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Yuriy Triger, OLEG FILIPOV, VASYL BZOVYY, LEONID YULMAN, EVGENY VOLODKO, YEVGENIY BELOUSOV, TEMUR DVALI, VIKTOR DOLISHNYY, VICTOR YUNGA, IGOR NEHAI, DAVIT AKOPYAN, OLEG TRIGER, VLADIMIR PUNYANSKIY, VLADIMIR ZAGORULKO, VLADMIR STEFANOVICH, Plaintiffs, v. Olympic Electrical Wiring Corp., OPTIMAL ELECTRIC, INC., KOLTUNOV ENTERPRISES, LLC, YEVGENY KOLTUNOV, MIKAIL KOLTUNOV, AND OLEH PLAMM, Defendants.
The following e-filed papers read herein: NYSCEF Doc Nos.:
Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause/Petition/Cross Motion and
Affidavits (Affirmations) Annexed 32-38
Opposing Affidavits (Affirmations) 39-43
Affidavits/ Affirmations in Reply 45-46
Upon the foregoing papers, defendant Mikhail Koltunov (defendant) moves, under motion sequence no. 3, for an order: (1) striking, without prejudice, the Amended Complaint dated November 6, 2025; and (2) enforcing the So-Ordered Stipulation between the parties, dated October 21, 2025, and directing plaintiffs Yury Triger, Oleg Filipov, Leonid Yulman, Evgeny Volodko, Yevgeniy Belousov, Temur Dvali, Viktor Dolishnyy, Victor Yunga, Igor Nehai, Davit Akopyan, Oleg Triger, Vladimir Punyanskiy, and Vladimir Stefanovich (collectively, plaintiffs) to file a conforming amended complaint.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs commenced this action in or about May 2015, alleging, inter alia, violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as well as violations of New York Labor Law (NYLL) (see NY Cts Elec Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 1), and subsequently amended their complaint in July 2015 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 5). In or around June 2015, because the 2015 Complaint asserted a FLSA claim, the action was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (docket number 1:15-cv-03711-EK-JAM) (the Federal Action) (see NYSCEF Doc No. 3). In or about October 2015, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint in the Federal Action, which only named Yevgeny Koltunov and Mikhail Koltunov as defendants (Second Amended Federal Complaint) (see NYSCEF Doc No. 35).
On January 29, 2024, the action was remanded back to this Court, as no federal claims remained pending in this case (see NYSCEF Doc No. 18). Plaintiffs thereafter moved (under motion sequence no. 2) to restore this action to the active calendar. By Order of this Court dated March 21, 2025, plaintiffs' motion was granted without opposition (see NYSCEF Doc No. 24).
The So-Ordered Stipulation
Plaintiffs and defendant Mikhail Koltunov subsequently entered into a stipulation, which was "so-ordered" by the Court on October 24, 2025 (the Stipulation). The Stipulation notes that, "while this matter was pending in Federal Court, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on or about October 22, 2015, which . . . named only Yevgeny Koltunov and Mikhail Koltunov as Defendants," and that the plaintiffs subsequently, "on or about November 18, 2022[,] . . . voluntarily dismissed all claims against Yevgeny Koltunov" (see NYSCEF Doc No. 34 at 1). The Stipulation further states that "on or about December 9, 2022[,] the plaintiffs voluntarily discontinued their First Claim for Relief, alleging a violation arising under the [FLSA]" (id.). In addition, the Stipulation notes that only 14 of the original 16 plaintiffs 1 remain in the action, which had been remanded back to state court and restored to active status. It further states the following:
WHEREAS, Plaintiffs would like to amend the complaint setting forth, and in conformity with the remaining parties, allegations and claims; and
WHEREAS, after the amendment to only remaining Defendant will be MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV; and
WHEREAS, Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV would like an extension of time to answer.
NOW, therefore, it is hereby Stipulated, by and between the attorneys for the parties herein that:
Plaintiffs are to file their amended complaint setting forth, and in conformity with, the remaining parties, allegations and claims by November 7, 2025 and Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV'S answer is due by December 5, 2025.
(id. at 2 [emphasis added]).
Plaintiffs thereafter filed their amended complaint (Amended Complaint) on November 6, 2025 (see NYSCEF Doc No. 28). Subsequently, the parties entered into a stipulation extending defendant's time to answer or make a motion concerning the Amended Complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 31). Defendant now moves to strike the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and enforce the Stipulation to which the parties agreed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues, in support of his motion, that plaintiffs' Amended Complaint should be stricken as it includes new material allegations, as well as a new claim for relief, and therefore violates the terms of the Stipulation. In this regard, defendant contends that the Stipulation "required plaintiffs to amend the original New York complaint" to reflect the "remaining parties, allegations and claims" that were "extant in the federal proceeding prior to remand" (NYSCEF Doc No. 33 at 7-8). Defendant maintains that, specifically, plaintiffs' inclusion of paragraphs 5 through 11, 32 through 34, and 43, as well as plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief demonstrate a violation of the Stipulation. As such, defendant contends that the Amended Complaint should be stricken and plaintiffs ordered to comply with the Stipulation's terms.
