JL v. LS (2026)

I. Statement Pursuant to CPLR § 2219 [a]

Upon the foregoing papers, and in compliance with CPLR § 2219 [a], the Court states that the following papers were read and considered upon Defendant's Order to Show Cause, designated Motion Sequence No. 012: the Order to Show Cause of Defendant LS, signed by the Hon. Jeffrey H. Pearlman, J.S.C. on January 6, 2026 and filed January 7, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 526); the Affirmation in Support of LS, affirmed December 30, 2025, together with Exhibits A through N annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497); the Affirmation in Support of Kevin M. McDonough, Esq., affirmed December 30, 2025, together with Exhibits O through Z annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498); the Affirmation of Kerri A. McDonough, Esq. pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.7 [f], affirmed December 30, 2025, together with Exhibit 1 annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 499); Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition of JL, affirmed January 16, 2026, together with the exhibits annexed thereto and the certification of Alexis Lisser, Esq. pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.8-b (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 527); the Attorney Affirmation in Opposition of Robert S. Michaels, Esq., affirmed January 16, 2026, together with Exhibits 2 and 3 annexed thereto and the certification pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.8-b (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 528); the Supplemental Affirmation to Motion Sequences 009, 012, and 013 of Kevin M. McDonough, Esq., affirmed April 7, 2026, together with Exhibit A annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 615); the Order Removing Forensic Evaluator, Directing Refund of Fees, and Scheduling Conference of this Court dated July 7, 2026 and filed July 9, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 851); the Stipulation and Agreement of the parties dated July 13, 2026, So Ordered by this Court on July 13, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 875); and the Short Form Order of this Court dated August 3, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 926 and 928).

Upon Defendant's Order to Show Cause, designated Motion Sequence No. 016, the Court states that the following papers were read and considered: the Order to Show Cause of Defendant LS, signed by the Hon. Jeffrey H. Pearlman, J.S.C. on April 27, 2026 and filed April 27, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 705); the Affirmation in Support of Kevin M. McDonough, Esq., affirmed April 21, 2026, together with the exhibits annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 668); the Affirmation in Support of LS, affirmed April 21, 2026, together with the exhibit annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 669); the Affirmation of Service of Deneen Heller, affirmed April 27, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 707); the Attorney Affirmation in Opposition of Robert S. Michaels, Esq., affirmed May 29, 2026, together with the exhibits annexed thereto and the certification pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.8-b (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 779); Plaintiff's Affirmation in Opposition of JL, affirmed May 29, 2026, together with the exhibits annexed thereto and the certification of Alexis Lisser, Esq. pursuant to 22 NYCRR 202.8-b (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 780); the Affirmation in Support of Kevin M. McDonough, Esq., affirmed June 12, 2026, together with the exhibits annexed thereto (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 822); the Affirmation in Further Support of LS, affirmed June 12, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 823); and the Reply Affirmations with the certification pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1-a (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 827), together with the Stipulation and Agreement dated July 13, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 875) and the Short Form Order dated August 3, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 926; 928] identified above.

The Court notes a discrepancy in the docketing of this second application. The affirmations in support were electronically filed under the designation Motion Sequence No. 015 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 668; 669), while the Order to Show Cause signed upon those affirmations, and every paper thereafter filed in opposition and in reply, bear the designation Motion Sequence No. 016 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 705; 779; 780; 822; 823; 827). The papers so filed relate to a single application seeking a single item of relief, namely an award of appellate counsel fees. The Court accordingly deems the affirmations filed under Motion Sequence No. 015 to be the moving papers upon Motion Sequence No. 016, determines the application herein as Motion Sequence No. 016, and finds that no separate application designated Motion Sequence No. 015 is pending before the Court.

No party requested oral argument beyond the return date fixed upon signature of the Order to Show Cause, and no party requested an evidentiary hearing upon any branch of either application. Both applications were fully submitted upon the papers enumerated above.

II. Findings of Fact

A. The Parties, the Children, and the Application Before the Court

At the outset, the Court notes the circumstance of its own assignment. By Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts dated June 26, 2026, bearing designation AO/150/2026, the Honorable Joseph A. Zayas, Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, upon consultation with and by agreement of the Honorable Dianne T. Renwick, Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, and the Honorable Hector D. LaSalle, Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, assigned the undersigned, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, from Supreme Court, Richmond County to Supreme Court, New York County, Civil Term, effective July 1, 2026. This matter, previously presided over by the Hon. Jeffrey H. Pearlman, J.S.C., was accordingly reassigned to the undersigned effective July 1, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 851).

This is a contested matrimonial action commenced by Plaintiff JL against Defendant LS. The parties are the parents of three unemancipated children: WL, born XXX XX, 2012, and twins EL and WL, born XXX XX, 2014 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶3). The child identified as WL in Defendant's affirmation is elsewhere in the record identified as WL (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 527 at ¶22); the Court uses the spelling appearing in the moving papers. Defendant affirms that she is Plaintiff's wife of nearly two decades, that she has never worked outside the home for compensation, and that she has dedicated her life to the family (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶3). Plaintiff does not dispute the duration of the marriage or that Defendant has not been employed outside the home during it. The children attend Salanter Akiba Riverdale Academy in the Bronx, a private religious day school which, both parties agree, does not offer bussing (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶10; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 527 at n 4). Nicole Riordan, Esq. of The Law Office of Nicole Riordan serves as the Attorney for the Children (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 526).

By Order to Show Cause signed on January 6, 2026 and filed January 7, 2026, Defendant sought an order: first, directing Plaintiff to restore the status quo concerning payment of the drivers who transport the parties' three children to and from school and to their various extracurricular activities and appointments, the family's housekeepers, and the childcare providers, pending the Court's determination of Motion Sequence No. 007; second, pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237, directing Plaintiff to pay the sum of $500,000 as and for Defendant's interim counsel fees and related costs and expenses associated with his demand that a forensic custody evaluation take place, with a custody trial to follow; third, pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d] [2], granting Defendant leave to reargue those portions of the December 19, 2025 forensic order of appointment of Dr. Alan Ravitz which set forth far reaching areas of inquiry, and instead limiting the scope of the evaluator's inquiry to assessing any mental health issues of either party which directly impact upon that party's parenting ability; fourth, pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d] [2], granting Defendant leave to reargue that portion of the December 19, 2025 forensic order which directed that Defendant be responsible for .05% of Dr. Ravitz's fees, and upon reargument directing that Plaintiff be responsible for 100% of those fees; and fifth, such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 526).

The Court notes, as a matter of record, that the interim relief requested in the proposed Order to Show Cause, which would have directed Plaintiff to pay the sum of $39,369.50 per month directly to Defendant pending the hearing and determination of the motion, was struck by the Hon. Jeffrey H. Pearlman, J.S.C. upon signature. In its place, the Court directed oral argument and made the application returnable on January 29, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 526). No interim relief was therefore ever granted upon this application.

Defendant's counsel complied with the notice requirements applicable to applications seeking interim relief. By electronic mail transmitted December 30, 2025 at 9:55 a.m. to Robert S. Michaels, Esq., Alexis Lisser, Esq., and Bonnie E. Rabin, Esq., with copies to the Attorney for the Children, Kerri A. McDonough, Esq. advised counsel that Defendant would be filing an Order to Show Cause seeking interim relief relating to payment of the household help (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 499 and Exhibit 1 thereto). The Court finds that Defendant satisfied 22 NYCRR 202.7 [f].

