D.J., Plaintiff, v. TEMPLE OF DELIVERANCE AND MYRA DAVIS (2026)

Plaintiff moves by notice of motion for an order (a) directing that the trial of this action proceed as a unified trial with the issues of liability and damages to be tried together, pursuant to CPLR 603, 4011, and 2201; and (b) vacating, withdrawing, or declining to issue any prior or prospective order of bifurcation in this action (motion sequence no. 2).

St. Anthony Baptist Church (St. Anthony) s/h/a Anthony Baptist Church opposes the motion.

Background

On August 5, 2021, Plaintiff commenced this action under the Child Victims Act (CVA) (see CPLR 214-g) by e-filing the summons and verified complaint with the Kings County Clerk (NYSCEF Doc No. 1). The complaint states that "Plaintiff brings this lawsuit to recover for the emotional and physical suffering he incurred because of the negligence of Myra Davis and Anthony Baptist Church F/K/A Temple of Deliverance" (Complaint ¶ 7). The complaint alleges that from 1983 through 1985, when Plaintiff was approximately 4 years old and continuing until age 6, Plaintiff was sexually abused by Myra Davis, the wife of a minister at Anthony Baptist Church (id. ¶ 16). The abuse included digital anal penetration and molesting and fondling Plaintiff's genitals (id.).

Plaintiff therefore seeks damages against Anthony Baptist Church under causes of action for negligence; negligent hiring, retention and supervision; and negligent infliction of emotional distress.¹

Plaintiff now moves for an order directing that the liability and damages issues be tried together. In support, Plaintiff relies on a short form order from the Westchester County Supreme Court issued in an Adult Survivors Act action. In that case, the court "declined to sign [an] order to show cause [for a unified trial] and filed an order directing the trial of that Adult Survivor Action be tried unified with respect to liability and damages" (NYSCEF Doc No. 44, Plaintiff's Memo at 7-8). The order reads, in relevant part, "[t]rials of Adult Survivors' actions are presumptively unified" (see Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). Plaintiff urges this court to "honor [the Westchester County Supreme Court's] directives" (Plaintiff's Memo at 8).

Plaintiff further argues that evidence concerning liability and damages are "inextricably intertwined" and cannot be fairly separated. According to Plaintiff, the proof relating to the "nature, severity, and permanency" of Plaintiff's injuries is also relevant to how the alleged sexual abuse occurred and will be presented with the same witnesses and evidence (Plaintiff's Memo at 9). In Plaintiff's view, "[i]t is clear through the testimony of the Plaintiff that this incident and the other incidents of abuse in Davis' home are inseparable from his pain and suffering" (id. at 9-10). A bifurcated trial, Plaintiff submits, is prejudicial because "[a] jury that hears only dry facts about the incident — divorced from any understanding of its human consequences — may be less likely to render a just liability verdict" (id. at 10).

St. Anthony opposes the motion. Much of St. Anthony's affirmation is devoted to contesting whether it is the appropriate defendant to be held responsible for the alleged abuse. St. Anthony also characterizes the instant motion as premature because "[n]o party has requested bifurcation and no Court order directs a bifurcated trial" (NYSCEF Doc No. 47, St. Anthony Aff ¶ 4). As to the merits, St. Anthony argues that a unified trial would "cause the jury to transfer sympathy for Plaintiff and condemnation of Myra to St. Anthony before deciding identity, agency, notice, and control" (id. ¶ 29). In addition, it contends that Plaintiff's submission is conclusory, not supported by credible proof, and that the proof as to liability is distinct from damages (see NYSCEF Doc No. 52, St. Anthony's Memo).

Discussion

As a general rule in negligence cases, the issues of liability and damages "represent distinct and severable issues which should be tried and determined separately" (Cutsogeorge v Hertz Corp., 239 AD2d 540, 540 [2d Dept 1997]). Moreover, trial "[j]udges are encouraged to order a bifurcated trial" in a personal injury action "where it appears that bifurcation may assist in a clarification or simplification of issues and a fair and more expeditious resolution of the action" (22 NYCRR 202.42[a]; see CPLR 603 [court may order a separate trial of any claim or issue "in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice"]; CPLR 4011 [court may determine sequence of trial issues "to achieve a speedy and unprejudiced disposition"]). Although bifurcation is encouraged under the statewide trial rules, "bifurcation is not an absolute given and it is the responsibility of the trial judge to exercise discretion in determining whether bifurcation is appropriate in light of all relevant facts and circumstances presented by the individual cases" (Castro v Malia Realty, LLC, 177 AD3d 58, 66 [2d Dept 2019]).

A unified trial is appropriate only "where the nature of the injuries has an important bearing on the issue of liability" (Parris v New York City Tr. Auth., 140 AD3d 938, 939 [2d Dept 2016]). The party proposing a unified trial bears the burden of demonstrating that evidence concerning the nature of the injuries will necessarily assist the factfinder in resolving the liability issue (see I. R. v Santos, 245 AD3d 843, 844 [2d Dept 2026]). In making its determination, the court should "determine whether the nature of the alleged injuries is probative of the issue of liability" and "evaluate the relative importance of such evidence to the parties' dispute," and then weigh those considerations "against the degree to which the gravity of such injuries will likely engender sympathy for the plaintiff" and prejudice defendant (Patino v County of Nassau, 124 AD3d 738, 740 [2d Dept 2015]).

