IN RE: Brian J. ROE (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the mother appeals from an order of the Family Court, Nassau County (Darlene D. Harris, J.), dated January 23, 2025.  The order denied the mother's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate an order of the same court dated November 12, 2024, made upon the mother's failure to appear at a continued hearing, granting the father's petition to modify a prior order of the same court dated July 15, 2024, so as to award the father residential custody of the parties' children.

ORDERED that the order dated January 23, 2025, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The parties are the parents of two children.  In an order dated November 12, 2024, upon the mother's default in appearing at a continued hearing, the Family Court granted the father's petition to modify a prior order of the same court so as to award the father residential custody of the children.  The mother moved pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the order dated November 12, 2024.  The court denied the mother's motion to vacate.  The mother appeals.  We affirm.

Generally, “ ‘[i]n order to vacate a default in appearing, a party must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the failure to appear and a potentially meritorious defense to the relief sought in the petition’ ” (Matter of Polanco v. Cruz, 236 AD3d 660, 661, quoting Matter of Goldstein v. Goldstein, 190 AD3d 971, 972).  Because “the law favors resolution on the merits in child custody proceedings,” “the general rule with respect to opening defaults in civil actions is not to be rigorously applied to cases involving child custody” (Matter of Paez v. Bambauer, 230 AD3d 586, 588 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  “ ‘A custody determination, whether made upon the default of a party or not, must always have a sound and substantial basis in the record’ ” (Matter of Da-Kym Barksdale v. Gilmore, 247 AD3d 886, 887, quoting Matter of Paez v. Bambauer, 230 AD3d at 588).

Here, the mother failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default or a meritorious defense to the father's petition, and the determination to grant the petition had a sound and substantial basis in the record.  Accordingly, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the mother's motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the order dated November 12, 2024 (see Matter of Polanco v. Cruz, 236 AD3d at 662;  Matter of Gordon v. Ngoun, 218 AD3d 577, 579).

The mother's remaining contention is without merit.

LASALLE, P.J., FORD, WAN and QUIRK, JJ., concur.