C.K., Plaintiff, v. T.K., as Co-Executor of the Estate of I.K., Deceased, substituted for , Defendant I.K., Defendant. (2026)

[This decision has been redacted for publication. The names of the parties and of counsel, the index number, docket citations, street addresses, and account identifiers have been omitted or replaced with initials.]

This post-judgment enforcement and contempt application comes before the undersigned, who was recently assigned to the Civil Term of the Supreme Court, New York County, by Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts. The Court has reviewed the entire record, including the papers enumerated below, and decides the motion and the cross motion as follows.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR 2219[a]

Upon the Order to Show Cause of Defendant, the Estate of I.K., dated March 12, 2026, signed by the Honorable Jeffrey H. Pearlman, J.S.C., and filed March 13, 2026, together with the Warning and Notice endorsed thereon; the Affidavit in Support of T.K., as Co-Executor, sworn to February 11, 2026, with the exhibits annexed thereto; and the Affirmation in Support of counsel for Defendant, dated March 6, 2026, with the exhibits annexed thereto; and upon proof of service by electronic mail and by overnight delivery; and

Upon the Notice of Cross Motion of Plaintiff, C.K., dated June 8, 2026; the Affirmation of C.K. in Support of the Cross Motion and in Opposition to the Order to Show Cause, dated June 8, 2026, with the exhibits annexed thereto; and the Attorney Affirmation of counsel for Plaintiff, in Support of the Cross Motion and in Opposition to the Order to Show Cause, dated June 8, 2026; and

Upon the Affirmation of T.K. in Opposition to the Cross Motion and in Further Support of the Order to Show Cause, affirmed July 9, 2026, with the exhibits annexed thereto; and the Affirmation of counsel for Defendant, in Further Support and in Opposition to the Cross Motion, affirmed July 13, 2026, with the exhibits annexed thereto; and

Upon the Attorney Affirmation of counsel for Plaintiff, in Further Support of the Cross Motion, dated August 7, 2026, with the exhibit annexed thereto; and the Affirmation of C.K. in Further Support of the Cross Motion, dated August 7, 2026, with the exhibits annexed thereto; and

Upon the parties' Stipulation of Settlement dated August 29, 2024, the Judgment of Divorce signed May 6, 2025 and entered May 13, 2025, the Letters Testamentary issued August 5, 2025, and the Notice of Default dated October 28, 2025; and upon all prior pleadings and proceedings had herein, the Court decides as follows.

II. Findings of Fact

A. The Marriage, the Action, and the Stipulation of Settlement

I.K. and C.K. were married on August 1, 1990. Plaintiff commenced this action for divorce on July 16, 2018. The litigation that followed consumed more than six years and involved extensive discovery, valuation proceedings, motion practice, and repeated court appearances.

On August 29, 2024, the date upon which trial was scheduled to commence, the parties executed a comprehensive Stipulation of Settlement resolving all issues of equitable distribution and the winding up of their financial affairs. Both parties were represented by experienced matrimonial counsel. Because I.K. was by then gravely ill and unable to attend, the parties' son, T.K., executed the Stipulation on his father's behalf pursuant to a Durable Power of Attorney dated January 9, 2023. I.K. thereafter signed the Stipulation personally.

The procedural course by which the divorce was granted bears setting out. By Referral Order of the Honorable Douglas E. Hoffman, J.S.C., dated December 12, 2023, all financial issues were referred to the Special Referee Part, and the matter was assigned to Special Referee Diego M. Santiago on April 16, 2024, the date upon which the Referral Order was filed. Trial was first scheduled for August 29, 2024. On August 22, 2024 counsel advised the Special Referee that a global settlement had been reached and asked that the matter be disposed of by inquest upon the grounds. On August 29, 2024 the Stipulation was executed, counsel consented upon the record to convert the reference to hear and determine pursuant to CPLR 4317[a], and the Special Referee conducted an inquest at which Plaintiff testified. The Stipulation was so-ordered by the Honorable Jeffrey H. Pearlman, J.S.C. on September 12, 2024. By Decision and Order dated November 13, 2024, the Special Referee determined that Plaintiff had sustained her burden under Domestic Relations Law § 170[7] and dissolved the marriage, directing counsel to submit a stipulated judgment for review.

The Judgment of Divorce was signed on May 6, 2025 by the Honorable Jeffrey H. Pearlman, J.S.C., nunc pro tunc to August 29, 2024, and was entered in the New York County Clerk's Office on May 13, 2025. The Stipulation was incorporated into, but not merged with, the Judgment of Divorce.

The marital estate included two apartments in New York County held in the parties' joint names: a cooperative apartment in upper Manhattan, which the parties refer to as the Uptown Residence and which is unencumbered, and a residential unit in lower Manhattan, which the parties refer to as the Downtown Residence and which is subject to a mortgage held by an institutional lender in the parties' joint names. The marital estate further included membership and partnership interests in approximately nineteen or twenty closely held restaurant entities, titled exclusively in the name of I.K. and referred to by the parties as the Restaurant Memberships; jointly titled bank and brokerage accounts; and two accounts maintained in Israel at one Israeli financial institution, with an approximate balance of $165,000, and at a second Israeli financial institution, with a last estimated approximate balance of $244,000, both titled solely in Plaintiff's name and referred to by the parties as the Israeli Accounts.

Under the Stipulation, Plaintiff was to receive, among other things, a fifty percent interest in each residence, both of which were to be listed for sale on or about April 15, 2025; a fifty percent interest in each of the Restaurant Memberships; a credit of $635,000 representing one half of the value of a residence at a residence in Queens County, payable from the net proceeds of whichever residence sold first; an award of $300,000 on account of expert, legal, and discovery costs, payable from the net proceeds of the second residence to sell; retention of her own retirement assets; fifty percent of the cash and securities held in jointly titled accounts, estimated at approximately $570,000, of which $50,000 was set aside in a separate account to maintain both apartments pending their sale; and the funds held in the Israeli Accounts, approximately $410,000.

The provisions of the Stipulation placed in issue on these applications are paragraph 6, governing the marketing and sale of the Downtown Residence; paragraph 8, requiring Plaintiff to vacate the Uptown Residence within sixty days of execution; paragraph 10, requiring that the Uptown Residence be listed for sale no later than April 15, 2025 subject to the procedures set out in paragraph 6; paragraph 20, governing the repatriation of the Israeli Accounts; paragraph 26, requiring that the parties' joint accounts be closed and their contents divided equally; paragraphs 27 and 28, governing the Restaurant Memberships, the distributions attributable to them, and the exchange of financial information pending completion of the assignments; paragraphs 5 and 9, governing replenishment of the account through which the carrying costs of both apartments are paid; and a provision appearing at page 4 of the Stipulation under which the parties agreed to share the cost of agreed upon mold remediation, if necessary.

B. The Death of the Defendant and the Appointment of Co-Executors

Prior to his death, and acting under the Power of Attorney, T.K. undertook to fund the I.K. Declaration of Trust dated January 9, 2023, so that his father's assets would pass outside of probate. The decedent's fifty percent interest in the unencumbered Uptown Residence was transferred to that trust. The decedent's fifty percent interest in the Downtown Residence was not transferred, because that property was encumbered by a mortgage titled in both parties' names and the lender's consent, and Plaintiff's signature, could not be obtained.

I.K. died on April 30, 2025. His Power of Attorney terminated by operation of law upon his death. Letters Testamentary were issued to T.K. and R.K., as Co-Executors, on August 5, 2025. T.K. has appeared and litigated these applications in that representative capacity. R.K. has not appeared. The record submitted upon these applications does not contain an order of substitution, a matter addressed in Point III[A] below. Neither the I.K. Declaration of Trust nor its trustees in their trustee capacities is a party to this action, and neither T.K. nor R.K. is a party in an individual capacity.

C. The Downtown Residence

Paragraph 6 of the Stipulation required that the Downtown Residence be listed for sale on or about April 15, 2025; that the parties mutually agree upon a broker on or before March 1, 2025 or, failing agreement, either select co-brokers or jointly select a neutral third broker; that each party execute a brokerage agreement within ten days of its presentation; and that the initial asking price be mutually agreed upon based upon the broker's recommendation or, failing agreement, set by the broker.

