A.C., Plaintiff, v. M.F., Defendant. (2026)

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR 2219 [a]

The following papers were read and considered upon Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, brought pursuant to CPLR 3213, seeking recognition and domestication of two judgments issued by courts of the United Kingdom: Order to Show Cause, signed August 17, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No 311); Affirmation of M.U., Esq., dated August 14, 2026, together with Exhibits 1 through 3 annexed thereto (NYSCEF Doc No 305); Affirmation of Plaintiff, dated August 14, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No 309); Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support, dated August 14, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No 310); Affirmations of Service of M.B., each dated August 19, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc Nos 313, 314); Affirmation of Defendant in Opposition, dated August 28, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No 315); Affirmation of J.M., Esq., dated August 28, 2026, together with Exhibits 1 through 6 annexed thereto (NYSCEF Doc No 316); Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition, dated August 28, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No 323); Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Her Order to Show Cause Seeking Domestication of Foreign Judgments, dated September 2, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No 324); and the Affirmation of C.H., Esq., dated September 2, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No 325). The Court has likewise considered the June 28, 2023 Order of the Family Court in the Royal Courts of Justice in London, filed at NYSCEF Doc No 307.

This action was recently assigned to the undersigned by administrative order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts. In accordance with this Court's Order dated August 11, 2026, and as recited in the Order to Show Cause signed August 17, 2026, opposition papers were to be served on or before August 28, 2026, reply papers, if any, were to be served on or before September 4, 2026, and the parties, on consent, waived oral argument. Plaintiff's reply papers were filed upon September 2, 2026 and are timely. The motion was fully submitted upon the filing of those papers.

Counsel for Defendant has certified pursuant to 22 NYCRR Part 161 that artificial intelligence tools were employed for legal research support and copy editing in the preparation of Defendant's opposition memorandum, and that all generated text, including citations, quotations, and legal analysis, was reviewed for accuracy and approved by an attorney (NYSCEF Doc No 316 ¶ 10). Counsel for Plaintiff has certified pursuant to 22 NYCRR Part 161 and the Part Rules of this Court that Vincent AI was employed for legal research and that Microsoft Copilot was employed in connection with the preparation of Plaintiff's reply memorandum, and that all generated text, including citations, quotations, and legal analysis, was reviewed for accuracy and approved by an attorney (NYSCEF Doc No 324). The Court notes the certifications and observes that the obligation of review which each counsel has assumed is the obligation the rule was written to impose.

II. Findings of Fact

A. The Parties and the English Matrimonial Proceedings

Plaintiff and Defendant began cohabiting in 2008 and were married on April 14, 2012, in the State of New York (Pl Aff ¶ 3; Def Aff ¶¶ 6, 8). On March 2, 2012, prior to the marriage, the parties executed a prenuptial agreement in accordance with the laws of the State of New York, and on March 23, 2014, they executed a modification agreement which increased Plaintiff's entitlement to Defendant's assets (Def Aff ¶¶ 5, 7). Plaintiff did not contest the validity of either instrument in the English Proceedings, although she asserts that Defendant breached the terms of both (Pl Aff ¶ 4).

Two children were born of the marriage, the elder in 2015 and the younger in 2018 (Pl Aff ¶ 3; Def Aff ¶ 8). In 2015 the parties made London their primary residence (Pl Aff ¶ 4). Plaintiff resides in London with the children, for whom she is the primary caretaker (Pl Aff ¶ 3). Plaintiff avers that Defendant divides his time between New York and Frankfurt; Defendant avers that he divides his time predominantly between the United States and Germany (Pl Aff ¶ 3; Def Aff ¶ 3). The distinction is immaterial to the disposition of this motion.

The parties separated in March 2020, and in December 2020 Plaintiff commenced divorce proceedings in the English courts, entitled in the matter of the marriage of the parties, the case number of which is omitted (the English Proceedings) (Pl Aff ¶ 4; Def Aff ¶¶ 2, 9). Defendant thereafter commenced financial remedy proceedings in March 2021 (Pl Aff ¶ 4). Both parties appeared in the English Proceedings, both were represented by counsel, both submitted extensive evidence of their assets and financial circumstances, and Plaintiff attended in excess of sixty days of court appearances (Pl Aff ¶ 7). Plaintiff's English solicitor confirms that the financial remedy proceedings which culminated in the June 2023 Order were lengthy and detailed, that they required Plaintiff to submit the specific expenses and costs she deemed necessary to meet the needs of the children following the divorce of their parents, and that the English Court scrutinized those figures before fixing the appropriate amount of child support in light of the financial circumstances and manner of living of the parents (C.H. Aff ¶ 4).

B. The Interim Order, the November 2022 Judgment, and the June 2023 Order

On February 21, 2022, Mr. Justice Mostyn of the English Family Court issued an interim maintenance order requiring Defendant to pay monthly maintenance of £71,300 together with various running costs, including property and staff costs, obligations which Defendant states exceeded £3.6 million per annum (Def Aff ¶ 10). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant substantially breached the interim orders then in force, which concerned the parties' mortgages, payments for the children and their schools, household staff, and steps to be taken with respect to real property (Pl Aff ¶ 8).

On November 14, 2022, the English Court issued an Approved Judgment which considered the parties' respective positions, their financial submissions, and the needs of the children (Pl Aff ¶ 9; M.U. Aff, Ex 3). The November 2022 Judgment fixed Plaintiff's entitlement upon the division of assets at £37,489,392, to be satisfied in part by cash and assets of £28,339,392 payable in cash and by transfers of property as soon as possible; directed Defendant to make monthly child support payments comprising the children's monthly expenses, nanny salaries, and school fees until the children attain the age of eighteen or complete their full-time tertiary education, whichever is later; and directed Defendant to secure an irrevocable bank guarantee in the sum of £14,318,970, the amount of which was to be reduced annually in accordance with Defendant's compliance in the preceding year (Pl Aff ¶ 10).

In explaining why security was required, the English Court stated that it was "satisfied that the child maintenance award should be secured," reasoning that Defendant had deliberately disobeyed the order for maintenance pending suit, that enforcement proceedings had twice been necessitated, and that Plaintiff should not be made to endure month-to-month uncertainty as to whether the maintenance, the school fees, and the nanny would be paid (Pl Aff ¶ 11). Defendant did not appeal the November 2022 Judgment (Pl Aff ¶ 9).