B. The Household Staffing Contentions

Defendant avers that Plaintiff unilaterally declared that he would pay only weekly sums of $1,550 for housekeeper support and $1,150 for transportation, amounting to $11,610 per month, and that this figure represents a fraction of what is required to maintain the children's day to day routine (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶7 and Exhibit C). She itemizes the asserted actual cost as follows: the housekeeper GH is employed sixty-four hours per week from Monday through Friday at $25 per hour, together with a monthly MetroCard of $132, for a monthly total of $7,012; Tiffany is employed on Saturdays and Sundays for twelve and one-half hours each day at $25 per hour, for a monthly total of $2,687.50, yielding aggregate monthly housekeeping costs of $9,699.50; childcare providers are employed seven days per week at $2,800 per week, or $12,040 per month; and drivers cost $150 each way for school transportation, or $1,500 per week and $6,450 per month, with additional activity-related driving ranging between $960 and $2,600 per week, or between $4,128 and $11,180 per month, producing total monthly driver costs of between $10,578 and $17,630 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶8 through ¶10). Combining the three categories, Defendant asserts monthly costs of between $32,317.50 and $39,369.50 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶11). Defendant further avers that the two less expensive drivers previously utilized, Marvin and Gary, are no longer available (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at n 1 and Exhibit E), that all three children carry individualized education program designations requiring educated caregivers (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶9), and that Plaintiff's conduct amounts to coercive control and financial abuse (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶5 and ¶24).

Plaintiff disputes these figures in their entirety. He affirms that he provides Defendant with $20,000 per month in unallocated support; approximately $2,832 per week, or an estimated $12,177.60 per month, for the children's school transportation, housekeeping, and childcare, comprised of $1,582 per week for housekeeping calculated at sixty-two hours per week at $25 per hour plus a $32 weekly MetroCard, $700 per week for school transportation, and $550 per week for supplemental transportation and childcare during peak hockey season; and as much as $100,000 per month in direct payments including New York City rent of $40,050 per month, utilities of $3,858.33 per month, private school tuition of $7,000 per month, extracurriculars and camp in excess of $5,000 per month, health insurance and all unreimbursed medical and therapeutic expenses for the children of $7,030 per month, and all carrying costs for the Hamptons residence of $31,413.66 per month, in addition to $200,500 expended to repair the roof and HVAC system at that residence (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 527 at ¶3 and ¶4). He further affirms that during the marriage the housekeeper GH generally worked fifty to fifty-two hours per week at $25 per hour, previously $22 per hour; that weekend housekeeping was limited to at most ten hours on Saturdays; that after-school babysitters were employed for approximately fifteen to twenty hours per week at $20 per hour, and that from the fall of 2024 through February 2025 no regular weekday babysitters were employed at all; and that the children never had personal drivers apart from school transportation costing generally $700 per week, with an additional $200 per week during hockey season (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 527 at ¶7, ¶9, 15, and ¶16). Plaintiff's counsel adds that Defendant submitted no exhibit, receipt, or example of any such expense that has gone unpaid, and that the application is duplicative of Defendant's pending Motion Sequence No. 007 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 528 at ¶3 and ¶4).

The submissions on this branch are irreconcilable. Each side accuses the other of manufacturing or misstating the marital standard of living, and each characterizes the other's litigation conduct as abusive. The Court records these contentions without resolving them, for the reasons set forth below, and expressly makes no finding as to the marital standard of living for household help, childcare, or transportation, that question being reserved for trial or settlement upon a full evidentiary record.

C. The Forensic Order of December 19, 2025

By order dated December 19, 2025 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 494), the Court appointed Dr. Alan Ravitz as the forensic evaluator in this matter. As quoted by Defendant's own counsel, that order directs the evaluator to address all relevant parenting issues, including each party's parenting skills, the nature of the current and past parent-child relationships, each parent's ability to co-parent and facilitate the children's healthy relationship with the other, each party's demonstrated ability to provide continuity and stability of environment, any parental alienation or estrangement with respect to the subject children, and history of domestic violence or dangers in the households (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶17 and Exhibit Y). The order further directs that Defendant bear .05% of the evaluator's fees (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶25; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 526).

Defendant contends that the scope so defined is far too broad and should be confined to an evaluation of whether either parent suffers from a mental health condition that affects his or her parenting behavior (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶18; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶19). In support, Defendant's counsel relies upon the December 2021 Report to the Governor of the Governor's Blue-Ribbon Commission on Forensic Custody Evaluations (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶21 and ¶22 and Exhibit Z), which he characterizes as reflecting majority support among Commission members for limiting the use and scope of forensic custody evaluations, for precluding evaluators from assessing allegations of intimate partner violence or of one parent distancing a child from the other, and for reclassifying forensic evaluators as Qualified Mental Health Evaluators. Counsel candidly acknowledges, however, that the issue remains a topic of debate (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶19 and ¶23). Defendant additionally objects to the forensic process as protracted and costly, estimating that most forensic reports take nine to twelve months to complete and that a custody trial would presumably follow in 2027 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶8).

The Court finds, as a matter of record, that Defendant's moving papers do not identify any statute, rule, or decisional authority that was cited to and overlooked by the Court in fixing the scope of the December 19, 2025 order, and do not identify any fact contained in the prior record that the Court is said to have misapprehended. The submission rests upon the recommendations of an advisory commission and upon counsel's disagreement with the breadth of the areas of inquiry, coupled with his express acknowledgment that the underlying question remains debated.

Plaintiff opposes, asserting that in issuing the forensic order the Court neither overlooked nor misapprehended any relevant fact, nor misapplied the controlling law, and that the order entered contains standard provisions and language commonly used in such cases (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 528 at ¶8 and ¶10). He further affirms that every expert involved in this matter, including the Attorney for the Children, recommended a forensic evaluation (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 528 at ¶20). As to the allocation of the evaluator's fees, Plaintiff affirms that Defendant's .05% share amounts to $6.50, and, more significantly, that he has already gone ahead and paid 100% of Dr. Ravitz's retainer, and that he has contacted the evaluator and scheduled a first meeting (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 527 at ¶31 and ¶33]. Plaintiff has separately affirmed that he has paid Dr. Ravitz approximately $13,000 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 779 at ¶14).

The forensic landscape has since changed entirely. By Order Removing Forensic Evaluator, Directing Refund of Fees, and Scheduling Conference dated July 7, 2026 and filed July 9, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 851), issued upon the Court's own motion following the reassignment of this matter, this Court noted the Memorandum of the Office of Attorneys for Children, Appellate Division, First Department, dated June 29, 2026, advising that Alan Ravitz, M.D. is no longer a member of the Mental Health Professionals Panel for the Appellate Division, First and Second Judicial Departments, and further noted that no forensic report had been submitted within the one hundred fifty day period fixed by the Appointment Order. Observing that the Mental Health Professionals Certification Committee is charged with determining who is qualified to serve as an impartial, court-appointed forensic evaluator (see 22 NYCRR 623.3; 623.4; 623.9; 680.3; 680.4; 680.9; Carlin v Carlin, 124 AD3d 817 [2d Dept 2015]), and that an evaluator's removal from the Panel warrants his removal from the case, the inadmissibility of his work product, and a refund of fees paid (see Chu v Chu, 224 AD3d 653 [2d Dept 2024]), the Court relieved and removed Dr. Ravitz as the court-appointed neutral forensic evaluator and vacated the Appointment Order dated December 19, 2025. The Court further directed Dr. Ravitz to refund to the parties all monies paid to him in connection with the Appointment Order, including the retainer of $13,000.00 or any portion thereof received, such refund to be made to each party in the same proportion as paid, namely 99.95% to Plaintiff and 0.05% to Defendant, together with a sworn accounting; directed that no report, notes, or other work product of Dr. Ravitz shall be admissible at trial or at any hearing in this action; and directed counsel for the parties and the Attorney for the Children to appear for an in-person conference on August 4, 2026 at 9:30 a.m., at which the parties were to be prepared to address, among other things, the appointment of a successor forensic evaluator from the current directory of the Mental Health Professionals Panel and a schedule for completion of the forensic evaluation (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 851).

The Court further finds that the Order dated July 7, 2026 remains in full force and effect. No party has moved to vacate, modify, renew, or reargue that Order, and no party has asked this Court to reinstate the Appointment Order dated December 19, 2025 or to restore Dr. Ravitz to his former role.