Plaintiffs, in opposition, agree to strike their Fourth Claim for Relief, but contend that the remaining allegations referenced by defendant do not violate the Stipulation, as they are consistent with the remaining parties, allegations, and claims, and merely add specificity or "backstory" to the extant claims set forth in the Second Amended Federal Complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 39 at 9).
Generally, "A trial court possesses discretionary power to entertain a motion to enforce a stipulation" (Transportation House v E.D.V. Maintenance Corp., 84 AD2d 534, 535 [2d Dept 1981]). "A so-ordered stipulation is a contract between the parties thereto and as such, is binding on them and will be construed in accordance with contract principles and the parties' intent" (City of New York v Quadrozzi, 189 AD3d 1342, 1344, [2d Dept 2020] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Aivaliotis v Continental Broker-Dealer Corp., 30 AD3d 446, 447 [2d Dept 2006]; Kraker v Roll, 100 AD2d 424, 436 [2d Dept 1984]; Nishman v DeMarco, 76 AD2d 360, 366 [2d Dept 1980]). "When interpreting a contract, a court must read the document as a whole to determine the parties' purpose and intent, giving a practical interpretation to the language used so that the parties' reasonable expectations are realized" (Berstein v Frazer, 211 AD3d 899, 900 [2d Dept 2022]). "However, a court should not, under the guise of interpretation, make a new contract for the parties" (Iacobacci v McAleavey, 222 AD2d 406, 407 [2d Dept 1995]). "As with a contract, courts should not disturb a valid stipulation absent a showing of good cause such as fraud, collusion, mistake or duress; or unless the agreement is unconscionable or contrary to public policy; or unless it suggests an ambiguity indicated that the words did not fully and accurately represent the parties' agreement" (McCoy v Feinman, 99 NY2d 295, 302 [2002] [internal citations omitted]).
Here, regarding the purpose of the Stipulation, the parties agreed that the plaintiffs would amend the complaint to reflect the remaining parties, allegations, and claims, expressly noting that Mikhail Koltunov would be the sole remaining defendant after the amendment. They therefore stipulated that the plaintiffs would file an amended complaint consistent with those remaining parties, allegations, and claims (see NYSCEF Doc No. 34 at 2). Read as a whole and given a practical interpretation, the Stipulation reflects the parties' intent to submit an amended complaint that does not add new allegations or causes of action, but simply memorializes that the sole remaining defendant is Mikhail Koltunov and that the plaintiffs are no longer pursuing their FLSA claim.
Contrary to defendant's contentions, the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint largely adheres to the terms set forth in the parties' Stipulation. Although defendant appears to argue that the Amended Complaint must track the precise language of the Second Amended Federal Complaint, no such requirement appears in the plain text of the Stipulation. The Court will not impose such restrictions that the parties themselves did not include in their agreement (see e.g. Tinter v Tinter, 96 AD2d 556, 557 [2d Dept 1983] ["[A] court cannot reform an agreement to conform to what it thinks is proper, if the parties have not assented to such a reformation"]).
Defendant's objections to the Amended Complaint appear to be directed primarily at paragraphs 5 through 10, as well as the Fourth Claim and allegations in paragraphs 32, 33, and 34, which assert a claim pursuant to NYLL § 191 for the timely payment of wages. As a preliminary matter, the plaintiffs' Fourth Claim seeks relief that was not previously asserted in either their 2015 Complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 1) or their Second Amended Federal Complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 35). Because plaintiffs have agreed, in opposition, to strike this claim, defendant's motion is granted to the extent that the Fourth Claim is stricken from the Amended Complaint. Furthermore, paragraphs 32, 33, and 34, which plaintiffs do not address, appear to form the basis of this NYLL § 191 claim and constitute new allegations not found in either prior pleading. Accordingly, defendant's motion is further granted to the extent that paragraphs 32, 33, and 34 are stricken from the Amended Complaint.
Defendant similarly takes exception with respect to paragraphs 9 and 10 of the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint which allege as follows:
9. Defendant hired employees, set pay rates, confirmed attendance on job sites, and/or otherwise directed Plaintiffs' work and their working conditions.
10. Additionally, when Defendant decided to limit his involvement, he still maintained an office within his son's company, hired employees, confirmed attendance on job sites, and/or otherwise directed Plaintiffs' work and their working conditions.
(NYSCEF Doc No. 36 at 2-3).