On June 28, 2023, Mr. Justice Mostyn converted the November 2022 Judgment into what was intended to be the final financial order in the English Proceedings (the June 2023 Order) (Pl Aff ¶ 12; Def Aff ¶ 11; NYSCEF Doc No 307). The June 2023 Order valued Plaintiff's entitlement under the modified prenuptial agreement at £37,489,392 and, in order that Plaintiff receive that entitlement, provided for the transfer of various properties and directed Defendant to pay a lump sum of £18,964,027 within fourteen days of receipt of Plaintiff's nominated bank account, that is, by July 27, 2023 (Def Aff ¶ 11). The June 2023 Order further determined Defendant's ongoing child maintenance obligations, which Defendant represents run at just over £60,000 per month, or £720,000 per year, with variations keyed to the anticipated needs of the children through 2039; carried forward the requirement that Defendant procure an irrevocable bank guarantee to secure those obligations, to be relied upon as security to the extent the periodic payments are not met by Defendant or his estate; and confirmed Defendant's undertaking to pay the children's health insurance (Pl Aff ¶ 13; Def Aff ¶ 11; Def Mem at 3, 18). Defendant did not appeal the June 2023 Order, and the time within which to do so has long since expired (Pl Aff ¶ 13; C.H. Aff ¶ 6).

The June 2023 Order also provided for transfers of real property between the parties, including an obligation running against Plaintiff to transfer title to real property in Capri, Italy, which Defendant represents remains unsatisfied (Def Mem at 17 n 6, citing NYSCEF Doc No 307 ¶ 37). Plaintiff answers that any question concerning the implementation of that provision has no bearing upon the comity analysis and does not alter the finality, validity, or present enforceability of the order (Reply Mem at 11 n 4).

The papers describe the issuing tribunal in several ways. The Order to Show Cause and the M.U. Affirmation identify the June 2023 Order as an order of the Family Court in the Royal Courts of Justice in London, United Kingdom, and the apostilled copy annexed as Exhibit 2 is so described (M.U. Aff ¶¶ 4, 6). Defendant refers to Mr. Justice Mostyn of the English Family Court (Def Aff ¶¶ 10, 11), and Plaintiff's English solicitor refers to the Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales (C.H. Aff ¶¶ 1, 3). These are descriptions of the forum offered by the parties rather than matters placed in issue, and no party contends that anything turns upon the difference. For the sake of precision the Court adopts, in the decretal paragraphs which follow, the designation appearing upon the apostilled instrument as annexed to the moving papers.

Plaintiff's English solicitor supplies further particulars of the instrument. She affirms that the June 2023 Order determined the respective claims of the parties arising out of the marriage in the financial remedy proceedings before the Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales; that it provided for a division of marital assets, directing the transfer of various properties and assets between the parties and the payment of a lump sum by Defendant to Plaintiff; that it imposed various ongoing financial obligations upon Defendant, including obligations with respect to the children; and that it requires the child maintenance payments to be secured by an irrevocable bank guarantee to be put in place by Defendant at a named financial institution in the sum of £14,320,000, which is to be relied upon as security to meet the obligation to pay the periodic payments to the extent that the obligation is not met by Defendant or his estate (C.H. Aff ¶ 3). She further affirms that the guarantee was to be put in place by December 31, 2023 and is scheduled to end on July 1, 2039, and that Defendant failed to put it in place (C.H. Aff ¶ 3). The Court observes that the sum stated in the C.H. Affirmation differs slightly from the sum recited in the Pl Affirmation with respect to the November 2022 Judgment (Pl Aff ¶ 10). Neither party has drawn the discrepancy into issue, and it is immaterial to the disposition of this motion.

C. Default, Enforcement, and Satisfaction of the Lump-Sum Payment

Defendant paid £1,000,000 toward the lump sum on January 9, 2023, six months before the June 2023 Order was made (Def Aff ¶ 11). He did not pay the balance by July 27, 2023. On that date his solicitors wrote to Plaintiff's solicitor advising that, notwithstanding every effort to sell assets and generate liquid funds, he was not then able to make the remaining payment (Def Aff ¶ 12). Defendant attributes his default to financial difficulties commencing in October 2022, including an inability to contribute capital to his United States property business, falling property prices, rising interest rates, and a stagnant property market (Def Aff ¶ 13).

Plaintiff commenced enforcement proceedings in the English Proceedings on October 5, 2023 (Def Aff ¶ 14). Plaintiff avers that Defendant remained in breach of the June 2023 Order for the ensuing two years, that in April 2024 he ceased making child maintenance payments altogether, that she was compelled to bring several enforcement applications in response to which the English Court issued no fewer than fifteen orders, that she and the children were forced to vacate their home following repossession by the mortgagee, and that the children were nearly removed from their schools for nonpayment after the issuance of several exclusion letters (Pl Aff ¶¶ 14, 15). Plaintiff's English solicitor affirms to the same effect, stating that the majority of the June 2023 Order was disregarded by Defendant, that he remained in breach of many aspects of it for over two years, that he failed to provide the ordered financial support to Plaintiff and the children from April 2024 to November 2025, and that he took steps to frustrate her efforts to enforce the order (C.H. Aff ¶ 5). On February 20, 2024, Mrs. Justice Knowles of the Family Division of the High Court of Justice heard Plaintiff's enforcement application together with Defendant's application to extend the lump-sum deadline, and directed Defendant to provide further evidence of his financial hardship (Def Aff ¶ 15).

On March 28, 2024, Defendant applied to the English Court for a downward modification of his child maintenance obligations under the interim order and the June 2023 Order, citing his financial hardship and his inability to procure the bank guarantee (the March 2024 Modification Application) (Def Aff ¶ 16; J.M. Aff, Ex 4). On April 10, 2024, Mrs. Justice Knowles stayed consideration of that application pending satisfaction of the lump-sum payment (Def Aff ¶ 17).

On March 25, 2025, Plaintiff applied to the English Court to modify the June 2023 Order (Def Aff ¶ 18), and on March 28, 2025 a hearing upon that application was held before Mr. Justice Poole (Def Aff ¶ 19). Plaintiff further avers that in or about July 2025, while her first domestication motion was pending in this Court, Defendant sold two New York properties for a price in excess of $30 million in violation of English orders restraining him from doing so (Pl Aff ¶ 16).

On September 24, 2025, Mr. Justice Poole issued a judgment granting in part Plaintiff's application to vary the June 2023 Order and fixing the outstanding balance then owing, inclusive of accrued interest, additional sums, and costs, at £31,344,267.63 (Pl Aff ¶ 17; Def Aff ¶ 23). On November 3, 2025, Defendant paid Plaintiff $30,040,000, and on November 17, 2025, days before a contempt hearing, he transferred a further $10,000,000, both payments having been facilitated by borrowing from his business partner (Pl Aff ¶ 18; Def Aff ¶¶ 22, 24, 25). In January 2026 Defendant paid an additional £16,459.37 in order to resolve a disagreement concerning the calculation of accrued interest (Def Aff ¶ 26). The parties agree that the June 2023 Order has been satisfied in full with respect to the lump-sum payment (Pl Aff ¶ 18; Def Aff ¶ 26).