D. The Relative Financial Circumstances of the Parties and the Counsel Fee Application

The record establishes an extraordinary disparity in the financial circumstances of these parties. Defendant affirms that the marital assets exceed $50 million by Plaintiff's own admission, of which over $25 million is liquid, and that Plaintiff's last year of income included a $10 million bonus alone (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶2). Defendant's counsel affirms that Plaintiff's income between 2016 and 2024 exceeded $50 million, that his 2025 income exceeded $10 million, and that he is in complete control of the family's liquid net worth (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶13 through ¶15 and Exhibits O through X). By supplemental affirmation, Defendant's counsel advised that a subpoena response disclosed that on March 10, 2026 Plaintiff received his 2025 yearend bonus of nearly $17 million, significantly in excess of his 2024 yearend bonus of $10 million (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 615 at ¶2 and Exhibit A).

The Court finds these representations concerning Plaintiff's income and assets to be uncontroverted upon this record. Plaintiff's opposition does not deny that he is the monied spouse, does not dispute the magnitude of the marital estate or of his 2025 compensation, does not challenge the subpoena response annexed to the supplemental affirmation, and nowhere asserts that he lacks the ability to pay the sum requested. His opposition is directed to whether an award should be made and in what amount, not to his capacity to satisfy one.

Defendant, by contrast, affirms that she has no income and no liquid assets (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶20), and her counsel affirms that as of December 30, 2025 the firm of Mantel McDonough Riso, LLP was owed more than $570,000 and co-counsel Rottenstreich Farley Bronstein Fisher Potter Hodas LLP was owed more than $136,000 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶12). Defendant affirms that her attorneys are owed in excess of $750,000, that they have been paid nothing beyond the $100,000 she was compelled to borrow from her mother to fund the retainer and the single $250,000 payment Plaintiff was directed to make by the Hon. Judge Hoffman more than six months earlier, and that Plaintiff has paid his own counsel in excess of $960,000 as of November 2025 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶25 and Exhibits J, L, M, and N). Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendant is without income or liquid assets, and does not dispute the existence or approximate magnitude of the receivable owed to her counsel.

Counsel sets forth the professional qualifications and billing rates of the attorneys performing the work, namely Kevin M. McDonough, Esq. at $995 per hour, Alison Leigh Epilone, Esq. at $795 per hour, Kerri A. McDonough, Esq. at $695 per hour, and Dan Rottenstreich, Esq. at $1,500 per hour, together with detailed recitations of their respective admissions, practice histories, and professional recognitions (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶30 through ¶34 and Exhibit K). Counsel further enumerates the work occasioned by the forensic evaluation and anticipated custody trial, which includes obtaining and organizing a detailed chronology of child related issues, obtaining and organizing third party medical, school, camp, and extracurricular records, interviewing and obtaining written statements from collateral sources, organizing and submitting materials to the evaluator, preparing the client for evaluator interviews, reviewing the materials Plaintiff provides to the evaluator, preparing a rebuttal response, reviewing and analyzing the evaluator's report, determining whether a peer review or rebuttal report is required and obtaining the same, preparing for the custody trial, and conducting a multi-week custody trial (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶28). Counsel estimates that this work will well exceed the requested $500,000 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶29).

Plaintiff, for his part, has never disputed that he is the more monied spouse and has repeatedly acknowledged his obligation to contribute to Defendant's legal fees (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 528 at ¶18). He affirms that he has already paid $297,500 toward Defendant's counsel fees (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 528 at ¶18). He opposes the present request as duplicative of the $1,000,000 sought in Motion Sequence No. 009, in support of which, he asserts, Defendant's counsel expressly referenced, factored in, and relied upon anticipated work related to trial preparation on legal and physical custody (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 528 at ¶17, citing NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 264). Plaintiff further contends that Defendant is represented by multiple prominent firms and that an award would reward dilatory and duplicative motion practice (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 528 at ¶12, ¶13, ¶19, and ¶22). Plaintiff does not identify any of the eleven categories of prospective work enumerated by Defendant's counsel as unnecessary, and does not contend that the hourly rates charged by Defendant's counsel are excessive or above the prevailing market.

The Court notes that the parties' papers refer in places to communications exchanged in the course of settlement negotiations, including proposals concerning the payment of counsel fees. The Court has not considered and does not rely upon any such communication in determining the amount of the award made herein, and any reference to settlement proposals contained in the parties' submissions has been disregarded (see CPLR § 4547). The determination that follows rests exclusively upon the parties' respective financial circumstances, the established receivable, the enumerated scope of work, the rates and qualifications of counsel, the sums already advanced, and the equities of the case.

E. Subsequent Procedural Developments

After this motion was fully submitted, the parties resolved a substantial portion of their interim financial disputes. By Stipulation and Agreement dated July 13, 2026, So Ordered by this Court on that date (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 875), the parties agreed, among other things, that contemporaneously with the execution of a lease agreement Plaintiff would transfer $2,640,000 to Defendant to pre-pay four years of rent for the rental townhouse located at XXX XX XX Street, New York, New York; that within ten days Plaintiff would provide $500,000 and a further $250,000 to furnish the townhouse; that commencing August 1, 2026 Plaintiff would pay Defendant $20,000 monthly in unallocated pendente lite support and an additional $25,000 monthly; that from those payments Defendant would pay food, clothing, and miscellaneous day-to-day expenses including household help, the utilities, insurance, and all other expenses associated with the townhouse, all expenses for the family vehicle, her unreimbursed medical expenses, ordinary expenses, and the children's transportation and drivers, subject to determination by the Court as to the allocation of the payment of these expenses; that Plaintiff would continue to pay 100% of all agreed-upon statutory add-on expenses for the children consistent with the marital standard, all expenses associated with the Sagaponack residence, 100% of the cost of health insurance, and 100% of the mobile phone plan; and that the foregoing payments would be without prejudice to each party's claims and defenses and subject to reallocation.

By Short Form Order dated August 3, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 926; 928), this Court confirmed that, on consent, the parties entered into a stipulation agreement resolving Motion Sequence No. 011, branch 1 of Motion Sequence No. 012, Motion Sequence No. 013, Motion Sequence No. 016, Motion Sequence No. 017, and Motion Sequence No. 018, and ordered those applications resolved. Accordingly, the sole matters remaining for determination upon Motion Sequence No. 012 are branches two, three, four, and five.

F. The Appeal and the Application for Appellate Counsel Fees

By Decision and Order dated February 25, 2026, this Court, then presided over by the Hon. Jeffrey H. Pearlman, J.S.C., determined Defendant's pendente lite application designated Motion Sequence No. 007 (the Pendente Lite Order) (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 668, Exhibit A). Defendant moved for renewal and reargument of that determination, designated Motion Sequence No. 013, and sought interim relief staying the Pendente Lite Order pending its determination. That interim relief was struck upon signature, and Defendant thereafter appealed to the Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, under Docket No. 2026-01059 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 822 at ¶8 through ¶10).

Defendant applied to the Appellate Division for a stay of the Pendente Lite Order pending the appeal. That Court granted the application to the extent of directing Plaintiff to maintain the status quo pendente lite payments to Defendant that had continued since April 2025, and that determination was thereafter reaffirmed by the full bench (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 779 at ¶5 and ¶6 and Exhibits C and D). Defendant perfected the appeal.

By Order to Show Cause signed April 27, 2026 and filed the same day, Defendant sought an order pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a] directing Plaintiff to pay directly to Defendant's counsel, Mantel McDonough Riso, LLP, the sum of $225,000 as and for appellate counsel fees and expenses in connection with the appeal, to be paid within ten days of the decision upon the application and with leave to apply for additional fees as may be necessary, together with such other, further and different relief as is just, proper and equitable (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 705).

