IN RE: the Application of J.G. WENTWORTH ORGINATIONS (2026)

The following numbered papers were used on this petition: NY St Ct Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 1-14.

Upon the foregoing papers, a hearing having been held, having heard oral argument, and due deliberation having been had, the within petition for approval of a transfer of structured payment settlement rights is determined as follows.

Introduction

In the within special proceeding, petitioner J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC ("J.G. Wentworth") has applied, pursuant to the Structured Settlement Protection Act (hereinafter "SSPA"), General Obligations Law § 5-1701 et seq., for the approval of the transfer of 12 monthly payments of $337.65 each beginning on July 1, 2026 and ending on June 1, 2027; 12 monthly payments of $358.22 each beginning on July 1, 2028 and ending on June 1, 2029; 12 monthly payments of $380.04 each beginning on July 1, 2030 and ending on June 1, 2031; and 108 monthly life-contingent payments of $4,862.13 each, increasing 3% annually, beginning on July 1, 2049 and ending on June 1, 2058 due Kiyoshi Wilkinson ("Ms. Wilkinson"), under a structured settlement agreement. This special proceeding was commenced by J.G. Wentworth, having been brought on by way of an order to show cause in which Ms. Wilkinson, Assigned Settlement Services Corp. and Prudential Insurance Company of America were named as Respondents. J.G. Wentworth's petition states that in exchange for Ms. Wilkinson assigning her rights to the aforesaid settlement proceeds, J.G. Wentworth would pay her $25,000.00.

Legal Background

Prior to approval or denial of an application to transfer future proceeds from a structured settlement, it is the duty of the court to analyze the details surrounding the request.

"Enacted in 2002, the purpose of the SSPA, as reflected in the legislative materials, was to establish 'procedural safeguards for those who sell settlements that are awarded as a result of litigation,' due to a recognition that '[m]any of the people who receive such settlements are being compensated for very serious, debilitating injuries, and have been unfairly taken advantage of in the past by the businesses that purchase their settlements' " (Pinnacle Capital, LLC v O'Bleanis, 214 AD3d 913, 915 [2d Dept 2023], quoting Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2002, ch 537 at 5.)

"Structured settlements serve strong public policy objectives in that they afford long-term financial protection for injury victims and their families. They protect against loss or premature dissipation of lump sum recoveries. They avoid the shift of responsibility for victims' care to public assistance programs. [¶] In the past several years there has been an explosion of efforts by unregulated entities, known as "factoring companies," to separate recipients of structured settlement payments from those payment streams. The subsequent factoring of structured settlement payments undermines the public policy objectives of structured settlements. They deprive injury victims and their families of the long-term financial security their settlements are designed to provide. The transfer can involve discounts corresponding to over 50% interest per year." (Letter from Life Ins. Council of NY, Inc., Bill Jacket, L 2002, ch 537.)

Yet, "The sale of structured settlements can serve the interest of a victim who has been awarded compensation for injuries or other damages, particularly if the victim has immediate needs that must be met. However, such persons may be particularly vulnerable to the overbearing sales tactics of structured settlement purchasers. The mandated judicial review of all such sales, coupled with the required disclosures of amounts that will be realized from the sale and the discount rate, should help ensure that the best interests of the payee, and his or her family, are served." (NY Atty Gen Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2002, ch 537.)

"Any purported transfer entered into after July 1, 2002 without court approval is unenforceable, and payees may not waive their rights under the Act" (Matter of Law First Fin., LLC v Jamestown Life Ins. Co., 72 Misc 3d 1207[A], 2021 NY Slip Op 50672[U] [Sup Ct, Erie County 2021], citing General Obligations Law §§ 5-1706, 5-1708 [a]).

"[L]egislative history makes clear that to avoid the victimization so prevalent in the industry, the courts are intended to examine the various statutory criteria and determine whether the proposed sale will truly serve the 'best interest' of the payee" (Matter of 321 Henderson Receivables, L.P. v Martinez, 11 Misc 3d 892, 895 [Sup Ct, NY County 2006]; see also General Obligations Law § 5-1706 [b]).