The Estate furnished Plaintiff with a Broker's Opinion of Value prepared by a real estate brokerage firm together with a proposed listing agreement. Plaintiff did not confirm her agreement to the broker and did not return an executed listing agreement. The property was not listed. It remains occupied by tenants at a monthly rent of $15,500.

Plaintiff asserts, and Defendant does not deny, that on September 24, 2024 T.K. agreed to a one year extension of the existing tenancy, and that by electronic mail dated February 28, 2025, one day before the ninety day notice to the tenants would have had to issue, he communicated that he would prefer not to begin selling at that time and wished to grant the tenants a further year long lease. Defendant responds that the discussed extension was temporary, that Plaintiff permitted the tenancy to continue after the agreed period expired, and that she did so without the Estate's consent.

Plaintiff further asserts that after the decedent's death no listing or sale could lawfully proceed until Letters Testamentary issued, and that despite repeated written requests, including a letter sent by registered mail on November 10, 2025 in response to the Notice of Default, she was never furnished with the Letters Testamentary or with documentation of T.K.'s authority under the trust, and first saw the Letters when they were annexed to the moving papers. Defendant responds that Letters Testamentary issued on August 5, 2025, that Plaintiff continued to refuse to proceed thereafter, and that an August 2025 communication upon which Plaintiff relies concerned distributions from the Restaurant Memberships rather than the Downtown Residence.

Plaintiff contends that the proposed a real estate brokerage firm listing agreement incorrectly identified the trust as the owner of the property and that no broker inspected the premises. Defendant responds that the Broker's Opinion of Value, not the listing agreement, was addressed to the trust, that the listing agreement was addressed to the decedent with signature spaces for Plaintiff, R.K., and T.K., and that any error could readily have been corrected had Plaintiff identified it. Defendant further states that the proposed listing agent was recommended by a real estate professional and is not known personally to either Co-Executor.

The property was appraised in or about December 2023 at a fair market value of $3,000,000, and a more recent broker's opinion places its value at approximately $3,500,000.

D. The Uptown Residence

Paragraph 8 of the Stipulation required Plaintiff to vacate the Uptown Residence within sixty days of execution, that is, on or before October 28, 2024. Paragraph 10 required that the property be listed for sale no later than April 15, 2025, subject to the same broker selection, execution, and pricing procedures set forth in paragraph 6.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff failed to vacate and remains in possession, that she declined to participate in broker selection, and that she refused to execute a a real estate brokerage firm listing agreement presented to her together with a Broker's Opinion of Value. Plaintiff asserts that she resided at the Uptown Residence until December 2024, when she relocated full time to another state.

Plaintiff further asserts that the Uptown Residence has for approximately fifteen years suffered recurring water intrusion originating in an exterior wall and the building's balconies; that the resulting damage includes extensive toxic mold, deterioration of the wooden flooring, and mold affecting the radiators used for heating and cooling; and that by the time the Stipulation was executed the apartment was effectively uninhabitable. She states that she lacked authority to compel the cooperative board to repair the building's common elements, that she repeatedly pressed the board and managing agent to act, that she retained and personally paid for an environmental evaluation in 2019, and that the exterior remediation was not completed until March 2026. She states that full professional mold remediation, including removal and reconstruction of flooring and remediation of the heating and cooling units, remains to be performed and may require six months or more. She annexes the opinion of a real estate broker to the effect that few purchasers would accept that risk and that the apartment could presently be sold only at a distressed price, and she estimates net proceeds of approximately $1,600,000 after remediation as against well under $1,000,000 in its present condition.

Plaintiff also asserts that a day before the Stipulation was signed, and again thereafter, she and T.K. expressly discussed and agreed that the apartment was not market ready, and that the parties agreed to defer any listing until the building completed the exterior repairs and the apartment could be remediated. She points as well to the provision at page 4 of the Stipulation allocating the cost of agreed upon mold remediation between the parties.

Defendant responds that the apartment was appraised in December 2018 and again in December 2023 for equitable distribution purposes and that neither appraisal identified mold, structural defect, or any condition affecting marketability; that Plaintiff had exclusive possession of the premises and responsibility for its maintenance throughout the relevant period; that the Estate had no access to the apartment; and that if the property's condition had materially changed after execution of the Stipulation, Plaintiff's remedy was to seek Defendant's written consent or judicial relief rather than to permit the deadlines to pass.

E. The Israeli Accounts

Paragraph 20 of the Stipulation required the parties, and T.K. as Co-Executor, to take all steps necessary to repatriate the Israeli Accounts as soon as possible and to engage an agreed upon attorney to attempt to repatriate the funds remotely, with costs to be shared equally.

The Israeli Accounts are titled solely in Plaintiff's name. At least one account was originally held jointly by Plaintiff and the decedent's mother; upon the latter's death her name was removed, leaving Plaintiff as sole titleholder. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff effected that removal. Plaintiff denies having done so and states that she lacks the language ability to have accomplished it. Both parties agree that the Estate cannot direct the Israeli financial institutions to transfer, close, or repatriate the accounts without Plaintiff's participation.

The parties agree that J.K., Esq., a Hebrew speaking attorney experienced in these matters, was engaged during the decedent's lifetime in an effort to address the accounts, and that the process was not completed before his death. On or about September 30, 2024, a conference call took place among Plaintiff, Mr. K., and T.K., during which Mr. K. proposed a particular method of repatriation. T.K. raised concerns regarding the legality, ethics, and potential tax exposure of that proposal, and sought clarification and assurances in light of his fiduciary obligations. Between October and November 2024 he sent multiple follow up communications. On or about December 4, 2024, Mr. K. declined to engage further, including on a paid consultation basis, unless formally retained.

T.K. thereafter consulted an international tax and compliance firm, which raised concerns regarding the proposed approach and recommended a standard, lawful repatriation process including streamlined compliance with the Internal Revenue Service in light of prior reporting issues affecting the accounts. He communicated that advice to Plaintiff and proposed that the parties jointly consult alternative counsel. Plaintiff rejected the alternatives and insisted that Mr. K. alone be retained, stating that she trusted him, believed his approach would minimize loss, and was concerned about the cost and structure of other firms. In or about February 2025 the Co-Executors agreed to proceed with Mr. K. provided that the approach be lawful, that no fictitious or improper transactions be used, and that the Estate be included as a client. No retention followed.

It is undisputed that no mutually agreed upon attorney has been retained, that the Israeli Accounts remain unrepatriated, and that neither party may accomplish repatriation acting alone. Plaintiff states that she remains willing to retain Mr. K. jointly with the Estate and to share his fees and costs equally, and asks that she not be required to travel to Israel.

F. The Joint Brokerage Account

Paragraph 26 of the Stipulation requires that the parties' joint accounts be closed and their contents divided equally. A joint brokerage account has not been closed or divided. Defendant states that he first learned of the account after his father's death while marshalling Estate assets, that he promptly advised counsel, and that the Estate stands ready to complete the transfer. Plaintiff states that upon receipt of the Estate's account information she is prepared to transfer approximately $1,436.15, representing one half of the balance, and characterizes the matter as minor and readily resolvable. There is accordingly no dispute that this obligation remains unperformed, nor any dispute that it is capable of immediate performance.

G. The Restaurant Memberships and the Related Financial Records

Paragraph 27 of the Stipulation awarded Plaintiff a fifty percent interest in the Restaurant Memberships, provided that she would receive distributions accordingly and bear responsibility for capital calls from the date of the agreement, and provided that she would receive the tips credits attributable to her interests for 2024. Paragraph 28 provides, in relevant part, that upon the effective date, and irrespective of the completion of any assignments or paperwork transferring fifty percent of the decedent's ownership interests, Plaintiff shall immediately have such rights and obligations as if the assignments were completed, and that until the assignments are completed the decedent or T.K., as power of attorney, shall provide all financial information to Plaintiff and shall be responsible for paying her one half share of any distributions received.