As to paragraph 9 of the Amended Complaint, although plaintiffs contend that portions of this allegation duplicate paragraph 6 of their Second Amended Federal Complaint, only the statements regarding defendant's power to hire and control wages are duplicative (see NYSCEF Doc No. 35 ¶ 6). In fact, plaintiffs concede that the additional allegations, including confirming attendance on job sites and directing plaintiffs' work and working conditions, derived from defendant's deposition (see NYSCEF Doc No. 39 at 4). Accordingly, because paragraph 9 contains new allegations which cannot be considered "remaining" allegations and its duplicative, portions are already adequately pled elsewhere in the Amended Complaint, defendant's motion is granted to the extent that paragraph 9 is stricken in its entirety.
Next, the allegation in paragraph 10, whether in form or substance, does not appear in either plaintiffs' initial 2015 Complaint, or their Second Amended Federal Complaint. Indeed, plaintiffs concede that the allegation in this paragraph also derived from defendant's deposition, but maintain that it is "certainly in line with the remaining claims" (NYSCEF Doc No. 39 at 4). However, because this allegation appears for the first time in the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, it cannot be deemed a "remaining" allegation when the parties' Stipulation is given a practical interpretation. Accordingly, defendant's motion is granted to the extent that paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint is also stricken.
However, that branch of defendant's motion seeking to strike plaintiffs' Amended Complaint based on the allegations in paragraphs 5 through 8 is denied. Paragraphs 5 through 8 state as follows:
5. Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV was the owner, chairman/chief executive officer, manager and/or operator of Defendant Olympic Electrical Wiring Corp. and Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV has, and at all times had, and exercised, the power to hire, fire and control the wages and working conditions of the Plaintiffs.
6. Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV was the owner, chairman/chief executive officer, manager and/or operator of Koltunov Enterprises, LLC. and Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV has, and at all times had, and exercised, the power to hire, fire, and control the wages and working conditions of the Plaintiffs.
7. Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV's son was the owner, chairman/chief executive officer, manager and/or operator Evergreen Electric Corp.
8. Irrespective of corporate formalities, Defendant was always Plaintiffs' employer' as defined by the NYLL. (NYSCEF Doc No. 36 at 2.)
Notably, these allegations were asserted in plaintiffs' original 2015 Complaint, which states in relevant part:
"9. Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV is the owner, chairman/chief executive officer, manager and/or operator of Defendant OLYMPIC ELECTRICAL WIRING CORP. Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV has, and at all relevant times had, and exercised, the power to hire, fire and control the wages and working conditions of the Plaintiffs.
10. Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV is the owner, chairman/chief executive officer, manager and/or operator of Defendant KOLTUNOV ENTERPRISES, LLC. Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV has, and at all relevant times had, and exercised, the power to hire, fire, and control the wages and working conditions of the Plaintiffs.
11. Defendant YEVGENY KOLTUNOV is the owner, chairman/chief executive officer, manager and/or operator of the now bankrupt Evergreen Electric Corp., the successor to OLYMPIC ELECTRICAL WIRING CORP. and KOLTUNOV ENTERPRISES, LLC. . .
12. Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV is the owner, chairman/chief executive officer, manager and/or operator of the now bankrupt Evergreen Electric Corp, the successor to OLYMPIC ELECTRICAL WIRING CORP. and KOLTUNOV ENTERPRISES, LLC. Defendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV has, and at all relevant times had, and exercised the power to hire, fire, and control the wages and working conditions of the Plaintiffs.
. . .
16. At all relevant times, Defendants ha[ve] been, and continue[ ] to be an 'employer' engaged in interstate 'commerce' and/or in the 'production of goods' for 'commerce', within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203 and the NYLL. At all relevant times, Defendants ha[ve] employed 'employee[s]', including the Plaintiffs. (NYSCEF Doc No. 46 at 3-4.)