In support, Defendant's counsel affirms that as of April 21, 2026 his firm was owed approximately $750,000 in connection with the matrimonial action and approximately $110,000 in connection with the appeal, inclusive of appellate printing costs, and that co-counsel Rottenstreich Farley Bronstein Fisher Potter Hodas LLP was owed approximately $180,000 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 668 at ¶2 and ¶12 and Exhibit F]. He enumerates the appellate work already performed, namely the filing of the informational sheet, service of notice upon the respondent's counsel, the application for interim relief together with the reply upon that application, the compilation of the record on appeal, and the drafting and filing of the appellant's brief, and identifies the work then remaining, namely review of the respondent's brief, preparation of a reply brief, preparation for oral argument, and argument of the appeal (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 668 at ¶27 and ¶28). He sets forth the hourly rates of the attorneys performing that work, namely Kevin M. McDonough, Esq. at $1,195 per hour, Alison Leigh Epilone, Esq. at $875 per hour, and Kerri A. McDonough, Esq. at $755 per hour (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 668 at ¶30 through ¶32]. Defendant affirms that she has no assets and no income (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 669 at ¶3).

By affirmation dated June 12, 2026, Defendant's counsel further affirms that his firm has been paid nothing since June 2025, that Defendant's counsel has received $227,185.67 in the aggregate, of which $177,185.67 was paid by Plaintiff, that approximately $1.3 million remains owing, and that nothing has been paid on account of the appellate work, and annexes updated billing records for that work (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 822 at ¶3 and ¶18 and Exhibit N). The Court notes that the aggregate of payments so stated differs from the sum of $297,500 that Plaintiff identifies upon Motion Sequence No. 012, and makes no finding reconciling the two figures, the difference being immaterial to the determinations made herein.

Plaintiff opposes. He contends that the appeal was frivolous and unnecessary and duplicative of the pending motion for renewal and reargument, that he offered before the appeal was taken to maintain the financial status quo, which is the relief the Appellate Division ultimately directed, that he has contributed nearly $300,000 toward Defendant's counsel fees, and that he has borne 100% of the other litigation costs in this action, exceeding $200,000 in the aggregate, including approximately $36,000 to the Attorney for the Children, $10,000 to Dr. Kuchuk, a $30,000 retainer to Judy White, approximately $13,000 to Dr. Ravitz, and not less than $100,000 in therapeutic supervision costs (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 779 at ¶7, ¶9, ¶13, and ¶14; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 780 at ¶3 and ¶4). Plaintiff does not dispute that he is the monied spouse, does not assert an inability to pay the sum requested, does not challenge the hourly rates of Defendant's appellate counsel, and does not contest the accuracy of the billing records annexed to the moving and reply papers.

The appeal has since been resolved. By the Stipulation and Agreement dated July 13, 2026, So Ordered by this Court (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 875), the parties agreed to resolve, among other applications, Defendant's appeal of the Pendente Lite Order. The Stipulation makes no provision for counsel fees of any kind. By Short Form Order dated August 3, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 926 and 928), this Court declared Motion Sequence No. 016, among others, resolved.

III. Conclusions of Law

A. Branch One Has Been Resolved by So-Ordered Stipulation and Is Academic

Branch one of the Order to Show Cause sought restoration of the status quo concerning payment of the children's drivers, the family's housekeepers, and the childcare providers pending determination of Motion Sequence No. 007. That relief has been superseded by the agreement of the parties. The So-Ordered Stipulation dated July 13, 2026 comprehensively addresses the very expenses that formed the subject of branch one, directing the payment to Defendant of $45,000 per month in the aggregate commencing August 1, 2026, from which Defendant is to pay household help and the children's transportation and drivers, expressly subject to determination by the Court as to allocation and to reallocation at trial or settlement (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 875 at ¶4 through ¶6). This Court has already declared branch one resolved (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 926 and 928).

A court should not adjudicate contentions that can have no practical effect upon the rights of the litigants before it. Because the parties have themselves fixed, by so-ordered agreement, the interim mechanism for funding household help and transportation, and because that agreement expressly preserves each party's claims, defenses, and right to seek reallocation, no purpose would be served by this Court now resolving the sharply contested factual disputes concerning the marital standard for housekeeping, childcare, and drivers. Those disputes are reserved for trial or settlement, where the aggregate of Plaintiff's interim payments and the propriety of Defendant's expenditures may be allocated upon a full record. Branch one having been disposed of by the Short Form Order dated August 3, 2026, the present decision memorializes that disposition and does not dispose of branch one a second time. Neither party is aggrieved by this portion of the decision, which grants no relief and denies none.

B. Branch Two: Interim Counsel Fees Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]

1. The governing standard

Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a] provides that in an action for a divorce the court may direct either spouse to pay counsel fees and the fees and expenses of experts directly to the attorney of the other spouse to enable the other party to carry on or defend the action or proceeding as, in the court's discretion, justice requires, having due regard to the circumstances of the case and the respective parties, and that there shall be a rebuttable presumption that counsel fees shall be awarded to the less monied spouse. The statute is remedial in design. The authority to compel one spouse to pay the other's counsel fees is intended to redress the economic disparity between the monied spouse and the non-monied spouse and to ensure that the matrimonial scales of justice are not unbalanced by the weight of the wealthier litigant's wallet (see O'Shea v O'Shea, 93 NY2d 187 [1999]; Frankel v Frankel, 2 NY3d 601 [2004]). The Court of Appeals has observed that more frequent interim counsel fee awards would prevent the accumulation of bills, and that deferring such applications to the trial court often compromises the non-monied spouse's ability to adequately litigate the case (see Frankel v Frankel, 2 NY3d 601 [2004]). Counsel fees are awarded to make certain that marital litigation is shaped not by the power of the bankroll but by the power of the evidence, and to ensure that a spouse with substantially greater financial resources cannot deploy those resources against the less powerful spouse to obtain the outcome he desires (see Charpié v Charpié, 271 AD2d 169 [1st Dept 2000]).

An award may be made for services yet to be rendered. The appellate courts have sustained awards of prospective fees where the non-monied spouse must prosecute or defend further proceedings (see Delgado v Delgado, 160 AD2d 385 [1st Dept 1990]; Caldwell v Caldwell, 209 AD2d 1022 [4th Dept 1994]; Holloway v Holloway, 307 AD2d 405 [3d Dept 2003]; see also Avedon v Avedon, 270 AD2d 65 [1st Dept 2000], lv dismissed 95 NY2d 902 [2000]). Nor is Defendant required to demonstrate a likelihood of success as a strict predicate to an award (see Cohen v Cohen, 73 AD3d 832 [2d Dept 2010]).

Substantial interim awards are neither novel nor extraordinary in litigation of this magnitude. The First Department has affirmed an interim award of $750,000, made expressly subject to reallocation after trial (see Voorham v Hicks-Voorham, 2025 NY Slip Op 05329 [1st Dept 2025]), a second interim award of $600,000 (see Cohen v Cohen, 209 AD3d 405 [1st Dept 2022]), an award of $475,000 (see Wechsler v Wechsler, 19 AD3d 157 [1st Dept 2005]), an award of $525,000 (see Evgeny F. v Inessa B., 127 AD3d 617 [1st Dept 2015]), and an award of $150,000 (see Lvovsky v Lvovsky, 2020 NY Slip Op 05857 [1st Dept 2020]), and has reversed the denial of interim counsel and expert fees where the additional sums sought were necessary to prevent the more affluent spouse from wearing down or financially punishing the opposition by recalcitrance (see Gober v Gober, 282 AD2d 392 [1st Dept 2001]; see also, Kaufman v Kaufman, 131 AD3d 939 [2d Dept 2015]; Penavic v Penavic, 60 AD3d 1026 [2d Dept 2009]).

The discretion conferred by the statute is not, however, unbounded. Any award of attorneys' fees must be based, inter alia, upon the relative financial circumstances of the parties, the relative merit of their positions, and the tactics of a party in unnecessarily prolonging the litigation (see Ventimiglia v Ventimiglia, 36 AD3d 899 [2d Dept 2007]). The court must likewise consider the parties' overall financial circumstances and the equities of the case, and not financial need alone (see DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 [1987]).