"Clearly, the New York State Legislature in enacting SSPA and in empowering the courts with the discretion to determine whether the terms of a proposed transfer of future payments are fair and reasonable did not intend for the courts to be mere rubber stamps" (Matter of Settlement Capital Corp. (Ballos), 1 Misc 3d 446, 461 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2003]). When the original 2002 legislation enacting SSPA was amended in 2004 to clarify that hardship was not a prerequisite for approving a sale of structured settlement proceeds, the Attorney General wrote that "we do note that there has been a very positive trend among members of the Judiciary to be sparing in approval of such sales, as was intended where the original legislation was drafted. Therefore, while hardship may not be required as a specific finding should this bill be approved, there is in our view, no reason for judges to refrain from weighing that factor, along with any other consideration they deem relevant in determining the 'best interest' criterion." (NY Atty Gen Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2004, ch 480.)

Accordingly, in the present special proceeding, the Court looks first to the statutory requirements of the SSPA, followed by an analysis of Ms. Wilkinson's best interest.

Compliance with Procedural Requirements

The SSPA contains various requirements. The Court finds that the following requirements were complied with by Petitioner in the papers submitted:

• At least ten days before the structured settlement transferor  1signs a transfer agreement, the transferee must provide a disclosure statement to the transferor, setting forth nine informational matters (see General Obligations Law § 5-1703). NYSCEF Doc No. 4 contains the disclosure statement provided to Ms. Wilkinson.

• The special proceeding seeking approval of the transfer shall be commenced by order to show cause in the Supreme Court of the county where the transferor resides or where the structured settlement was approved (see General Obligations Law § 5-1705 [a], [b]). Ms. Wilkinson currently resides in Kings County, so commencement of this special proceeding via order to show cause in Supreme Court, Kings County, by J.G. Wentworth, is proper.

• A copy of the order to show cause and petition must be served upon all interested parties at least twenty days before the time at which the petition is noticed to be heard (see id. § 5-1705 [c]). This was effectuated (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 11, 13, 14).

• The transferor has been advised in writing by the transferee to seek independent professional advice regarding the transfer and has either received such advice or knowingly waived such advice in writing (see General Obligations Law § 5-1706 [c]). Ms. Wilkinson acknowledged receipt of the advice and waived her right to seek independent professional advice (see NYSCEF Doc No. 5).

• A petition for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall include a copy of the transfer agreement, a copy of the disclosure statement and proof of notice of that statement pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-1703, and a listing of each of the payee's dependents, together with each dependent's age (see General Obligations Law § 5-1705 [d] [i], [ii], [iii]). These were all complied with (see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 1, 4, 7).

• The transferor is required to attend the court hearing on the petition, unless attendance is excused for good cause (see id. § 5-1705 [e]). Ms. Wilkinson attended the hearing.

General Obligations Law § 5-1705 [d] [iv] requires that a petition for approval of a transfer of structured settlement payment rights include a statement setting forth whether there have been any previous transfers or applications for transfer of the structured settlement payment rights and giving details of all such transfers or applications for transfer. J.G. Wentworth's petition included the following:

20. Based upon a review of the public information available on the New York Unified Court System conducted by this office, The Payee, has previously transferred and/or attempted to transfer her rights to future structured settlement payments.

21. Upon information and belief, Payee's application to the Kings County Supreme Court to transfer rights to future structured settlement payments under index number 2933/2013 was granted by Order of the Honorable Bert A. Bunyan, J.S.C.

22. Upon information and belief, Payee's application to the Suffolk County Supreme Court to transfer rights to future structured settlement payments under index number 14-00716 was granted by Order of the Honorable Jerry Garguilo, J.S.C.

23. Upon information and belief, Payee's application to the Suffolk County Supreme Court to transfer rights to future structured settlement payments under index number 14-17932 was granted by Order of the Honorable Joseph C. Pastoressa, J.S.C.

24. Upon information and belief, Payee's application to the Suffolk County Supreme Court to transfer rights to future structured settlement payments under index number 297/2016 was granted by Order of the Honorable Denise F. Molia, J.S.C.

