S.F., Plaintiff, v. L.L.F., Defendant. (2026)

This protracted matrimonial action, commenced in 2016, was recently reassigned to the undersigned. Before the Court is Motion Sequence 012, a sequence that has accumulated more than three years of submissions and encompasses the following applications: Defendant's motion, dated March 11, 2023, for a final accounting of the distributive award rendered by this Court's Decision and Order dated April 7, 2022, and for related relief; Plaintiff's cross motion, dated July 12, 2023, to amend and modify the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order with respect to the equitable distribution of Defendant's two public pensions; and Plaintiff's third cross motion, dated July 7, 2026, to strike Defendant's July 1, 2026 and July 2, 2026 filings or, in the alternative, to fix a schedule for Plaintiff's response thereto. Upon the papers enumerated below, the motions are decided as follows.

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a], the following papers, all filed electronically through NYSCEF, were read and considered in reaching this determination: Plaintiff's Notice of Cross Motion dated July 12, 2023 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 7); Defendant's Supplemental Affidavit in further support of her Motion for Final Accounting, with exhibits (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 38-72); Defendant's Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's July 12, 2023 Motion, sworn to in December 2023, with exhibits (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 73-74; 76); Plaintiff's Memorandum in Reply, dated January 4, 2024 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 77); Defendant's Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to End Child Support and in Support of Defendant's Cross Motion, with the accompanying notice (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 86-88); Plaintiff's Memorandum in Response to Defendant's April 23, 2024 and May 10, 2024 Document Submissions, dated May 15, 2024 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 118); the parties' status correspondence concerning Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceedings (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 133; 148; 163; 201; 203; 207); Defendant's July 1, 2026 and July 2, 2026 submission (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 209-251), to the extent addressed herein; Plaintiff's Notice of Third Cross Motion and supporting affidavit, dated July 7, 2026 with exhibit (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 252-254); Defendant's July 8, 2026 letter and belatedly filed Notice of Motion with exhibits (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 255-257); Plaintiff's letters of July 19, 2026 and July 20, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 260, 261); and Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Third Cross Motion, sworn to July 21, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 264). The Court has additionally reviewed, for procedural context, the papers filed in the related motion sequences contained within the record, including the subpoena application in Motion Sequence 014 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 21; 28; 34; 37) and the life insurance application in Motion Sequence 016 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 123; 131; 178; 179; 182).

II. Findings of Fact

A. The Marriage, the Parties' Employment, and the Two Pensions

The parties were married on September 24, 1994. At the time of the marriage, Defendant had been employed since 1989 as a prosecutor with the [County] District Attorney's Office, in which capacity she participated in the City's Deferred Compensation program and in the New York City Employees' Retirement System (NYCERS). During the marriage, the parties agreed to buy back, with marital funds, pension credit attributable to Defendant's premarital years of City service. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 42). Defendant left the District Attorney's Office in 2006 and thereafter performed legal work for Plaintiff's solo law practice. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 44; 47). The parties separated in July 2013, when Plaintiff vacated the marital residence. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 47). In or about March 2014, Defendant was hired by a New York State agency, was later promoted to a regional director position, and, upon commencing State employment, joined the New York State and Local Retirement System (NYSLRS). (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 73). Defendant remains so employed. It is therefore undisputed on this record that Defendant holds two distinct public pensions: the City pension, administered by NYCERS and attributable to her service with the District Attorney's Office; and the State pension, administered by NYSLRS and attributable to her post-separation State employment commencing in 2014.

During the marriage the parties acquired the marital residence, where Defendant and the parties' two daughters, A. and E., continued to reside following the separation. (see id). The record reflects that the home was thereafter imperiled by mortgage arrears; that Defendant withdrew in excess of $15,000 from her own retirement accounts to cure those arrears and avert foreclosure; that Plaintiff's mother-in-law extended a loan to cover Plaintiff's share of the monthly mortgage; and that, on April 6, 2016, the parties contracted to sell the home for $930,000, with the closing to occur by June 30, 2016. (see id). The net proceeds of sale, approximately $549,000, were placed in escrow with the escrow agent, where a substantial portion, approximately $183,278.50, remains. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 38; 49). Plaintiff commenced this action for divorce on April 11, 2016, one week after the contract of sale was executed. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 2). During the period between his December 2013 retention of matrimonial counsel and the commencement of the action, Plaintiff accumulated personal and business credit card and related debts of approximately $92,400, a course of conduct that Defendant characterized at trial and in these motion papers as a divorce planning scheme and that Plaintiff attributes to the insufficiency of his law firm's earnings during the years when Defendant was absent from the paid workforce. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 73).