Beginning in November 2025, Defendant became current with his child maintenance obligations and has continued to make monthly payments pursuant to the June 2023 Order (Pl Aff ¶ 19; Def Aff ¶ 27). Plaintiff concedes, and the Court accordingly finds, that Defendant is presently current upon his child support obligations and that no arrears are outstanding (Pl Mem at 4, 9; Def Aff ¶ 27). Plaintiff reiterates the concession in reply, stating that she is not seeking recognition of support arrears because there presently are none (Reply Mem at 8).

In the English Proceedings Plaintiff initiated contempt proceedings arising from the sale of certain real property situated in Southampton, New York, and from other alleged breaches of the English orders (Def Aff ¶ 28). On November 28, 2025, Mr. Justice Poole found Defendant in contempt with respect to that sale but found no contempt as to any other alleged violation (Def Aff ¶ 29; J.M. Aff, Ex 2). On February 11, 2026, Mr. Justice Poole determined that the contempt had been mitigated by subsequent payments to Plaintiff, observing that the impact of the breach upon Plaintiff had ultimately not been serious, and concluded that neither committal nor a fine was appropriate (Def Aff ¶ 31; J.M. Aff, Ex 3). Defendant avers, and the record does not contradict, that Plaintiff never asked the English Court to hold him in contempt for his failure to procure the bank guarantee, nor otherwise sought its enforcement by contempt in England (Def Aff ¶ 30).

D. The Bank Guarantee and the Pending Modification Applications

Defendant has not procured the irrevocable bank guarantee (Pl Aff ¶ 20; Def Aff ¶ 32; C.H. Aff ¶ 3). Plaintiff maintains that he is therefore in breach of the June 2023 Order, the guarantee having been established to afford the children security in the event of future breaches or of Defendant's death (Pl Aff ¶ 20). Defendant maintains that no financial institution has been willing to issue such a guarantee in light of his present financial circumstances, that he has been candid concerning that fact with both Plaintiff and the English Court, and that he has supplied documentary evidence in support (Def Aff ¶¶ 32, 36).

On November 17, 2025, notwithstanding the satisfaction of the lump-sum payment and Defendant's current status upon maintenance, Plaintiff applied in the English Proceedings to replace the bank guarantee provision with an order directing that certain assets allocated to Defendant be sold and the proceeds held as partial security (the November 2025 Modification Application) (Def Aff ¶ 32; J.M. Aff, Ex 5). In a judgment issued November 20, 2025, Mr. Justice Poole accepted that Defendant may be unable to procure the guarantee, observing that it "may not now be available or achievable," and directed further proceedings both to explore whether the guarantee is achievable in the circumstances that have since arisen and to permit the parties to consider alternatives to it (Def Aff ¶ 33; J.M. Aff, Ex 1 ¶ 15). Plaintiff's English solicitor affirms that the November 20, 2025 ruling was made in adjacent committal proceedings rather than within the financial remedy proceeding, that statements made within committal proceedings do not constitute a variation or termination of the provisions of the June 2023 Order, and that the transcript of the hearing of that date records Mr. Justice Poole as having said that "there is a guarantee required under the order, that remains a requirement" (C.H. Aff ¶ 10; Reply Mem at 10, 11).

In June 2026, Plaintiff made a further application requesting that the English Court capitalize the child maintenance payments required by the June 2023 Order over the ensuing decade (the June 2026 Modification Application) (Def Aff ¶ 35; J.M. Aff, Ex 6). Defendant objects to capitalization and, the lump-sum payment having been made, renewed his March 2024 Modification Application seeking a downward modification of child maintenance in light of his asserted financial decline (Def Aff ¶ 34; J.M. Aff, Ex 4). Defendant represents that were the English Court to grant capitalization, his ongoing periodic child support obligations would be discharged (Def Mem at 18; J.M. Aff, Ex 6). Plaintiff describes the same three applications as her application to enforce Defendant's obligation to secure the bank guarantee, her application to capitalize Defendant's child maintenance obligations, and Defendant's application to vary both his child maintenance obligations and his obligation to establish the guarantee (Pl Aff ¶ 21).

Plaintiff's English solicitor describes the three applications in materially identical terms. She affirms that there are currently three applications before the English Court: one by Plaintiff seeking orders for the sale of various properties in order to fund Defendant's obligation to secure his child maintenance obligations by setting up the requisite bank guarantee pursuant to the June 2023 Order; one by Plaintiff seeking to capitalize Defendant's child maintenance obligations pursuant to the June 2023 Order; and one by Defendant seeking a variation of his child maintenance obligations and of his obligation to set up the bank guarantee pursuant to the June 2023 Order (C.H. Aff ¶ 8). She affirms that a final hearing of these applications is currently scheduled for November 17 through 20, 2026, that a decision upon all three applications should be made at or shortly after that hearing, that she cannot be certain of the exact timing of the judgment, and that any projection upon the outcome of the applications is purely speculative (C.H. Aff ¶ 8).

Defendant submitted updated financial disclosures in the English Proceedings on June 26, 2026. Plaintiff's reciprocal disclosures were due four weeks thereafter, by July 24, 2026, and had not been served as of the date of these submissions; on August 21, 2026 Plaintiff applied to extend that deadline to September 8, 2026, which application Defendant opposed as leaving insufficient time before the pre-trial review (Def Aff ¶¶ 36, 37). A pre-trial review hearing is scheduled in the English Proceedings for September 24, 2026, and a final hearing upon the three pending modification applications is scheduled, tentatively, for November 2026, Plaintiff identifying the dates as November 17 through 20, 2026 (Pl Aff ¶ 21; Def Aff ¶ 38; C.H. Aff ¶ 8).

E. The Reply Submissions

Upon reply Plaintiff submitted a Reply Memorandum of Law dated September 2, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No 324) and the Affirmation of C.H., Esq., dated September 2, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No 325). Ms. H. affirms that she is a partner at a London law firm, the solicitors acting on behalf of Plaintiff in proceedings before the Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales to enforce a final financial order following her divorce from Defendant, and that she is fully familiar with the decrees and orders issued within those proceedings and with the facts and circumstances set forth in her affirmation (C.H. Aff ¶ 1). She affirms under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of New York and notes that Defendant has consented to the domestication of the Decree Absolute, so that she addresses only his opposition to the domestication of the June 2023 Order (C.H. Aff ¶ 2).

