The People of the State of New York v. Carlos Melendez, Defendant. (2026)

Defendant Carlos Melendez moves to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30. The People oppose defendant's motion in its entirety

Upon review and consideration of the written submissions, the court file, and relevant legal authority, defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.

Facts and Procedural History

On May 30, 2020, at approximately 11:05 p.m., in front of 436 Brook Avenue in Bronx County, defendant was alleged to have possessed one black semi-automatic pistol containing a magazine with four live rounds. He was subsequently arrested.

On May 31, 2020, defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint in Criminal Court and subsequently indicted. On December 9, 2020, he was arraigned on the indictment in Supreme Court and charged with Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree (see Penal Law § 265.03 [3]), and other related offenses.

On December 15, 2020, the People served defense counsel and filed with the court an automatic disclosure form, a certificate of compliance (COC), and a statement of readiness (SOR).

On August 19, 2021, when defendant failed to appear, a bench warrant was stayed by the court. On September 1, 2021, after another non-appearance by defendant, the bench warrant was executed.

On November 25, 2024, pursuant to a fugitive warrant, defendant was arrested in the state of Pennsylvania for homicide charges under Indictment No. 75704-2024 (see tr at 6, lines 1-4, People's exhibit 1).

On March 11, 2025, pursuant to a Governor's warrant issued on behalf of the Office of the Bronx District Attorney (see Governor's warrant, defense exhibit A), defendant was extradited to New York and held in custody by the New York City Department of Correction (DOC).¹ On March 13, 2025, defendant was arraigned on homicide charges under Indictment No. 75704-2024. Defendant was remanded and remains incarcerated as of the date of this decision.

On May 15, 2026, defendant was finally produced to court on the instant indictment and the warrant was vacated. Defendant requested a motion schedule, arguing that the People failed to produce him for trial -- despite knowing he was incarcerated in the same jurisdiction -- and exceeded the statutory time allowed for the People's readiness.

On June 1, 2026, defendant filed the instant speedy trial motion, the People responded to the motion on July 21, 2026, and defendant filed a reply on July 24, 2026. The court adjourned the matter for decision to August 20, 2026.

Discussion

The People must be ready for trial within six (6) months of the commencement of a criminal action where a defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony (see CPL 30.30 [1] [a]). Although a criminal action commences with the filing of an accusatory instrument, computation for speedy trial purposes commences on the following day (see People v Stiles, 70 NY2d 765 [1987]). The defendant has the initial burden in a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPL 30.30 to allege that his right to a speedy trial has been violated (see People v Luperon, 85 NY2d 71 [1995]). The People bear the burden of proving the excludability of an adjournment (see People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 349 [1980]).

In determining whether the People have satisfied their obligation to be ready for trial under CPL 30.30, the court must calculate the time between the filing of the first accusatory instrument and the People's declaration of readiness, then subtract any statutorily excludable periods of delay. Finally, the court must add any periods of post-readiness delay that are attributable to the People for which no statutory exclusions apply (see People v Cortes, 80 NY2d 201 [1992]).

Accordingly, in this matter, the People had six months, or 182 days, commencing on June 1, 2020, to be ready for trial.

Based on the foregoing, the following periods are chargeable to the People:

May 31, 2020 — July 1, 2020

On May 31, 2020, defendant was arraigned on the felony complaint. The case was adjourned for grand jury action to July 1, 2020. Typically, speedy trial commences the day after arraignment (see Stiles, 70 NY2d 765). However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, by a series of Executive Orders issued by the Governor, CPL 30.30 was suspended as of March 20, 2020 and tolling of speedy trial time continued until October 20, 2020 (see Executive Order [A. Cuomo] Nos 202.8 [9 NYCRR 8.202.8], 202.67 [9 NYCRR 8.202.67]).

Accordingly, zero (0) days are charged to the People.

July 1, 2020 — October 1, 2020

On July 1, 2020, the case was administratively adjourned due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Speedy trial time remained suspended until October 4, 2020 (see Executive Order [A. Cuomo] Nos 202.8 [9 NYCRR 8.202.8], 202.67 [9 NYCRR 8.202.67]).

Accordingly, zero (0) days are charged to the People.

