advised by the parties' son that in May 2025 Defendant told him that the lawyers had said he was paying her too much money.

D. The Parties' Earnings History

Plaintiff sets forth the parties' respective gross earnings for the final five years of the marriage as follows. In 2021, Defendant earned $522,760 and Plaintiff earned $96,072. In 2022, Defendant earned $390,965 and Plaintiff earned $84,437. In 2023, Defendant earned $350,805 and Plaintiff earned $143,764. In 2024, Defendant earned $384,000 and Plaintiff earned $29,760. In 2025, Defendant earned $549,807, a figure inclusive of the 2024 bonus received on March 7, 2025, and Plaintiff earned nothing during the marital period. Plaintiff computes Defendant's five-year average income at $460,000. Defendant's counsel computes Plaintiff's five-year average at $70,807 using Plaintiff's own figures.

Plaintiff attributes her intermittent employment to a chronic psychiatric condition with which Defendant has been diagnosed and which produced recurrent episodes over a period of years. She states that she served as his treatment support partner and health care proxy, communicated regularly with his care providers, accompanied him to appointments including physical therapy two to three times each week, and supported him through two major surgeries in 2021 and 2024. She states that she twice postponed a surgical procedure of her own so as to remain available to him, and did not undergo it until January 2025. She further states that she has herself been diagnosed with anxiety and post-traumatic stress conditions attributed by her providers to chronic stress, and that she has received ongoing out-of-network treatment since 2022. The particulars of the parties' diagnoses and treatment are omitted from this published version of the decision; they are set forth in the papers on file and have been considered by the Court.

Defendant disputes this account. He asserts that there were isolated occasions across a lengthy marriage in which he required some assistance surrounding medical procedures, that none of those circumstances prevented Plaintiff from maintaining outside employment, and that his own uninterrupted earnings demonstrate that he was not incapacitated. He characterizes Plaintiff's departure from the workforce as a voluntary career choice, observes that nothing in the record reflects that she became disabled or was involuntarily terminated between 2023 and 2024, and notes the absence of documentary evidence of a job search in the moving papers. In reply, Plaintiff annexes a certificate reflecting her 2024 graduation from a family support program, together with electronic mail correspondence with Defendant's physicians concerning surgical planning, physical therapy attendance, and medication changes.

E. Defendant's Income as Now Disclosed

Defendant filed his original Statement of Net Worth on July 1, 2025, shortly before the Preliminary Conference (NYSCEF Doc. No. 15). It was sworn to on May 29, 2025 and purports to be accurate as of March 2025. That instrument set forth gross income for 2024 in the amount of $374,981. Under the heading for checking accounts, it disclosed only the joint checking account, titled in the names of both parties. It listed monthly expenses of $28,264.

Defendant's Updated Statement of Net Worth, filed with his opposition, discloses gross income for 2025 in the amount of $800,665, and $824,165.26 when his 401(k) contribution is added back, as reflected on the 2025 Form W-2 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 61 at pp. 9, 11, 53). The updated instrument sets forth monthly expenses of $32,787, an increase of $4,523 per month over the figure sworn to some nine months earlier. It discloses two out-of-state accounts, a checking account and a savings account, both opened on April 22, 2025, and neither of which appeared in the inventory of documents Defendant produced. It lists no account in North Carolina notwithstanding Defendant's relocation to that state.

Defendant asserts that he is and long has been a Form W-2 employee, that his gross base salary is $350,000 per year, and that his net monthly income after required deductions is approximately $15,491. He states that his 2025 commission was attributable to a single, non-recurring bankruptcy-related engagement that generated atypical revenue, and that it does not represent ongoing or predictable income.

Plaintiff has tabulated the deposits into Defendant's individual checking account, the account Defendant opened upon relocating to Texas. The monthly totals are as follows: for the statement ending March 20, 2025, $85,001.00; April 21, 2025, $26,625.56; May 20, 2025, $81,589.58; June 18, 2025, $72,448.78; July 22, 2025, $82,922.34; August 20, 2025, $72,661.24; September 19, 2025, $47,246.61; October 22, 2025, $31,770.81; November 18, 2025, $42,382.02; December 19, 2025, $26,908.64; January 21, 2026, $44,711.63; and February 18, 2026, $38,528.33. The aggregate is $652,796.54. Even setting aside the $85,000 transferred from the marital account, deposits into this single account exceeded $565,000 over twelve months, a figure that cannot be reconciled with an asserted annual net income of approximately $185,892.

F. The Claimed Loans and the Claimed Reimbursements

Defendant's Updated Statement of Net Worth lists a loan from a former colleague in the amount of $125,000 and a loan from a second individual in the amount of $20,000. The instrument supplies no date for the loan from the former colleague, stating only that it was post-commencement. No promissory note, loan agreement, or other writing evidencing either obligation has been produced.

The statements for Defendant's individual checking account reflect not a single advance of $125,000 but eight irregular wire transfers from a private account at a brokerage in the name of a former colleague: $15,000 on June 4, 2025; $14,950 on June 11, 2025; $14,975 on July 15, 2025; $10,295 on July 23, 2025; $18,217 on August 11, 2025; $14,975 on September 19, 2025; $22,475 on December 24, 2025; and $12,475 on January 28, 2026, aggregating $123,362. the former colleague is a Vice-President at Defendant's former employer, Defendant's former employer, and was hired approximately one year before Defendant departed that firm.

Defendant characterizes certain deposits from Defendant's employer between June and August of 2025 as reimbursements of business expenses, and has produced documentation as to two such deposits. He states affirmatively that he does not receive compensation through undisclosed entities, hidden accounts, or deferred arrangements, and that he received no unreported bonus income in 2023. He states that his California trip from June 4 to June 17, 2025 was for work, with the cost reimbursed to him.

G. Defendant's Post-Commencement Expenditures

Plaintiff has submitted Defendant's credit card statements (NYSCEF Doc. No. 49). Defendant opened that account on or about April 17, 2025, after commencement, and did not disclose it on the Statement of Net Worth he swore to in May 2025. The statements reflect multiple cards bearing the account, together with a card in the name of a second signatory, a third party, bearing a credit limit of $2,000.