2. The procedural posture of the application

Before turning to the sufficiency of the submissions, the standard against which they are measured warrants a word. An application under Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a] is addressed to the discretion of the court and is routinely determined upon the papers, as the appellate authority sustaining substantial interim awards reflects (see Cohen v Cohen, 209 AD3d 405 [1st Dept 2022]; Evgeny F. v Inessa B., 127 AD3d 617 [1st Dept 2015]; Lvovsky v Lvovsky, 2020 NY Slip Op 05857 [1st Dept 2020]). Neither party has requested a hearing, and Plaintiff, who opposed at length through both his own affirmation and that of his counsel, has not asked that one be held. Plaintiff was afforded and took full advantage of the opportunity to be heard: he submitted his own sworn affirmation addressing each branch of the application, together with the affirmation of his counsel and supporting exhibits, and he has supplemented the record thereafter. Any contention that an evidentiary hearing was required is unpreserved, and in any event the Court finds that the papers submitted are sufficient to permit a reasoned exercise of discretion at this interim stage.

An interim award is moreover not a final determination of the reasonable value of counsel's services. It is a provisional advance designed to permit the non-monied spouse to carry on or defend the action while it is pending, and its sufficiency is judged against that purpose rather than against the itemized proof that governs a final fee award after trial. The Court's task at this stage is to ensure that the litigation is shaped by the power of the evidence rather than the power of the bankroll (see Charpié v Charpié, 271 AD2d 169 [1st Dept 2000]), and the reasonable value of all services rendered in this action, together with the ultimate responsibility for them, remains reserved for trial or settlement. Every dollar directed herein remains subject to reallocation, and no party is prejudiced in any final accounting by the award now made.

That provisional character informs the standard by which an award of this kind is reviewed. It is the settled rule of this Department that a pendente lite award should be modified only rarely, and that an aggrieved party's remedy for any perceived inequities in such an award is a speedy trial (see Anonymous v Anonymous, 63 AD3d 493 [1st Dept 2009], lv dismissed 14 NY3d 921 [2010]; Kohli v Tewari, 216 AD3d 512 [1st Dept 2023]; Torres v Torres, 171 AD3d 613 [1st Dept 2019]; Wolinsky v Berkowitz, 227 AD3d 433 [1st Dept 2024]). Absent a showing of exigent circumstances, no exception to that rule is warranted (see Kohli v Tewari, 216 AD3d 512 [1st Dept 2023]). The rule applies with equal force to interim counsel fee awards, and the First Department has declined to disturb such awards where they were made without prejudice to further applications (see Voorham v Hicks-Voorham, 2025 NY Slip Op 05329 [1st Dept 2025]; Lennox v Weberman, 109 AD3d 703 [1st Dept 2013]). The award made herein is provisional, is made without prejudice to further applications by either party, and is subject in all respects to reallocation upon the full record developed at trial, and the Court will accommodate any application by either party for an expedited trial of the custody and financial issues in this action.

3. The statutory presumption and the relative financial circumstances of the parties

Applying these principles, the Court finds that the statutory presumption in favor of the less monied spouse applies with unusual force and has not been rebutted. Plaintiff has never disputed that he is the more monied spouse and has repeatedly acknowledged his obligation to contribute (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 528 at ¶18). The disparity is not marginal. Defendant has no income and no independent assets and has not worked outside the home during a marriage of nearly two decades, while Plaintiff controls marital assets exceeding $50 million, including more than $25 million in liquid assets, has paid his own attorneys in excess of $960,000 as of November 2025, and received a year-end bonus of nearly $17 million on March 10, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 497, 498, and 615). Plaintiff does not assert an inability to pay, and the Court expressly finds that he possesses ample liquid resources to satisfy the award made herein without impairment of his own ability to litigate. Where the monied spouse's resources so far exceed those of the non-monied spouse, an interim award is not a windfall but the very instrument the Legislature devised to preserve parity (see O'Shea v O'Shea, 93 NY2d 187 [1999]; Charpié v Charpié, 271 AD2d 169 [1st Dept 2000]).

The Court declines to treat the payments directed by the So-Ordered Stipulation as a source of funds for legal fees. Those payments are allocated by their own terms to the pre-payment of rent, to furnishings, and to support from which Defendant must pay food, clothing, utilities, insurance, household help, and the children's transportation (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 875 at ¶1 through ¶6). The Stipulation does not purport to provide for counsel fees, and no provision of it is directed to that purpose. A non-monied spouse is not required to spend down a substantial portion of the assets available to her in order to fund her defense (see Charpié v Charpié, 271 AD2d 169 [1st Dept 2000]; Lvovsky v Lvovsky, 2020 NY Slip Op 05857 [1st Dept 2020]). To divert earmarked support to counsel fees would defeat the purpose of both the stipulation and the statute.

4. The award is supported by accrued unpaid fees standing alone

The application is adequately substantiated. Counsel has submitted the parties' retainer agreements (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498, Exhibit K), billing records reflecting the sums outstanding (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497, Exhibit J), and detailed recitations of the qualifications and hourly rates of the attorneys performing the work, namely $995 for Kevin M. McDonough, Esq., $795 for Alison Leigh Epilone, Esq., $695 for Kerri A. McDonough, Esq., and $1,500 for Dan Rottenstreich, Esq. (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶30 through ¶34]. Those rates are commensurate with the rates prevailing among the matrimonial bar in this County and are not challenged as unreasonable by Plaintiff, who has himself paid his own counsel in excess of $960,000 in this action.

The Court finds that as of December 30, 2025 Mantel McDonough Riso, LLP was owed more than $570,000 and Rottenstreich Farley Bronstein Fisher Potter Hodas LLP was owed more than $136,000, an aggregate receivable in excess of $750,000 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶25; (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶12); that the only sums received by Defendant's counsel are the $100,000 retainer Defendant borrowed from her mother and the $250,000 Plaintiff was directed to pay by order of the Hon. Judge Hoffman (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 497 at ¶25 and Exhibits M and N); and that Plaintiff represents that his contributions toward Defendant's counsel fees total $297,500 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 528 at ¶18).

That finding is itself dispositive of the amount awarded. The established receivable of more than $750,000 represents services already rendered and unpaid as of December 30, 2025, and it exceeds by half again the $500,000 now awarded. It exceeds the award even if the entirety of the $297,500 Plaintiff identifies is treated as a credit against it. The award therefore does not depend upon any projection of future services: it is fully supported, as a first and independent ground, by fees already incurred, documented by retainer agreements and billing records, and undisputed in their approximate magnitude. Nothing in Plaintiff's opposition contests the existence of that receivable, challenges the billing records annexed as Exhibit J, or suggests that the work generating those charges was not performed.

5. The prospective component is independently supported

As a second and independent ground, the award is supported by the prospective work occasioned by the custody litigation. Counsel has enumerated eleven discrete categories of such work and estimates that it will exceed $500,000 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶28 and ¶29). No projection of hours accompanies that estimate, and the Court does not treat it as a substitute for the itemized proof that will be required upon any final application. It is, however, uncontroverted as to the scope of the work described. Plaintiff, though he characterizes the request as excessive, does not identify a single enumerated task that will not in fact have to be performed, does not contend that any of the eleven categories is unnecessary or duplicative of work already done, and does not challenge the rates at which that work will be billed. The burden of rebutting the statutory presumption rested upon him, and generalized objections to the total sum, unaccompanied by any specific challenge to the components from which it is derived, do not discharge that burden.

Measured against the rates set forth above, the eleven categories of work, culminating in a multi-week custody trial, could not be accomplished for materially less than the sum requested. The Court reaches that conclusion not upon speculation but upon the rates and the scope of work appearing in this record, and upon Plaintiff's own expenditure in excess of $960,000 upon his own representation through November 2025, at a stage of this litigation preceding any forensic evaluation and any custody trial. Plaintiff's own outlay is the most reliable available measure of what this litigation costs to conduct, and it demonstrates that the sum sought by the non-monied spouse for the far more demanding phase now ahead is conservative rather than excessive.