Plaintiff asserts that T.K. transferred one hundred percent of the Restaurant Memberships into the trust, including her fifty percent share; that joinder agreements admitting the trust to the various operating agreements were obtained in October 2024 while no corresponding joinders were obtained for her; that the Membership Transfer Agreements were furnished only in early May 2025, after the decedent's death, bearing an execution date of April 14, 2025; that during the intervening period distributions were paid to the decedent and thereafter to the trust rather than to her; and that although she has received some distributions and some check images, she has never received the 2024 and 2025 Schedules K-1 issued to the decedent and the trust, a statement of distributions, or documentation permitting her to verify that she has received her full share. She raises specific questions concerning entities identified as three of the restaurant entities.

Defendant responds that the Restaurant Memberships comprise numerous separate limited liability companies and partnership interests governed by operating agreements involving third party partners and, in one instance, liquor licensing approval, and that the transfers could not be accomplished by unilateral action; that every step was taken upon the advice of counsel and in consultation with the accountants and attorneys for the restaurant entities; that the transfers have been completed and Plaintiff is now recognized as the owner of the interests allocated to her; that she received Schedules K-1 through 2023 and, as a partner, now receives them directly from the restaurants' accountants; that she has received fifty percent of all distributions made to the decedent, totaling in excess of $400,000; and that she identifies no specific interest that remains untransferred and no specific distribution that was withheld.

H. The Account Maintained for the Carrying Costs of the Apartments

Paragraphs 5 and 9 of the Stipulation provide that in the event the balance of the account through which all income and expenses relating to both apartments are paid falls below $10,000, each party shall replenish the account by contributing $5,000. Plaintiff asserts that a building assessment of $3,423.67 came due, that the projected carrying costs for both apartments exceed the $15,500 in monthly rental income, that she furnished T.K. with an accounting of those expenses in March 2025 and again in April 2026, that she requested a contribution of $25,000 representing the Estate's share for five months, and that she has funded one hundred percent of the costs of both properties in excess of the rental income. Defendant does not deny the existence of the obligation. He responds that the Estate should no longer be required to pay these expenses and, on May 1, 2026, declined to consent to a further six month extension of the Downtown Residence tenancy.

I. The Notice of Default and the Present Applications

By correspondence dated October 28, 2025, Defendant's counsel served a Notice of Default enumerating the claimed defaults and identifying the steps required to cure them without judicial intervention. Plaintiff responded by registered mail on November 10, 2025. Defendant characterizes that response as a lengthy communication that failed to address the enumerated defaults and instead sought to shift blame to the Estate. Plaintiff characterizes it as an identification of the outstanding issues coupled with a renewed request for proof of T.K.'s authority, and asserts that she received no substantive reply. The parties agree that there was prior motion practice in this matter, including an Order to Show Cause filed October 25, 2024 seeking to enforce the Stipulation, a cross motion filed November 4, 2024, both returnable November 18, 2024 before Justice Pearlman, and orders thereafter.

The Order to Show Cause was signed on March 12, 2026 and served upon Plaintiff by electronic mail on May 1, 2026 and by overnight delivery received May 4, 2026. Defendant seeks an adjudication of civil and criminal contempt, fines and imprisonment, a warrant for Plaintiff's immediate arrest, enforcement of the Stipulation and Judgment, authority to effectuate their terms, and counsel fees of $15,000 with leave to enter a money judgment for any unpaid portion. Plaintiff cross moves to deny the application in its entirety and for an accounting, document production, injunctive relief, a right of first refusal, monthly funding of the operating account, an order compelling joint retention of Mr. K., production of the trust instrument, sanctions, and counsel fees of $50,000.

In support of the fee application, counsel for Defendant, a partner at Defendant's firm admitted in 2003 with more than twenty-three years of experience concentrated in matrimonial matters, states that his hourly rate in this matter is $610, that approximately fifteen hours had been devoted to the application as of its filing, and that billing records for July 2025 through January 2026 and for February through May 2026 are annexed. In support of her fee application, counsel for Plaintiff, a principal at Plaintiff's firm with thirty years of practice devoted exclusively to family law, states that Plaintiff retained the firm on March 13, 2026 and paid an initial retainer of $20,000, that her hourly rate is $825, and that the rates of the associated attorneys are $545, $440, and $425 respectively. Plaintiff states that she has incurred approximately $50,000 in fees through June 5, 2026 and annexes redacted invoices.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Substitution of the Deceased Defendant, Amendment of the Caption, and Related Threshold Matters

I.K. died on April 30, 2025, while the obligations created by the Stipulation of Settlement remained to be performed. Where the claim survives, the Court shall order substitution of the proper parties (see CPLR 1015[a]), and CPLR 1021 prescribes the procedure by which substitution is accomplished. Until substitution is effected the action is generally stayed, and a determination rendered in the interim is a nullity (see Stancu v Cheon Hyang Oh, 74 AD3d 1322 [2d Dept 2010]). The Court therefore addresses the constitution of the action before reaching the merits.

The caption employed by the parties designates the Defendant as I.K., deceased, by his Estate. That designation is legally insufficient. An estate is not a legal entity, and an action for or against an estate must be maintained by or against its executor or administrator in a representative capacity (see Grosso v Estate of Gershenson, 33 AD3d 587, 587 [2d Dept 2006]). Letters Testamentary issued to T.K. and R.K. on August 5, 2025. No order of substitution has heretofore been entered in this action.

T.K. has appeared. He retained counsel, submitted sworn statements as Co-Executor, brought the Order to Show Cause in that capacity, and has litigated these applications throughout. Substitution as to him is therefore granted upon his voluntary appearance, pursuant to CPLR 1015 and 1021, and the caption is amended as set forth above. R.K. stands differently. The docket contains no notice of appearance on her behalf, and the only indication of her participation is her brother's sworn statement that she joins in the application. A representation by one fiduciary that another joins does not establish that the second authorized counsel to appear for her or that she has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. Substitution as to R.K. is accordingly not granted upon a voluntary appearance. CPLR 1021 provides for substitution upon motion, and upon notice to the persons interested, and the Court directs below that she be served with a copy of this Decision and Order and afforded an opportunity to appear, upon which substitution as to her may be completed.

The absence of her appearance does not impede the determinations made today. The Estate is before the Court, defended by a duly qualified Co-Executor who holds Letters Testamentary, who is represented by counsel, and who is the movant upon the application being decided. The directions that follow run against the Estate and bind T.K. as its Co-Executor. Should R.K. appear, she will be heard upon any matter reserved for the hearing or for the conference directed below, and nothing herein prejudices any application she may be advised to make.

A second threshold matter concerns the Judgment of Divorce. It was signed on May 6, 2025 and entered on May 13, 2025, six days and thirteen days respectively after the Defendant's death, nunc pro tunc to August 29, 2024. A judgment of divorce may be entered nunc pro tunc following the death of a party only where the substantive rights of the parties were finally adjudicated during the lifetime of both, and nothing remained but the ministerial act of entering judgment upon that adjudication (see Cornell v Cornell, 7 NY2d 164, 169-170 [1959]). The execution of a stipulation of settlement, and even the so-ordering of such a stipulation, does not itself constitute the judicial determination that Cornell requires. Absent that determination the matrimonial action abates upon the death of a party, and while the settlement may survive as an independently enforceable contract, it does not follow that it may be enforced by motion in an action that has abated rather than by a plenary action upon the contract.

The record supplies that predicate. By Referral Order dated December 12, 2023 and filed April 16, 2024, the Honorable Douglas E. Hoffman, J.S.C., referred this matter to the Office of the Special Referee to hear and report upon all of the financial issues in this matrimonial action, including maintenance, equitable distribution, and counsel fees, except that, in the event of and upon the filing of a stipulation of the parties as permitted by CPLR 4317, the Special Referee was to determine those issues. That Referral Order supplied the judicial approval and designation that CPLR 4317[a] requires before a reference to determine may be had in a matrimonial action, although by its terms the determination it authorized extended to the financial issues rather than to the grounds. The matter was assigned to Special Referee Diego M. Santiago on April 16, 2024, the date upon which the Referral Order was filed. On August 29, 2024, Plaintiff appeared in person and the Defendant appeared by his son T.K. under the Power of Attorney, both parties appearing by counsel. On that date the parties executed the Stipulation of Settlement, counsel consented upon the record, after discussion with their respective clients, to convert the reference from hear and report to hear and determine pursuant to CPLR 4317[a], and the Special Referee proceeded to an inquest upon the grounds at which Plaintiff testified and at which the pleadings were conformed to the proof. The transcript of that proceeding was filed on October 8, 2024. The Stipulation was thereafter so-ordered by the Honorable Jeffrey H. Pearlman, J.S.C. on September 12, 2024.