The substance of the C.H. Affirmation, so far as it bears upon the questions presented, may be stated compendiously. Ms. H. affirms that Defendant did not appeal the June 2023 Order, that the timeframe within which to do so has long lapsed, that the June 2023 Order is a final order, and that it is the operative order governing the obligations of the parties for the child maintenance and support of their two children (C.H. Aff ¶ 6). She affirms that a judgment in financial remedy proceedings frequently makes provision for child maintenance, that because such obligations are typically ongoing the terms of a final judgment are capable of variation by the court, and that unless the court grants a stay of an aspect of an order, which she affirms is not the case here, an application to vary a term of an order does not alter the finality of that order (C.H. Aff ¶ 7). She affirms that the pending applications concerning child maintenance and security do not nullify or alter the enforceability of the June 2023 Order, that the parties are presently subject to its terms, and that were Defendant to fail to make a monthly maintenance payment he would stand in breach notwithstanding the pendency of his application to vary the level of those payments (C.H. Aff ¶ 9). She affirms that no orders have been issued by the English Court which would prevent the domestication of the June 2023 Order by the courts of New York, and that Defendant remains subject to the terms of the June 2023 Order, which remain in force (C.H. Aff ¶¶ 10, 11). Finally, she affirms her understanding that in a related proceeding in France, Defendant has asked the Versailles Court of Appeal to recognize and domesticate the June 2023 Order, so that his opposition to the instant application appears to her to be at odds with the position he has taken in the French forum (C.H. Aff ¶ 12).

Plaintiff's reply memorandum advances five principal contentions. She contends, first, that the motion is one of recognition rather than enforcement, and that Defendant has conflated the two in order to argue that the comity analysis renders CPLR 3213 unavailable (Reply Mem at 1, 2, 4, 11). She contends, second, that the June 2023 Order is final, resting upon Defendant's own description of it as the then-final order and as the order intended to be the final financial order in the English Proceedings, and upon the recitation in the English judgment of November 20, 2025 that a final order was made by Mr. Justice Mostyn on June 28, 2023 (Reply Mem at 6). She contends, third, that the authorities upon which Defendant relies concern retroactive modification and support arrears rather than prospective variation, and that a support judgment capable of modification is nonetheless final and entitled to recognition (Reply Mem at 7, 8). She contends, fourth, that Defendant's obligation to secure the bank guarantee remains unchanged, that the November 20, 2025 ruling worked no modification of it, and that speculation as to what the English Court may do hereafter is no proper basis for withholding recognition (Reply Mem at 10, 11). She contends, fifth, that there is no risk of inconsistent judgments because no inconsistent judgment exists, that Defendant has identified no cognizable prejudice, that recognition would neither enlarge his obligations nor create arrears nor alter substantive rights nor predetermine any future enforcement proceeding, and that Matter of Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v Fiorilla is far removed from the facts of this case (Reply Mem at 11, 12). Plaintiff also observes, in a footnote, that a denial under CPLR 3213 ordinarily results in the moving and answering papers being deemed the complaint and the answer unless the court orders otherwise, and inquires what discovery Defendant could suggest would be necessary (Reply Mem at 4 n 1).

F. The Proceedings Before This Court

On March 28, 2025, the same day as the hearing before Mr. Justice Poole upon her application to vary the June 2023 Order, Plaintiff commenced this action, seeking by Motion Sequence 1 a declaration of the validity of a foreign judgment pursuant to CPLR article 54 and CPLR 5406 and the domestication and enforcement of seventeen orders issued in the English Proceedings (Def Aff ¶¶ 19, 20). That motion was never determined and was withdrawn without prejudice (M.U. Aff ¶ 7; Def Aff ¶ 21; NYSCEF Doc No 301).

At a conference before this Court on August 11, 2026, Plaintiff represented that although no arrears remained outstanding under the English orders she nevertheless wished to proceed with the domestication of the Decree Absolute and the June 2023 Order, and the Court directed that the defective Motion Sequence 1 be withdrawn and the application resubmitted by order to show cause (Def Mem at 6; NYSCEF Doc No 301). Plaintiff filed the instant application on August 14, 2026. The Order to Show Cause was signed on August 17, 2026, and directed service upon counsel for Defendant by NYSCEF and electronic mail and upon Defendant by overnight mail on or before August 20, 2026 (NYSCEF Doc No 311). Service was effected upon Defendant's counsel on August 18, 2026 by overnight courier and electronic mail, and upon Defendant on August 19, 2026 by overnight courier (NYSCEF Doc Nos 313, 314).

By this motion Plaintiff seeks the recognition and domestication of two instruments: the Decree Absolute dated July 25, 2023, issued by the Family Court at Bury St. Edmunds in Suffolk, East Anglia, United Kingdom, an apostilled copy of which is annexed to the M.U. Affirmation as Exhibit 1, and the June 2023 Order, an apostilled copy of which is annexed as Exhibit 2 (M.U. Aff ¶¶ 2, 4, 6; Pl Mem at 1). Defendant consents to the domestication of the Decree Absolute and opposes the domestication of the June 2023 Order (M.U. Aff ¶ 3; Def Mem at 7 and n 2; C.H. Aff ¶ 2).

III. Conclusions of Law

A. The Standard Governing Recognition of Foreign Country Matrimonial Judgments

Judgments of a foreign country addressing support or equitable distribution in a matrimonial action are entitled neither to full faith and credit under CPLR article 54 nor to recognition under CPLR article 53, article 53 being inapplicable by force of CPLR 5302 [b] [3], which excludes from its operation judgments for divorce, support or maintenance and other judgments rendered in connection with domestic relations. Their reception in this State is governed instead by the discretionary doctrine of comity, which, loosely stated, means courtesy, respect, or mutual accommodation, and which permits each sovereign, this State included, to decide for itself which foreign country judgments it will recognize and which it will not (Siegel, NY Prac § 472 [6th ed]; see DAB v MAS, 77 Misc 3d 679, 686 [Sup Ct, Richmond County 2022], describing comity as voluntary deference). Under comity, as contrasted with full faith and credit, the courts of this State possess the power to deny even prima facie validity to the judgments of foreign countries for policy reasons, whatever allegations of jurisdiction may appear upon their face (Rosenbaum v Rosenbaum, 309 NY 371, 375 [1955]), for the presumptive legality which attaches to the judgments of our sister States under the Federal Constitution does not extend to a foreign decree (Maltese v Maltese, 32 Misc 2d 993, 994 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 1962]).

