IN RE: Jeremiah J. SHEEHAN (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Ulster County) to review a determination of respondent Department of Motor Vehicles revoking petitioner's driver's license.

In October 2023, petitioner was stopped by two state troopers while operating his vehicle in the City of Kingston, Ulster County.  Petitioner admitted to having consumed alcoholic beverages and, after failing a portable breath test (hereinafter PBT), was arrested for driving while intoxicated (hereinafter DWI).  At the police barracks, the troopers requested that petitioner submit to a chemical test and read petitioner the standard refusal warning, but petitioner refused to submit to the test.  As a result, petitioner was charged with several traffic violations and DWI in Kingston City Court, which the court (Ball, J.) ultimately dismissed on procedural grounds.  Thereafter, a refusal hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter ALJ).  The ALJ revoked petitioner's driver's license for his refusal to submit to the chemical test, and respondent Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV) affirmed the decision upon administrative appeal.  Petitioner commenced this proceeding seeking to annul the license revocation and to reinstate his driver's license.  Respondents answered, asserting, among other things, that the matter should be transferred to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804(g).  Petitioner opposed, arguing that there were outstanding questions of law that needed to be determined by Supreme Court prior to any transfer.  Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court, finding that any questions of law were without merit and that there were outstanding questions of substantial evidence.

We are unpersuaded by petitioner's contention that the determination is not supported by substantial evidence.  “Following an evidentiary hearing, an administrative determination revoking a person's driver's license will be upheld so long as it is supported by substantial evidence – a minimal standard that requires less than the preponderance of the evidence and demands only the existence of a rational basis in the record as a whole to support the findings upon which the determination is based” (Matter of Reuss v. Schroeder, 217 AD3d 1083, 1084 [3d Dept 2023] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis and citations omitted];  see Matter of Wegman v New York State Dept. of Health, 229 AD3d 862, 863–864 [3d Dept 2024] ).  “Prior to revocation, a person has the right to a hearing, at which an ALJ must focus on four inquiries:  ‘(1) did the police officer have reasonable grounds to believe that such person had been driving in violation of any subdivision of [Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192];  (2) did the police officer make a lawful arrest of such person;  (3) was such person given sufficient warning, in clear or unequivocal language, prior to such refusal that such refusal to submit to such chemical test or any portion thereof, would result in the immediate suspension and subsequent revocation of such person's license or operating privilege whether or not such person is found guilty of the charge for which the arrest was made;  and (4) did such person refuse to submit to such chemical test or any portion thereof’ “(Matter of Reuss v. Schroeder, 217 AD3d at 1085 [citation omitted], quoting Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][c] ).

At the hearing, the report of refusal to submit to chemical test (hereinafter refusal report) and accompanying supporting deposition/bill of particulars, which were signed by one of the troopers under penalty of perjury, as well as videos from each of the two troopers' body cameras were admitted into evidence.  In the refusal report, one of the troopers documented that petitioner was pulled over for having failed to stop at a stop sign, beeping his horn several times and tailgating another vehicle.  The refusal report also documented that, when he was pulled over, petitioner had impaired motor coordination, and the supporting deposition established that petitioner smelled of alcoholic beverages, had glassy eyes and that the PBT result was .15%.¹ The body camera footage demonstrates that petitioner admitted to consuming two beers and struggled with completing the field sobriety tests.  Additionally, the refusal report documented that petitioner was read his DWI warnings three times, informing him that refusing to submit to a chemical test would result in immediate suspension and subsequent revocation of his driver's license, and that he refused said testing all three times.  In fact, during his testimony, petitioner admitted to refusing to submit to a chemical test.

Although neither of the troopers testified at the refusal hearing, the ALJ's determination that they had reasonable grounds to believe petitioner had been driving in an intoxicated condition and therefore lawfully arrested petitioner is supported by substantial evidence (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][c];  Matter of Hagberg v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs. Appeals Bd., 224 AD3d 1305, 1305–1306 [4th Dept 2024];  Matter of Van Tassell v New York State Commr. of Motor Vehs., 46 A.D.2d 984, 984 [3d Dept 1974] ).  Substantial evidence also supports the determination that petitioner refused to submit to a chemical test despite being “given sufficient warning” of the consequence (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][c][3];  see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][c][4] ).  Finally, the ALJ was permitted to “make findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the chemical test refusal report and any other relevant evidence in the record, notwithstanding the police officer[s'] nonappearance” (15 NYCRR 127.9[c] ).  Accordingly, the ALJ's determination is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Monaghan v. Schroeder, 45 NY3d 543, 551 [2025];  Matter of Reuss v. Schroeder, 217 AD3d at 1086).

Petitioner's argument that the refusal hearing determination must be annulled because City Court, based upon its dismissal on procedural grounds, “lacked authority to initiate the DMV refusal hearing process” is misplaced.  At the outset, the DMV refusal hearing process is administrative and separate from the City Court proceeding (see generally Matter of Endara–Caicedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 38 NY3d 20, 25–26 [2022] ).  Here, City Court was required to transmit the refusal report to respondent Commissioner of Motor Vehicles within 48 hours of petitioner's arraignment (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][b][3] ).  That the DWI and related traffic tickets were subsequently dismissed on procedural grounds does not retroactively void the administrative process that commences upon a refusal to submit to a chemical test.  Indeed, “the administrative license revocation applies upon refusal, independent of whether the motorist is ultimately convicted of the intoxicated driving offense for which he or she was arrested” (Matter of Endara–Caicedo v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 38 NY3d at 26;  see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][b] ).²

Finally, we are unpersuaded by petitioner's contention that his due process rights were violated by the ALJ's denial of his requests to cross-examine the troopers and for an adjournment (see Matter of Monaghan v. Schroeder, 45 NY3d at 553).  Nor was it an abuse of discretion for the ALJ to deny petitioner's untimely, and third, adjournment request made during the hearing (see 15 NYCRR 127.7[b];  Matter of Roenbeck v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 221 AD3d 1013, 1015 [2d Dept 2023] ).  To the extent not specifically examined, we have reviewed petitioner's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.

ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The body camera footage also shows that one of the troopers did not realize that petitioner failed the PBT and told petitioner he could leave.  The other trooper, who administered the PBT, quickly intervened and stated that the result had been .15% and petitioner needed to be arrested.

2.   Petitioner's argument that respondents were collaterally estopped from relitigating the lawfulness of the stop is unpreserved as he did not raise this defense until the filing of the instant petition (see Matter of Bernstein v Department of State, Div. of Licensing Servs., 96 AD3d 1183, 1184–1185 [3d Dept 2012] ).

Pritzker, J.

Clark, J.P., Ceresia, Mackey and Corcoran, JJ., concur.