The charges include several thousand dollars at high-end apparel retailers; a short-term lodging rental in San Francisco in the amount of $2,972.89; restaurant charges of $771.31 and $380.65 during a California stay from approximately June 4 to June 17, 2025; charges at other high-end restaurants; charges incurred in four southeastern states from late August through mid-September, including at a resort; and airline tickets purchased for the third party totaling $668.36 in June 2025. On April 26, 2025 alone, charges at three luxury retailers totaled just under $7,000. The May statement alone reflects total charges of $38,157.88. Payments to the account from April through October 2025 totaled $87,450.86.

Plaintiff further identifies $4,649.00 paid from Defendant's individual checking account in the month of May 2025 alone to several individuals through a peer-to-peer payment application, together with further such transactions totaling in the tens of thousands of dollars over the preceding year, for which the underlying records disclose neither payee nor purpose. Defendant responds that he traveled by automobile rather than by air because air travel aggravates his hip condition, with the exception of a brief trip to Texas necessitated by emergency dental surgery, and that the California travel was required by his employment.

H. Plaintiff's Present Circumstances and Stated Need

Plaintiff filed a Statement of Net Worth on April 28, 2025 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 10), approximately eight months before this application was filed. That instrument reported that she was unemployed and set forth monthly expenses of $32,735, a figure that included the carrying charges for the former marital residence and certain expenses attributable to Defendant while the parties still resided together. An updated Statement of Net Worth, annexed as Exhibit 21 to the reply, reports substantially greater indebtedness and reduced expenses.

Plaintiff was unemployed from March 2024 through August 2025 and held only short-term contract or consulting roles from 2017 until 2024, at hourly rates ranging from $64 to $93. After commencement she obtained part-time employment at a wellness practice at $22 per hour, yielding gross biweekly earnings of approximately $600, and Form W-2 earnings for 2025 of $6,991.16. Her 2024 Form W-2 reflects earnings of $33,321.98. She has partnered with a coaching organization in 2026 as a corporate executive coach, an arrangement that is commission based, under which she has no base salary, no current clients, and no revenue to date. She also maintains a limited liability company, a home-based venture providing support to families of persons with mental health challenges, which has generated no income.

Plaintiff states that she has no separate bank accounts and no other source of income; that she has borrowed $15,000 from the parties' younger son through December 2025 and $1,400 from her parents, who live on social security; that she is unable to meet the minimum monthly payments on numerous consumer accounts, all of which are in default; and that three of the four student loans co-signed for the parties' sons are likewise in default. She has drawn upon her own 401(k) in 2022 and 2023, long before commencement, to pay for health professionals. Defendant disputes that those withdrawals were attributable to his care, noting that his psychiatrist cost approximately $25 per week at the time.

In her moving affirmation Plaintiff represents that her current monthly expenses approximate $17,000. In reply she states that the carrying charges of the former marital residence are $6,423 per month and that her other expenses exceed $14,000 per month. She seeks $15,000 per month, from which she would pay all carrying charges of the former marital residence together with her other expenses, applying her part-time earnings to the balance.

I. Defendant's Claimed Obligations and the Termination of His Employment

Defendant states that he pays approximately $10,995 per month in marital obligations, comprising the marital residence mortgage of $3,965; cooperative maintenance of $2,561; $1,444 per month upon a payment plan for a 2015 joint tax debt owed to the Internal Revenue Service; $2,240 per month upon a 2015 joint tax debt owed to the State of Connecticut, which is garnished from his wages; and $785 per month upon the educational loan for the parties' older son. He emphasizes that these are not discretionary expenditures, that they directly benefit Plaintiff, who remains in the marital residence and is jointly liable for the tax debts, and that he reserves the right to seek reimbursement at the equitable distribution stage.

Plaintiff counters that Defendant pays nothing directly to her, and that of the sum he identifies only $6,523 per month, later stated as $6,423, represents the carrying charges of the residence. She asserts that Defendant failed to pay the cooperative maintenance in August and October 2025, annexing a statement of arrears received from the managing agent on October 17. Defendant denies this categorically and annexes statements reflecting payment of the mortgage and cooperative maintenance every month.

Defendant further establishes that his employment was terminated effective March 11, 2026, that he will receive one year of base salary continuation, that he will receive no commissions for 2026 because he will not be working for the company, and that he is subject to a non-compete provision running through approximately March 2027 that materially limits his ability to obtain comparable employment in what he describes as a niche industry. He states that after paying the obligations enumerated above he retains approximately $4,500 per month for his own living expenses, which he has supplemented from savings and from loans obtained from friends. He also lists a personal loan of $50,000, upon which he states he pays approximately $1,434 per month, which does not appear among the liabilities on his Updated Statement of Net Worth, and reports monthly tax payments of $3,684, roughly five times the $650 reported at commencement, with no accompanying explanation for constant balances.

J. The Course of Disclosure

The Preliminary Conference was held on July 7, 2025, and the resulting Order required the parties to exchange enumerated categories of documents for the preceding five years within forty-five days, that is, by August 21, 2025 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 17). Plaintiff produced on August 21, 2025. Defendant did not. Following inquiry on August 27, 2025, Defendant's counsel advised that the documents were being processed and saved to the firm's document management system. Production was not made until September 4, 2025.

Both parties served and electronically filed Notices for Discovery and Inspection on August 7, 2025 (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 22 and 23). Responses were due September 9, 2025, and counsel agreed to extend that date to September 30, 2025. On September 29, 2025, Defendant's counsel confirmed that additional documents would be provided the following day. Plaintiff served a formal response on September 30, 2025. Defendant served no formal response and provided only the parties' 2019 tax returns and a 2021 Form IT-370 extension application. Defendant fully complied with a single demand and partially complied with three others. No extension was sought from Plaintiff's counsel or from the Court.

