J. H., etc., et al., appellants, v. SOUTH COUNTRY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Q/

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Linda J. Kevins, J.), dated November 4, 2024.  The order granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In September 2021, the infant plaintiff, who was then a ninth grade student attending the defendant Bellport High School, which was under the control of the defendant South Country Central School District, allegedly injured his shoulder when trying to intercept a football that students were using during an ultimate frisbee gym class unit.  Thereafter, the infant plaintiff, by his father and natural guardian, and his father suing derivatively, commenced this action against, among others, the defendant Bridget Roche, the infant plaintiff's gym teacher, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, alleging, among other things, negligent supervision.  The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  In an order dated November 4, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the motion.  The plaintiffs appeal.

Schools are under a duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge, and they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision (see Brown v. City of New York, 242 AD3d 816, 817;  Cristofari v North Shore Cent. Sch. Dist., 237 AD3d 898, 898–899).  A school, however, is not an insurer of its students’ safety and will be held liable only for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision (see Brown v. City of New York, 242 AD3d at 817;  Santos v. City of New York, 138 AD3d 968, 969).  The mere happening of an accident, in and of itself, does not establish liability of a defendant (see Scavelli v. Town of Carmel, 131 AD3d 688, 690).  Moreover, where an accident occurs in so short a span of time that even the most intense supervision could not have prevented it, any lack of supervision is not the proximate cause of the injury and summary judgment in favor of the defendant school district is warranted (see Brown v. City of New York, 242 AD3d at 817;  Santos v. City of New York, 138 AD3d at 969).

Here, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  The defendants demonstrated their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting, among other things, a transcript of the deposition testimony of Roche and transcripts of the General Municipal Law § 50–h hearing testimony and deposition testimony of the infant plaintiff, which established, prima facie, that the defendants provided adequate supervision and instruction during the infant plaintiff's gym class and that, in any event, any alleged inadequacy in the level of supervision was not a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff's injuries (see S.T. v Island Park Union Free Sch. Dist., 225 AD3d 924, 926;  Scavelli v. Town of Carmel, 131 AD3d at 690;  cf.  Roth v Central Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 145 AD3d 1056, 1057).  In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Cristofari v North Shore Cent. Sch. Dist., 237 AD3d at 899).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

BARROS, J.P., CHAMBERS, TAYLOR and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.