25. Upon information and belief, Payee's application to the Suffolk County Supreme Court to transfer rights to future structured settlement payments under index number 622804/2019 was denied by Order of the Honorable Vincent J. Martorana, J.S.C.

26. Upon information and belief, Payee's application to the Suffolk County Supreme Court to transfer rights to future structured settlement payments under index number 605557/2020 was granted by Order of the Honorable Denise Molia, J.S.C.

27. Payee's application to the Queens County Supreme Court to transfer rights to future structured settlement payments under index number 721093/2024 was denied by Order of the Honorable Claudia Lanzetta, J.S.C.

28. On or about June 5, 2025, Payee's application to the Queens County Supreme Court to transfer rights to future structured settlement payments under index number 707665/2025 was denied by Order of the Honorable Lumarie Maldonado Cruz, J.S.C.

However, the information provided by J.G. Wentworth was insufficient. The petition is devoid of information about such transfers or attempted transfers other than the court, county, index number, justice's name, and outcome.

Although these deficiencies might be deemed minimal, nonetheless, the petition did not contain all that is required to apprise the Court of "whether there have been any previous transfers or applications for transfer of the structured settlement payment rights and giving details of all such transfers or applications for transfer" (General Obligations Law § 5-1705 [d] [iv] [emphasis added]). In a prior case, this Court held as follows:

A petitioner under SSPA must provide complete disclosure regarding all previous attempted transfers, be they court-approved or not, and this Court concludes as a matter of law that at a minimum the following details concerning them must be provided:

• Date of agreement

• Purchaser

• Amount of structured settlement proceeds transferred or attempted to be transferred

• Purchase price of transferred or attempted-to-be-transferred structured settlement proceeds

• Discount rate and other financial details, as set forth in General Obligations Law § 5-1703

• Reason for payee's sale of structured settlement proceeds

• Caption, court, county, and index number of special proceeding

• Justice's name

• Outcome of special proceeding and the court's reasoning

• If transfer was approved by the court, how the funds received by the payee were used

Providing this information would comport with the legislative purpose in enacting the SSPA initially in 2002, as well as in amending it in 2010 to require that details of previous transfers and applications be set forth. The sponsor of the 2010 amendatory provisions wrote: "These changes ․ will insure that the court ․ is properly informed about the history of the structured settlement and can make inquiries of the payee to ensure compliance with the statute" (Letter from Hon. Helene E. Weinstein, June 25, 2010, Bill Jacket, L 2010, ch 511). Another proponent wrote: "The additional information ․. will provide the court with the tools necessary to properly protect the plaintiff and society, who may bear the costs of an insolvent injured plaintiff, as it renders its decisions" (Mem NY Consumer Protection Board in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2010, ch 511). (Matter of Sapphire Valley Group, LLC v Prudential Assigned Settlement Servs. Corp., 78 Misc 3d 1224[A], 2023 NY Slip Op 50343[U], *7 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2023]).

Significantly, the petition herein did not set forth with respect to the previous transfers or applications for transfer the dates of the agreements, the purchasers, the amounts transferred or attempted to be transferred, the purchase prices, the discounted rates and other financial details, the stated reasons for seeking the transfers, the captions, the courts' reasoning, and how proceeds from transfers were used. This weighs heavily on this Court.

Background of Factors to Consider

Ms. Wilkinson is willing and anxious to transfer the payments in question. However, according to one court, "the structured settlement payee's willingness to transfer the settlement proceeds has no bearing on this Court's determination of whether the transfer is fair and reasonable" (Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC (Allstate Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.—Kwant), 61 Misc 3d 1224[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51730[U], *1 [Sup Ct, Dutchess County 2018]; see Matter of Settlement Funding of NY, 195 Misc 2d 721, 724 [Sup Ct, Rensselaer County 2003]). While a transferee's desires can be taken into account, a court reviewing a proposed transfer of structured settlement proceeds must assess it objectively.