The statutory exclusion is not a disability. The exclusion of foreign court support judgments in matrimonial or family matters from CPLR article 53 is not designed to preclude recognition, but to acknowledge their unique status and treatment and to leave them to existing law, which is quite generous in New York (Downs v Yuen, 298 AD2d 177, 177 [1st Dept 2002]). Within its limits the doctrine of comity operates generously. New York courts generally accord recognition to judgments rendered in a foreign country under the doctrine of comity absent some showing of fraud in the procurement of the judgment or that recognition of the judgment would do violence to some strong public policy of this State (Matter of Fickling v Fickling, 210 AD2d 223, 223-224 [2d Dept 1994]; see Azim v Saidazimova, 280 AD2d 566 [2d Dept 2001]; D.S.S. v C.B., 85 Misc 3d 1271[A], 2025 NY Slip Op 50687[U], *2 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2025]; Ahmad v Khalil, 40 Misc 3d 1206[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51058[U], *7 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2013]). It is rare that a foreign judgment will be refused domestication under a comity analysis, the high burden springing from an ordered sense of respect and tolerance for the adjudications of foreign nations (Matter of Gotlib v Ratsutsky, 83 NY2d 696, 700 [1994]; see Matter of Caputo, 266 AD2d 538 [2d Dept 1999]).

In applying the doctrine, the courts of this State examine whether the foreign court's proceedings satisfy basic concepts of due process analogous to our own (S.B. v W.A., 38 Misc 3d 780, 806 [Sup Ct, Westchester County 2012], affd 135 AD3d 792 [2d Dept 2016]; see Downs v Yuen, 298 AD2d 177, 178 [1st Dept 2002]). The factors considered include whether the parties were represented by counsel, whether they participated in the proceedings, whether they enjoyed a full opportunity to contest jurisdiction, whether the proceedings resulted in a final and binding judgment, and whether the rendering court possessed jurisdiction over the parties at the time the judgment issued (S.B. v W.A., 38 Misc 3d at 818; Downs v Yuen, 298 AD2d at 177-178). Recognition is withheld where enforcement would offend a strong and fundamental public policy of this State by endorsing that which is inherently vicious, wicked or immoral (Greschler v Greschler, 51 NY2d 368, 377 [1980]; Matter of Gotlib v Ratsutsky, 83 NY2d at 699-700; Azim v Saidazimova, 280 AD2d at 566; S.B. v W.A., 38 Misc 3d at 798, 806), or where the judgment is otherwise contrary to the public policy of New York (2 NY Civil Prac: Matrimonial Actions § 22.04 [1]).

Recognition and enforcement are related but distinct. Recognition determines whether the adjudication of the foreign sovereign will be received in this State; enforcement determines what coercive process, if any, this State will lend in aid of it. The distinction is illustrated by Scanlon v Scanlon, where the court granted recognition of a United Kingdom matrimonial judgment upon summary judgment while the remaining relief requested was separately addressed under the Domestic Relations Law and other applicable provisions (41 Misc 3d 1204[A], 2013 NY Slip Op 51573[U], *6, *7 n 2 [Sup Ct, NY County 2013]). Plaintiff is correct to insist upon the distinction, and the Court observes it throughout what follows.

B. The Decree Absolute Is Entitled to Recognition and Domestication

Defendant does not oppose the domestication of the Decree Absolute, and has advised both Plaintiff's counsel and the Court that he consents to it (M.U. Aff ¶ 3; Def Mem at 7 and n 2; Reply Mem at 3; C.H. Aff ¶ 2). Consent does not relieve the Court of the obligation to satisfy itself that the requisites of comity are met, and upon this record they plainly are.

The Decree Absolute was issued on July 25, 2023 by the Family Court at Bury St. Edmunds in Suffolk, East Anglia, a well-established court of the United Kingdom, a jurisdiction whose courts observe procedures compatible with due process (see Society of Lloyd's v Grace, 278 AD2d 169 [1st Dept 2000]). Both parties appeared in the underlying proceedings, both were represented by counsel, both participated actively and made substantial submissions, and Plaintiff attended in excess of sixty days of court appearances (Pl Aff ¶ 7). Neither party has suggested any want of jurisdiction over the person, nor any fraud in the procurement of the decree. The instrument is final in every sense: it dissolved the marriage and declared the parties divorced, and nothing in this record suggests that the English courts retain any power to unmake it. Recognition of a decree dissolving a marriage endorses nothing inherently vicious, wicked or immoral and offends no public policy of this State (Greschler v Greschler, 51 NY2d at 377; Matter of Fickling v Fickling, 210 AD2d at 223-224). The requirements of CPLR 3213 are likewise satisfied, for the Decree Absolute is a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction whose operative effect is apparent upon its face and requires no resort to extrinsic proof (see Weissman v Sinorm Deli, Inc., 88 NY2d 437, 444-445 [1996]; Scanlon v Scanlon, 2013 NY Slip Op 51573[U], *6). The apostilled Decree Absolute annexed as Exhibit 1 to the M.U. Affirmation is therefore recognized and domesticated.

C. CPLR 3213 Is an Available Vehicle for the Recognition of a Foreign Country Judgment

Defendant contends that the accelerated procedure of CPLR 3213 is unavailable to Plaintiff, and this Court has considered whether the June 2023 Order may be said to fall outside the statute because it contains obligations which are not monetary. The Court declines to rest its determination upon that ground, and expressly declines to hold that the June 2023 Order is categorically outside the reach of the statute by reason of its non-monetary content.

CPLR 3213 affords an accelerated remedy where an action is founded upon an instrument for the payment of money only or upon any judgment. The statute states two categories, not one, and the qualifying words "for the payment of money only" govern the first of them. An action founded upon a judgment stands in the second category, and the movant who proceeds upon a judgment is not required to demonstrate that the judgment directs the payment of money and nothing else. The construction is confirmed by the cases which Plaintiff cites and by the disposition made in Point B above. In Scanlon v Scanlon the court recognized a composite United Kingdom matrimonial judgment upon a motion made pursuant to the statute (2013 NY Slip Op 51573[U], *6, *7 n 2), and in Bond v Lichtenstein the First Department sustained an award of summary judgment in lieu of complaint upon a Hong Kong judgment for child support (129 AD3d 535, 535 [1st Dept 2015], citing Sung Hwan Co., Ltd. v Rite Aid Corp., 7 NY3d 78 [2006], Downs v Yuen, 298 AD2d 177 [1st Dept 2002], and Greschler v Greschler, 51 NY2d 368, 376 [1980]). As set forth in Point B above, the Court recognizes the Decree Absolute upon this same motion, and a decree dissolving a marriage directs the payment of no money at all. The reasoning which would exclude the June 2023 Order for its non-monetary content would exclude the Decree Absolute as well, and that consequence is a sufficient demonstration that the reasoning is unsound.

Plaintiff is likewise correct that the absence of any material factual dispute is a condition of summary relief and not a disqualification from it. Defendant contests neither the existence nor the contents of the June 2023 Order, nor the fact, existence, and status of the three applications pending abroad (Reply Mem at 4). The Court so finds. Plaintiff is further correct that the observation in Scanlon concerning the impropriety of the statute as a vehicle was directed to the branches of that motion which sought enforcement, and not to the branch which sought recognition (2013 NY Slip Op 51573[U], *7 n 2). Nothing in Scanlon forecloses the procedure Plaintiff has adopted here.

