IN RE: Robert REID (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND JUDGMENT

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent denying petitioner's applications for performance of duty and accidental disability retirement benefits.

Petitioner, a former police officer employed by the Village of Hempstead Police Department in Nassau County, filed applications for performance of duty and accidental disability retirement benefits in October 2017, citing that he was permanently disabled as a result of multiple strokes, open heart surgery and pain in his back, right knee, right hip and left shoulder.  Petitioner listed an on-duty car accident that occurred on September 20, 2014 as the reason for his claimed disability.  He filed another performance of duty application – this one based upon the statutory “heart presumption” (see Retirement and Social Security Law § 363–a) – on the same day.  In that application, petitioner noted that he was permanently disabled because of “heart, multiple strokes, [and] open heart surgery,” but he failed to list the date or description of incidents which he claimed led to those disabilities.  Petitioner's heart presumption application was denied for failure to file notice of the incident as required by Retirement and Social Security Law § 363–c (e).  His performance of duty and accidental disability applications were both denied for failure to prove that he was permanently incapacitated from the performance of his duties.  Following a hearing for redetermination on the applications, the Hearing Officer upheld all three denials.  Respondent then affirmed the Hearing Officer's decision, and petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding.

We confirm.  “In connection with any application for accidental or performance of duty disability retirement benefits, the applicant bears the burden of proving that he or she is permanently incapacitated from the performance of his or her job duties” (Matter of Hannon v. DiNapoli, 226 AD3d 1122, 1123 [3d Dept 2024] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted];  see Matter of Merante v. DiNapoli, 246 AD3d 1191, 1192 [3d Dept 2026] ).  Petitioner testified on his own behalf, indicating that following an on-duty car accident he missed work for a month before returning to “light duty working on the desk.”  According to petitioner, light duty consisted of working from a desk at police headquarters – accepting complaints, assisting with radio dispatch and doing anything else that is required within the building.  He maintained that light duty position until he stopped working altogether almost two years later.  Petitioner described how the pain levels in his back prevented him from being able to stand or sit for any extended period of time and prevented him from walking without feeling pain.  Following a series of strokes, petitioner started experiencing psychological symptoms as well, including depression, anxiety and feelings of inadequacy.

In contrast to petitioner's testimony, Tal Mednick, a neurologist, testified that after she performed a neurological evaluation of petitioner, she concluded that petitioner was exhibiting symptoms consistent with someone who had suffered a stroke, including right-sided weakness, decreased sensations and diminished motor function, but that he was not permanently incapacitated from performing his light duty work assignment.  In addition to Mednick's testimony and report, petitioner's medical records indicated that he was also examined by an orthopedic surgeon who determined that petitioner had “no orthopedic disability” and was “capable of maintaining full employment without restrictions.”  Following his open heart surgery, a cardiologist also cleared petitioner for “all activities including competitive sports without restriction.”

Given the medical evidence presented and petitioner's failure to provide any medical proof to the contrary, petitioner did not prove that he is permanently incapacitated from performing his light duty work and respondent's determination to that effect is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Ellrodt v. DiNapoli, 169 AD3d 1128, 1129 [3d Dept 2019];  Matter of Maldari v. DiNapoli, 160 AD3d 1323, 1324 [3d Dept 2018] ).  In view of the foregoing, we need not address his remaining argument regarding the heart presumption set forth by Retirement and Social Security Law § 363–a (see Matter of Pellittiere v New York State & Local Police & Fire Retirement Sys., 121 AD3d 1143, 1144–1145 [3d Dept 2014] ).

ADJUDGED that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

Ceresia, J.

Pritzker, J.P., Powers, Corcoran and Ryba, JJ., concur.