DOWNER v. FORD (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Mojgan Cohanim Lancman, J.), entered August 2, 2024.  The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiffs allegedly were injured while they were passengers on a bus owned or operated by the defendants as it was traveling on Murdock Avenue approaching its intersection with 205th Street.  There was no traffic control device governing vehicles traveling on Murdock Avenue, but there was a stop sign governing vehicles traveling on 205th Street.  The accident occurred when the bus stopped short in order to avoid a collision with a vehicle that entered the intersection from 205th Street and cut in front of the bus.  The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  In an order entered August 2, 2024, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion.  The plaintiffs appeal.

“A defendant moving for summary judgment in a negligence action has the burden of establishing, prima facie, that he or she was not at fault in the happening of the subject accident” (Boulos v. Lerner–Harrington, 124 A.D.3d 709, 709, 2 N.Y.S.3d 526).  Pursuant to the emergency doctrine, “when an actor is faced with a sudden and unexpected circumstance which leaves little or no time for thought, deliberation or consideration, or causes the actor to be reasonably so disturbed that the actor must make a speedy decision without weighing alternative courses of conduct, the actor may not be negligent if the actions taken are reasonable and prudent in the emergency context” (Rivera v. New York City Tr. Auth., 77 N.Y.2d 322, 327, 567 N.Y.S.2d 629, 569 N.E.2d 432;  see Anderson v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 208 A.D.3d 742, 743, 174 N.Y.S.3d 398;  see also Wilson v. New York City Tr. Auth., 219 A.D.3d 1563, 196 N.Y.S.3d 557).  “Both the existence of an emergency and the reasonableness of a party's response thereto will ordinarily present questions of fact” (Pavane v. Marte, 109 A.D.3d 970, 971, 971 N.Y.S.2d 562 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Mulombo v. City of New York, 239 A.D.3d 665, 666, 237 N.Y.S.3d 80).  “Summary judgment may be granted, however, when a party presents sufficient evidence demonstrating the existence of an emergency, as well as the reasonableness of the actor's response to it” (Kinard v. New York City Tr. Auth., 233 A.D.3d 665, 666, 222 N.Y.S.3d 151 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Wu Kai Ming v. Grossman, 133 A.D.3d 742, 19 N.Y.S.3d 334).

Here, in support of their motion, the defendants submitted, inter alia, transcripts of the deposition testimony of the plaintiffs and the bus driver and authenticated surveillance video footage of the accident.  This evidence established, prima facie, that the actions of the bus driver in braking abruptly to avoid a collision with the vehicle that had suddenly entered the intersection directly into the path of the bus were reasonably prudent in an emergency situation not of the bus driver's own making (see Mulombo v. City of New York, 239 A.D.3d at 667, 237 N.Y.S.3d 80;  Kinard v. New York City Tr. Auth., 233 A.D.3d at 666–667, 222 N.Y.S.3d 151;  Rasweiler v. Town of Huntington, 220 A.D.3d 675, 676, 196 N.Y.S.3d 788).  In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Rohn v. Aly, 167 A.D.3d 1054, 1056, 91 N.Y.S.3d 256;  Foley v. Santucci, 135 A.D.3d 813, 814, 23 N.Y.S.3d 338).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

BARROS, J.P., WOOTEN, TAYLOR and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.