LCF v. DOLCE HAIR DESIGNS KAREN OWENS (2026)

NYSCEF documents 1 through 12 were read and considered in deciding this motion.

Relief Requested

The plaintiff moves pursuant to CPLR 3213 for summary judgment in lieu of complaint in the principal sum of $7,495.15, with statutory interest from December 12, 2025, plus statutory costs.

Background

This action stems from a breach of a settlement agreement entered into by the plaintiff and the defendants on November 26, 2025 (see Exhibit 1).¹ The plaintiff alleges that the defendants materially breached the agreement and are liable to the plaintiff in the amount of $7,495.15, which remains due and owing, with statutory interest from December 12, 2025, plus statutory costs.

The defendants have not opposed the motion despite being properly served with the commencement papers (see NYSCEF docs. 11-12; see also CPLR 308, 311).

Discussion

"Pursuant to CPLR 3213, [w]hen an action is based upon an instrument for the payment of money only or upon any judgment, the plaintiff may serve with the summons a notice of motion for summary judgment and the supporting papers in lieu of a complaint" (Pearl Riv. Campus, LLC v ReadyScrip, LLC, 240 AD3d 610 [2d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

The plaintiff established, prima facie, that the settlement agreement is an "instrument for the payment of money only" within the meaning of CPLR 3213, and that the defendants defaulted under the terms of the settlement agreement (see Kays v Antzoulatos, 211 AD3d 925, 925-926 [2d Dept 2022]). In opposition, the defendants, having failed to oppose the motion, failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint pursuant to CPLR 3213 is GRANTED.

Submit judgment on notice (see 22 NYCRR 202.48[a]-[b]).

Dated: September 3, 2026

Mineola, New York

E N T E R :

HON. SARIKA KAPOOR, A.J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although LCF did not sign the agreement and there is no evidence of any express waiver of the contractual condition requiring each party's signature for enforceability, an unsigned contract may nonetheless be binding where objective evidence establishes that the parties intended to be bound by its terms (Gallagher v Long Island Plastic Surgical Group, P.C., 113 AD3d 652 [2d Dept 2014]). Here, LCF's acceptance of payments under the agreement, its treatment of the agreement as operative, and its efforts to enforce the defendants' obligations constitute objective manifestations of assent sufficient to establish a binding contract notwithstanding the absence of LCF's signature (Flores v Lower E. Side Serv. Ctr., Inc., 4 NY3d 363 [2005]).

Sarika Kapoor, J.