B. The Trial, the Referee's Report, and the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order

The parties' financial trial was conducted before a Special Referee in 2018. The sole valuation evidence concerning Defendant's pension was the parties' pension valuation report, admitted as trial exhibit 54, which denominated the appraised plan as the New York State Employees' Retirement System (Tier 4) and assigned it a present value of approximately $399,000. On June 28, 2021, the Special Referee issued his Report with Recommendations. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 61). As pertinent here, the Referee wrote that the Husband is entitled to a fifty percent share of the contributions made to the plan between the marriage date of September 24, 1994 and the date in 2006 that the Wife left employment with the [County] District Attorney's Office (Referee Report at 17), while denominating the plan so distributed as the New York State Employee's Retirement System. The Referee further recommended that each party retain the retirement accounts held in their own names without any redistribution (Referee Report at 17 to 18), and recommended that Plaintiff contribute fifty-seven percent toward the children's college expenses, rejecting Plaintiff's request for a SUNY cap (Referee Report at 22).

Both parties moved to confirm or reject the Report (Motion Sequence No. 010 and Motion Sequence No. 011). By Decision and Order dated April 7, 2022, this Court (O'Neill Levy, J.) modified the Report with respect to Defendant's pension attributable to her service with the [County] District Attorney's Office, holding that pension credits bought back during the marriage and effected with the use of marital funds are properly considered marital property to be divided evenly (Decision and Order at 2 to 3), and otherwise confirmed the Report except as modified (Decision and Order at 6). In so ruling, the Decision and Order employed, at various points, the locutions pension for New York State, Defendant's NYS pension, and Defendant's New York State pension plan (Decision and Order at 1 to 3). The Decision and Order also directed Plaintiff's fifty-seven percent contribution toward the children's college expenses (Decision and Order at 6).

C. The Pension Nomenclature Dispute and the Present Cross Motion

The administrative distinction between Defendant's two pensions surfaced in the spring of 2023. In her April 21, 2023 response to Plaintiff's April 10, 2023 cross motion, Defendant clarified that the pension addressed at trial, in the valuation report, in the Referee's Report, and in the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order was the City pension administered by NYCERS, notwithstanding the recurrent mislabeling of that plan as a New York State pension, because Defendant did not join NYSLRS until 2014, well after both the marriage's operative accrual period and the parties' 2013 separation. Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant cross motion, dated July 12, 2023, seeking to amend and modify the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order to clarify Plaintiff's right to fifty percent of Defendant's New York City pension and fifty percent of the marital portion of Defendant's New York State pension (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 7). Plaintiff avers that his object is to permit the accurate drafting of the qualified domestic relations order or orders necessary to effectuate the distributive award.

The parties are in agreement on the first branch. Defendant expressly concurs that the pension the Referee described, the only pension in existence between September 24, 1994 and 2006, is the City pension, and she affirmatively requests that the Decision and Order be corrected to identify the award to Plaintiff as a share of the NYCERS pension and to excise the erroneous reference to a New York State pension plan (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 73 at ¶20-¶21). The parties part company on the second branch. Plaintiff contends that, because the valuation report, the Referee's Report, and the Decision and Order all spoke in terms of a New York State pension, he reasonably believed throughout the litigation that the State pension was encompassed within the distributive award, that he never waived any claim thereto, and that the Decision and Order as written grants him a fifty percent interest therein. Defendant rejoins that Plaintiff never sought a share of the NYSLRS pension at trial, in his written summation of August 3, 2018, in his rebuttal of August 17, 2018, or in his motion to confirm or reject; that Defendant's own summation expressly identified her two pensions and argued that the State pension was her separate property, an argument Plaintiff never answered; that the Referee's operative description of the distributed asset, contributions between 1994 and 2006, can refer only to the City pension; that the Referee's residual recommendation, that each party retain the retirement accounts held in their own names without redistribution, disposed of the State pension; and that, in all events, an award of any share of the modest NYSLRS accruals, which Defendant places at approximately $4,706 as of the 2016 commencement, would be inequitable in light of Plaintiff's accumulation of approximately $92,400 in debt and Defendant's depletion of more than $15,000 of her own retirement assets to preserve the marital residence during the identical period.