By letter dated October 9, 2025, Plaintiff's counsel advised that a formal response was required. Defendant's counsel replied by electronic mail the same day, assuring that Defendant would make a diligent search and provide responsive documents, while confirming that counsel had no intention of subscribing any document response. On November 4, 2025, more than a month after the extended date, a paralegal in the office of Defendant's counsel transmitted additional documents without any formal response, which Plaintiff characterizes as a document dump of materials in no particular order and without any indication of which documents were responsive to which demand. Upon inquiry, the paralegal replied that the parties' understanding was that the CPLR requires production as kept in the regular course of business, that an inventory had been supplied, and that as a courtesy an itemization would follow.

By electronic mail dated November 18, 2025, the same paralegal transmitted objections to various demands, asserting that certain demands were unduly burdensome, and stating that Defendant possessed no documents responsive to twenty-two enumerated requests. Among these was Request No. 11, which sought documents furnished to Defendant by his employer's affiliated entities that Defendant had used to prepare financial reports he provided to Plaintiff on or about January 10, 2025, that is, documents Defendant had himself already delivered to Plaintiff. The response likewise disclaimed possession of personal financial statements sought by Request No. 18 and of documents pertaining to title to the parties' apartment sought by Request No. 22.

Defendant did produce more than one hundred fifty photographic and videographic files, represented to be responsive to Request No. 48, which seeks films, photographs, video tapes, or audio tapes involving Plaintiff. Not one of those items involves Plaintiff.

The inventory of Defendant's production, dated September 4, 2025 and annexed as Exhibit 25 to the reply, omits any statements for those out-of-state accounts, notwithstanding that Demand No. 12 seeks any and all checking account statements and Demand No. 14 seeks any and all foreign or domestic savings account statements. Plaintiff has been compelled to serve subpoenas, responses to which remain outstanding.

Defendant states that he received and reviewed the list of documents required to be exchanged, did his best to search for and gather what existed and was within his possession, custody, or control, and provided all such documents to his attorneys, who produced them with an inventory. He asks the Court to excuse any delay on the ground that he was working a full-time job and did not have the time available to a plaintiff he describes as allegedly unemployed.

K. Counsel Fees Incurred and the Retainer History

Plaintiff has been represented by three successive attorneys. She retained her first firm on February 14, 2025, paying $6,500 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 10 at p. 84). She retained her second firm on May 12, 2025, paying $10,000 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 13 at p. 2). She retained Plaintiff's counsel, on July 15, 2025, then at her third firm, paying $15,000, at an hourly rate reduced from $750 to $700 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 21). Counsel left that firm effective November 14, 2025 and joined Plaintiff's present firm, and Plaintiff executed a new retainer agreement on December 8, 2025, paying $5,000 with a further $5,000 payable within thirty days, at an hourly rate of $750 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 29). Both retainer agreements are on file with the Court.

Plaintiff states that from February 2025 through November 2025 she incurred counsel fees totaling $71,000, invoices for which are annexed as Exhibit 5, and that this figure does not include time incurred upon this application. The most current invoice is annexed as Exhibit 26 to the reply. Plaintiff's counsel represents that prior counsel prepared the pleadings and the Statement of Net Worth, and that the bulk of the work, consisting of the preparation and service of the document demand and the review of the response, was performed by her. Counsel sets forth her professional background at length, including substantial prior judicial service devoted to matrimonial matters and many years of practice in the field.

Plaintiff seeks $90,000 in counsel fees, with leave to apply for additional fees, and anticipates the need to serve supplemental demands, to conduct depositions, and possibly to retain a forensic accountant or seek the appointment of a neutral. Defendant responds that he cannot afford the sums sought while paying his own living expenses.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. The Threshold Objection Under 22 NYCRR 202.16 [k] [2]

Defendant contends at the threshold that the application is facially and fatally defective because Plaintiff failed to annex a Statement of Net Worth, her financial documents, and her retainer agreement to the moving papers, and failed to supply a statutory maintenance calculation. He invokes 22 NYCRR 202.16 [k] [2], which provides that no motion for maintenance or counsel fees shall be heard unless the moving papers include a statement of net worth in the official form, and marshals a series of authorities in which such applications were denied (Daich v Daich, 153 AD3d 900, 901 [2d Dept 2017]; Barton v Barton, 137 AD3d 723, 724 [2d Dept 2016]; Grace v Grace, 132 AD3d 1218 [3d Dept 2015]; LKF v MTF, 85 Misc 3d 994 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2024]; R.A. v U.A., 84 Misc 3d 1248[A] [Sup Ct, NY County 2024]; Crocker C. v Anne R., 49 Misc 3d 1202[A] [Sup Ct, Kings County 2015]; M v M, 44 Misc 3d 1210[A] [Sup Ct, NY County 2014]).

The Court does not treat that requirement lightly. The rule opens with the qualification that its requirements may be dispensed with upon application for good cause shown, and the First Department has recently confirmed that where a movant fails to submit the required statement the ordinary course is to decline to entertain the application or to deny it without prejudice, although the requirement may be dispensed with for good cause where ample financial information is otherwise available (Park v Butkow, 2026 NY Slip Op 02882 [1st Dept 2026]). Denial has accordingly been sustained where neither the prescribed statement nor comparable current financial information was supplied (Milchin v Milchin, 244 AD3d 420 [1st Dept 2025]). By the same token, omission of the prescribed form does not mandate denial as a matter of law where the movant has otherwise placed substantially equivalent financial disclosure before the court (Antoine L. v Virginie F., 212 AD3d 502 [1st Dept 2023]; Perrone v Perrone, 224 AD3d 518, 519 [1st Dept 2024]). A court retains discretion to accept a statement of net worth that is not of recent vintage (Plotkin v Esposito-Plotkin, 216 AD3d 676, 679 [2d Dept 2023]; Nieves-Iglesias v Iglesias, 186 AD3d 1234, 1235 [2d Dept 2020]), and no new statement is required where there is no evidence that the movant's economic condition has substantially changed (Kiwon S. v Daniel S., 95 AD3d 680 [1st Dept 2012]).