Against this backdrop, Plaintiff's reliance on the Westchester County Supreme Court's short form order is unpersuasive. While reasoned decisions from courts of coordinate jurisdiction may be persuasive authority in an appropriate case, this court is not bound by any such decision (see McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Statutes § 72[b] ["Whether a judicial construction of a statute is a binding precedent depends on the court by which it was rendered and the rank of the tribunal in the judicial hierarchy"]; Montrose v Baggott, 161 AD 494, 502 [2d Dept 1914] [stare decisis applies to principles of law established by court of last resort and intermediate court decisions in harmony with established law]). From a substantive standpoint, a categorical presumption that CVA actions must be tried on a unified basis would be inconsistent with the Second Department's clear direction that trials courts use their "discretion to determine whether a personal injury trial should be unified or bifurcated in accordance with the standard set forth in the statewide rule" (Castro, 177 AD3d at 65). A presumptive rule mandating unified trials in all CVA actions would also be contrary to established precedent, namely: 22 NYCRR 202.42(a), which encourages judges to order bifurcation; Castro's directive that trial courts exercise discretion in determining the order of trial issues on a case-by-case basis (177 AD3d at 63); and the balancing test enumerated in Patino for determining whether a unified trial is appropriate in any particular case (124 AD3d at 740). Thus, the proper test is whether bifurcation would simplify or clarify the issues and bring about a fair resolution of the action (Castro, 177 AD3d at 67; see 22 NYCRR 202.42[a]).

Here, Plaintiff failed to make a proper evidentiary showing that proof of his injuries is necessary to resolve the question of liability. Plaintiff annexed only the Westchester County Supreme Court order to this motion and otherwise relied principally on counsel's unsworn memorandum which contains a conclusory assertion that liability and damages are inextricably intertwined (see Galarza v Crown Container Co., Inc., 90 AD3d 703, 704 [2d Dept 2011] [finding "plaintiff's bald assertion" insufficient to meet burden]; Wahid v Long Is. R.R. Co., 59 AD3d 712, 713 [2d Dept 2009] [finding conclusory assertions on motion for unified trial are "without probative value"]). Although Plaintiff's memorandum of law cites to his own deposition transcript as NYSCEF Doc No. 33 to support his requested relief, that document is St. Anthony's attorney's affirmation submitted on a prior motion to compel, and not Plaintiff's deposition.

By contrast, St. Anthony submitted several deposition transcript excerpts in its opposition to demonstrate "that corporate identity, agency, notice, control, and causation remain disputed threshold liability issues that should be resolved before the structure of any trial is determined" (St. Anthony's Aff ¶ 18; see NYSCEF Doc Nos. 49 [Plaintiff's EBT], 50 [Davis' EBT], and 51 [Harden's EBT]). Even considering Plaintiff's deposition transcript excerpts submitted by St. Anthony in opposition, the testimony does not show that the nature of the injuries alleged here would assist in determining whether Plaintiff was a victim of childhood sexual abuse, and whether these defendants should be held liable under the theories of liability pled in the complaint. Plaintiff testified to a pattern of grooming, including groping and physical abuse, which ultimately led to digital anal penetration. Indeed, courts have found that some proof of injuries may be admitted at the liability phase of a bifurcated trial so long as it is probative of liability and accompanied by a proper limiting instruction (see Bennetti v New York City Tr. Auth., 22 NY2d 742, 743 [1968] [finding evidence of injuries to passengers should have been allowed to prove force of impact and relative speed of vehicles involved, with limiting instruction]; Jacobs v Broidy, 88 AD2d 904, 904 [2d Dept 1982] [finding some showing of severity of plaintiff's injuries should have been allowed at liability phase]).

Moreover, Plaintiff's contention that a factfinder presented with "only dry facts about the incident — divorced from any understanding of its human consequences — may be less likely to render a just liability verdict" is squarely within the rationale in favor of bifurcation. Factfinders presented with facts of the "human consequences" resulting from childhood sexual abuse creates "a palpable danger of confusion and prejudice to [defendants] if the jury were exposed to the full extent of the plaintiff's case on the issue of damages while it was considering the issue of liability" (Patino, 124 AD3d at 740). Thus, a benefit of bifurcation is that it excludes evidence of the gravity of the injuries to avoid "engender[ing] sympathy for the plaintiff" (Castro, 177 AD3d at 64, quoting Patino, 124 AD3d at 740). That said, contrary to Plaintiff's contention, a factfinder that determines liability based upon the human consequences of child sexual abuse does not render a "just liability verdict." Rather, it creates a serious risk that sympathy for Plaintiff's circumstances and the factfinder's repudiation of Davis would transfer liability to St. Anthony.

The circumstances here differ from those in Castro (177 AD3d at 65-66), where evidence of plaintiff's injuries was probative in determining whether the incident was a result of an elevation-risk or from his own actions. The instant facts are unlike Roman v McNulty (99 AD2d 544, 544 [2d Dept 1984]), where medical evidence related to plaintiff's injuries was necessary to corroborate plaintiff's version of how the accident occurred. They are also distinguishable from Jacobs (88 AD2d at 904) where the severity of plaintiff's injuries was relevant to determining whether defendant's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances. Unlike those cases, there was no proof submitted here to show that either the location or extent of Plaintiff's injuries would indicate how the sex abuse occurred or "help determine the appropriate liable party" (Upton v Redmond Products, Inc., 23 AD3d 551, 552 [2d Dept 2005]).

Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff's notice of motion for a unified trial on the issues of liability and damages (motion sequence no. 2) is denied in its entirety.

St. Anthony shall serve a copy of this decision and order, with notice of entry, upon Plaintiff within five (5) days of such entry. St. Anthony shall e-file an affidavit of said service within five (5) days of effectuating service.

Any issue raised and not decided herein is denied.

This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: September 2, 2026

E N T E R:

Hon. Joanne D. Quiñones

Justice of the Supreme Court

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiff has separate causes of action as to Davis for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (see Complaint ¶¶ 44-61).

Joanne D. Quiñones, J.