The availability of the vehicle is, however, one question, and entitlement to the judgment sought is another. CPLR 3213 substitutes a motion for a complaint; it does not relieve the movant of the burden of establishing entitlement to judgment as a matter of law upon the record presented. The accelerated device presupposes a claim susceptible of summary treatment, and where further proceedings in the rendering forum are required in order to determine that to which the moving party is entitled, the summary procedure has been held unavailable (Cecuk v MacAdoo, 284 AD2d 188, 188 [1st Dept 2001]). The Court does not suggest that Cecuk governs this case. There the foreign judgment had already been modified by the rendering country and expressly contemplated further proceedings to fix the plaintiffs' entitlement, whereas here no English order has modified the operative provisions, no stay is in force, and the monthly maintenance figure is presently ascertainable (C.H. Aff ¶¶ 7, 9, 10, 11). The concern which animates Cecuk is nonetheless instructive, and it is taken up in Point E below.

D. Prospective Modifiability, Standing Alone, Does Not Defeat Recognition

It has been said that foreign matrimonial awards are accorded recognition in New York provided they are final and incapable of being modified by the rendering country (Mandel-Mantello v Treves, 79 AD2d 569, 569 [1st Dept 1980]). Read at large that formulation would swallow every continuing order of support, for such orders are prospectively modifiable everywhere, and it would follow that no foreign order for child maintenance could ever be received in this State. The Court declines to announce so sweeping a rule, and Plaintiff is right to say that it would be an untenable one (Reply Mem at 9, 12).

Read in their context, the authorities are considerably narrower, and Plaintiff has identified their true subject with precision. In Mandel-Mantello the inquiry was whether the Swiss divorce judgment was non-modifiable retroactively, and the Appellate Division remitted the matter because the record was too sparse to answer it (79 AD2d at 569). Tannenberg v Beldock holds that a judgment for arrears due under a foreign divorce decree will be entered only where the arrears are vested and nonmodifiable (68 AD2d 307, 313 [1st Dept 1979]). Oka v Oka addresses the power of the rendering court to modify its decree with retroactive effect (92 Misc 2d 1080, 1081 [App Term, 2d Dept 1977]; see S.B. v W.A., 38 Misc 3d at 807). And in S.B. v W.A. the court recognized the support directive of the foreign judgment, which was clear upon its face, while withholding recognition of arrears for want of proof of their precise amount (38 Misc 3d at 807). The distinction upon which Plaintiff insists, between orders which are modifiable and orders which are modifiable retroactively, is a genuine one, and the Court adopts it.

The Court therefore holds, and holds expressly, that the prospective modifiability of a foreign order of support does not of itself defeat its recognition in this State. Plaintiff's English solicitor affirms that because provision for child maintenance is an ongoing obligation, the terms of a final judgment in financial remedy proceedings are capable of variation by the court, and that an application to vary a term does not, in the absence of a stay, alter the finality of the order under the law of England and Wales (C.H. Aff ¶ 7). The Court accepts that account of English practice. It accepts as well that the June 2023 Order presently binds Defendant, that he would stand in breach were he to withhold this month's maintenance notwithstanding the pendency of his variation application, that no English order has nullified or altered the enforceability of the June 2023 Order, and that no English order forbids its domestication here (C.H. Aff ¶¶ 6, 9, 10, 11). Each of those averments is uncontroverted upon this record, and each is found as a fact. Nothing in this Decision and Order questions the standing of the June 2023 Order in the jurisdiction which made it.

E. Recognition of the June 2023 Order Is Premature

The difficulty presented by this branch of the motion lies elsewhere, and it is a difficulty of timing rather than of principle. Plaintiff asks this Court to accord to the June 2023 Order the same force and effect as though it had been rendered here. The lump-sum obligation which that order imposed has been satisfied in full and the transfers it directed are not the subject of the relief practically sought. The provisions of the order which remain unsatisfied or continuing, and which are therefore materially implicated by the relief sought, are two: the obligation to procure the irrevocable bank guarantee, and the ongoing child maintenance obligations. Those two provisions are also the precise subject matter of three applications presently pending before the court which made them.

By her November 2025 Modification Application Plaintiff asks the English Court to replace the bank guarantee provision with an order directing the sale of assets allocated to Defendant, the proceeds to be held as partial security (Def Aff ¶ 32; J.M. Aff, Ex 5; C.H. Aff ¶ 8). By her June 2026 Modification Application she asks that court to capitalize the entirety of the future child maintenance over the ensuing decade (Def Aff ¶ 35; J.M. Aff, Ex 6; C.H. Aff ¶ 8). Defendant represents, without contradiction upon this record, that the grant of capitalization would discharge his ongoing periodic child support obligations altogether (Def Mem at 18; J.M. Aff, Ex 6). And by his renewed March 2024 Modification Application Defendant asks that both the maintenance obligations and the guarantee obligation be reduced or varied (Def Aff ¶¶ 16, 34; J.M. Aff, Ex 4; C.H. Aff ¶ 8). Plaintiff characterizes these applications as seeking adjustment upon a going forward basis, no different from applications which would be made in New York upon a change of financial circumstance (Reply Mem at 8, 9). That characterization does not fit her own capitalization application, which does not ask that a monthly figure be raised or lowered but that the periodic obligation be replaced in its entirety by a capital sum.

The timing is not remote. A pre-trial review is fixed for September 24, 2026, and a final hearing upon all three applications is fixed for November 17 through 20, 2026, with a decision to be made at or shortly after that hearing (Pl Aff ¶ 21; Def Aff ¶ 38; C.H. Aff ¶ 8). Plaintiff's own solicitor affirms, with a candor the Court commends, that any projection upon the outcome of those applications is purely speculative (C.H. Aff ¶ 8). The Court agrees that the outcome cannot be foretold, and it draws no inference as to what the English Court will do.

What the Court does draw from the record is the absence of any present occasion for its intervention. Defendant is current upon his child support obligations and no arrears are outstanding, as Plaintiff concedes both in her moving papers and again in reply (Pl Mem at 4, 9; Def Aff ¶ 27; Reply Mem at 8). The lump-sum obligation has been satisfied in full (Pl Aff ¶ 18; Def Aff ¶ 26). Plaintiff seeks recognition alone and disclaims any present request for enforcement (Reply Mem at 1, 11). The Court does not hold, and would not hold, that a party must await the necessity of enforcement before seeking recognition of a foreign judgment. The significance of these circumstances is narrower. They establish that no adjudication of this Court is presently required in order to preserve any right of Plaintiff or of the children, and that a limited deferral will therefore subtract nothing from her position which renewal cannot restore.