Defendant argues, however, that upon filing the Second Amended Federal Complaint, plaintiffs failed to specifically name Olympic Electrical Wiring Corp. and Koltunov Enterprises, LLC, electing instead to merely allege that, "[d]efendant MIKHAIL KOLTUNOV was the chairman/chief executive officer, manager and/or operator of the now bankrupt Evergreen Electric Corp. and its predecessors" (NYSCEF Doc No. 35 at 2), and are therefore now foreclosed from mentioning Olympic Electrical Wiring Corp. and Koltunov Enterprises LLC by name in their Amended Complaint. This argument lacks merit, as defendant has not shown that plaintiffs repudiated or abandoned their allegations that Olympic Electrical Wiring Corp. and Koltunov Enterprises, LLC are predecessors to Evergreen Electric Corp., as alleged in the 2015 Complaint. Nor has defendant demonstrated that these allegations are not "remaining allegations" simply because plaintiffs characterized or referenced them as "predecessors" to Evergreen Electric Corp. in the Second Amended Federal Complaint. Moreover, the allegations in paragraphs 5 through 8 concern the remaining individual defendant, Mikhail Koltunov, and the roles he allegedly held. They do not reintroduce Olympic Electrical Wiring Corp. or Koltunov Enterprises, LLC as defendants. Under a practical interpretation of the Stipulation's language, the Court finds that these allegations remain in conformity with the "remaining parties, allegations and claims" (NYSCEF Doc No. 34 at 2). Additionally, defendant has not shown that he would be prejudiced or surprised by these allegations, as he acknowledges that whether an entity is a "predecessor" of Evergreen Electric Corp. is a mixed question of law and fact that has been central to this case for ten years since the filing of the Second Amended Federal Complaint, and further concedes he was aware of the allegations in the initial 2015 Complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 45 at 2-3; see e.g. Potter v Cigna-McKillen, 47 AD3d 909, 909 [2d Dept 2008] ["The amended complaint was served pursuant to a stipulation signed by the appellant, the appellant failed to demonstrate that it would be prejudiced by the delay in amending the complaint, and the amended complaint was neither palpably insufficient nor totally devoid of merit"]).
Furthermore, to the extent that defendant argues that the allegations in paragraphs 7 and 8 are entirely new, both the 2015 Complaint and the Second Federal Amended Complaint contain these same allegations (see NYSCEF Doc No. 46, 2015 Complaint ¶ 11 ["YEVGENY KOLTUNOV is the owner, chairman/chief executive officer, manager and/or operator of the now Bankrupt Evergreen Electric Corp."], and ¶16 ["At all relevant times, Defendants ha[ve] been and continue[ ] to be an 'employer' . . . within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203 and the NYLL."]; NYSCEF Doc No. 35, Second Federal Amended Complaint ¶ 8 ["YEVGENY KOLTUNOV was the owner, chairman/chief executive officer, manager and/or operator of the now bankrupt Evergreen Electric Corp.], and ¶ 10 ["At all relevant times, Defendants have been an 'employer' . . . within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203 and the NYLL."]). Accordingly, to the extent defendant seeks to strike plaintiffs' Amended Complaint based on paragraphs 5 through 8, that branch of the motion is denied.
Defendant also objects to paragraph 11 of plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which alleges that, at all relevant times, the "[d]efendant has been an "employer" within the meaning of the NYLL . . . [and] has employed "employee[s]", including the [p]laintiffs." (NYSCEF Doc No. 36 ¶ 11). However, defendant offers no specific argument explaining why this allegation is not a remaining claim, given that a substantially similar allegation was asserted in paragraph 16 of the 2015 Complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 46 ¶ 16) and in paragraph 10 of the Second Amended Federal Complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 35 ¶ 10).
Similarly, although defendant claims that paragraph 43 2 of the Amended Complaint is a "new allegation" (NYSCEF Doc No. 33 at 5), the same allegation appears in paragraph 49 of the plaintiffs' 2015 Complaint (see NYSCEF Doc No. 46 ¶ 49). Defendant has also failed to establish that plaintiffs ever disavowed or withdrew this allegation. Accordingly, to the extent defendant seeks to strike plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on this basis, that branch of the motion is denied.
Conclusion
Accordingly, defendant's motion, under motion sequence no. 3, is granted solely to the extent that paragraphs9, 10, 32, 33, and 34, as well as plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, are stricken. The remainder of defendant's motion is otherwise denied.
Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to electronically serve a copy of this Decision and Order with Notice of Entry on defendant's counsel and to electronically file an affidavit of said service with the Kings County Clerk, all by September 30, 2026.
Plaintiffs' counsel also shall serve and file another amended complaint which conforms to the within decision and order by September 30, 2026.
The newly amended complaint, conforming to the within decision and order, is deemed served and filed, nunc pro tunc, and defendant is directed to electronically answer it within 20 days after electronic service of said newly amended complaint.
The Court, having considered the parties' remaining contentions, if any, finds them unavailing. Any relief not expressly granted herein, has been considered and is denied.
This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.
ENTER
HON. AARON D. MASLOW
Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
FOOTNOTES
1. The Court notes that, pursuant to plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Vasyl Bzovyy and Vladimir Zagorulko are no longer named as plaintiffs in this action (see NYSCEF Doc No. 36).
2. Paragraph 43 of the Amended Complaint alleges that the "[d]efendant'[s] record keeping and notice violations prevented [p]laintiff from knowing his legal rights and from figuring out exactly how many hours he was not compensated for" (NYSCEF Doc No. 36).
Aaron D. Maslow, J.
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Docket No: Index No. 506059 /2015
Decided: September 10, 2026
Court: Supreme Court, Kings County, New York.
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