Accordingly, this Court must focus on the circumstances and details surrounding the transfer. When determining the best interest of the payee, courts have held that there exist both numerical and personal elements that should be considered. "[T]wo distinct substantive inquiries are required of the court before transfer of a structured settlement can be approved[,] one assessing whether the proposed transfer is in the best interest of the payee and the other assessing whether the transaction is fair and reasonable" (Matter of Barr v Hartford Life Ins. Co., 4 Misc 3d 1021[A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50980[U], *1 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2004]). Furthermore, "[w]hile considering the best interest of the payee, the court must also determine whether the transaction, including the discount rate used to determine the gross advance amount and the fees and expenses used to determine the net advance amount are fair and reasonable" (Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC (Allstate Life Ins. Co. of N.Y.—Kwant), 2018 NY Slip Op 51730[U], *1).

Fairness and Reasonableness of the Transaction

Looking first to the numerical elements of an agreement of the type under review, it has been noted that "there has been little agreement as to what constitutes a proper discount rate or what amount of fees and costs are allowable. Courts have also reached different conclusions with regard to the fairness and reasonableness of the fees and costs associated with the transaction [citations omitted]" (Matter of Am. Farms, LLC v John Hancock Assignment Co., 61 Misc 3d 1203[A], 2018 NY Slip Op 51349[U], *3-4 [Sup Ct, Kings County 2018]). "Although what constitutes a fair and reasonable transaction is also left undefined in the statute, two factors are specifically identified for consideration: the fees and expenses and the discount rate" (Matter of Barr v Hartford Life Ins. Co., 2004 NY Slip Op 50980[U], *1). The reasonableness of the fees and expenses is not in question here as J.G. Wentworth has averred that it does not intend to seek any fees or expenses resulting from the instant transaction (see NYSCEF Doc No. 4).

Based on J.G. Wentworth's own New York Disclosure Statement, Ms. Wilkinson would be selling $605,649.60 of future payments for $25,000.00, when the discounted amount applying the IRS's 4.60% applicable federal rate would be much more, $178,140.32 (see id. at 2). J.G. Wentworth disclosed that a comparable annuity of the $605,649.60 to be paid could be obtained for $173,597.79 (see id.), i.e., if one were to purchase a similar annuity yielding $605,649.60, the purchase price would be $173,597.79, according to a comparable from the annuity issuer. This demonstrates that it would be eminently unfair and unreasonable to pay someone $25,000.00 in exchange for 12 monthly payments of $337.65 each beginning on July 1, 2026 and ending on June 1, 2027; 12 monthly payments of $358.22 each beginning on July 1, 2028 and ending on June 1, 2029; 12 monthly payments of $380.04 each beginning on July 1, 2030 and ending on June 1, 2031; and 108 monthly life-contingent payments of $4,862.13 each, increasing at 3% annually, beginning on July 1, 2049 and ending on June 1, 2058, totaling $605,649.60.

Best Interest of the Transferor

General Obligations Law § 5-1706 (b) provides:

No direct or indirect transfer of structured settlement payment rights shall be effective and no structured settlement obligor or annuity issuer shall be required to make any payment directly or indirectly to any transferee of structured settlement payment rights unless the transfer has been authorized in advance in a final order of a court of competent jurisdiction based upon express findings by such court that:

․

(b) the transfer is in the best interest of the payee, taking into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependants; and whether the transaction, including the discount rate used to determine the gross advance amount and the fees and expenses used to determine the net advance amount, are fair and reasonable [emphasis added].

The court in Matter of Settlement Capital Corp. (Ballos), 1 Misc 3d at 455, articulated the meaning of the phrase "best interest of the payee" in this context as follows:

After an independent analysis of decisional law in this and other jurisdictions, and consideration of the legislative history of SSPA, this court determines that the best interest prong should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, giving specific consideration to such factors as the payee's age; mental and physical capacity; maturity level; ability to show sufficient income that is independent of the payments sought for transfer; capacity to provide for the welfare and support of the payee's dependents; the need for medical treatment; the stated purpose for the transfer; and the demonstrated ability of the payee to appreciate the financial terms and consequences of the proposed transfer based upon truly independent legal and financial advice.