D. The College Expense Controversy

Interwoven through this sequence is Defendant's application, first advanced in her March 11, 2023 motion, for a credit against Plaintiff's share of the escrowed sale proceeds representing his fifty-seven percent contribution toward the college expenses of the parties' younger daughter, E., who enrolled at [the University] as a full-time student in the fall of 2020 and completed her degree requirements, graduating on May 4, 2024. Defendant initially sought reimbursement for tuition only, in the aggregate amount of $185,385, comprising $105,835 for the 2020/2021 through 2022/2023 academic years and $79,550 prospectively, expressly waiving contribution toward housing, meals, and other collateral expenses.

She supported the application, over successive submissions, with a university enrollment verification letter, tuition statements, and a Parent PLUS loan summary reflecting her borrowing, and she averred that the escrowed house proceeds were always intended by the parties to fund the children's college educations. Plaintiff opposed at every turn, contending that Defendant's self-selected and concededly incomplete statements fail to prove what she or E. actually paid; that the statements disclose approximately $62,575 in [grant program] credits, an apparent university grant that need not be repaid; that unexplained refunds were remitted to E.; that the Parent PLUS summary does not bear Defendant's full name, establish her liability, or correlate with the loan entries on the statements; and that any room and board component is subject, in the Court's discretion, to an offset against the basic child support Plaintiff paid throughout E.'s enrollment. In April and May of 2024, Defendant tendered a further submission, unsworn, enlarging her request to encompass tuition, housing, and limited food and utility costs, and Plaintiff responded by memorandum dated May 15, 2024, computing alternative reimbursement figures of $47,208 or $61,355 should the Court credit Defendant's proof in part.

E. The Bankruptcy Proceedings and the 2026 Submissions

On May 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Chapter 7 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court (case number omitted). The record reflects, through the parties' status correspondence, the following salient events in that forum: a discharge order entered October 15, 2024, excepting nondischargeable debts; an order lifting the automatic stay entered November 26, 2024; a September 29, 2025 decision in the related adversary proceeding (case number omitted) determining the subject debt not dischargeable; a November 18, 2025 turnover order respecting the escrowed funds; and, by order dated May 18, 2026, the Bankruptcy Court's abstention from matters concurrently pending before this Court and a temporary stay of the bankruptcy proceedings pending this Court's resolution of those matters. As both parties acknowledge, the Bankruptcy Court now awaits this Court's determination.

At a June 1, 2026 conference before Justice Pearlman, Defendant sought leave to supplement her March 11, 2023 motion to account for the changed circumstances wrought by the bankruptcy, the turnover order, the closure of the parties' joint account, and E.'s graduation. The transcript of that conference, excerpted at pages 17 and 18 and annexed to both parties' present papers, reflects that the Court advised Defendant that her application was likely going to require another motion and stated that it was not objecting to you doing it just put it in a motion. On July 1, 2026 and July 2, 2026, Defendant filed an affidavit with thirty-three exhibits (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 209-251), seeking modification of the relief sought in her March 11, 2023 motion and of the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order, but omitted a notice of motion. On July 7, 2026, Plaintiff interposed his third cross motion (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 252; 253), contending that the submission is either an unauthorized surreply or an unnoticed motion, in either event violative of CPLR § 2214 and of the Court's June 1, 2026 direction, and seeking to strike it or, in the alternative, a schedule to respond. By letter dated July 8, 2026, Defendant explained that the omission of the notice of motion, which she had previously prepared and signed in anticipation of a June 30, 2026 filing, was an oversight born of haste, and she cured the defect that day by e-filing the notice (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 256).

