CONTI v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, etc., respondent. (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to certain real property and for related declaratory relief, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Ingrid Joseph, J.), dated August 12, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted those branches of the motion of the defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company which were pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first through fifth causes of action insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In January 2004, the plaintiff's now-deceased father acquired title to certain real property located in Brooklyn.  In February 2005, title to the property was purportedly transferred by deed (hereinafter the 2005 deed) from the plaintiff's father to nonparty Amelio Marino (hereinafter Amelio) and the defendant Rose Marino (hereinafter Rose).  Thereafter, Amelio and Rose obtained a loan in the amount of $696,000, secured by a mortgage on the property (hereinafter the Deutsche Bank mortgage), which was transferred to defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (hereinafter Deutsche Bank).  In May 2007, the property was purportedly transferred by deed (hereinafter the 2007 deed) from Amelio and Rose to Amelio and the plaintiff, and, in May 2013, Amelio transferred his interest in the property to Rose. In or about April 2013, Amelio and Rose defaulted in payment of the Deutsche Bank mortgage, and in January 2015, Deutsche Bank initiated an action against Amelio, Rose, and the plaintiff to foreclose upon the Deutsche Bank mortgage (hereinafter the foreclosure action).

In April 2023, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, pursuant to RPAPL article 15 to quiet title to the property and for related declaratory relief.  As relevant to this appeal, the first, fourth, and fifth causes of action sought to quiet title and judgments declaring that the 2005 deed, the 2007 deed, and the Deutsche Bank mortgage were nullities.  The second and third causes of action sought to recover damages for fraud in the factum and fraud in the inducement of the deeds.  Deutsche Bank moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the first through fifth causes of action insofar as asserted against it.  In an order dated August 12, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted those branches of Deutsche Bank's motion.  The plaintiff appeals

The Supreme Court properly directed dismissal of the second and third causes of action insofar as asserted against Deutsche Bank, which sought to recover damages for fraud, as time-barred.  “A cause of action based upon fraud must be commenced within six years from the time of the fraud, or within two years from the time the fraud was discovered, or with reasonable diligence could have been discovered, whichever is longer” (Dodobayeva v. Rubinoff, 242 AD3d 706, 708 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see CPLR 213[8];  Williams–Guillaume v. Bank of Am., N.A., 130 AD3d 1016, 1017).  Here, the alleged fraud occurred, at the latest, in May 2007, and Deutsche Bank demonstrated that the plaintiff had knowledge of the alleged fraud, at the latest, in December 2017, as indicated by the plaintiff's answer in the foreclosure action.  Since this action was not commenced until April 2023, Deutsche Bank demonstrated, prima facie, that the second and third causes of action, seeking damages based upon fraud, were time-barred (see Mostafa v. Pension Solutions, LLC, 221 AD3d 997, 999;  Schulman v. Schulman, 166 AD3d 833, 833).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Beizer v. Hirsch, 116 AD3d 725, 726).

The plaintiff argues on appeal that the Supreme Court improperly directed dismissal of the first, fourth, and fifth causes of action insofar as asserted against Deutsche Bank pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7).  The plaintiff raised no argument in his main brief concerning so much of the order as directed dismissal of the first, fourth, and fifth causes of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) for lack of standing.  Thus, we affirm that portion of the order without reaching the plaintiff's argument that those causes of action were not subject to dismissal under CPLR 3211(a)(1) and (a)(7) (see AA Med., P.C. v Employee Med. Health Plan of Suffolk County, 229 AD3d 487, 488).

The parties' remaining contentions either need not be reached in light of our determination or are without merit.

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.