6. Plaintiff's remaining objections

The considerations Plaintiff advances do not warrant a lesser award.

He argues first that the request duplicates the $1,000,000 sought in Motion Sequence No. 009, and that the affirmation supporting that application referenced anticipated work related to trial preparation on legal and physical custody (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 17). The premise has been overtaken by events. Motion Sequence No. 009 was submitted before any forensic evaluator had been appointed and long before the appointment was vacated. Whatever custody work that application contemplated, it cannot have contemplated a forensic process that must now begin again from nothing, the Appointment Order having been vacated, the evaluator having been removed, his fees ordered refunded, and his work product declared inadmissible (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 851). The risk of duplicative recovery is nonetheless real, and the Court has addressed it directly and completely: the sum awarded herein shall be credited, dollar for dollar, against any award of interim counsel fees ultimately made upon Motion Sequence No. 009. Plaintiff cannot therefore be made to pay twice for the same services, and the objection is answered by that credit rather than by a reduction that would leave the established receivable unmet.

Plaintiff argues second that he has already contributed toward Defendant's counsel fees. He has, and the Court has weighed those payments (see DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 [1987]). They do not alter the outcome. The $297,500 Plaintiff identifies is measured against an established receivable in excess of $750,000, so that even after full credit for every dollar he has paid, the accrued and unpaid fees exceed the award now made. The Court further notes that the larger part of that sum was paid under compulsion of an order of the Hon. Judge Hoffman rather than voluntarily, a circumstance bearing upon the weight to be given to it in the equitable balance, though the result would be the same were it otherwise.

Plaintiff argues finally that an award would reward dilatory and duplicative motion practice. The relative merit of the parties' positions and the tactics of a party in unnecessarily prolonging the litigation are proper considerations (see Ventimiglia v Ventimiglia, 36 AD3d 899 [2d Dept 2007]; DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 [1987]), and the Court has considered them. They cannot carry the weight Plaintiff assigns them here. The conduct he invokes consists of allegations of alienation and obstruction that are vigorously disputed, that Defendant answers with allegations of abandonment and financial coercion equally vigorously disputed, and that no court has yet adjudicated. To discount a statutory fee award on the strength of unadjudicated accusations would be to decide the merits of this custody dispute through the mechanism of a fee application, and would leave the non-monied spouse unable to litigate the very issues upon which her conduct is to be judged. The Court declines to do so, and expressly makes no finding upon those allegations. The Court adds that it has reviewed the motion history of this action and finds no basis to conclude that Defendant's applications were interposed for delay; branch one of the present application, for example, was resolved by agreement of the parties on terms materially exceeding what Plaintiff had theretofore been paying, which is not the signature of a frivolous application.

7. Balance

Balancing the presumption, the magnitude of the disparity, the relative merit of the parties' positions, the tactics of the parties, the scope and complexity of the custody litigation, the substantiation described above, the amounts already advanced, Plaintiff's undisputed ability to pay, and the credit directed against Motion Sequence No. 009, the Court concludes that the requested award of $500,000 is warranted in full. The figure is consistent with awards sustained in this Department in litigation of comparable magnitude, and is materially smaller than the $750,000 interim award recently affirmed in Voorham v Hicks-Voorham, 2025 NY Slip Op 05329 [1st Dept 2025] (see also, Cohen v Cohen, 209 AD3d 405 [1st Dept 2022]; Evgeny F. v Inessa B., 127 AD3d 617 [1st Dept 2015]; Wechsler v Wechsler, 19 AD3d 157 [1st Dept 2005]), and it is modest measured against the $960,000 Plaintiff had paid his own attorneys by November 2025 and against a year end bonus of nearly $17 million. An award materially smaller would not level the playing field but would merely postpone the next application, an outcome the Court of Appeals has cautioned against (see Frankel v Frankel, 2 NY3d 601 [2004]).

The Court states expressly that the two grounds set forth in Parts III.B.4 and III.B.5 above are independent of one another, and that the award would be made in the same amount upon either ground standing alone. The sum shall be paid to Mantel McDonough Riso, LLP, as Defendant's counsel of record, for allocation between that firm and co-counsel Rottenstreich Farley Bronstein Fisher Potter Hodas LLP as they may agree, each firm having established an unpaid receivable in this action. The award is made without prejudice to further applications as the litigation proceeds, is credited against any award ultimately made upon Motion Sequence No. 009 and is subject in all respects to reallocation at the time of trial or upon settlement. Branch two is granted in its entirety.

C. Branch Three: Reargument of the Scope of the Forensic Order

A motion for leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d] [2] is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and must be predicated upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion. It is not a vehicle by which an unsuccessful party may advance arguments different from those originally tendered, nor an invitation to the court to reconsider a determination with which the movant simply disagrees.

1. The branch is academic

Branch three is academic. The order whose scope Defendant asks this Court to narrow no longer exists. By Order dated July 7, 2026, this Court relieved and removed Alan Ravitz, M.D. as the court-appointed neutral forensic evaluator, vacated the Appointment Order dated December 19, 2025 in its entirety, directed the refund of all fees paid, and precluded the admission of any report, notes, or other work product generated by that evaluator (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 851). That Order stands unchallenged; no party has sought to vacate, modify, renew, or reargue it. A motion for leave to reargue presupposes a subsisting determination. Where the order sought to be reargued has been vacated, there remains no directive to modify and no scope to circumscribe, and the application will not be entertained.

The Court further observes that Defendant has obtained, by operation of the July 7, 2026 Order, relief exceeding that which branch three sought. Branch three asked that the areas of inquiry be narrowed; the evaluation has instead been terminated in its entirety, the evaluator removed, and his work product rendered inadmissible. Defendant is not aggrieved by the denial of a narrowing she no longer needs.

2. In the alternative, the branch fails upon the merits

Lest the disposition of this branch be thought to rest upon the July 7, 2026 Order alone, the Court determines in the alternative, and as an independent ground, that leave to reargue would be denied upon the merits were the Appointment Order still in force.

CPLR § 2221 [d] [2] requires the movant to demonstrate that the court overlooked or misapprehended a matter of fact or of law in determining the prior motion. Defendant's submission identifies none. It does not point to any fact in the prior record that was placed before the court and disregarded. It does not identify any statute, rule, or decision that was cited and not applied, or applied incorrectly. It rests instead upon the recommendations of the Governor's Blue-Ribbon Commission on Forensic Custody Evaluations, an advisory body whose December 2021 Report to the Governor proposes changes to existing practice (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶21 and ¶22 and Exhibit Z]. Recommendations for prospective reform, however thoughtful, are not controlling authority, and a court does not misapprehend the law by declining to anticipate legislative or regulatory changes that have not been enacted. Defendant's counsel candidly acknowledges that the question remains a subject of debate (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 498 at ¶19 and ¶23), and that acknowledgment is itself inconsistent with the proposition that settled law was overlooked.

Nor does the substance of the objection establish an abuse of the discretion originally exercised. Custody is determined by the best interests of the children (Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1] [a]), an inquiry that is necessarily comprehensive. The areas of inquiry specified in the Appointment Order, each party's parenting skills, the nature of the current and past parent-child relationships, each parent's ability to co-parent and to facilitate the children's relationship with the other, each party's demonstrated ability to provide continuity and stability, any alienation or estrangement, and any history of domestic violence or dangers in the households, are matters bearing directly upon that inquiry. To confine a court-appointed evaluator to the single question whether either parent suffers from a diagnosable mental health condition affecting parenting would be to exclude from the evaluation subjects the Court must ultimately decide, and would do so in a case in which, as Plaintiff affirms without contradiction, every expert involved and the Attorney for the Children recommended a forensic evaluation (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 528 at ¶20). A determination declining so to confine the inquiry reflects no misapprehension of law.

Branch three would accordingly be denied upon the merits in any event, and the Court so holds in the alternative.