Measured against that standard, the Court finds good cause to dispense with literal compliance upon this record. Plaintiff's sworn Statement of Net Worth was filed on April 28, 2025 (NYSCEF Doc. No. 10), only eight months before this application, and was identified in the moving papers by NYSCEF document number. The parties' 2023 income tax return was filed with it, the very return Defendant himself later annexed to his Updated Statement of Net Worth. Both of Plaintiff's operative retainer agreements were filed (NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 21 and 29), and her counsel fee invoices were annexed as Exhibit 5. Her moving affirmation supplied current information regarding her employment, earnings, expenses, indebtedness, and claimed need, and expressly advised the Court and Defendant that an updated statement would follow, as one now has. Defendant possessed that information, addressed it in opposition, and has identified no resulting prejudice. The record accordingly contains ample financial information from which an informed interim determination may be made (Park v Butkow, 2026 NY Slip Op 02882 [1st Dept 2026]; Antoine L. v Virginie F., 212 AD3d 502 [1st Dept 2023]). The eight-month interval is also far removed from the six-year and nine-year staleness that warranted rejection in Molner v Molner (243 AD3d 528, 528-529 [1st Dept 2025]).

The authorities Defendant marshals do not command a contrary result. Daich concerned an order entered in May 2015, before matrimonial matters were filed electronically, and the distinction between a document being in the possession of a court and a document having been filed on NYSCEF is a real one. R.A. v U.A. involved a movant whose papers cited an annexed statement of net worth that had never been filed at all. Barton and Grace were post-judgment modification applications, in which the burden of demonstrating changed circumstances necessarily rests upon documentary proof of the movant's own finances. LKF v MTF and M v M turned upon the absence of retainer agreements, invoices, and hourly rate information, all of which are present here. Crocker C. expressly framed its holding as an application of Second Department precedent, a qualification the First Department authority cited above does not share.

Nothing in this determination relaxes the requirement of 22 NYCRR 202.16 [k] [2], which counsel are expected to observe in the ordinary course, and which the First Department has recently reaffirmed. The Court holds only that upon this particular record, where the required disclosure was filed, identified by document number, supplemented in the moving affirmation, and answered without prejudice, good cause exists to reach the merits. The branch of the opposition seeking outright denial of the motion upon procedural grounds is denied.

The related contention that Plaintiff was obliged to supply the statutory maintenance calculation is likewise without merit. The statute directs the court to perform the calculation, and the parties' arithmetic, however useful, is not a condition precedent to relief. Finally, the citation in the Order to Show Cause to Domestic Relations Law § 237 [c] rather than § 237 [a] is a scrivener's error of no consequence. Defendant's counsel correctly identified it as such and responded to the application on its merits, and the Court may disregard a mistake that prejudices no substantial right (CPLR 2001; Kallo v Kane St. Synagogue, 241 AD3d 522, 523 [2d Dept 2025]). The application is treated as one brought under Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a].

B. The Objection to Plaintiff's Reply Submission

Defendant anticipates that Plaintiff will attempt to cure defects on reply and invokes the settled principle that a movant may not meet a burden by submitting evidence for the first time in reply (Accardo v Metro-North R.R., 103 AD3d 589 [1st Dept 2013]; Safir v Safir, 237 AD3d 868, 869 [2d Dept 2025]; Rengifo v City of New York, 7 AD3d 773 [2d Dept 2004]).

That principle is not implicated here. Plaintiff's prima facie showing did not depend upon the updated statement; it rested upon the statement filed in April 2025, the retainer agreements, the invoices, and the documentary proof of Defendant's finances. The updated statement supplements rather than supplies. Of greater significance, Defendant himself elected to file an Updated Statement of Net Worth with his opposition, disclosing for the first time a 2025 gross income of $800,665 where his original instrument had reported $374,981 for 2024. Plaintiff was entitled to address that disclosure, and the reply does so. A litigant who introduces materially new financial disclosure in opposition cannot be heard to complain that his adversary answered it.

Plaintiff has stated that she would not oppose a sur-reply confined to comment upon her updated statement. Defendant, however, never sought leave to serve one, electing instead to press for outright rejection of the motion, and no prior order of this Court authorized any further submission. A party's willingness to receive a responsive paper does not itself confer leave to file one, and the Court will not grant, on its own initiative, relief that the party who would benefit from it has never requested. The motion is accordingly decided upon the record as submitted. The Court has reviewed the updated statement and finds that it reports, in substance, what Plaintiff's moving papers described: reduced expenses, increased indebtedness, and modest part-time earnings. Nothing herein impairs Defendant's right to seek modification of the interim relief granted upon a material change of circumstances occurring after the determination of this application, including a material change in his salary continuation, employment, income, or other financial resources.

C. Temporary Maintenance

Temporary maintenance is governed by Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5-a]. The statute prescribes a guideline calculation applied to the payor's income up to a statutory cap, which was $228,000 when this application was filed and is now $241,000, and the formula itself was revised effective March 1, 2026. Where the payor's income exceeds the cap, the court may award additional maintenance upon consideration of the enumerated factors (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5-a] [h] [1]; § 236 [B] [5-a] [h] [2]). Where the guideline amount would be unjust or inappropriate, the court may deviate from it (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5-a] [h] [1]; Dewald v Dewald, 234 AD3d 520 [1st Dept 2025]).

Because this application was made in January 2026, before the March 1, 2026 adjustment of the statutory income cap, the Court applies the $228,000 cap then in effect. Defendant's counsel has performed a calculation, expressly styled hypothetical, employing the $460,000 five-year average income Plaintiff ascribed to Defendant and a $70,807 five-year average for Plaintiff. Employing those same figures, the first computation yields thirty percent of $228,000, or $68,400, less twenty percent of $70,807, or $14,161.40, for a result of $54,238.60. The second computation yields forty percent of the combined income of $298,807, or $119,522.80, less Plaintiff's income of $70,807, for a result of $48,715.80. The statute directs that the lower of the two computations governs.

