Syedul Alam, appellant, v. Uber Technologies, Inc., et al., defendants, Adlet Ilyassov, respondent. (2026)

Submitted—March 31, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Ulysses B. Leverett, J.), dated March 25, 2025.  The order granted the motion of the defendant Adlet Ilyassov for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion of the defendant Adlet Ilyassov for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident is denied.

The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident.  The defendant Adlet Ilyassov (hereinafter the defendant) moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident.  In an order dated March 25, 2025, the Supreme Court granted the motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

The defendant met his prima facie burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345;  Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957).  The defendant demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 AD3d 614).  In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained serious injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of his spine, his left shoulder, and his left knee under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Perl v. Meher, 18 NY3d 208).  Moreover, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the cervical and lumbar regions of the plaintiff's spine, his left shoulder, and his left knee were not caused by the accident (see Navarro v. Afifi, 138 AD3d 803, 804).

Since the defendant failed to establish that the plaintiff's injuries were not caused by the accident, the burden never shifted to the plaintiff to explain any gap in treatment (see Cortez v. Nugent, 175 AD3d 1383, 1384;  see generally Pommells v. Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 572).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident.

The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court