Additionally, courts must take into consideration "whether the proposed transfer of structured settlement payments, which were designed to preserve the injured person's long-term financial security, will provide needed financial rescue without jeopardizing or irreparably impairing the financial security afforded to the payee and his or her dependents by the periodic payments" (id.).

Ms. Wilkinson testified that as a result of a settlement of her son's tort claim, she became the beneficiary of structured settlement payments, and her son became the beneficiary of a trust. Ms. Wilkinson's son passed away in 2015, and she became the recipient of his trust. Although Ms. Wilkinson did not recall the settlement amount or the amount of structured settlement payments she will receive in the future, she testified that at the time of the transfer of her son's trust, about $500,000.00 remained in the trust.

Ms. Wilkinson currently has no minor dependents. Additionally, it is apparent to this Court that she possesses sufficient mental capacity. Ms. Wilkinson is a 47-year-old adult. At the time of filing her affirmation in support, she had been employed at Ross earning $24.00 per hour, but at the time of the hearing, Ms. Wilkinson testified that she had not been employed since March of 2026.

Ms. Wilkinson's affirmation in support states that she intends to use the $25,000.00 to be paid from J.G. Wentworth as follows: to use $5,000.00 toward getting her license reinstated as it is currently suspended, $10,000.00 towards paying down her car note, $6,000.00 toward paying off her Chase credit card account, and $4,000.00 toward getting a place of her own as she is currently staying with a friend, including paying something toward her security deposit, first month's rent, and last month's rent. Ms. Wilkinson affirmed that the $5,000.00 requested is because she owes tickets in Nassau and New York County and must pay to get her license reinstated. As for her car note, she testified that she purchased a $40,000.00 car and there remain approximately $23,000.00 left to pay off but she needs to put $10,000.00 down in order to qualify for a payment plan. Ms. Wilkinson also testified at the hearing that she currently is staying at her cousin's house and is planning to move to stay with a different cousin who resides in North Carolina. She asserted that she had written the petition in 2025 for the previous applications made in Queens County Supreme Court and had not updated it to reflect her current residence. This gives the Court pause as to the veracity of Ms. Wilkinson's stated reasons for wishing to transfer.

Furthermore, Ms. Wilkinson averred several times throughout the hearing that she had personally prepared her affirmation in support. The Court provided her with a copy of said affirmation and read her the number indicated on the top of it "Docusign Envelope ID: 7138ACB9-8E74-4AAE-9A5C-28EBB17F0C60." Ms. Wilkinson was not familiar with the number and stated that she had actually provided J.G. Wentworth with her financial information and it had drafted her affirmation in support. This also weighs on the Court.

With regard to previous transfer applications made, although the first four transfers listed in the petition were not available to view on NYSCEF (Index Nos. 2933/2013, 14-00716, 14-17932, and 297/2016), Justice Martorana indicated in his order denying Ms. Wilkinson's fifth attempt to transfer her structured settlement proceeds that the Court had discovered that the special proceedings under these index numbers resulted in an estimated $323,000.00 transferred in exchange for discounted lump sum payments. Furthermore, Justice Maldonado Cruz's order denying Ms. Wilkinson's eighth and most recent attempt to transfer stated, "Upon a review of the index numbers provided for those actions, it appears Ms. Wilkinson received a lump sum payment of $32,000.00 in 2013 under Index Number 2933/2013, an undisclosed amount in 2014 under Index Number 14/00716, $100,000.00 under Index Number 14/17932 in 2014, [and] $50,864.96 under Index Number 297/16 in 2016. ․" Although the prior filings are unavailable, the findings in the subsequent orders demonstrate that Ms. Wilkinson has previously transferred a substantial portion of her structured settlement proceeds in exchange for significantly discounted lump-sum payments.

In Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC v Wilkinson (Index No. 622804/2019 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County]), Judge Vincent J. Martorana issued an order dated April 22, 2020, denying Ms. Wilkinson's attempt to transfer structured settlement proceeds in the amount of $263,560.48 which she otherwise would have received in increments from July 1, 2022 through June 1, 2049 for the sum of $80,026.57. Ms. Wilkinson indicated that at the time she was a seasonal part-time cashier at Target. Her stated needs were to use $22,000.00 to pay off her car loan, $30,000.00 for surgery, $2,000.00 to "fix" her credit, and the rest of the funds, $26,000.00, to help her move into an apartment and pay rent up front. Ms. Wilkinson did not explain why it was in her best interest to pay her car loan off and pay her rent up front, why it would cost $2,000.00 to fix her credit, or what the nature of the surgery was or if it was medically necessary. There was no apartment lease offered or any evidentiary showing of what she owed on her car loan. The court noted that Ms. Wilkinson had already dissipated a substantial sum from her structured settlement. Based on the record presented, the Court was unable to properly weigh all relevant factors and therefore could not find that the proposed transaction was in her best interest.

In Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC v Wilkinson (Index No. 605557/2020 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County]), Justice Denise F. Molia issued an amended order dated August 3, 2020, approving Ms. Wilkinson's attempt to transfer structured settlement proceeds in the amount of $263,560.48 in exchange for $83,000.00. Ms. Wilkinson indicated in her affirmation in this matter that she was a seasonal employee as a cashier at Target making $13.50 an hour working 20 hours per week. She stated that she planned to use the proceeds of $30,000.00 to pay down her car note and $53,000.00 towards a down payment and closing costs on a home.

In Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC v Wilkinson (Index No. 721093/2024 [Sup Ct, Queens County]), Justice Claudia Lanzetta issued an order dated January 14, 2025, denying Ms. Wilkinson's attempt to transfer structured settlement proceeds in the amount of $1,022,909.04 in exchange for $20,000.00. Ms. Wilkinson's affidavit indicated that she was employed by GAP, Inc., making $24.00 an hour. She was staying in a shelter and planned to use the proceeds to secure an apartment, assist in satisfying a car debt, and assist in satisfying a credit card debt. Judge Lanzetta recognized these purposes as commendable but did not grant the petition as there was no supportive documentation regarding these plans and little information provided about the prior transfers or how those proceeds were used. As such, the Court was not able to determine if Ms. Wilkinson was financially responsible, and the fact that she was willing to transfer her structured settlement at such a discounted rate showed that she was not.

In Matter of J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC v Wilkinson (Index No.707665/2025 [Sup Ct, Queens County]), Justice Lumarie Maldonado Cruz issued an order dated June 6, 2025, denying Ms. Wilkinson's attempt to transfer structured settlement proceeds in the amount of $840,952.92 in exchange for $25,000.00. Ms. Wilkinson's affidavit stated that she was employed at Burlington earning $19.38 per hour. She planned to use the proceeds of the sale to secure an apartment as she was between living arrangements, assist in satisfying a car debt, assist in satisfying storage unit debt, and assist in satisfying credit card debt. Judge Cruz noted that Ms. Wilkinson had failed to provide any supporting documentation to substantiate these plans. Furthermore, Ms. Wilkinson had sought to transfer her structured settlement proceeds seven times and her affirmations in support of her previous petitions stated essentially the same or very similar reasons for the proposed sale.

The petition and supporting documents in the instant action are, like in previous attempts at transferring made by Ms. Wilkinson, likewise devoid of any supporting documentation to corroborate her stated reasons for making the application. There is no documentary evidence of Ms. Wilkinson's car note, license reinstatement costs, credit card debt, or expected housing expenses. Furthermore, the instant application contains similar reasons to prior petitions, several of which have been granted.

At the hearing, Ms. Wilkinson testified that she made her first application to allow her and her son to move to Long Island and buy things for the house. While living there, she was unable to work as she had to provide care to her son. She made other transfers to take care of her debts. When asked about the last approved transfer she made in 2020, where she received $83,000.00, Ms. Wilkinson stated that when she used $30,000.00 to pay off her car note it was for a previous car.

