ROJAS v. RIVERHEAD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT RSW LLC (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant third-party plaintiff and the defendant Stalco Construction, Inc., separately appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Kathy G. Bergmann, J.), dated March 26, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from by the defendant third-party plaintiff, granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against it and denied that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment on the third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification.  The order, insofar as appealed from by the defendant Stalco Construction, Inc., granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

In August 2013, the plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries when he fell from a ladder while performing roofing work at a building owned by the defendant Riverhead Central School District (hereinafter RCSD).  At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was employed by Dynasty RSW, LLC (hereinafter Dynasty), and the defendant Stalco Construction, Inc. (hereinafter Stalco), was the general contractor on the project.  The plaintiff alleged that as he descended the unsecured ladder, the ladder shifted, causing him to fall.

The plaintiff commenced this personal injury action against RCSD and Stalco, alleging, inter alia, a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).  RCSD commenced a third-party action against Dynasty, seeking, among other things, contractual indemnification.  The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).  RCSD moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification.  In an order dated March 26, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted the plaintiff's motion and denied that branch of RCSD's motion which was for summary judgment on the third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification.  RCSD and Stalco separately appeal.

A fall from a ladder, by itself, is not sufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 240(1) (see Villalta v Tonka Realty On 5th, LLC, 237 AD3d 1001, 1002;  Melchor v Singh, 90 AD3d 866, 868).  Liability will be imposed when the evidence shows that the “ladder was defective or inadequately secured and that the defect, or the failure to secure the ladder, was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injuries” (Rosario v Horizon Networks, Inc., 240 AD3d 537, 539 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Acatila v Really Neat Realty, Inc., 239 AD3d 926, 927).  Thus, “where a ladder slides, shifts, tips over, or otherwise collapses for no apparent reason, the plaintiff has established a violation” (Cioffi v Target Corp., 188 AD3d 788, 791;  see Rosario v Horizon Networks, Inc., 240 AD3d at 539).

Here, the plaintiff demonstrated his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) by submitting evidence, including a transcript of his deposition testimony and a transcript of his testimony at a General Municipal Law § 50–h hearing, that established that the unsecured ladder shifted, causing him to fall (see Bista v State, 248 AD3d 727;  Aguilar v 58 Gerry St, LLC, 244 AD3d 799, 801).  In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action.

The Supreme Court properly denied that branch of RCSD's motion which was for summary judgment on the third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification against Dynasty.  Since RCSD was not a party to the agreement between Stalco and Dynasty or named as an indemnitee therein, RCSD is not entitled to contractual indemnification under that agreement (see Nicholson v Sabey Data Ctr. Props., LLC, 160 AD3d 587, 587;  Nazario v 222 Broadway, LLC, 135 AD3d 506, 510, mod on other grounds 28 NY3d 1054;  Baillargeon v Kings County Waterproofing Corp., 91 AD3d 686, 688).  Additionally, contrary to RCSD's contention, Dynasty would not be bound by an indemnification clause contained in the agreement between RCSD and Stalco, even if the agreement between Stalco and Dynasty incorporated the terms and conditions of the agreement between RCSD and Stalco (see Callan v RCB3 Nominee, LLC, 245 AD3d 503, 504;  Higgins v TST 375 Hudson, L.L.C., 179 AD3d 508, 511;  Naupari v Murray, 163 AD3d 401, 402).

GENOVESI, J.P., DOWLING, TAYLOR and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.