The presumptive award upon income up to the applicable statutory cap is therefore $48,715.80 per year, or $4,059.65 per month. To the extent Defendant's counsel arrived at $54,989 per year, or $4,582 per month, the Court respectfully differs.

Because Defendant's income substantially exceeds the cap, the Court proceeds to the analytically distinct question whether an additional award upon income above the cap is warranted (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5-a] [h] [2]). Upon consideration of the factors enumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5-a] [h] [1], the Court concludes that such an award is warranted, for the reasons that follow.

First, the presumptive figure of $4,059.65 per month does not approach the carrying charges of the former marital residence alone, which the parties variously fix at $6,423 to $6,526 per month. The monthly cost of the marital residence is itself an indicium of the standard of living established during the marriage, a factor the statute directs the Court to weigh (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5-a] [h] [1] [k]). An award that leaves the payee unable to remain in the home the parties owned throughout the marriage cannot be squared with that standard.

Second, the $460,000 average upon which the calculation rests understates Defendant's actual income. Defendant's own Updated Statement of Net Worth admits gross 2025 income of $800,665, and $824,165.26 with the 401(k) deferral restored, an admission upon which this Court is entitled to rely (Lackwood v Lackwood, 245 AD3d 598 [1st Dept 2026]). That figure is more than double what Defendant disclosed as his 2024 income scarcely nine months earlier, and more than three times the statutory cap.

Third, a court is not obliged to accept a party's own account of his finances (Weitzner v Weitzner, 120 AD3d 1406, 1407 [2d Dept 2014]). Where a party's account is not believable, the court may impute a true or potential income higher than that alleged (Wesche v Wesche, 77 AD3d 921, 923 [2d Dept 2010]). Several features of this record compel that course. Defendant asserts a net monthly income of approximately $15,491, which annualizes to $185,892, yet deposits into a single one of his accounts totaled $652,796.54 over twelve months, and exceeded $565,000 even after excluding the $85,000 drawn from marital funds. Defendant claims monthly expenses of $32,787 on his own updated instrument, an increase of $4,523 per month over the figure sworn to nine months earlier, at the very moment he professes an inability to pay support. That disparity supports the conclusion that Defendant has access to financial resources not reflected in his asserted monthly net income.

Fourth, the claimed loans are not documented. The Court need not determine conclusively at this interim stage whether the transfers from the former colleague constitute taxable income or bona fide borrowing; that question awaits a fuller record. What is presently before the Court is that no promissory note, loan agreement, repayment term, maturity date, interest obligation, or evidence of any repayment has been produced, and that no date is supplied for the larger of the two claimed obligations. A bare assertion of a loan has been rejected where unsupported by such indicia (Y.L. v L.L., 68 Misc 3d 1209[A] [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2020]). The bank records disclose a pattern of eight irregular wire transfers over eight months, in varying amounts, from a brokerage account belonging to an officer of Defendant's former employer, aggregating $123,362 rather than the round $125,000 recited on the Statement of Net Worth. Their recurring character, the absence of any instrument of indebtedness, and their availability to fund Defendant's expenditures support treating those funds as a financial resource available to him, and support an imputation of income for purposes of this pendente lite determination.

Fifth, a court may in its discretion impute income based upon fringe benefits and perquisites provided as compensation for employment (Ahrens v Ahrens, 159 AD3d 1377, 1378 [4th Dept 2018]; Matter of Geller v Geller, 133 AD3d 599, 600 [2d Dept 2015]). The legitimate reimbursement of documented business expenditures is not income, and the Court does not treat it as such. Reimbursement payments may nevertheless be considered where they represent employment-related perquisites, where they defray personal living expenses, or where they cannot be traced to corresponding business expenditures. Defendant has documented two deposits as expense reimbursements and asks the Court to treat an unquantified balance the same way. His statement that the California travel was undertaken with the cost reimbursed to him is an acknowledgment of reimbursements he has not quantified, and the untraced balance is properly weighed among his available resources.

The Court has weighed the countervailing considerations pressed by Defendant, and they are not insubstantial. He has established that his employment terminated effective March 11, 2026, that he will receive one year of base salary continuation without commissions, and that a non-compete provision constrains his re-employment through approximately March 2027. He has continued to pay the mortgage and cooperative maintenance, and the record contains statements corroborating those payments. He is servicing two joint tax obligations arising from 2015, one of which is garnished from his wages, and an educational loan for the parties' son. The First Department has cautioned that a payee is not entitled to significantly more maintenance simply on the strength of the payor's income (Lorne v Lorne, 217 AD3d 412, 415 [1st Dept 2023]; see also Cohen v Cohen, 120 AD3d 1060 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 909 [2014]; Gass v Gass, 137 AD3d 423 [1st Dept 2016]).

The Court has also satisfied itself that Defendant possesses the present ability to meet the obligations imposed. He will receive one year of base salary continuation at a gross rate of $350,000, yielding the net monthly sum of approximately $15,491 he himself asserts. Deposits into a single one of his accounts totaled $652,796.54 over the twelve months ending February 18, 2026, and exceeded $565,000 exclusive of the marital funds transferred in March 2025. The transfers from the former colleague continued as recently as January 28, 2026. He holds approximately $46,000 in combined checking and savings accounts and a retirement account with a balance of approximately $160,000. He reports current monthly expenditures of $32,787 upon his own updated instrument and serviced a single credit card account at a rate of $87,450.86 over seven months. From these sources, and from the moderation of discretionary spending that his changed circumstances reasonably require, Defendant is able to satisfy the award directed herein together with the obligations he continues to carry.