In her sworn response of July 21, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 264), Defendant reiterated that the filing was made with the Court's leave. The parties' dueling letters of July 19 and July 20, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 260, 261) dispute the import of the June 1, 2026 colloquy, and Plaintiff's July 20, 2026 letter further argues, citing Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9], that no statutory vehicle exists for the modification of a distributive award upon changed circumstances (see Maddaloni v Maddaloni, 194 AD3d 705 [2d Dept 2021]; Manuella v Manuella, 242 AD3d 870 [2d Dept 2025]; Welsh v Lawler, 282 AD2d 977 [3d Dept 2001]).

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Correction of the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order to Identify the NYCERS Pension

The branch of Plaintiff's cross motion seeking to amend the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order to render certain his entitlement to fifty percent of the marital share of Defendant's New York City pension is granted, upon the parties' effective concurrence and upon the Court's independent review of the record. Pursuant to CPLR § 5019 [a], a court may correct a mistake, defect, or irregularity in a judgment or order that does not affect a substantial right of a party. That authority extends to a correction that causes the judgment or order to conform to the court's original intention as demonstrated by the record, but not to a substantive alteration of the adjudicated rights of the parties (see Johnson v Societe Generale S.A., 94 AD3d 663 [1st Dept 2012]). The correction sought here falls comfortably within that compass.

The asset the Special Referee distributed was defined not by its label but by its temporal contours: contributions made between the marriage date of September 24, 1994 and Defendant's 2006 departure from the [County] District Attorney's Office. Only one pension existed during that interval, the NYCERS City pension, for Defendant did not join NYSLRS until 2014. The valuation report's denomination of the appraised plan as the New York State Employees' Retirement System, faithfully repeated by the Referee and thereafter by the Decision and Order, was a misnomer, a scrivener's error in the truest sense, and scrivener's errors are treated as such. The substance of the award, fifty percent of the marital share of the pension attributable to Defendant's City service, including the premarital credits bought back with marital funds as directed by the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order, is unaffected. The Decision and Order shall be corrected pursuant to CPLR § 5019 [a] so that every reference therein to Defendant's New York State pension, NYS pension, or New York State pension plan is understood, and shall read, as a reference to Defendant's pension administered by the New York City Employees' Retirement System, thereby conforming the order to the original adjudication. This correction supplies the parties and their qualified domestic relations order draftsman with the certainty Plaintiff professes to seek, and works no substantive alteration of the adjudicated award.

B. Plaintiff's Request for a Distributive Share of the NYSLRS Pension

The branch of Plaintiff's cross motion seeking fifty percent of the marital portion of Defendant's NYSLRS State pension stands on an altogether different footing, and it is denied. As an initial matter, the request is irreconcilable with the trial record. Plaintiff, a seasoned attorney who acknowledged his burden at trial, elicited no testimony concerning the State pension, its inception, or its value; his written summation of August 3, 2018 and his rebuttal of August 17, 2018 argued exclusively for a share of the pension attributable to Defendant's City employment; and his motion to confirm or reject the Referee's Report was similarly silent. Defendant, by contrast, expressly identified her two pensions in her own summation and argued that the State pension constituted her separate property in consequence of Plaintiff's post-separation conduct, an argument Plaintiff never engaged.

The Referee, having before him no application respecting the State pension, awarded a share of the 1994 to 2006 accruals and recommended that each party otherwise retain the retirement accounts held in their own names without any redistribution, and the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order confirmed the Report except as modified. A distributive award cannot be conjured from a clerical mislabel; the nomenclature error identified above cannot be transmuted into an adjudication of an asset that was never litigated, never valued as such, and never awarded.

Nor does Plaintiff's professed reliance upon the valuation report's misnomer alter the calculus. The report's function was to appraise the pension actually presented for distribution, and its description of contributions spanning the marriage through 2006 corresponds only to the City plan. Because the Referee's residual recommendation, as confirmed by the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order, left the parties' remaining retirement accounts with their respective titled owners, the NYSLRS pension was necessarily disposed of in Defendant's favor. Plaintiff's present request therefore seeks a substantive modification of the equitable distribution determination, which is unavailable based upon a claimed change in circumstances or a belated construction of a clerical misnomer. While Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9] provides for the modification of maintenance and child support upon a change in circumstances, no comparable provision permits the modification of a distributive award (see Maddaloni v Maddaloni, 194 AD3d 705 [2d Dept 2021]; Manuella v Manuella, 242 AD3d 870 [2d Dept 2025]; Wasserman v Wasserman, 103 AD3d 793 [2d Dept 2013]; Welsh v Lawler, 282 AD2d 977 [3d Dept 2001]). That principle applies equally to both parties; the same rule that shields Plaintiff's adjudicated share of the City pension from after-the-fact revision equally bars his effort to alter the residual disposition under which Defendant retained the NYSLRS pension. And unlike the correction granted above, which merely conforms the order to the adjudication actually rendered, the relief Plaintiff seeks would work precisely the substantive alteration of adjudicated rights that CPLR § 5019 [a] does not permit (see Johnson v Societe Generale S.A., 94 AD3d 663 [1st Dept 2012]).