By Decision and Order dated November 13, 2024, the Special Referee found upon the credible and uncontroverted testimony of Plaintiff that she had met her burden of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence under Domestic Relations Law § 170[7], and determined that the marriage was thereby dissolved, the ancillary issues having been resolved by the Stipulation, which was to survive and not merge with the Judgment of Divorce except as incorporated by reference. Counsel was directed to submit a stipulated judgment and the supporting papers for review. That Decision and Order recites that the matter was disposed of pursuant to the executed Stipulation, the written stipulations and allocutions, and the inquest placed upon the record on August 29, 2024, and it states that it constitutes the decision and order of the court. The determination was accordingly made upon the consent of the parties, pursuant to a reference authorized by the Court, by a Special Referee empowered to hear and determine, and while both parties were living. I.K. did not die until April 30, 2025, more than five months later.

The determination of the grounds requires separate attention, because the Referral Order did not in terms reach them. The authority for that determination rests not upon the Referral Order but upon the stipulation the parties made in open court, which the Special Referee recites in his Decision and Order dated November 13, 2024 and which is reflected in the transcript of the proceedings of August 29, 2024. A week before the scheduled trial date counsel advised the Special Referee that a global settlement had been reached and asked that the action be disposed of by an inquest upon the grounds on August 29, 2024. On that date, after discussion with their respective clients, both parties stipulated upon the record to convert the reference to one to hear and determine pursuant to CPLR 4317[a], and they did so for the announced purpose of disposing of the action, which necessarily embraced the grounds. The Special Referee then took the inquest, granted a motion to conform the pleadings to the proof, and made the determination described above. CPLR 4317[a] permits the parties to stipulate that any issue be determined by a referee, and the Court, having already approved a reference to determine in this action, finds the stipulation the parties made before the Special Referee to whom the action stood referred sufficient to confer that authority as to the grounds (see Matter of Baines v Shapiro, 299 AD2d 193 [1st Dept 2002] [the parties' knowing consent expanded the Special Referee's authority to hear and determine the entire matter]). The matrimonial action safeguard of CPLR 4317[a] is satisfied because the Referral Order supplied judicial leave for a reference to determine and designated the Special Referee mechanism, while the parties' subsequent open court stipulation supplied the requisite consent and knowingly expanded the issues to encompass the grounds (see Auriemmo v Auriemmo, 87 AD3d 1090, 1091 [2d Dept 2011]; Allison v Allison, 28 AD3d 406, 406-407 [2d Dept 2006], cert denied 549 US 1307 [2007]; Matter of Baines v Shapiro, 299 AD2d 193 [1st Dept 2002]).

To the extent the determination of the grounds exceeded the literal terms of the Referral Order, the objection was one the parties were free to waive and did waive. Both were represented by experienced counsel. Both stipulated to the procedure. Neither objected at the inquest, upon receipt of the Decision and Order, or at any time in the nearly twenty-two months since. Both thereafter approved the resulting Judgment of Divorce as to form and content with notice of settlement waived. The Court further observes that Justice Pearlman so-ordered the Stipulation on September 12, 2024 and entertained motion practice concerning its enforcement in November 2024, and that no party has ever suggested, in those applications or in these, that the marriage was not dissolved on November 13, 2024. Nothing in the record indicates that any party was prejudiced by the procedure adopted.

The substantive rights of the parties were therefore finally adjudicated during the lifetime of both, and nothing remained but the ministerial execution and entry of a judgment conforming to that determination. The docket confirms as much. On October 8, 2024, some seven months before the Defendant died, counsel filed the complete uncontested judgment package: an Affirmation of Regularity, a Certificate of Dissolution, a Sworn Statement of Removal of Barriers to Remarriage, a Domestic Relations Law § 255 Addendum, the inquest transcript, proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and the proposed Judgment of Divorce. That proposed Judgment was approved as to form and content by counsel for both parties with notice of settlement waived, and it bore a typewritten date of October 2024, which was struck and replaced by hand with the date of signature. The Judgment of Divorce signed on May 6, 2025 and entered on May 13, 2025 was accordingly entered nunc pro tunc to August 29, 2024 in conformity with Cornell v Cornell, 7 NY2d 164, 169-170 [1959]. The action did not abate upon the Defendant's death, and the parties' obligations under the Stipulation of Settlement, which was incorporated but not merged into that Judgment, are enforceable by motion in this action.

A third threshold matter concerns service. The Order to Show Cause as signed directed service pursuant to CPLR 308[1] on or before March 19, 2026. The proofs of service filed establish that Plaintiff was served on May 1, 2026 by electronic mail at the address she uses in this litigation, and by overnight delivery to her out-of-state residence, which was received on May 4, 2026. Although service was not effected by the method or within the period prescribed in the Order to Show Cause, Plaintiff, through counsel, fully opposed the application upon the merits and cross-moved for affirmative relief without objecting to the manner or timing of service. Any objection based upon that procedural irregularity was therefore waived, and no substantial right of Plaintiff was prejudiced. The Court accordingly proceeds to the merits. The Court further notes that the Order to Show Cause bears upon its face the warning and the notice that the accused may be punished by fine, imprisonment, or both, as Judiciary Law § 756 requires. Because certain contempt branches are referred to a hearing, notice of that hearing shall be served in strict compliance with the requirements the Court fixes at the conference directed below.

A fourth threshold matter concerns the I.K. Declaration of Trust, which holds the decedent's fifty percent interest in the Uptown Residence. Neither the trust nor its trustees in their trustee capacities is a party to this action. Complete relief concerning the conveyance of that interest may not be obtainable in their absence (see CPLR 1001[a]). The relief granted below is therefore limited to what lies within the possession, custody, or control of the Estate and of T.K. as Co-Executor, and nothing herein adjudicates the rights or the obligations of the trust or of its trustees in their trustee capacities. Should the participation of the trustees prove necessary to list, contract for, or convey the trust's interest in the Uptown Residence, application should be made to join them, and the Court will entertain such an application at or before the conference directed below.

B. The Stipulation of Settlement Is a Binding Contract Enforceable According to Its Terms

Stipulations of settlement are favored by the courts and are not lightly set aside, a principle of particular force in matrimonial actions, where negotiated agreements supply the finality and certainty that protracted litigation cannot (see Hallock v State of New York, 64 NY2d 224, 230 [1984]; Popovic v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 180 AD2d 493 [1st Dept 1992]). An open court stipulation in a matrimonial action is governed by CPLR 2104 and will be enforced (see Rubenfeld v Rubenfeld, 279 AD2d 153, 158 [1st Dept 2001]). A stipulation of settlement incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce is a contract subject to the ordinary principles of contract construction and interpretation (see McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295 [2002]; Rainbow v Swisher, 72 NY2d 106, 109-110 [1988]).

It follows that the Court may neither rewrite the parties' bargain under the guise of interpretation nor relieve a party of an obligation merely because performance has proved inconvenient, costly, or more complicated than anticipated (see Greenfield v Philles Records, Inc., 98 NY2d 562 [2002]; Reiss v Financial Performance Corp., 97 NY2d 195 [2001]; Riverside S. Planning Corp. v CRP/Extell Riverside, L.P., 60 AD3d 61 [1st Dept 2008]). A party asserting that performance has become impossible bears the burden of establishing objective impossibility rather than mere difficulty or expense (see Kel Kim Corp. v Central Mkts., Inc., 70 NY2d 900 [1987]). These principles bind both sides of this dispute with equal force, and the Court applies them accordingly.