Conclusion

"The interest of public policy is preserved by [structured settlements to resolve tort claims] because it ensures a compensation stream to pay for future care or needs. It serves to prevent settlement funds from being dissipated, and such injuries becoming the responsibility of the public health care system" (Mem NY Consumer Protection Board in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2010, ch 511). "Consumers of one-time structured settlement payment services must be accountable to the court and provide a justifiable reason for amending the court[ ] order and seeking to liquidate their structured settlement into a lump sum payment" (id.).

As acknowledged above, the legislative purposes underpinning the SSPA were both societal and personal in nature. Both the public at large needed to be protected as did compensated tort victims. To approve approve the transfer at bar in this special proceeding, this Court would undermine the legislative priorities of avoiding tort victims from becoming public charges, preventing resourceful factoring companies from preying on them, enabling individuals who have serious needs for immediate cash to obtain it, requiring complete disclosure of transfer situations, and facilitating courts' informed consideration of transfers. (See supra at 2.)

The SSPA was created to allow courts to act as a shield preventing vulnerable individuals from being exploited by those more privileged in their knowledge of the intricacies of the financial system. The discretionary nature of the SSPA grants the courts the right to analyze applications substantively while simultaneously scrutinizing parties' adherence to procedural rules. This Court performs its review of the proposed transfer herein, bearing in mind the legislative goals in enacting the SSPA.

The Court is constrained to reject the proposed transfer based on the best interest of the payee, taking into consideration the payee's age, maturity level, stated purpose for the transfer, and demonstrated ability to appreciate the financial terms and consequences of the proposed transfer. This Court is of the view that Ms. Wilkinson's interests would be better served by receiving the 12 monthly payments of $337.65 each beginning on July 1, 2026 and ending on June 1, 2027; 12 monthly payments of $358.22 each beginning on July 1, 2028 and ending on June 1, 2029; 12 monthly payments of $380.04 each beginning on July 1, 2030 and ending on June 1, 2031; and 108 monthly life-contingent payments of $4,862.13 each, increasing 3% annually, beginning on July 1, 2049 and ending on June 1, 2058.

Ms. Wilkinson currently has no source of income although she has worked several retail jobs making an hourly wage in the past. She does not receive any public assistance or disability benefits. Ms. Wilkinson has made eight known attempts to sell the proceeds of her structured settlement for discounted amounts, five of which have been successful. Ms. Wilkinson has worked with J.G. Wentworth numerous times in these attempts. She sought out J.G. Wentworth to discuss selling the structured settlement payments attempted in this action. Ms. Wilkinson testified that she did not know the amount of her total settlement nor the total amount of the approved sales made. Furthermore, Ms. Wilkinson indicated that she personally had prepared the affirmation in support but later averred that she had spoken to a representative of J.G. Wentworth's and they had put the papers together. The Court finds these considerations relevant to its assessment of payee's demonstrated ability to appreciate the financial terms and consequences of the proposed transfer. Indeed, the Court finds that Ms. Wilkinson has not demonstrated financial responsibility and has not been completely forthright.

Ms. Wilkinson stated that she would use the money from the settlement to pay towards getting her license reinstated, her car note, her credit card debt, and obtain new housing. However, her testimony reflects that she no longer needs to find new housing as she has been living with a family member and plans on living with another family member for the foreseeable future. Ms. Wilkinson did not indicate how she intends to use the requested $4,000.00 for housing in lieu of its stated purpose. Furthermore, when the Court asked Ms. Wilkinson why she is requesting $10,000.00 for the stated purpose of paying her car note when she had previously made applications citing the same reason and had been awarded $30,000.00 in 2020, she expressed that the previous request was for a different car. Furthermore, the car that she has now was purchased for $40,000.00. Without any further explanation, it appears Ms. Wilkinson purchased two vehicles within the span of six years, while not being able to afford stable housing. Such repeated reliance on structured settlement proceeds to address vehicle debts weights against approval.