C. Plaintiff's Third Cross Motion to Strike Defendant's July 2026 Submission

Plaintiff's third cross motion to strike NYSCEF Document Numbers 209 through 251 is denied, and his alternative application for a schedule to respond is granted. The Court takes seriously the authorities Plaintiff cites. In E*Trade Bank v Plotch (244 AD3d 522 [1st Dept 2025]), the First Department, relying upon Adames v New York City Tr. Auth. (126 AD2d 462 [1st Dept 1987]), held that the failure to serve a litigant with the notice of motion deprived the court of jurisdiction to enter the resulting judgment; those cases teach that an unnoticed application cannot be adjudicated merely because the opposing party eventually learns of it, and 430 E. 86th St. Tenants Comm. v State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal (254 AD2d 41 [1st Dept 1998]) teaches that an unauthorized surreply is not properly received. Those authorities do not require a different result here. Defendant's July 1, 2026 and July 2, 2026 papers were not independently adjudicable as filed, for they arrived without a notice of motion, and the Court neither granted nor will grant any relief upon them in that unnoticed posture. But on July 8, 2026, within one week, Defendant e-filed the previously executed Notice of Motion through NYSCEF (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 256), whereupon it was electronically transmitted to Plaintiff, a registered participant in electronic filing in this action who directs that all papers be transmitted to him via e-filing only; Plaintiff's ensuing submissions of July 19, July 20, and thereafter, which engage the substance of Defendant's application, leave no doubt of his actual and timely receipt. From that moment the papers collectively constituted a noticed application of which Plaintiff has full and undisputed notice. No determination on the updated application will be made until the briefing schedule fixed herein has run its course and Plaintiff has enjoyed a complete opportunity to oppose. The jurisdictional infirmity that condemned the applications in E*Trade and Adames, an adjudication upon papers never noticed to the adversary, is therefore wholly absent here.

Beyond the cure, good cause exists under CPLR § 2214 [c], which provides that only papers served in accordance with that rule shall be read in support of, or in opposition to, a motion, unless the court for good cause shall otherwise direct. First, Defendant sought and obtained leave in open court on June 1, 2026 to place her updated application before the Court, the presiding Justice directing only that she do so by motion; her July 2026 filing, once noticed, was an unmistakable effort to comply with that direction, and it therefore cannot be dismissed as an unauthorized surreply. Second, Plaintiff identifies no prejudice flowing from the seven-day interval between the papers and the notice. Third, the intervening circumstances are genuinely changed and genuinely material: Plaintiff's Chapter 7 petition, the discharge, the adversary determination of nondischargeability, the turnover order respecting the escrow, the Bankruptcy Court's May 18, 2026 abstention in deference to this Court, and E.'s graduation have each reshaped the landscape upon which the March 11, 2023 accounting motion was built. A final accounting predicated upon a record frozen in 2023 would disserve both parties and the federal court that now awaits this Court's determination.

At the same time, elementary fairness entitles Plaintiff to a full and orderly opportunity to answer a submission comprising an affidavit and thirty-three exhibits. Plaintiff shall serve and file his response to NYSCEF Document Numbers 209 through 251 and 256 on or before September 18, 2026, and Defendant may serve and file a reply, limited to the matters raised in the response, on or before October 5, 2026, upon which the application shall be deemed fully submitted without further papers absent leave of Court. The Court cautions both parties, each an experienced litigant and one a member of the bar, that the era of serial supplementation in this sequence is at an end; no further submissions will be received in Motion Sequence No. 012 beyond those herein authorized, absent prior leave upon a showing of good cause.