3. Guidance as to any successor appointment

The Court adds only what the present posture requires. The record on this motion does not reflect the appointment of a successor forensic evaluator, and the Court does not reach, and expresses no view upon, the appropriate scope of any evaluation that may hereafter be directed. Any such appointment must satisfy Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1] [a-3], which permits the appointment of a child custody forensic evaluator who is a psychologist, social worker, or psychiatrist licensed in this State and who has received, within the last two years, a certification of completion of the training program established pursuant to Executive Law § 575 [3] [o], and which further requires the court, upon appointment, to obtain proof of that certification. That statutory certification is distinct from membership in the Mental Health Professionals Panel maintained under the rules of the Appellate Division, the credential addressed in the Memorandum of the Office of Attorneys for Children dated June 29, 2026 and in this Court's Order of July 7, 2026 (see 22 NYCRR 623.3; 623.4; 623.9; 680.3; 680.4; 680.9; Carlin v Carlin, 124 AD3d 817 [2d Dept 2015]; Chu v Chu, 224 AD3d 653 [2d Dept 2024]). Any successor appointment in this action shall conform to both the statutory qualification requirements and any applicable rules governing the Panel. The foregoing is guidance for the conduct of future proceedings and is not a determination of any application presently before the Court.

Branch three is therefore denied, without prejudice to the positions of either party and of the Attorney for the Children upon any properly presented application for the appointment of a successor forensic evaluator, including the scope of any such evaluation, and without prejudice to objections to the methodology, admissibility, or weight of any successor evaluator's report at the appropriate juncture.

D.Branch Four: Reargument of the Allocation of the Forensic Evaluator's Fees

Branch four seeks leave to reargue that portion of the December 19, 2025 order directing that Defendant bear .05% of Dr. Ravitz's fees, and, upon reargument, an order directing that Plaintiff bear 100% of those fees. This branch fails for three independent reasons, each of which the Court holds sufficient standing alone.

First, Plaintiff affirmed under penalty of perjury that he had already gone ahead and paid 100% of Dr. Ravitz's retainer (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 527 at ¶31), so that Defendant had, in substance, obtained precisely what branch four sought before the application was decided. A party is not aggrieved by the denial of relief she has already received.

Second, the Appointment Order that fixed the challenged allocation has been vacated, and this Court has directed Dr. Ravitz to refund all monies received in connection with that order, including the retainer of $13,000.00, in the same proportion as paid (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 851). The fee obligation Defendant asks this Court to reallocate has been extinguished, and any sum she may have contributed is to be returned to her. There is nothing left to allocate.

Third, and independently of the two foregoing grounds, Defendant has not identified any fact or principle of law overlooked or misapprehended in the fixing of that allocation, as CPLR § 2221 [d] [2] requires. The moving papers do not contend that the Court was unaware of the parties' respective financial circumstances when it fixed the allocation; they contend only that the allocation should have been different. That is a ground for appeal or for reallocation upon a full record, not for reargument. The Court further notes that the allocation of the costs of a court-appointed expert made at the pendente lite stage is by its nature provisional and remains subject to reallocation upon the record developed at trial, and that the disputed share amounted, upon Plaintiff's uncontradicted calculation, to $6.50 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 527 at ¶31).

Branch four is accordingly denied, without prejudice to Defendant's right to be heard upon the allocation of the fees of any successor forensic evaluator, and without prejudice to reallocation of all sums advanced on account of the forensic process at the time of trial or upon settlement.

E. Branch Five: Residual Relief

Branch five seeks such other, further, and different relief as is just, proper, and equitable. To the extent this branch is intended to reach relief not specifically identified in branches one through four, it is denied. A court will not fashion relief that a movant has not particularized and to which an opposing party has had no meaningful opportunity to respond. No specific relief has been identified under this branch, and the Court accordingly grants none.

F. Motion Sequence No. 016: Appellate Counsel Fees Pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]

1. The scope of the Short Form Order dated August 3, 2026

The Court addresses at the threshold the effect of its own Short Form Order dated August 3, 2026, which declared Motion Sequence No. 016 resolved upon the So-Ordered Stipulation of July 13, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 875, 926, and 928). The Stipulation resolved the appeal itself. It does not, in any of its eleven paragraphs, make provision for counsel fees, and no party contends that the fee application was compromised, withdrawn, or otherwise settled by it. The consequence, were the Short Form Order given literal effect, would be that a fully submitted application for fees incurred in prosecuting an appeal would stand disposed of without any determination and without any payment, a result the Stipulation does not support and that this Court did not intend.

A court possesses inherent authority to correct its own order so that it conforms to the disposition actually intended, and may do so upon its own motion (see CPLR § 5019 [a]). The Court accordingly recalls and vacates so much of the Short Form Order dated August 3, 2026 as declared Motion Sequence No. 016 resolved, that Order remaining in full force and effect in all other respects, including as to Motion Sequence Nos. 011, 013, 017, and 018 and as to branch one of Motion Sequence No. 012. The application for appellate counsel fees is determined upon the merits below. Neither party is prejudiced by this course. Both were fully heard upon the application, Defendant by two affirmations in support and two in reply, Plaintiff by the affirmations of himself and his counsel with exhibits, and no party has been deprived of an opportunity to address any question the Court decides.

2. The governing standard

Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a] reaches services rendered upon an appeal. An application for an award of counsel fees for appellate services is correctly presented to the court of original instance (see Holloway v Holloway, 307 AD2d 405 [3d Dept 2003]), and such an award may be made either before or after the appeal has been resolved (see Caldwell v Caldwell, 209 AD2d 1022 [4th Dept 1994]; Delgado v Delgado, 160 AD2d 385 [1st Dept 1990]). The considerations governing the exercise of discretion are those that govern any award under the statute, namely the relative financial circumstances of the parties, the relative merit of their positions, and the tactics of a party in unnecessarily prolonging the litigation, and those considerations apply with equal force to an award for appellate litigation (see Ventimiglia v Ventimiglia, 36 AD3d 899 [2d Dept 2007]; DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 [1987]). The non-monied spouse is not required to demonstrate a likelihood of success upon the appeal as a strict predicate to an award (see Cohen v Cohen, 73 AD3d 832 [2d Dept 2010]).

3.The statutory presumption

The findings set forth in Part III.B.3 above as to the relative financial circumstances of these parties apply with equal force here and are incorporated by reference. Defendant has no income and no independent assets. Plaintiff controls a marital estate exceeding $50 million, of which more than $25 million is liquid, received a year-end bonus of nearly $17 million on March 10, 2026, and has paid his own attorneys sums that Defendant's counsel places, without contradiction, at not less than $1.2 million as of April 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 822 at ¶3). Plaintiff has never disputed that he is the monied spouse and does not assert that he lacks the ability to pay. The presumption in favor of the less monied spouse applies and has not been rebutted.

4. The fees actually incurred upon the appeal are established

Defendant's counsel affirmed, upon billing records annexed to the moving papers and updated in reply, that fees and disbursements incurred upon the appeal, inclusive of appellate printing costs, exceeded $110,000 as of April 21, 2026, and that nothing has been paid on account of them (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 668 at ¶12 and Exhibit F; NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 822 at ¶18 and Exhibit N]. Plaintiff does not challenge those records, does not contend that the enumerated appellate tasks were not performed, and does not argue that the rates charged exceed the prevailing market. That showing is sufficient at this interim stage to establish an accrued and unpaid appellate receivable of $110,000, and the Court so finds.

5. The prospective component is academic

The balance of the sum requested rests upon work that will not now be performed. The $225,000 sought was measured against the completion of the appeal, including review of the respondent's brief, preparation of a reply brief, preparation for oral argument, and argument before the Appellate Division (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 668 at ¶27 and ¶28). The parties having resolved the appeal by the Stipulation of July 13, 2026, those services will not be rendered. An interim award is an advance against services necessary to carry on or defend the action, and the Court will not direct payment for appellate services that the resolution of the appeal has rendered unnecessary. So much of the application as seeks fees in excess of the accrued sum is denied as academic, without prejudice to an application, upon proper proof, for appellate fees actually incurred through July 13, 2026 and not compensated by this Decision and Order.

