IN RE: George LORENZ (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent denying petitioner's application for World Trade Center accidental disability retirement benefits.

Petitioner, a former police officer for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, participated in search and rescue operations at the World Trade Center (hereinafter WTC) site between September 2001 and May 2002.  In October 2002, petitioner was promoted to sergeant and served in that capacity until he took service retirement in January 2010.  In April 2021, petitioner filed an application for World Trade Center accidental disability retirement benefits, citing posttraumatic stress disorder (hereinafter PTSD).  The New York State and Local Police and Fire Retirement System denied the application upon the ground that petitioner was not permanently incapacitated from performing his duties as a police officer.  Petitioner requested a hearing and redetermination of his application.  At the hearing, the Retirement System conceded that petitioner's PTSD was causally related to his work at the WTC site, leaving only the issue as to whether petitioner was permanently disabled from performing his job duties due to his condition.  Following the hearing, the Hearing Officer upheld the denial of the application, and respondent adopted that decision.  This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

Given the Retirement System's concession as to causation, “the sole issue before us is whether petitioner met his burden of proving that his medical condition[ ] rendered him permanently incapacitated from the performance of his job duties” (Matter of Mercurio v. DiNapoli, 243 AD3d 1084, 1085 [3d Dept 2025] [internal quotation marks, ellipsis and citations omitted];  see Matter of Diesel v. DiNapoli, 185 AD3d 1135, 1136 [3d Dept 2020] ).  “Respondent is vested with the authority to resolve conflicting medical evidence in that regard and to credit one expert's opinion over another, and his determination will be sustained if supported by substantial evidence” (Matter of Hannon v. DiNapoli, 226 AD3d 1122, 1123 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted];  see Matter of Merante v. DiNapoli, 246 AD3d 1191, 1192 [3d Dept 2026] ).

Margaret Mortensen, petitioner's psychologist, who began treating him in November 2020, diagnosed him with chronic PTSD and opined that, due to this condition, he is unable to perform his duties as a police officer due to difficulty in making decisions in situations involving human conflict and unexpected events.  Mortensen also referenced petitioner suffering from agoraphobia, that he suffers panic attacks brought on by certain triggers, including being in crowds, loud noises, driving and pictures of New York City, as well as moments when petitioner “blanks out,” during which petitioner would not be able to function as a police officer.  According to Mortensen, these panic attacks were occurring several times a week but that therapy and medication have helped reduce them to once a week.  Mortensen did not provide any treatment records or notes from her sessions with petitioner in support of her opinion.

William Cox, the psychiatrist who examined petitioner and reviewed his medical records on behalf of the Retirement System, also diagnosed petitioner with chronic PTSD resulting from his participation in the WTC search and rescue operations.  According to Cox, however, the presence of a PTSD diagnosis “does not automatically translate to a disability” and people may still function with that condition.  Cox explained that the fact that petitioner stated that his PTSD symptoms started almost immediately after his participation at the WTC site, and he continued to work for several years without any indication that his symptoms were interfering with his ability to perform his job duties, reflect that he was functioning as a police officer with his condition.  Although Cox noted that it was difficult to evaluate petitioner's current ability to perform his job duties due to the significant length of time between when he retired and when he applied for WTC accidental disability retirement benefits and how changes regarding his general health during that time may have materially affected “the trajectory of [petitioner's] PTSD,” he maintained that there was “no psychiatric contraindication” preventing petitioner from resuming his job duties at the time he applied for benefits (see Retirement and Social Security Law § 363[a];  Matter of Mercurio v. DiNapoli, 243 AD3d at 1085).¹  In our view, although there was medical evidence that could support a contrary conclusion, Cox's rational opinion based upon an examination of petitioner and a review of his medical records provides substantial evidence supporting respondent's determination that petitioner did not meet his burden of establishing that he was permanently incapacitated from his job duties due to his medical condition (see Matter of Kennedy v. DiNapoli, 175 AD3d 1638, 1639–1640 [3d Dept 2019];  Matter of Del Peschio v. DiNapoli, 139 AD3d 1298, 1300 [3d Dept 2016] ).  Accordingly, the determination is confirmed.  Petitioner's remaining contentions have been considered and found to be without merit.

ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Contrary to petitioner's contention, the fact that he continued working for several years after the manifestation of his PTSD symptoms was relevant when considering whether he was permanently incapacitated from performing his job duties at the time he filed his benefits application (see e.g. Matter of Walsh v New York State & Local Empls.  Retirement Sys., 176 AD3d 1430, 1432 [3d Dept 2019] ).

Mackey, J.

Garry, P.J., Aarons, Pritzker and McShan, JJ., concur.