PEOPLE v. MCNEIL (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Howard E. Sturim, J.), rendered December 6, 2022, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree, and two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in connection with a shooting incident.

The defendant contends that the County Court improperly shifted the burden of proof to him during trial based upon the court's response to defense counsel's objections to questions asked by the prosecutor during the presentation of the People's case.  To the extent that the defendant's contention is based upon the court's response to defense counsel's objection to certain testimony elicited by the prosecutor from the complaining witness, the contention is unpreserved for appellate review, since the defendant did not object to the subject testimony on the specific ground that he now raises on appeal (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. McAllister, 264 A.D.2d 742, 743).  To the extent that the defendant's contention is based upon the use of the defendant's middle name during the direct examination of the arresting detective, the contention is without merit.  Here, the indictment named the defendant as “Floyd McNeil, Jr.” However, during prior testimony, the People established that the defendant also used the name “Kwami.”  Then, during the detective's testimony, the prosecutor elicited from the detective that the person arrested in connection with this case was named “Floyd Kwami McNeil, Jr.” Thus, the purpose of referring to the defendant by his full name, including his middle name, was to establish the defendant's identity.  Given the foregoing, the court properly directed defense counsel to address the issue on cross-examination and did not shift the burden of proof to the defendant (see People v. Menendez, 50 AD3d 1061, 1062;  see also People v. Murphy, 52 AD3d 846, 846).

The defendant's contention that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of trial counsel is without merit.  The record shows that the defendant was afforded meaningful representation based on the evidence, the law, and the circumstances of the case, viewed in totality and as of the time of the representation (see People v. Maffei, 35 NY3d 264, 269;  People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712;  People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147).  The defendant failed to demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for the alleged deficiencies of counsel (see People v. Maffei, 35 NY3d at 269;  People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d at 712;  People v. Abodalo, 189 AD3d 1607, 1608).

The defendant's contention that the County Court, by the sentence it imposed, penalized him for refusing to accept a plea offer and exercising his right to a trial is without merit.  A review of the record here reveals no indication that the sentence imposed was the result of vindictiveness or retribution against the defendant for refusing to accept a plea offer and exercising his right to proceed to trial (see People v. Cardoza, 247 AD3d 779, 780;  People v. Cowan, 243 AD3d 674, 676;  People v. Gordon, 226 AD3d 700, 702–703).  Moreover, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).

The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit.

IANNACCI, J.P., DOWLING, WAN and LOVE, JJ., concur.