Balancing the marital standard of living, the disparity in the parties' present and prospective earnings, Plaintiff's demonstrated inability to meet her expenses upon part-time earnings of approximately $600 biweekly, the twenty-eight year duration of the marriage, Defendant's admitted income, imputed income, financial resources, and demonstrated access to funds, and the reduction in his prospective earnings, the Court concludes that an above-cap award is warranted in addition to the presumptive amount, though in a sum below that which Plaintiff seeks. The total temporary maintenance obligation is fixed at $12,000 per month. Consistent with the approach sustained in Khazaneh v Khazaneh (217 AD3d 629 [1st Dept 2023]), where an award of $17,000 per month was upheld against a presumptive award of $5,075 and the payee was required to bear the carrying costs of the marital residence from the maintenance received, Plaintiff shall pay the mortgage and cooperative maintenance for the former marital residence from the sums awarded. Defendant shall remain responsible for the two joint tax obligations and the educational loan he has been servicing.

This arrangement resolves the dispute over the timeliness of the carrying charge payments without the Court resolving credibility upon a paper record, places responsibility for the residence in the hands of the party who occupies it, and accords with Defendant's own stated willingness to remit the funds to Plaintiff upon her undertaking to pay the building. Plaintiff is directed to furnish proof of those payments, and any failure to apply the funds as directed may be raised by prompt application.

The Court is mindful that speedy trial is the appropriate remedy for any perceived inequity in a pendente lite award, and nothing herein constrains the Court at trial in fixing final maintenance or in allocating the parties' respective claims for credits.

D. Imputation of Income to Plaintiff

Defendant asks the Court to ascribe an earning capacity to Plaintiff based upon her demonstrated six-figure earnings, and suggests that an income of at least $30,000 per year must be imputed (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5-a] [h] [1] [b]; Wen Wen Sun v Ti Zhou, 243 AD3d 735 [2d Dept 2025]; Remsen v Remsen, 198 AD3d 658, 660 [2d Dept 2021]; Moffre v Moffre, 29 AD3d 1149, 1151 [3d Dept 2006]; Bukovinsky v Bukovinsky, 299 AD2d 786 [3d Dept 2002]). Plaintiff's counsel represents that in correspondence Defendant's counsel proposed imputing $80,000.

The Court declines to impute income at this interim stage. Plaintiff's actual earnings are before the Court and have been considered, and she has expressly acknowledged that those earnings will defray a portion of her expenses. She has not worked full time in many years, and the competing accounts of why she withdrew from the workforce, whether by voluntary election as Defendant maintains or by the demands of caregiving as Plaintiff maintains, present precisely the sort of credibility question that a pendente lite application on papers cannot resolve. The question of Plaintiff's earning capacity is expressly reserved to the Court at trial, which will have the benefit of testimony, cross-examination, and completed disclosure.

E. The Retroactive Date of the Award

Plaintiff seeks retroactivity to the date of commencement. Defendant contends that the 2015 amendments to the maintenance statute deleted the language formerly contained in Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a] making an award effective as of the date of the application, and that no statutory basis for retroactivity survives; alternatively, he argues that any award can reach back no further than January 2026, when this application was filed, relying upon Caviolo v Caviolo (155 AD2d 410 [2d Dept 1989]).

There is force in Defendant's observation. The retroactivity language formerly appearing in Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a] was not carried forward into the temporary maintenance provisions enacted in 2015, and the parties have identified no controlling post-amendment First Department authority approving an award of temporary maintenance retroactive to the date of commencement. The authorities Plaintiff marshals for that proposition are trial-level determinations (T.H. v I.H., 82 Misc 3d 1235[A] [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2024]; LS v GS, 80 Misc 3d 1237[A] [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2023]; R.J.D. v T.M.D., 54 Misc 3d 1224[A] [Sup Ct, Warren County 2017]), and the Second Department authority upon which she relies noted an award retroactive to the date of the pleading requesting maintenance without passing upon the question (Kaprov v Stalinsky, 145 AD3d 869, 873 [2d Dept 2016]).

While Plaintiff's Summons with Notice, filed February 14, 2025, did contain a request for spousal maintenance, the Court declines to rest a substantial arrears obligation upon an unsettled question of statutory construction. The Court exercises its discretion to fix the retroactive date as of February 11, 2026 (Caviolo v Caviolo, 155 AD2d 410 [2d Dept 1989]). A motion on notice is made when the notice of motion or the order to show cause is served (CPLR 2211). Plaintiff's papers were filed on January 5, 2026, but the Order to Show Cause was not signed until February 11, 2026, and was served that day (NYSCEF Doc. No. 55). February 11, 2026 is therefore the date upon which this application was made. That date accords as well with Plaintiff's own explanation that she deliberately deferred this application until she had received and reviewed Defendant's document production. Nothing herein limits any claim Plaintiff may advance at trial concerning support for the earlier period, and sums paid on account of the temporary award remain creditable against the ultimate obligation.

Defendant shall receive credit against the retroactive award for all payments of the marital residence mortgage and cooperative maintenance actually made by him on and after February 11, 2026, upon proof of payment. The Court does not fix the arrears figure in the first instance, because the amount of the credits depends upon documentary proof that is not fully before it, and the parties are far better positioned to perform that arithmetic than is the Court.

F. Disclosure

The branch of the motion seeking to compel a formal response and further production is granted. CPLR 3122 [a] [1] requires a party served with a notice under CPLR 3120 to serve a response within the prescribed period and, where objection is taken, to state with reasonable particularity the reasons for each objection. Rule 130-1.1-a of the Rules of the Chief Administrator provides that every pleading, written motion, and other paper served on another party or filed or submitted to the court shall be signed by an attorney (22 NYCRR 130-1.1-a).

Defendant argues that no statute compels an affirmative representation that responsive documents do not exist, and that CPLR 3122 [c] requires only that documents be produced as kept in the ordinary course of business or labeled to correspond to the categories of the request. He observes, correctly, that the sole authority Plaintiff previously invoked, Celebrity Farms, LLC v Family Cas. Ins. Co. (2018 NY Slip Op 33877), involved a written response that had been directed by the court in that case.

