IN RE: HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, inter alia, to permanently stay arbitration of a claim for uninsured motorist benefits, Devorah Villanueva appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Anne J. Swern, J.), dated June 20, 2024. The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of the motion of Devorah Villanueva which was pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate an order of the same court (Robin S. Garson, J.) dated June 22, 2023, which upon Villanueva's default, in effect, in opposing the petition, granted that branch of the petition which was to permanently stay arbitration.

ORDERED that the order dated June 20, 2024, is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner, Hartford Fire Insurance Company (hereinafter Hartford), commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75, inter alia, to permanently stay arbitration of a claim by Devorah Villanueva for uninsured motorist benefits arising out of an alleged hit-and-run collision in February 2022 involving Villanueva, who was riding a motorized scooter, and an unidentified motorcyclist. In an order dated June 1, 2023, the Supreme Court directed Villanueva to serve written opposition to the petition by June 15, 2023, and adjourned the petition to June 22, 2023. Villanueva failed to submit written opposition to the petition. Thereafter, in an order dated June 22, 2023 (hereinafter the June 2023 order), the court granted that branch of the petition which was to permanently stay arbitration upon Villanueva's default, in effect, in opposing the petition.

In August 2023, Villanueva moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate the June 2023 order. Hartford opposed the motion. In an order dated June 20, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied that branch of Villanueva's motion. Villanueva appeals.

To obtain relief pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1), Villanueva was required to show both a reasonable excuse for the default and a potentially meritorious defense to the petition (see Matter of Maya Assur. Co. v Long Sheng Zheng, 207 AD3d 632, 632; Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Fiduciary Ins. Co. of Am., 111 AD3d 731, 732). “The determination of whether an excuse is reasonable lies within the sound discretion of the trial court” (126 Henry St., Inc. v Cater, 197 AD3d 598, 600; see Beach 28 RE, LLC v Somra, 216 AD3d 610, 611). Here, Villanueva failed to proffer a reasonable excuse for the default. Villanueva's conclusory and unsubstantiated assertions that she was hampered in opposing the petition by the lack of production of certain medical records and a purported police report did not constitute a reasonable excuse, as she provided no explanation as to efforts made to obtain those documents. Since Villanueva failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for the default, it is unnecessary to consider whether she demonstrated a potentially meritorious defense to the petition (see Matter of Maya Assur. Co. v Long Sheng Zheng, 207 AD3d at 633; Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Dae-Hee Lee, 78 AD3d 944, 945).

The parties’ remaining contentions either are without merit, need not be reached in light of our determination, or are improperly raised for the first time on appeal.

DUFFY, J.P., WARHIT, VENTURA and OTTLEY, JJ., concur.