C. The Governing Standards for Civil and Criminal Contempt

To sustain a finding of civil contempt, the movant must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a lawful order of the court clearly expressing an unequivocal mandate was in effect, that the order was disobeyed, that the party charged had knowledge of the order, and that the rights of a party to the litigation were prejudiced by the offending conduct (see El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d 19, 29 [2015]; McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216, 226 [1994]; Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574 [1983]). A showing of willfulness is not an element of civil contempt (see Judiciary Law § 753[A]; El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d at 34), and the act of disobedience, whatever its motive, will suffice where it defeats, impairs, impedes, or prejudices the rights of a party (see Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574 [1983]). The failure to establish any one element compels denial of the application.

Criminal contempt under Judiciary Law § 750[A][3] and [4] reaches willful disobedience of a lawful mandate and resistance willfully offered to a lawful mandate. It does not require a showing that the movant's rights were prejudiced, but it does require willfulness, and it requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the contemnor willfully failed to obey an order of the court (see Rush v Save My Home Corp., 145 AD3d 930, 931 [2d Dept 2016], quoting Matter of Rubackin v Rubackin, 62 AD3d 11, 15 [2d Dept 2009]; see also Sheridan v Kennedy, 12 AD2d 332 [1st Dept 1961]). The same act may in a proper case be punishable as both a civil and a criminal contempt (see Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574 [1983]).

The first element deserves emphasis. The mandate said to have been violated must be clear and unequivocal, and its absence is fatal to a contempt claim (see Hicks v Russi, 254 AD2d 801 [4th Dept 1998]). Contempt is properly sustained where the directive is specific and the violation unmistakable, as in the case of a failure to pay a sum certain or the direct breach of a prohibition (see Town of Copake v 13 Lackawanna Props., LLC, 73 AD3d 1308 [3d Dept 2010]; Garry v Garry, 121 Misc 2d 81 [Sup Ct 1983]). Where, by contrast, a direction concerning the sale of a marital residence does not place responsibility for accomplishing the sale solely upon the party charged, and the record shows that neither party made reasonable efforts to perform, contempt has been held unwarranted (see Cover v Cover, 173 AD3d 970 [2d Dept 2019]).

D. The Application for an Adjudication of Criminal Contempt Is Denied

Measured against the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the branch of the Order to Show Cause seeking an adjudication of criminal contempt cannot succeed on this record. Willfulness is the essence of the charge (see Rush v Save My Home Corp., 145 AD3d at 931), and the papers before the Court do not permit a finding of willfulness to that exacting degree.

Two features of the record are decisive. First, the Estate's own representative communicated in writing on February 28, 2025, some six weeks before the April 15, 2025 listing dates, that he preferred not to begin selling and wished to grant the Downtown tenants a further year long lease, and that it did not make sense to rush the Uptown Residence if it was not in good condition. Whatever the ultimate legal significance of that communication, a party cannot be convicted of criminal contempt beyond a reasonable doubt for declining to perform on a date that the movant's own agent had proposed to defer. Second, the decedent died on April 30, 2025, two weeks after the listing dates, and Letters Testamentary did not issue until August 5, 2025. Plaintiff's stated insistence upon proof of fiduciary authority before executing listing documents affecting an estate asset is not, on this record, so plainly unreasonable as to establish criminal intent to the requisite degree.

Criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of willful disobedience. The conflicting evidence concerning consent to delay, fiduciary authority, and the parties' respective cooperation precludes that finding. Accordingly, the branch of the application seeking an adjudication of criminal contempt is denied, as is the related request that a warrant for Plaintiff's immediate arrest issue forthwith pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 245 and Judiciary Law §§ 753, 756, 773, and 774.

E. The Application for an Adjudication of Civil Contempt as to the Israeli Accounts Is Denied

Paragraph 20 of the Stipulation obligates the parties to take all steps necessary to repatriate the Israeli Accounts as soon as possible and to engage an agreed upon attorney, with costs shared equally. By its terms that undertaking is bilateral and its central mechanism, the identity of the attorney, was left to the parties' mutual agreement. It is undisputed that no such agreement was ever reached: Plaintiff insisted upon Mr. K., and the Co-Executors, invoking fiduciary concerns and the advice of an international tax and compliance professional, sought either alternative counsel or assurances regarding the proposed method.

Defendant has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the failure to repatriate constitutes disobedience attributable to Plaintiff. Paragraph 20 does not place responsibility for accomplishing the repatriation solely upon her. It obligates both parties, and the Co-Executors expressly, to take the necessary steps and to engage counsel upon whom they agree. The record shows that each side declined the other's proposal: Plaintiff would accept no professional other than Mr. K., and the Estate would not proceed with him absent assurances it never obtained. Where a direction of this character does not place the burden of performance solely upon the party charged, and the record reflects that neither party accomplished what the direction required, contempt is not warranted (see Cover v Cover, 173 AD3d 970 [2d Dept 2019]). That the impasse has persisted for nearly two years is regrettable and is chargeable to both sides. It is remediable by enforcement rather than by punishment.

F. The Application for an Adjudication of Civil Contempt as to the the brokerage Account Is Denied

Paragraph 26 imposes a mutual obligation to close and divide the parties' joint accounts. The joint brokerage account has not been closed, and Plaintiff's share of the balance is approximately $1,436.15. Defendant concedes that he learned of the account only after his father's death, that he did not raise it during the implementation process, and that the Estate stands ready to complete the transfer. Plaintiff concedes the obligation and offers immediate performance upon receipt of the Estate's account information.

Although the delayed division of the account could impair a contractual right, Defendant has not established by clear and convincing evidence that the delay resulted from disobedience attributable to Plaintiff. The Estate acknowledges that it discovered the account only after I.K.'s death, that the subject was never raised during the implementation process, and that it had not furnished the account information necessary to complete the transfer. Plaintiff has offered immediate performance upon receipt of that information. Paragraph 26 imposes the obligation upon both parties, and on this record the element of disobedience attributable to Plaintiff has not been established (see El-Dehdan v El-Dehdan, 26 NY3d at 29). This branch of the application is denied, and the obligation will instead be enforced by direction.

G. A Hearing Is Required on the Civil Contempt Branches Concerning the Two Residences

Different considerations govern the two residences. Paragraphs 6, 8, and 10 of the Stipulation are specific. They fix a date by which Plaintiff was to vacate the Uptown Residence, dates by which a broker was to be selected and both properties listed, and a period of ten days within which a brokerage agreement presented to a party was to be executed. Plaintiff does not contend that these provisions are ambiguous, that she was unaware of them, or that she performed them. She contends instead that her nonperformance was excused. The Court is satisfied, and finds, that the first and third elements of civil contempt are established: the Judgment contains facially clear and unequivocal directives, and Plaintiff, who negotiated and executed the Stipulation while represented by experienced counsel, had knowledge of them.

The remaining elements are another matter. Plaintiff asserts that the Estate, through the very representative who now seeks her incarceration, agreed before the deadlines expired to defer the listing of both properties, and she points to a text message of August 28, 2024 and to the electronic mail of February 28, 2025. Defendant does not deny that a lease extension was discussed and that the February 2025 communication was sent; he characterizes the arrangement as temporary and limited. The Judgment contains facially clear directives and deadlines, and the disputed communications do not alter the text of that mandate. They bear instead upon whether Plaintiff's nonperformance constituted disobedience attributable to her, whether Defendant consented to defer performance, whether an inability to comply or an equitable defense has been established, and whether Defendant's rights were prejudiced. Those questions cannot be resolved upon conflicting affidavits.

The condition of the Uptown Residence presents the same difficulty. That evidence goes to Plaintiff's ability to comply and, potentially, to the scope of the remediation the Stipulation required before a listing could sensibly occur. It does not bear upon the clarity of the direction itself. Defendant relies upon two appraisals that identified no such condition; Plaintiff relies upon board and management correspondence, an environmental evaluation she commissioned in 2019, photographs of the damage, a broker's opinion that the apartment could presently be sold only at a distressed price, and the fact that the building's exterior remediation was not completed until March 2026. Whether the property was capable of being listed in April 2025, whether Plaintiff vacated in December 2024 as she asserts or remains in possession as Defendant asserts, and whether any deterioration arose or worsened during her exclusive occupancy, are questions of fact that the Court cannot responsibly resolve on paper.