October 1, 2020 — December 9, 2020

On October 1, 2020, the matter was adjourned for grand jury action. For unindicted felonies, speedy trial time began to run when the suspension of the speedy trial clock lifted on October 20, 2020 (see Executive Order [A. Cuomo] No 202.67 [9 NYCRR 8.202.67]). This indictment was subsequently filed on October 28, 2020. The People concede that the eight-day period from October 20, 2020 to October 28, 2020 is chargeable, but argue that speedy trial time was subsequently tolled because a motion schedule was set after defendant was arraigned on the indictment on October 28, 2020. However, defendant was not arraigned on the indictment until December 9, 2020 and the case remained in a pre-readiness posture as the People had not yet filed a COC and SOR. Therefore, the period from October 20, 2020 to December 9, 2020 is chargeable to the People.

Accordingly, fifty (50) days are charged to the People.

December 9, 2020 — March 4, 2021

On December 9, 2020, defendant was arraigned on the indictment, and a motion schedule was set. Additionally, on December 15, 2020, the People filed an off-calendar COC and SOR. This entire period is excludable for motion practice (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

Accordingly, zero (0) days are charged to the People.

March 4, 2021 — May 25, 2021

On March 4, 2021, the motions were still under consideration by the court, and the matter was adjourned to May 25, 2021 for decision. On March 31, 2021, the court issued its decisions on an omnibus motion and a motion to compel a buccal swab. The period from March 4, 2021 to March 31, 2021 is excludable given that the case was in a motion posture (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]). The period from March 31, 2021 to May 25, 2021 is also excludable as the People previously stated ready for trial.

Accordingly, zero (0) days are charged to the People for this period.

May 25, 2021 — August 19, 2021

On May 25, 2021, the People filed a supplemental COC and SOR. At an appearance on that same day, the court record shows that defendant did not appear. Contrary to the People's argument, a bench warrant was not stayed. Rather, the case was adjourned to August 19, 2021 for trial. The case remained in a post-readiness posture as the People filed a second SOR.

Accordingly, zero (0) days are charged to the People.

August 19, 2021 — September 1, 2021

On August 19, 2021, defendant failed to appear. The court stayed a bench warrant until September 1, 2021. This entire period is excludable due to defendant's absence or unavailability (see CPL 30.30 [4] [c] [i], [ii]).

Accordingly, zero (0) days are chargeable to the People.

September 1, 2021 — May 15, 2026

On September 1, 2021, defendant failed to appear as required and the court executed a bench warrant. As of March 11, 2025, after extradition from Pennsylvania, defendant was in DOC custody, but he was not returned on the warrant until May 15, 2026.

Defendant argues that the People should be charged 430 days for the period of March 11, 2025 to May 15, 2026. He contends that the People were aware that he was in DOC custody as of March 11, 2025, but failed to exercise due diligence and produce him for trial. Indeed, defendant was regularly produced for appearances on his unrelated homicide matter, but never returned on the bench warrant for this case.

The People argue that zero days are chargeable because defendant failed to appear on a bench warrant. They rely on CPL 30.30 (4) (c) (ii) and the holdings in People v Penil (18 Misc 3d 355 [Sup Ct, NY County 2007]) and People v Howard (182 Misc 2d 549 [Sup Ct, NY County 1999]). They further assert that when defendant was arraigned on the homicide charges on March 13, 2025, this matter was also adjourned to June 9, 2025, and that the case was in a post-readiness posture, rendering the adjournment excludable.

With respect to the time period of September 1, 2021 to March 10, 2025, no time is charged to the People. On September 1, 2021, defendant failed to appear in court and a bench warrant was issued. The period from September 1, 2021 to November 24, 2024 -- the day before defendant's Pennsylvania arrest -- is excludable due to defendant's absence and failure to appear on the bench warrant (see CPL 30.30 [4] [c] [i], [ii]). On November 25, 2024, defendant was arrested in Pennsylvania as a fugitive from New York on homicide charges. On February 18, 2025, the People obtained a Governor's warrant and defendant was subsequently extradited to New York. As such, this period is excludable due to defendant's detention in another jurisdiction and the People's diligent and reasonable efforts to secure his presence for trial (see CPL 30.30 [4] [e]).