The disposition which follows is one of discretionary deferral. CPLR 2201 confirms the settled authority of a court to control the proceedings upon its docket where temporary deferral will avoid duplicative adjudication and the possibility of inconsistent results. Although the Court does not impose a stay here, the same considerations inform the exercise of discretion under the doctrine of comity, which supplies the discretion actually exercised. The parties are presently before the issuing court upon applications directed to the prospective obligations materially implicated by the recognition sought, those applications are scheduled for imminent determination, and neither arrears nor any present enforcement request is before this Court. Considered together, those circumstances warrant the denial of this branch of the motion as premature and without prejudice to prompt renewal. The holding is one of prematurity. It is not a determination that the June 2023 Order is wanting in finality where it was made, nor a determination that its provisions are unenforceable, nor a determination upon the merits of any application pending abroad.

F. The Bank Guarantee Provision Remains in Force and Remains Under Reconsideration

Plaintiff devotes a portion of her reply to the proposition that Defendant's obligation to secure the bank guarantee remains unchanged, that the ruling of November 20, 2025 was made in adjacent committal proceedings and outside the financial remedy proceeding, that statements made within committal proceedings work no variation or termination of the provisions of the June 2023 Order, and that the transcript of that hearing records Mr. Justice Poole as having said that "there is a guarantee required under the order, that remains a requirement" (Reply Mem at 10, 11; C.H. Aff ¶ 10). The Court accepts every part of that submission and finds accordingly. No English order has varied or terminated the bank guarantee provision. Defendant remains subject to it and has not performed it. The Court further accepts that comity does not turn upon predictions as to what a foreign court will do hereafter.

The submission nevertheless proves less than Plaintiff requires of it. The Court withholds recognition not because it forecasts that the guarantee will be struck, but because the issuing court has been asked by both parties to reconsider the provision, has accepted that the guarantee "may not now be available or achievable," and has directed further proceedings both to test whether it remains achievable in the circumstances which have since arisen and to permit the parties to consider alternatives to it (Def Aff ¶ 33; J.M. Aff, Ex 1 ¶ 15). The two statements of Mr. Justice Poole to which the parties respectively point are not in conflict. The guarantee remains a requirement of the order, and the question whether it is achievable and in what form it should endure remains open before the court that imposed it. Both propositions are true, and together they describe an obligation presently under reconsideration rather than an obligation at rest.

G. Prudential Considerations Counsel Deferral Rather Than Present Domestication

Comity exists to promote consistency and mutual respect between sovereigns, not to create parallel and potentially conflicting regimes for the same obligation. Defendant invokes a line of authority concerning inconsistent judgments, and the Court has considered it with care and with a due sense of its limits. In Byblos Bank Eur., S.A. v Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of recognition to a foreign country judgment which stood in conflict with a related foreign judgment already rendered (10 NY3d 243, 248-249 [2008]). In Nagy v Wood a second judgment had already nullified the first in substantial respects (95 AD2d 728, 729 [1st Dept 1983]). In Matter of Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. v Fiorilla the arbitration award had already been vacated by a court of this State before enforcement was pursued abroad through an ex parte proceeding, without disclosure of the vacatur to the French court and without notice to the adversary (178 AD3d 567, 568-571 [1st Dept 2019]). No such conflict exists here. No English order has nullified or superseded the June 2023 Order, and the possibility that its provisions may be altered in November remains contingent. The Court therefore does not rest its disposition upon those authorities, and it agrees with Plaintiff that the facts of Citigroup bear no resemblance to the facts of this case. Plaintiff has proceeded openly, upon notice, before a court of competent jurisdiction, and upon papers which disclose the pendency of the English applications rather than concealing them. No want of good faith is imputed to her, and none is found.

The nearer and more apposite line of authority is that in which the courts of this State defer to proceedings pending elsewhere in order to avoid duplication of effort, waste of judicial resources, and the possibility of inconsistent rulings (OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v Colgate-Palmolive Co., 96 AD3d 541, 541 [1st Dept 2012]; Asher v Abbott Labs., 307 AD2d 211, 211-212 [1st Dept 2003]; Matter of Grassetto v Sartore, 75 Misc 3d 1208[A], 2022 NY Slip Op 50418[U], *6-7 [Sup Ct, NY County 2022]). Those cases arose upon applications to stay rather than upon applications to deny, and the relief sought in the two forums there was more nearly identical than it is here, where the English Court is asked to vary and the courts of this State are asked to recognize. They are cited accordingly not as controlling but for the principle of case management which they embody, and that principle counsels deferral in the exercise of discretion. Were this Court to domesticate the June 2023 Order in its present form and were the English Court thereafter to replace the bank guarantee provision or to capitalize, restructure, or reduce the child maintenance obligations, this State would hold an enforceable judgment embodying obligations which had ceased to exist in the jurisdiction that created them, and the parties would necessarily return to this Court to domesticate the superseding order, expending judicial resources twice over upon a single set of rights. Temporary deferral pending the imminent English proceedings minimizes the risk of duplicative adjudication while preserving Plaintiff's ability to renew promptly after the English Court determines the pending applications.

Plaintiff answers that the objection conflates recognition with enforcement, and that any question of inconsistency would arise only as a defense to enforcement (Reply Mem at 11). As Point A observes, the distinction is genuine and the Court honors it. But the distinction cuts both ways upon this record. Because Plaintiff seeks recognition alone, and because no application for enforcement is before this Court, the very distinction upon which she relies confirms that a temporary deferral pending the imminent English proceedings will not disturb the practical position of either party. Plaintiff assures the Court that recognition would neither enlarge Defendant's obligations nor create arrears nor alter substantive rights (Reply Mem at 12). Upon her own description, a limited postponement of recognition will do no more.

H. Plaintiff's Remaining Contentions

Plaintiff invokes Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC v Saad Trading, Contr. & Fin. Servs. Co., 117 AD3d 609 [1st Dept 2014], for the proposition that recognition may be granted so that a party may preserve the opportunity to pursue enforcement steps in the future even where no present enforcement is contemplated. The principle is sound and the Court adopts it. A party has a legitimate interest in securing recognition in advance of the moment at which enforcement becomes necessary, and nothing in this Decision and Order denies relief upon the ground that Plaintiff has no immediate need of it. The difficulty identified in Point E is a different one. It is not that recognition must always be accompanied by enforcement, but that the particular provisions materially implicated by the relief sought are presently submitted to the issuing court for replacement, capitalization, reduction, or discharge, and are set down for imminent determination.