A third question is the effect of the decedent's death and the interval before Letters Testamentary issued. Plaintiff asserts that she requested proof of fiduciary authority repeatedly and received none until the moving papers were served. Defendant asserts that Letters issued on August 5, 2025 and that Plaintiff continued to refuse to proceed thereafter. Even if the delay between April 30, 2025 and August 5, 2025 is attributable to neither party, the period from August 2025 forward requires a factual determination as to what was requested, what was furnished, and what remained genuinely impossible.

Civil contempt must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Where, as here, the affidavits are in sharp and material conflict upon facts bearing on disobedience, consent, inability to comply, and prejudice, the application may be resolved only after a hearing. The Court accordingly refers to a hearing the branches of the Order to Show Cause seeking an adjudication of civil contempt with respect to the Downtown Residence and the Uptown Residence. The Court uses the language of consent and deferral rather than of waiver or modification advisedly, since an agreement modifying a matrimonial stipulation may implicate the form requirements imposed by statute, an issue neither party has briefed and which is reserved. Nothing in this determination should be read as a finding that Plaintiff has or has not complied with the Stipulation. It is a determination that the question cannot be answered on these papers.

H. Enforcement of the Stipulation and Judgment Is Warranted

The denial of contempt as to certain branches, and the referral of others to a hearing, leaves untouched the Court's authority and obligation to enforce its own Judgment. The parties bargained for the orderly liquidation and division of a substantial marital estate. More than two years after the Stipulation was executed, neither apartment has been listed, the Israeli Accounts remain in Israel, a joint brokerage account remains open, and the Estate cannot be closed. Both parties ask the Court to compel performance. Both are entitled to it.

The Court therefore directs performance of the outstanding obligations upon a fixed schedule, as set forth in the decretal paragraphs below. The directions that follow enforce the Stipulation as the parties wrote it. They add nothing to it. Should either party fail to comply, the aggrieved party may seek relief upon the record then existing, and such noncompliance may be considered at the hearing directed herein.

I. The Cross Motion Is Properly Before the Court, but Only as Against the Estate

Defendant contends that the cross motion improperly exceeds the scope of the enforcement application. That objection is overruled in part. Relief sought by cross motion need not be responsive to the relief sought in the original motion (see CPLR 2215[b]; Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v Monte Carlo, LLC, 227 AD3d 632 [1st Dept 2024]; Fried v Jacob Holding, Inc., 110 AD3d 56 [2d Dept 2013]). The relief Plaintiff seeks arises from the same Stipulation, the same Judgment, and the same post-judgment course of conduct that gave rise to the Order to Show Cause. Requiring her to commence a separate proceeding would multiply cost and delay to no purpose.

A cross motion, however, is a motion made by one party against a party who has moved against it. Substantial portions of the relief Plaintiff seeks are directed not at the Estate but at T.K. and R.K. individually and in their capacities as trustees of the I.K. Declaration of Trust, at R.K. in her capacity as Co-Executor, in which capacity she has not appeared, at their attorneys, agents, servants, and employees, and at the trust itself. In none of those capacities are they parties to this matrimonial action, and none has been brought before the Court by process. To the extent the cross motion seeks relief against them in those capacities, it is denied for that reason alone, and the relief that is granted is correspondingly confined to what lies within the possession, custody, or control of the Estate and of T.K. as Co-Executor.

J. The Application for a Compulsory Accounting Is Denied, and Enforcement of Paragraph 28 Is Granted in Part

Plaintiff seeks an accounting pursuant to CPLR 7701, invoking CPLR 7703 and the standing provisions of the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act, and relying upon the principle that a creditor need not prove her claim in order to obtain an accounting and may petition notwithstanding that the claim is disputed (see SCPA 2205[a]; Matter of Schwartz, 26 Misc 2d 1088, 1088 [Sur Ct, Kings County 1960]). She supports the application with authorities addressing the fiduciary obligations of an attorney in fact, who must act with undivided loyalty and in accordance with the highest principles of fidelity and fair dealing, must keep the principal's property separate from his own, and who may be held liable where he cannot account for the disposition of the principal's assets (see Matter of Metz, 238 AD3d 1477, 1477-1478 [4th Dept 2025]; Matter of Ferrara, 7 NY3d 244, 254 [2006]; Matter of Garson, 2 Misc 3d 847 [Sup Ct 2003], affd 17 AD3d 243 [1st Dept 2005]; General Obligations Law § 5-1505[2][a][1]; Matter of Audrey H., 65 AD3d 1008, 1009 [2d Dept 2009]).

Those authorities may well have force in a proceeding properly framed. This is not that proceeding. A compulsory accounting under Article 77 runs against a trustee, and the trustees of the I.K. Declaration of Trust are not parties here. The relief is sought by cross motion in a matrimonial action against persons who have never been served with process in it, and it would require the Court to adjudicate claims of self-dealing and breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the administration of a trust and an estate. Post-judgment enforcement of a judgment of divorce is not a vehicle for the adjudication of those claims. This branch of the cross motion is denied without prejudice to a proceeding properly commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction.

A narrower and quite different question is presented by paragraph 28 of the Stipulation, which the Estate is bound to honor. That provision obligates the decedent, and T.K. acting for him, to provide all financial information to Plaintiff and to pay her one half share of any distributions received until the assignments of the Restaurant Membership interests were complete. That is a negotiated contractual entitlement, and enforcing it neither expands the Stipulation nor imposes an obligation the parties did not accept. Defendant's position that Plaintiff has already received everything to which she is entitled, and Plaintiff's position that she cannot confirm as much, are readily reconciled by production of the documents themselves.

This branch of the cross motion is therefore granted to the limited extent of directing T.K., as Co-Executor of the Estate, to furnish Plaintiff, to the extent the material is within the possession, custody, or control of the Estate or of T.K. as Co-Executor, with the Schedules K-1 issued for the 2024 and 2025 tax years to I.K., to his estate, and to the trust for each restaurant entity in which an interest was held; images of the distribution checks issued on account of those interests from August 29, 2024 forward; and a schedule identifying, for each entity, the distributions received and the amounts remitted to Plaintiff. To the extent any such material is held only by the trustees in their trustee capacities, T.K. shall so state in a sworn writing identifying the custodian, and nothing herein adjudicates the obligations of the trustees as such. The balance of the demand, which would reach every monthly bank statement of the decedent, the trust, and the Estate from January 2024 through December 2025, together with the tax returns of the Estate and the trust and a complete inventory of trust assets, is denied. That material lies beyond the financial information pertaining to the Restaurant Memberships for which paragraph 28 provides, and Plaintiff's stated basis for it is that additional assets may exist. Speculation of that nature will not support so sweeping a demand in a post-judgment enforcement proceeding.

K. The Applications for Injunctive Relief Are Denied

Plaintiff seeks to restrain T.K., R.K., and those acting on their behalf from transferring, alienating, encumbering, hypothecating, or dissipating any asset held in the trust pending completion of an accounting, and from selling, transferring, encumbering, or dissipating either residence. The first request fails with the accounting application, for the reasons already stated and because it is directed at non-parties. The second request fails for an additional and more fundamental reason. Both parties have asked this Court to enforce a Stipulation that requires precisely what the requested injunction would forbid, namely the marketing and sale of both apartments. The Court will not enjoin the performance it is simultaneously being asked to compel. These branches of the cross motion are denied.

L. The Application for a Right of First Refusal Is Denied

Plaintiff asks that, if the properties are to be marketed, she be granted a right of first refusal permitting her to purchase the Estate's fifty percent interest in either residence by matching the listing price or the highest bona fide offer, with credit for the sums due her under the Stipulation. She advances practical arguments in support: that a right of first refusal already exists under the governing condominium documents at Downtown, that such provisions are common and do not impair marketability, that the Estate would receive the cash value of its interest without the uncertainties attending a closing, and that the arrangement would forestall further litigation.