The argument misapprehends what is at issue. Defendant did not simply produce documents as kept in the ordinary course and stand silent. He interposed objections, asserting that certain demands were unduly burdensome, and he affirmatively represented that no documents responsive to twenty-two enumerated demands existed within his possession, custody, or control. Having elected to object and to make representations, Defendant was obliged to do so in a paper served by counsel of record and subscribed by counsel of record. An unsigned electronic mail message transmitted by a paralegal satisfies neither CPLR 3122 [a] [1] nor 22 NYCRR 130-1.1-a. The subscription of counsel is not an empty formality. It is the certification that attends every paper served in a New York action, and it is the mechanism by which the profession answers for the accuracy of what it serves.

The content of that response independently warrants relief. Request No. 11 sought documents Defendant had himself furnished to Plaintiff on or about January 10, 2025. A representation that such documents are not within his possession, custody, or control is difficult to accept without explanation. The same is true of the disclaimer as to personal financial statements and as to documents concerning title to the parties' apartment. Whatever the ultimate explanation, Plaintiff is entitled to receive it in a form for which counsel has taken responsibility.

A word is required as to the form of the relief. CPLR 3122 [a] [1] obliges counsel to serve and subscribe the response and to state the grounds of objection with reasonable particularity. It does not oblige counsel personally to certify historical facts concerning the client's records. Where documents called for by a demand are said not to exist, the appropriate course is an affidavit from a person with knowledge describing where responsive documents were likely maintained, the efforts made to locate them, and the results of that search (Jackson v City of New York, 185 AD2d 768, 770 [1st Dept 1992]). The Court directs both, allocating each obligation to the person properly charged with it.

The record further establishes concrete gaps in production. An out-of-state checking account and an out-of-state savings account, opened April 22, 2025, appear nowhere in the September 4, 2025 inventory, notwithstanding demands squarely calling for all checking account statements and all savings account statements. No promissory note or loan agreement has been produced for either claimed loan. Documentation of the claimed employer reimbursements is limited to two deposits. Defendant's explanation, that he was working a full-time job while Plaintiff was not, is not a cognizable excuse for non-compliance with a court order and with duly served demands, and in any event Defendant advises that he is no longer employed as of March 11, 2026.

The Court adds a word regarding scheduling. The Preliminary Conference Order fixed August 21, 2025 as the date for exchange. Plaintiff complied. Defendant produced on September 4, 2025, and served nothing resembling a response to the Notice for Discovery and Inspection until November, more than a month after an extension to which Plaintiff's counsel had courteously consented. No further extension was sought from Plaintiff or from the Court. Deadlines fixed by court order are not aspirational.

G. Counsel Fees

Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a] authorizes the Court to direct one spouse to pay counsel fees to enable the other to carry on or defend the action as, in the Court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties, and creates a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. An award of interim counsel fees is designed to redress the economic disparity between the monied and the non-monied spouse and to ensure that the matrimonial scales of justice are not unbalanced by the weight of the wealthier litigant's wallet (Hutchinson v Hutchinson, 219 AD3d 1320, 1322 [2d Dept 2023], quoting Prichep v Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 65 [2d Dept 2008]).

Plaintiff is unmistakably the less monied spouse. She earned $6,991.16 in 2025 and works part time at $22 per hour. Defendant's admitted 2025 gross income was $800,665. An award of interim fees will permit her to continue the litigation (Wolinsky v Berkowitz, 227 AD3d 433, 434 [1st Dept 2024]). Defendant has not rebutted the presumption.

In fixing an award the Court considers the financial circumstances of the parties together with all the other circumstances of the case, including the relative merits of the parties' positions (DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879, 881 [1987]), and whether either party has engaged in conduct or taken positions resulting in delay of the proceedings or unnecessary litigation (Prichep, 52 AD3d at 64). That factor weighs heavily here. A substantial portion of the fees Plaintiff has incurred is traceable to Defendant's late production, to the absence of any response subscribed by counsel, to a production that omitted bank accounts squarely within the demands while including more than one hundred fifty photographic and videographic files having nothing to do with Plaintiff, and to the consequent necessity of serving subpoenas. Fees may also be awarded for time incurred in connection with the fee application itself, lest the purpose of the statute be frustrated by protracted proceedings upon the application (O'Shea v O'Shea, 93 NY2d 187 [1999]; Wyser-Pratte v Wyser-Pratte, 160 AD2d 290, 291 [1st Dept 1990]).

Certain considerations temper the award. Plaintiff has retained three successive firms, and although her counsel represents that prior counsel prepared only the pleadings and the Statement of Net Worth, some measure of duplication is inherent in successive representation. The invoices before the Court run through November 2025, and no invoice has yet been rendered for the work performed since counsel joined her present firm. Defendant's employment terminated on March 11, 2026, and his prospective earnings are constrained by a non-compete provision. The sum sought also contemplates forensic work and neutral appointments that have not been authorized and may never be required.

Weighing these matters, an award of $60,000 is appropriate, without prejudice to an application for additional fees upon a proper showing and subject in all respects to reallocation by the Court at trial upon the final resolution of the economic issues. Because of the change in Defendant's employment circumstances, the award shall be payable in installments.

The award requires allocation. The record establishes that Plaintiff personally paid retainers totaling at least $36,500, consisting of $6,500 to her first firm, $10,000 to her second firm, $15,000 to her third firm, and $5,000 to her present firm, and that she incurred fees of approximately $71,000 through November 2025. Her retainer agreement with her present firm required a further payment of $5,000 within thirty days, but the present record does not establish whether that payment was made. Neither does the record establish what portion of the fees incurred remains outstanding, to which firm it is owed, or whether her present firm assumed any receivable of her former firm. Accordingly, $20,000 of the award is directed to Plaintiff as reimbursement of fees she has personally paid, a sum amply supported by the retainers documented in the record, and $40,000 is directed to her present firm on account of outstanding and prospective fees. Plaintiff's counsel shall file an accounting of the amounts presently outstanding to each firm, and the Court reserves the authority to reallocate the award upon its receipt.