Plaintiff's reliance upon Mittenthal v Mittenthal, 99 Misc 2d 778 [Sup Ct, NY County 1979], is misplaced for a reason which she candidly identifies herself. Mittenthal concerned the conversion of a New Jersey judgment, and the plaintiff there stood upon the full faith and credit which the Federal Constitution commands as of right (id. at 782). Plaintiff acknowledges in her own footnote that the recognition of a foreign country judgment is distinct, such a judgment not being automatically entitled to full faith and credit (Reply Mem at 8 n 2, citing S.B. v W.A., 38 Misc 3d at 798, and Greschler v Greschler, 51 NY2d at 376). Comity is voluntary deference rather than constitutional command (see DAB v MAS, 77 Misc 3d at 686), and the discretion which the doctrine reserves to this Court is the discretion exercised in Point E.

Plaintiff urges that Defendant has identified no cognizable prejudice which would result from recognition, that recognition would neither increase his obligations, nor create arrears, nor alter the substantive rights established by the English Court, nor predetermine any future enforcement proceeding (Reply Mem at 12). The Court accepts the description and finds no bad faith upon her part in advancing the application. The absence of prejudice to an adversary is not, however, an affirmative warrant for relief. The Court does not deny this branch of the motion because Plaintiff lacks a present need of it. It defers determination because the obligations tendered for conversion are presently before the issuing court for reconsideration, and because Plaintiff's own description of the practical consequences of recognition confirms that a limited deferral will leave her position substantially intact and her right of renewal unimpaired.

Plaintiff observes that Defendant has asked the Versailles Court of Appeal, in a related proceeding in France, to recognize and domesticate the very June 2023 Order which he resists here (Reply Mem at 2, 6; C.H. Aff ¶ 12). The observation is noted. It does not affect the disposition. The averment is made upon Ms. H.'s understanding, and no order, application, submission, or evidence of the law of France concerning that proceeding has been placed before this Court. The Court makes no finding as to the position Defendant has taken in the French forum and draws no inference from it, favorable or unfavorable, to either party. The disposition made here rests upon the posture of the English Proceedings and upon nothing else.

Defendant's reference to the unsatisfied Capri provision, and Plaintiff's answer that questions of implementation do not affect the finality, validity, or present enforceability of the June 2023 Order, require no separate resolution (Def Mem at 17 n 6; Reply Mem at 11 n 4). The Court does not rest upon the Capri provision, and expresses no view upon the state of its performance by either party.

Plaintiff observes, finally and in a footnote, that CPLR 3213 directs that upon the denial of the motion the moving and answering papers shall be deemed the complaint and the answer respectively unless the court orders otherwise, and inquires what discovery Defendant would suggest is necessary (Reply Mem at 4 n 1). The inquiry answers itself and the statute supplies the remedy. This branch of the motion is not denied for any want of proof, and no discovery is required or contemplated. The Court will therefore exercise the authority which the statute reserves to it and direct otherwise, so that the papers submitted upon this motion shall not be deemed the complaint and the answer and so that no further plenary proceedings shall ensue in this State upon the very questions which the English Court is preparing to decide in November 2026.

Denial is accordingly without prejudice. The Court is not indifferent to the history which this record discloses, nor to Plaintiff's submission that she ought not be required to await a further default before obtaining the protection of recognition (Reply Mem at 2). The years of default recounted in the affirmations of Plaintiff and of her English solicitor are a serious matter, and nothing in this Decision and Order diminishes them or excuses them. The answer to that history, however, is a domesticated judgment which states obligations that will still exist when the ink upon it is dry, and such a judgment can be framed only after the English Court has spoken. Should the English Court determine the pending modification applications, either party may apply anew, upon an appropriate procedural vehicle and upon a proper showing, for the recognition and domestication of the resulting order. Nothing in this Decision and Order should be understood as an expression of any view upon the merits of the applications pending in the English Proceedings, upon Defendant's asserted inability to procure the guarantee, or upon the good faith of either party in the prosecution of those applications.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon due deliberation, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause for summary judgment in lieu of complaint pursuant to CPLR 3213, seeking the recognition and domestication of foreign judgments, designated Motion Sequence No. 006, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, as set forth below; and it is further

ORDERED that so much of the motion as seeks the recognition and domestication of the Decree Absolute dated July 25, 2023, issued by the Family Court at Bury St. Edmunds in Suffolk, East Anglia, United Kingdom, an apostilled copy of which is annexed as Exhibit 1 to the Affirmation of M.U., Esq. dated August 14, 2026, is GRANTED, and the said Decree Absolute is hereby recognized and domesticated and shall be accorded the same force and effect as though rendered by this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that so much of the motion as seeks the recognition and domestication of the Order dated June 28, 2023, issued by the Family Court in the Royal Courts of Justice in London, United Kingdom, an apostilled copy of which is annexed as Exhibit 2 to the Affirmation of M.U., Esq. dated August 14, 2026, is DENIED as premature; and it is further

ORDERED that the denial of the relief sought with respect to the Order dated June 28, 2023 is without prejudice to renewal, upon a proper procedural vehicle and upon a proper showing, following a determination by the English Court resolving the modification applications now pending before it; and it is further

ORDERED that nothing contained in this Decision and Order shall be construed as a determination that the Order dated June 28, 2023 is wanting in finality in the jurisdiction which issued it, that its provisions are unenforceable there or elsewhere, or that the prospective modifiability of an order of support, standing alone, defeats recognition under the doctrine of comity in this State; and it is further

ORDERED that nothing contained in this Decision and Order shall be construed as a determination that CPLR 3213 is an improper vehicle for the recognition of a foreign country judgment, including a foreign country matrimonial judgment excluded from CPLR article 53 by CPLR 5302 [b] [3]; and it is further

ORDERED that, the Court so directing pursuant to CPLR 3213, the moving and answering papers submitted upon Motion Sequence No. 006 shall not be deemed the complaint and the answer respectively, and no further plenary proceedings shall ensue from the denial of that branch of the motion; and it is further

ORDERED that nothing contained in this Decision and Order shall be construed as an expression of any view upon the merits of the applications pending in the English Proceedings, upon Defendant's compliance or non-compliance with the bank guarantee provision of the Order dated June 28, 2023, or upon the enforceability of that Order in the jurisdiction which issued it; and it is further

ORDERED that nothing contained in this Decision and Order shall be construed as a finding of bad faith, harassment, or improper litigation conduct on the part of either party; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order, with notice of entry, upon Defendant and upon counsel for Defendant within twenty [20] days of the date of entry hereof; and it is further

ORDERED that any relief requested and not expressly granted herein is DENIED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: September 8, 2026

New York, New York

E N T E R :

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR., J.S.C.

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.