Those arguments are not unreasonable, but they are addressed to the wrong forum. The Stipulation was the product of years of negotiation between parties represented by experienced counsel, and it contains no right of first refusal. Plaintiff could have sought such a provision before she executed it. Courts enforce agreements as they are written and do not supply terms that a party, on reflection, wishes she had obtained (see Greenfield v Philles Records, Inc., 98 NY2d 562 [2002]; Reiss v Financial Performance Corp., 97 NY2d 195 [2001]; Riverside S. Planning Corp. v CRP/Extell Riverside, L.P., 60 AD3d 61 [1st Dept 2008]). To grant this relief would be to rewrite the parties' bargain in a material respect. This branch of the cross motion is denied. Nothing herein precludes the parties from agreeing between themselves to such an arrangement, and the Court observes that a negotiated buyout may well serve both sides better than a distressed sale.

M. The Application Concerning the Operating Account Is Granted in Part

Paragraphs 5 and 9 of the Stipulation require that when the balance of the account through which the income and expenses of both apartments are paid falls below $10,000, each party shall replenish it by contributing $5,000. Defendant does not dispute the existence of this obligation. His response, that the Estate should no longer be paying these expenses, is not an answer to it. Until the apartments are sold, the Estate holds a fifty percent interest in each and bears the corresponding burden. Plaintiff has come forward with the building assessment and with expense projections indicating that carrying costs exceed the rental income, and she asserts without contradiction that she has been funding the shortfall alone.

Plaintiff's request as framed, however, seeks $5,000 per month on the first day of each month, retroactive to January 1, 2026, payable by the Estate alone. That is not the obligation the parties negotiated in two respects. The contractual trigger is the account balance rather than the calendar, and the obligation to replenish falls upon each party, not upon one of them. The Court will enforce the provision as written and will neither convert a conditional replenishment obligation into a fixed monthly payment nor relieve Plaintiff of the contribution the Stipulation requires of her.

This branch of the cross motion is accordingly granted to the extent that, upon Plaintiff furnishing a statement of the account demonstrating that the balance has fallen below $10,000, together with supporting documentation of the expenses paid, each party shall contribute $5,000 to the account, subject to any credit established by Plaintiff for documented advances previously made on account of the Estate's share. Plaintiff asserts that she has already funded the Estate's portion of these carrying costs. If that is so she is entitled to a credit, and it would be an odd result to compel her to advance a further sum before the credit is fixed and applied. The Court declines to fix a credit upon the present record, which contains expense projections and an assessment notice rather than proof of payments actually made. Plaintiff shall submit, at or before the conference directed below, an itemized statement of the advances she contends were made on account of the Estate's contractual share, with supporting documentation. The Court will then determine the amount and application of any credit, and the replenishment direction shall take effect as to Plaintiff only after that determination is made. The branch of the application seeking fixed monthly payments retroactive to January 1, 2026 is denied.

N. The Application to Compel Joint Retention of Counsel for the Israeli Accounts Is Granted in Part

Paragraph 20 requires the engagement of an agreed upon attorney with costs shared equally. Plaintiff asks the Court to compel the Estate to retain Mr. K. specifically and to share his fees. To designate counsel would substitute the Court's choice for the agreement the parties made, and the Estate's stated reservations, grounded in fiduciary duty and in the advice of an independent tax and compliance professional, are not frivolous. On the other hand, the present deadlock cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely, and the Estate has represented that it agreed in February 2025 to proceed with Mr. K. provided the approach be lawful and the Estate be included as a client.

The Court accordingly directs the parties to confer in good faith and to jointly retain a mutually agreeable attorney competent to effect the repatriation, and to share that attorney's fees and costs equally, in accordance with paragraph 20. If the parties are unable to agree within the period fixed below, each shall submit the name and qualifications of a proposed attorney, together with a short statement of position, and the Court will address the matter at the conference directed herein. The request that Plaintiff not be required to travel to Israel is premature and is denied without prejudice to renewal if and when the retained attorney advises that travel is necessary.

O. The Application for Production of the Trust Instrument Is Granted in Part

The dispute over proof of fiduciary authority has been a persistent obstacle to the sale of both properties and is capable of immediate resolution. The Letters Testamentary have now been filed, which disposes of that question as to the Estate. The Uptown Residence, however, is held in part by the trust, and Plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to execute a listing agreement or a contract of sale without confirmation that the person signing on the other side is empowered to convey. Production of the entire trust instrument is neither necessary to that purpose nor within Plaintiff's entitlement under the Stipulation. This branch of the cross motion is granted to the extent of directing T.K., as Co-Executor of the Estate, to furnish Plaintiff with a certification of trust or comparable documentation sufficient to identify the trustees and to establish their authority to list, contract for, and convey the trust's interest in the Uptown Residence, and is otherwise denied.

P. The Application for Sanctions Is Denied

Plaintiff seeks sanctions under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 and CPLR 3126 on the ground that the Order to Show Cause is frivolous, brought in bad faith, and founded upon material misstatements. The application is denied. Conduct is frivolous within the meaning of the rule when it is completely without merit in law, when it is undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the litigation or to harass or maliciously injure another, or when it asserts material factual statements that are false (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[c]). Defendant's application does not meet that description. Plaintiff herself concedes that the two apartments were not listed, that the Israeli Accounts were not repatriated, and that the joint brokerage account was not divided. An application to enforce a judgment of divorce on such a record is not frivolous merely because the movant has sought more relief than the Court is prepared to grant.

The Court does not overlook the vigor with which each side has characterized the other, nor the fact that this application seeks the incarceration of the movant's own mother. Intemperate advocacy, however, is not the same thing as sanctionable conduct. CPLR 3126 likewise provides no relief, because Plaintiff has not established a willful failure to disclose information required under article 31 of the CPLR, nor identified a disclosure order that Defendant violated. This branch of the cross motion is denied.

Q. Both Applications for Counsel Fees Are Held in Abeyance

Defendant seeks $15,000 pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 238 and Judiciary Law § 773, together with leave to enter a money judgment for any portion unpaid within fifteen days. Plaintiff seeks not less than $50,000, which she requests pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237[a]. Both applications arise in a post-judgment proceeding to enforce a judgment entered in a matrimonial action, and Domestic Relations Law § 238, entitled expenses in enforcement and modification proceedings, is the provision that governs them. It commits the award to the Court's discretion, having regard to the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties. The Court therefore considers Plaintiff's application under section 238 as well, and neither party is prejudiced by that treatment, since the discretionary standard and the showing required are materially the same. Judiciary Law § 773 authorizes a fine measured by the complainant's costs and expenses, together with $250, where actual loss or injury is not shown, but it presupposes an adjudication of contempt that has not been made.

In exercising its discretion the Court may consider the relative merit of the parties' positions (see DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 [1987]), as well as the skill, experience, and background of counsel, the nature of the services rendered, the difficulty and complexity of the issues, and the time actually devoted to the matter (see Silver v Silver, 62 AD2d 1017 [2d Dept 1978]). Fee shifting in matrimonial litigation serves to prevent the party with superior control of assets and information from exhausting the other through attrition (see Frankel v Frankel, 2 NY3d 601 [2004]; Prichep v Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 65 [2d Dept 2008]).

The relative merit of these parties' positions cannot be assessed until the contempt branches referred to a hearing are determined. Each side has prevailed in part and failed in part on the applications decided today. Both fee applications are therefore held in abeyance pending the hearing, with leave to renew upon its conclusion and upon updated billing records. Defendant's request for leave to enter a money judgment is denied as premature.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

This was, by every account in the record, a difficult marriage followed by a difficult divorce, and it has now become a difficult estate. The parties negotiated a detailed settlement that was intended to end their financial entanglement. It has not done so. The Court declines the invitation to resolve that failure by imprisoning the Plaintiff, and it declines the invitation to punish the Estate for seeking to enforce the agreement it holds. What the record requires is not punishment but performance, upon a schedule, with consequences for noncompliance. That is what the Court directs.