H. Matters Reserved

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's transfer of approximately $96,000 two days after service, and his August 2025 withdrawal of $31,250 from his 401(k), contravened the Automatic Orders served with the Summons with Notice (NYSCEF Doc. No. 3). Defendant acknowledges the transfer and offers an explanation. Plaintiff for her part transferred $79,095 from the same joint accounts on the same day. No enforcement relief was requested in the Order to Show Cause, no contempt application is before the Court, and the Court makes no determination upon these allegations. All claims of the parties for credits, charges, or other relief arising from the post-commencement movement of marital funds are reserved to the Court at trial in connection with equitable distribution.

Plaintiff also observes that Defendant's counsel did not furnish the certification concerning the use of generative artificial intelligence called for by the rules of the Part. No relief is sought upon that ground and none is granted. The Court notes only that counsel are expected to comply with all applicable Part rules going forward.

No sanctions have been sought by either party, and none are imposed.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Plaintiff has established her entitlement to temporary maintenance in an amount exceeding the presumptive calculation, to an order compelling a properly subscribed discovery response and further production, and to an award of interim counsel fees, though in amounts less than those sought. Defendant's threshold procedural objections are rejected. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the branch of Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, Motion Sequence No. 001, seeking an award of pendente lite maintenance is GRANTED to the extent set forth herein, and Defendant shall pay to Plaintiff temporary maintenance in the sum of $12,000 per month, commencing on October 1, 2026 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter until further order of this Court or the entry of a judgment of divorce, and the balance of that branch of the application, seeking maintenance in a greater amount, is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that from the sums so awarded Plaintiff shall pay the mortgage and the cooperative maintenance charges for the former marital residence in a timely manner each month, and shall furnish proof of such payment to Defendant's counsel within ten days of each payment; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant shall continue to pay, directly and in a timely manner, the monthly installments due upon the parties' 2015 joint federal tax obligation, the parties' 2015 joint Connecticut tax obligation, and the educational loan for the parties' son, and shall not reduce, defer, or discontinue any of those payments without leave of this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that the award of temporary maintenance is retroactive to February 11, 2026, the date upon which Plaintiff served the signed Order to Show Cause constituting this application and upon which the application was made within the meaning of CPLR 2211, and that Defendant shall receive credit against the retroactive award for all payments of the marital residence mortgage and cooperative maintenance actually made by him on and after that date, upon proof of payment; and it is further

ORDERED that on or before October 8, 2026 Defendant shall serve upon Plaintiff's counsel documentary proof of all payments for which credit is claimed, and that on or before October 23, 2026 the parties shall file a stipulation computing the net retroactive arrears, and that in the absence of such a stipulation either party may restore the limited question of the computation of arrears by letter application to this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that the net retroactive arrears so computed shall be paid by Defendant in twelve equal consecutive monthly installments, in addition to the current monthly obligation, commencing on January 1, 2027; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause seeking to compel Defendant to respond to Plaintiff's First Notice of Discovery and Inspection is GRANTED, and on or before October 8, 2026 Defendant shall serve upon Plaintiff a written response to Plaintiff's First Notice of Discovery and Inspection (NYSCEF Doc. No. 23), subscribed by counsel of record in compliance with CPLR 3122 [a] [1] and 22 NYCRR 130-1.1-a, stating with reasonable particularity the basis for each objection interposed; and it is further

ORDERED that on or before October 8, 2026 Defendant shall serve upon Plaintiff an affidavit of a person with knowledge, which may be Defendant himself, describing, as to each demand for which no document is produced, where responsive documents were likely maintained, the efforts made to locate them, the results of that search, and, to the extent known, the disposition of any responsive documents no longer within Defendant's possession, custody, or control; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause seeking to compel the production of outstanding documents is GRANTED, and on or before October 8, 2026 Defendant shall produce all documents responsive to Plaintiff's First Notice of Discovery and Inspection not heretofore produced, including without limitation all statements for an out-of-state checking account and an out-of-state savings account; all statements for any account maintained by Defendant in the State of North Carolina or elsewhere and not previously disclosed; all promissory notes, loan agreements, and other writings evidencing the claimed loans from a former colleague and from a second individual, together with all records of the transfers comprising them; and all documentation of the expense reimbursements Defendant claims to have received from his employer; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause seeking an award of interim counsel fees is GRANTED to the extent that Defendant shall pay the total sum of $60,000, allocated as follows: the sum of $20,000 to Plaintiff, as reimbursement of counsel fees she has personally paid, on or before November 9, 2026; and the sum of $40,000 to Plaintiff's present firm, of which $15,000 shall be paid on or before October 8, 2026 and the balance of $25,000 shall be paid in five equal consecutive monthly installments of $5,000 each, commencing November 1, 2026; and the balance of that branch of the application, seeking counsel fees in a greater amount, is DENIED without prejudice to a further application upon a proper showing; and it is further

ORDERED that on or before September 22, 2026 Plaintiff's counsel shall file an affirmation setting forth the counsel fees presently outstanding to each firm that has represented Plaintiff in this action, and whether her present firm has assumed any receivable of her former firm, and the Court reserves the authority to reallocate the award of interim counsel fees upon receipt of that accounting; and it is further

ORDERED that the award of interim counsel fees is made without prejudice to reallocation by the Court at trial upon the final determination of the economic issues in this action; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's request that the Court impute income to Plaintiff for purposes of this application is DENIED, without prejudice to the litigation of Plaintiff's earning capacity at trial; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's application to deny Plaintiff's motion in its entirety upon the ground that the moving papers failed to comply with 22 NYCRR 202.16 [k] [2] is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that all claims of either party for credits, charges, or other relief arising from the post-commencement movement of marital funds, including the transfers effected on March 14, 2025 and the withdrawal from Defendant's 401(k) account in August 2025, are reserved to the Court at trial in connection with equitable distribution; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause, Motion Sequence No. 001, is in all other respects DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that any relief requested and not expressly granted herein is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that counsel shall appear for a compliance conference on a date to be fixed by the Court, at which the status of Defendant's production and the outstanding subpoena responses shall be addressed; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry upon Defendant within ten days of the date hereof.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: September 8, 2026

New York, New York

E N T E R :

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR., J.S.C.

Ronald Castorina Jr., J.