INC VILLAGE OF FREEPORT v. FREEPORT UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to certain real property and for related declaratory relief, the defendant appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Francis Ricigliano, J.), entered October 23, 2024, and (2) a judgment of the same court entered December 9, 2024.  The order granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the first and second causes of action and denied the defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  The judgment declared that the plaintiff holds fee title to the real property at issue unencumbered by any interest in favor of the defendant, and that the defendant holds a revocable license to use the real property.

ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed;  and it is further,

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed;  and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff.

The appeal from the order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 248).  The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501[a][1] ).

In 2021, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to quiet title to certain real property (hereinafter the property) located in Freeport and used by the defendant as parkland, and for related declaratory relief.  As is relevant to the appeal, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the first and second causes of action seeking a judgment declaring, among other things, that it holds fee title to the property unencumbered by any interest in favor of the defendant and that the defendant holds only a revocable license to use the property.  The defendant opposed the plaintiff's motion and cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  In an order entered October 23, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's cross-motion.  On December 9, 2024, the court entered a judgment declaring that the plaintiff holds fee title to the property unencumbered by any interest in favor of the defendant and that the defendant holds only an easement in gross, or a revocable license, to use the property.  The defendant appeals.

The Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the first and second causes of action.  The plaintiff established, prima facie, that it holds fee title to the property and that the defendant has only an easement in gross, or a revocable license, and does not possess an easement appurtenant to the property (see Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d 623, 630;  State of New York v. Johnson, 45 AD3d 1016, 1018–1019).

In opposition, the defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  Parkland, such as the property at issue here, “is impressed with a public trust, requiring legislative approval before it can be alienated or used for an extended period for non-park purposes” (Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d at 630 [footnote omitted] ).  “[P]arkland cannot be leased, even for a park purpose, absent legislative approval” (Union Sq. Park Community Coalition, Inc. v New York City Dept. of Parks & Recreation, 22 NY3d 648, 656).  Here, since an easement is an alienation of land requiring authorization from the New York State Legislature (see Miller v. City of New York, 15 N.Y.2d 34, 37;  Millbrook Hunt v. Smith, 249 A.D.2d 281, 282), the defendant failed to show that legislative approval for an easement appurtenant was “plainly conferred” through the “direct and specific approval of the State Legislature” (Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v City of New York, 95 N.Y.2d at 632 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  The defendant's contention that the Long Island State Park Commission (hereinafter the Park Commission) granted such approval did not raise an issue of fact, as the Park Commission's grant to the defendant constituted an easement in gross, or a revocable license, rather than an easement appurtenant (see State of New York v. Johnson, 45 AD3d at 1018–1019).

The defendant also failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether it possesses an easement appurtenant by estoppel (see Air Stream Corp. v. 3300 Lawson Corp., 99 AD3d 822, 828).  The defendant failed to show that it relied upon any representation made by the plaintiff that the defendant had an easement appurtenant to the property rather than an easement in gross (see MJK Bldg. Corp. v. Fayland Realty, Inc., 181 AD3d 860, 862).

The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.

For the same reasons, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

DUFFY, J.P., WARHIT, VENTURA and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.