The crucial period at issue is the timeframe of March 11, 2025 to May 15, 2026. As of March 11, 2025, after extradition, defendant was in DOC custody and should have been returned to court. However, the People made no subsequent efforts to produce defendant for this matter until he was returned on the bench warrant on May 15, 2026. Consequently, the court finds that the People should be charged the entirety of the time period of March 11, 2025 to May 15, 2026 (see People v Knight, 163 AD2d 583, 585 [2d Dept 1990]).

It is well settled that the People must produce an incarcerated defendant for court, and any delay in production is attributable to them when they are aware the defendant is in custody in the same jurisdiction (see People v Anderson, 66 NY2d 529, 540 [1985]; People v Ramos, 230 AD2d 630 [1st Dept 1996]; People v Daniels, 217 AD2d 448, 452 [1st Dept 1995]; People v Gatling, 160 Misc 2d 886, 891 [Sup Ct, NY County 1994]). "[D]ue diligence must be shown if detention in the same jurisdiction is to be excluded" from speedy trial calculations (Anderson, 66 NY2d at 540). Delay may be chargeable to the People even when a bench warrant has been issued (see Ramos, 230 AD2d at 630 [holding that the motion court properly charged the People with the period of time between issuance of bench warrant against defendant and his return thereon following completion of term of incarceration in another county]).

CPL 30.30 (4) (c) provides that certain periods of time are excludable due to delay caused by the absence or unavailability of a defendant (see People v Quiles, 176 AD2d 164, 164 [1st Dept 1991]). For example, the period between the issuance of a bench warrant and a defendant's return to court is commonly excludable (see id.). However, the People must exercise and demonstrate due diligence in producing a defendant and "[t]he only circumstance where due diligence need not be established is where defendant may be deemed absent because his location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution" (id.). That was not the case here. Defendant's location was plainly known to the People as he was in DOC custody due to their own efforts. That knowledge "must be imputed to the District Attorney's office" (People v Mapp, 308 AD2d 463, 463 [2d Dept 2003] [finding that the prosecution was properly charged speedy trial time where they had knowledge of the defendant's whereabouts but made no efforts to produce him to court]). Once defendant was extradited to New York, no additional efforts were made to produce him for court on this case. Therefore, defendant was not absent or unavailable within the meaning of CPL 30.30 (4) (c) and this period is charged to the People (see People v Providence, 216 AD2d 75, 75-76 [1st Dept 1995]).

Furthermore, Penil and Howard are inapposite because they involved locating defendants during their bench warrant status. Here, no diligent efforts were made to produce defendant after he was actually found and taken into custody by law enforcement.

Ultimately, "[t]he inquiry on a speedy trial motion is whether the People have done all that is required of them to bring the case to a point where it may be tried. The People are not presently ready where they fail to produce an incarcerated defendant for trial" (People v Brewer, 63 AD3d 402, 403 [1st Dept 2009], citing People v England, 84 NY2d 1, 4 [1994]). Despite knowing defendant's exact location and custody status, the People failed to exercise due diligence to secure his production on this indictment (see Mapp, 308 AD2d 463).

Accordingly, the four hundred and thirty (430) days from March 11, 2025 to May 15, 2026 are charged to the People.

May 15, 2026 — June 25, 2026

On May 15, 2026, the People produced defendant and the warrant was vacated. The court set a motion schedule and adjourned the case for decision to June 25, 2026. This entire period is excludable because of motion practice (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

Accordingly, zero (0) days are charged to the People.

June 25, 2026 - August 20, 2026

On June 25, 2026, defendant was produced. The case was adjourned for decision to August 20, 2026. This entire period is excludable because the case was in a motion posture (see CPL 30.30 [4] [a]).

Accordingly, zero (0) days are charged to the People.

Conclusion

In sum, the court finds that the People are to be charged four hundred and eighty (480) days of speedy trial time.

Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to CPL 30.30 is GRANTED.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.

Dated: August 19, 2026

Bronx, New York

Hon. Jay Y. Kim, A.J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   NYC Department of Correction Person in Custody Lookup, https://a073-ils-web.nyc.gov/inmatelookup/pages/home/home.jsf [last accessed August 18, 2026]

Jay Y. Kim, J.