D. The Remaining Branches of the Final Accounting

The remaining branches of Defendant's motion for a final accounting, including the application for a credit of fifty-seven percent of E.'s college expenses against Plaintiff's share of the escrow, the claimed child support and add-on arrears, the requested restoration of the children's UTMA accounts, and the ultimate directions to the escrow agent, are held in abeyance pending completion of the briefing schedule fixed herein, and shall be determined promptly thereafter. The Court observes, for the parties' guidance and without prejudgment, that the governing legal framework is not in serious dispute: in this Department, recoverable college expenses comprehend room, board, tuition, and required books, less any grants or awards which do not have to be repaid, and the supporting documentation must be complete (Matter of Kent v Kent, 29 AD3d 123 [1st Dept 2006]); a credit against child support for room and board expenses is not mandatory but depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case, taking into account the needs of the custodial parent to maintain a household and provide certain necessaries (Matter of Deborah R. v Dean E.H., 181 AD3d 447 [1st Dept 2020]); in the absence of a clear and unambiguous provision to the contrary, a court should not deduct from the parents' college expense obligation loans for which the student herself is responsible (Bungart v Bungart, 107 AD3d 751 [2d Dept 2013]); and the propriety of post-majority college contribution through the conclusion of the children's studies has already been adjudicated in this action (see Otero v Otero, 222 AD2d 328 [1st Dept 1995]). The parties' forthcoming submissions should be addressed to those standards, with particular attention to the completeness of the university statements, the treatment of the [grant program] credits, the identity of the obligor on each loan reflected therein, and the extent, if any, to which room and board should be offset against basic child support paid. Should the completed submissions leave material issues of fact unresolved, the Court will schedule an evidentiary hearing.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

The Court has considered the parties' remaining contentions and finds them unavailing or academic in light of the foregoing. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the branch of Plaintiff's cross motion, dated July 12, 2023, seeking to amend and modify this Court's April 7, 2022 Decision and Order to clarify Plaintiff's entitlement to fifty percent of the marital share of Defendant's New York City pension is GRANTED, and the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order is corrected pursuant to CPLR § 5019 [a] to conform to the original adjudication, such that each and every reference therein to Defendant's New York State pension, NYS pension, or New York State pension plan is deemed a reference to Defendant's pension administered by the New York City Employees' Retirement System (NYCERS), attributable to her service with the [County] District Attorney's Office, inclusive of the premarital credits bought back with marital funds; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Plaintiff's cross motion, dated July 12, 2023, seeking an award of fifty percent of the marital portion of Defendant's New York State and Local Retirement System (NYSLRS) pension is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff may settle, on notice to Defendant, a proposed qualified domestic relations order consistent with this Decision and Order and with the April 7, 2022 Decision and Order as herein amended; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Plaintiff's third cross motion, dated July 7, 2026, seeking to strike Defendant's July 1, 2026 and July 2, 2026 filings (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 209 through 251) is DENIED, and those filings, together with the Notice of Motion filed July 8, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 256), shall be received and considered as Defendant's updated application within Motion Sequence No. 012; and it is further

ORDERED that the alternative branch of Plaintiff's third cross motion seeking a schedule to respond is GRANTED, and Plaintiff shall serve and file his response on or before September 18, 2026, and Defendant may serve and file a reply, limited to the matters raised in the response, on or before October 5, 2026, whereupon the application shall be deemed fully submitted; and it is further

ORDERED that no further papers shall be filed in Motion Sequence No. 012 beyond those authorized herein absent prior leave of Court upon a showing of good cause; and it is further

ORDERED that the remaining branches of Defendant's motion for a final accounting, including the college expense credit, arrears, the restoration of the children's UTMA accounts, and the distribution of the escrowed proceeds, are held in abeyance pending the completion of the schedule fixed herein and shall be determined thereafter, with an evidentiary hearing to be scheduled should material issues of fact remain; and it is further

ORDERED that any relief requested in Motion Sequence No. 012 not expressly granted herein or expressly held in abeyance herein is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry upon Defendant and upon the escrow agent within twenty days of entry, and shall file proof of such service via NYSCEF.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: August 18, 2026

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.