Accordingly, upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby

ORDERED that T.K., as Co-Executor of the Estate of I.K., deceased, is SUBSTITUTED for the deceased Defendant pursuant to CPLR 1015 and 1021 upon his voluntary appearance, and the caption of this action is amended to read as set forth above, and all papers hereafter filed shall bear the amended caption; and it is further

ORDERED that substitution as to R.K., as Co-Executor, is RESERVED, no notice of appearance having been filed on her behalf, and counsel for the Estate shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry upon R.K. personally within ten days of entry and shall file proof of such service, so that she may be afforded the notice CPLR 1021 requires; and it is further

ORDERED that if R.K. files a notice of appearance as Co-Executor within twenty days of such service, she shall thereupon stand substituted for the deceased Defendant together with T.K. and the caption shall be further amended to include her, without further order; and that if she does not so appear, either party may move for her substitution upon notice pursuant to CPLR 1021, and the question shall be addressed at the conference directed below; and it is further

ORDERED that nothing in this Decision and Order adjudicates the rights or the obligations of the I.K. Declaration of Trust dated January 9, 2023, or of its trustees in their trustee capacities, none of whom is a party to this action, and every direction herein is limited to that which lies within the possession, custody, or control of the Estate and of T.K. as Co-Executor; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Defendant's Order to Show Cause seeking an adjudication that Plaintiff, C.K., is in criminal contempt pursuant to Judiciary Law § 750, and seeking her fine and imprisonment on that ground, is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Defendant's Order to Show Cause seeking a warrant for Plaintiff's immediate arrest pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 245 and Judiciary Law §§ 753, 756, 773, and 774 is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Defendant's Order to Show Cause seeking an adjudication of civil contempt with respect to the Israeli Accounts and with respect to the joint brokerage account is DENIED, without prejudice to a renewed application in the event of noncompliance with the directions set forth below; and it is further

ORDERED that the branches of Defendant's Order to Show Cause seeking an adjudication of civil contempt with respect to the Downtown Residence and the Uptown Residence are REFERRED TO A HEARING, at which the Court shall determine whether the decedent or the Estate consented to deferred performance of the deadlines fixed by paragraphs 6, 8, and 10 of the Stipulation of Settlement; whether Plaintiff's nonperformance constituted disobedience attributable to her; whether and when Plaintiff vacated the Uptown Residence; whether Plaintiff has established an inability to comply or any other recognized defense, including as it concerns the condition of the Uptown Residence and the remediation the Stipulation contemplated; what documentation of fiduciary authority was requested and furnished and when; and whether prejudice to Defendant's rights has been proven; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Defendant's Order to Show Cause seeking enforcement of the parties' Stipulation of Settlement dated August 29, 2024 and the Judgment of Divorce entered May 13, 2025 is GRANTED, and the parties are directed to perform as set forth in the paragraphs that follow; and it is further

ORDERED that within thirty days of service of a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry, the parties shall mutually agree upon a broker for the Downtown Residence or, failing such agreement, shall proceed in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Stipulation of Settlement by selecting co-brokers or jointly selecting a neutral third broker, and shall thereafter execute a brokerage agreement within ten days of its presentation and list the property for sale; and it is further

ORDERED that within thirty days of service of a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry, the parties shall exchange written proposals concerning the remediation and listing of the Uptown Residence, including the scope, estimated cost, and estimated duration of any remediation asserted to be necessary and the allocation of that cost pursuant to the Stipulation of Settlement, and shall be prepared to address the listing of that property at the conference directed below; and it is further

ORDERED that within forty-five days of service of a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry, the parties shall confer in good faith and jointly retain a mutually agreeable attorney to effect the repatriation of the Israeli Accounts and shall share that attorney's fees and costs equally in accordance with paragraph 20 of the Stipulation of Settlement, and if no agreement is reached within that period each party shall submit to the Court the name and qualifications of a proposed attorney together with a statement of position not exceeding three pages; and it is further

ORDERED that within twenty days of service of a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry, Defendant shall furnish Plaintiff with the account information necessary to effect the transfer, and within ten days thereafter the parties shall close the joint brokerage account and divide its contents equally in accordance with paragraph 26 of the Stipulation of Settlement; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Cross Motion is GRANTED to the extent set forth in the paragraphs that follow and is otherwise DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that within forty-five days of service of a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry, T.K., as Co-Executor of the Estate, shall furnish Plaintiff, in enforcement of paragraph 28 of the Stipulation of Settlement and to the extent the material is within the possession, custody, or control of the Estate or of T.K. as Co-Executor, with the Schedules K-1 issued for the 2024 and 2025 tax years to I.K., to his estate, and to the I.K. Declaration of Trust for each restaurant entity in which an interest was held; images of the distribution checks issued on account of those interests from August 29, 2024 forward; and a schedule identifying, for each entity, the distributions received and the amounts remitted to Plaintiff, and shall state in a sworn writing, as to any such material held only by the trustees in their trustee capacities, the identity of the custodian thereof; and it is further

ORDERED that within thirty days of service of a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry, T.K., as Co-Executor of the Estate, shall furnish Plaintiff with a certification of trust or comparable documentation sufficient to identify the trustees of the I.K. Declaration of Trust and to establish their authority to list, contract for, and convey the trust's interest in the Uptown Residence, to the extent such documentation is within the possession, custody, or control of the Estate or of T.K. as Co-Executor, and shall otherwise state in a sworn writing why it is unavailable to him in that representative capacity; and it is further

ORDERED that upon Plaintiff furnishing a statement demonstrating that the balance of the account maintained for the expenses of the two apartments has fallen below $10,000, together with documentation of the expenses paid, each party shall contribute $5,000 to that account within fifteen days in accordance with paragraphs 5 and 9 of the Stipulation of Settlement, and shall do so upon each subsequent occasion on which the same showing is made, provided that this direction shall take effect as to Plaintiff only after the Court has determined the amount and application of any credit to which she is entitled for documented advances previously made on account of the Estate's share, so that no duplicative contribution is required of her; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall submit, at or before the conference directed below, an itemized statement, with supporting documentation, of any advances she contends were made on account of the Estate's contractual share of the carrying costs of the two apartments, whereupon the Court will make the findings necessary to fix any credit to which she may be entitled, and that the branch of the Cross Motion seeking fixed monthly payments of $5,000 retroactive to January 1, 2026 is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the branches of Plaintiff's Cross Motion seeking a compulsory accounting pursuant to CPLR 7701, seeking injunctive relief restraining the administration of the Estate or of the I.K. Declaration of Trust, seeking to restrain the sale of either residence, and seeking relief against T.K. and R.K. individually and in their capacities as trustees of the I.K. Declaration of Trust, and against their attorneys, agents, servants, and employees, in none of which capacities are they parties to this action, are DENIED, without prejudice to a proceeding properly commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Plaintiff's Cross Motion seeking a right of first refusal to purchase the Estate's fifty percent interest in the Downtown Residence or the Uptown Residence is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Plaintiff's Cross Motion seeking sanctions against Defendant and Defendant's counsel pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 and CPLR 3126 is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant's application for counsel fees in the sum of $15,000 pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 238 and Judiciary Law § 773, together with the request for leave to enter a money judgment, and Plaintiff's application for counsel fees in the sum of $50,000, which the Court considers under Domestic Relations Law § 238 as the provision governing expenses in enforcement proceedings, are each HELD IN ABEYANCE pending the hearing directed herein, with leave to renew upon its conclusion and upon updated and properly supported billing records; and it is further

ORDERED that counsel and the parties shall appear for a conference before the undersigned in Part 44, at the Courthouse located at 60 Centre Street, New York, New York, at which the hearing directed herein shall be scheduled and compliance with the foregoing directions shall be reviewed, and at which counsel shall be prepared to identify the persons presently serving as trustees of the I.K. Declaration of Trust and to address whether their joinder is necessary to convey the trust's interest in the Uptown Residence, on October 20, 2026 at 9:30 a.m., or on such adjourned date as the Court shall direct; and it is further

ORDERED that any relief requested and not expressly granted herein is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry upon Plaintiff within ten days of entry.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: September 8, 2026

New York, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR., J.S.C.

Ronald Castorina Jr., J.