Ms. Wilkinson further has requested $5,000.00 towards getting her driver's license reinstated, which she attested is needed because she owes money for traffic infraction tickets. Although reinstatement of Ms. Wilkinson's license may constitute a legitimate financial need, the existence of a legitimate need does not, in itself, establish whether the need justifies the substantial impairment of the long-term financial security afforded by the structured settlement. Here, the amount actually required to satisfy the outstanding tickets is not established, nor is it demonstrated why the proposed $5,000.00 expenditure warrants the liquidation of future structured settlement payments at the substantial discount proposed.

The same concern applies to the proposed $6,000.00 payment toward Ms. Wilkinson's credit card debt. Although reducing high-interest consumer debt may ordinarily constitute a legitimate financial objective, the record contains little evidence concerning the debt itself or why liquidation of future structured settlement payments is necessary to address it. More importantly, Ms. Wilkinson has previously sought and received substantial lump-sum payments to address similar financial obligations yet continues to experience the same debts and financial instability. The Court therefore cannot conclude that another discounted transfer will remedy the underlying circumstances rather than merely accelerate the dissipation of additional settlement proceeds.

Ms. Wilkinson seeks to accomplish her stated reasons by selling her structured settlement proceeds at an unfair and unreasonable discount. In J.G. Wentworth's Disclosure Statement, it states that "[t]he discounted present value of the aggregate purchase payments at the federal interest rate of 4.60% is $178,140.32 [, which] is the calculation of the current value of the transferred structured settlement payments (Purchased Payments) under federal standards for valuing annuities." (NYSCEF Doc No. 4 at 2). Furthermore, according to the Disclosure Statement, "Based on a price quote from Prudential Insurance Company of America the current costs of purchasing a comparable annuity for the aggregate amount of payments to be transferred is $173,597.79" (id.). The agreed upon price between J.G. Wentworth and Ms. Wilkinson of $25,000.00 is significantly less than these comparatives.

One of the legislative purposes of the SSPA is to promote the long-term financial stability for tort victims by preserving settlement proceeds for their future needs. Permitting a payee to sell a substantial portion of their settlement at steeply discounted rates through repeated applications is inconsistent with that statutory objective and undermines the protections the SSPA was intended to provide.

The Court herein concludes that the proposed sale of Ms. Wilkinson's structured settlement proceeds is not in her best interest.

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:

(1) The findings necessary for a court to approve a transfer of structured settlement payment rights pursuant to General Obligations Law § 5-1706 have not been proved.

(2) The application by Petitioner J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC to approve a transfer of $605,649.60 of Respondent Kiyoshi Wilkinson's future structured settlement proceeds payments of 12 monthly payments of $337.65 each beginning on July 1, 2026 and ending on June 1, 2027; 12 monthly payments of $358.22 each beginning on July 1, 2028 and ending on June 1, 2029; 12 monthly payments of $380.04 each beginning on July 1, 2030 and ending on June 1, 2031; and 108 monthly life-contingent payments of $4,862.13 each, increasing 3% annually, beginning on July 1, 2049 and ending on June 1, 2058, is denied.

(3) The within special proceeding is dismissed.

(4) Within ten days of the entry of this decision, order, and judgment, Petitioner J.G. Wentworth Originations, LLC shall serve a copy of it upon all Respondents herein (a) by first-class mail (with a postmarked certificate of mailing being obtained) to all known residence and business addresses, (b) by certified mail, return receipt requested, to all known residence and business addresses, and (c) by email to all known email addresses for them; proof of said service, including the postal confirmations, shall be filed on NYSCEF within ten days after service is effectuated.

(5) A copy of this decision, order, and judgment shall be annexed to any future petitions commencing proceedings in this or any other county under the Structured Settlement Protection Act seeking approval of transfers of any remaining payments due Respondent Kiyoshi Wilkinson pursuant to the subject structured settlement.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

1.   "Payee" is the statutory term, because the transferor has been or will be paid the structured settlement payments. However, in terms of the within special proceeding seeking approval of an assignment of the payments, the "payee" is denoted as the "transferor."

Aaron D. Maslow, J.* FN* This Court acknowledges the assistance of Maxine Como, judicial intern and second year student at Cardozo School of Law, in the preparation of this decision.