6. Plaintiff's objections

Plaintiff argues first that the appeal was frivolous. The record does not bear that characterization. Defendant applied to the Appellate Division for a stay and obtained one, that Court having directed the maintenance of the status quo pendente lite payments, and having thereafter reaffirmed that direction upon the full bench (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 779 at ¶5 and ¶6 and Exhibits C and D). A litigant who obtains the relief she seeks from an appellate court has not litigated frivolously, whatever the ultimate merit of the appeal, which this Court does not reach and upon which it expressly makes no finding. That Plaintiff offered comparable relief before the appeal was taken does not alter the analysis, the offer having been declined and the relief having been secured only by application to the Appellate Division.

Plaintiff argues second that the appellate work duplicates Motion Sequence No. 013, the motion for renewal and reargument. It does not. The services compensated herein were rendered in a different forum, upon a different record, and in a form governed by the rules of the Appellate Division. The award made herein is confined to appellate services and disbursements and to no other work in this action.

Plaintiff argues third that he has already contributed toward Defendant's counsel fees. He has, and the Court has weighed those payments (see DeCabrera v Cabrera-Rosete, 70 NY2d 879 [1987]). They were made on account of trial level services and are measured against a total receivable that, upon this record, is an order of magnitude larger. As upon Motion Sequence No. 012, the Court has not considered and does not rely upon any communication exchanged in the course of settlement negotiations, including the proposed stipulations of counsel fees described in the parties' papers (see CPLR § 4547).

7. Balance

Balancing the presumption, the magnitude of the financial disparity, the relative merit of the parties' positions, the tactics of the parties, the documented and unchallenged appellate receivable, the sums already advanced, and Plaintiff's undisputed ability to pay, the Court concludes that an award of $110,000 is warranted, and that the balance of the sum requested must be denied as academic. The sum shall be paid to Mantel McDonough Riso, LLP, as Defendant's counsel of record upon the appeal. The award is separate from the award made upon Motion Sequence No. 012 and shall not be credited against it or against any award ultimately made upon Motion Sequence No. 009, the services compensated being appellate in character and distinct from the trial level services underlying those applications. It is made without prejudice to further applications as the litigation may require and is subject in all respects to reallocation at the time of trial or upon settlement.

IV. Conclusion and Decretal Paragraphs

The Court has considered the parties' remaining contentions, including their reciprocal accusations of misconduct and bad faith, and finds them either addressed above or without merit or bearing upon the relief determined herein. Nothing in this Decision and Order shall be construed as a finding upon any contested allegation of alienation, abandonment, abuse, or financial misconduct, all of which remain for determination upon a full evidentiary record.

The Court states expressly that the determinations made herein rest upon independent and alternative grounds as set forth above, and that each such ground is separately and sufficiently dispositive of the branch to which it pertains. All relief granted herein is interim and provisional in character and is subject in all respects to reallocation at the time of trial or upon settlement, so that no party is finally prejudiced by any determination made upon this application.

Accordingly, upon the foregoing papers, and after due deliberation, it is hereby

ORDERED that branch one of Defendant's Order to Show Cause bearing Motion Sequence No. 012, which sought an order directing Plaintiff to restore the status quo concerning payment of the children's drivers, the family's housekeepers, and the childcare providers, having been resolved on consent by the Stipulation and Agreement dated July 13, 2026 and So Ordered by this Court (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 875), and having been declared RESOLVED by Short Form Order dated August 3, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 926 and 928), requires no further determination, this Decision and Order memorializing that prior disposition; and it is further

ORDERED that branch two of Defendant's Order to Show Cause, seeking an award of interim counsel fees pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a], is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff JL shall pay the sum of Five Hundred Thousand ($500,000.00) Dollars as and for Defendant's interim counsel fees, payable directly to Defendant's counsel of record, Mantel McDonough Riso, LLP, 410 Park Avenue, 17th Floor, New York, New York 10022, within twenty (20) days of service upon Plaintiff of a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry, said sum to be allocated between Mantel McDonough Riso, LLP and co-counsel Rottenstreich Farley Bronstein Fisher Potter Hodas LLP as those firms may agree; and it is further

ORDERED that the foregoing award is made upon two independent grounds, namely the accrued and unpaid receivable of Defendant's counsel established upon this record and, alternatively and independently, the prospective work occasioned by the custody litigation, the Court determining that the award would be made in the same amount upon either ground standing alone; and it is further

ORDERED that the foregoing award shall be credited, dollar for dollar, against any award of interim counsel fees ultimately made upon Motion Sequence No. 009, shall not otherwise be deemed a determination of that application in whole or in part, is without prejudice to further applications for counsel fees as the litigation may require, and shall be subject in all respects to reallocation at the time of trial or upon settlement; and it is further

ORDERED that branch three of Defendant's Order to Show Cause, seeking leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d] [2] those portions of the December 19, 2025 order appointing Alan Ravitz, M.D. which define the scope of the forensic evaluation, and to limit that scope to the assessment of mental health issues directly impacting parenting ability, is DENIED as academic in light of this Court's Order dated July 7, 2026 vacating the said Appointment Order (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 851), and is in the alternative and upon an independent ground DENIED upon the merits, Defendant having failed to identify any matter of fact or law overlooked or misapprehended as CPLR § 2221 [d] [2] requires; and it is further

ORDERED that the denial of branch three is without prejudice to the positions of either party and of the Attorney for the Children upon any properly presented application for the appointment of a successor forensic evaluator, including the scope of any such evaluation and a schedule for its completion, any such appointment to conform to Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1] [a-3] and to any applicable rules governing the Mental Health Professionals Panel; and it is further

ORDERED that branch four of Defendant's Order to Show Cause, seeking leave to reargue pursuant to CPLR § 2221 [d] [2] that portion of the December 19, 2025 order directing that Defendant be responsible for .05% of the fees of Alan Ravitz, M.D., is DENIED upon three independent grounds, namely Plaintiff's payment of 100% of the evaluator's retainer, this Court's Order dated July 7, 2026 vacating the Appointment Order and directing the refund of all monies paid to the said evaluator (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 851), and Defendant's failure to identify any matter of fact or law overlooked or misapprehended as CPLR § 2221 [d] [2] requires, without prejudice to Defendant's right to be heard upon the allocation of the fees of any successor forensic evaluator and without prejudice to reallocation of all sums paid on account of the forensic process at the time of trial or upon settlement; and it is further

ORDERED that branch five of Defendant's Order to Show Cause, seeking such other, further, and different relief as is just, proper, and equitable, is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that the affirmations electronically filed under the designation Motion Sequence No. 015 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 668; 669] are deemed the moving papers upon Motion Sequence No. 016, and no separate application designated Motion Sequence No. 015 is pending before this Court; and it is further

ORDERED that so much of the Short Form Order of this Court dated August 3, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc Nos. 926 and 928] as declared Motion Sequence No. 016 resolved is recalled and vacated, the said Short Form Order remaining in full force and effect in all other respects; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Defendant's Order to Show Cause bearing Motion Sequence No. 016, seeking an award of appellate counsel fees pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a] in connection with the appeal pending in the Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, under Docket No. 2026-01059, is GRANTED TO THE EXTENT set forth herein; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff JL shall pay the sum of One Hundred Ten Thousand ($110,000.00) Dollars as and for Defendant's appellate counsel fees and disbursements, payable directly to Defendant's counsel of record, Mantel McDonough Riso, LLP, 410 Park Avenue, 17th Floor, New York, New York 10022, within twenty (20) days of service upon Plaintiff of a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry; and it is further

ORDERED that the foregoing award is separate from the award made herein upon Motion Sequence No. 012, shall not be credited against that award or against any award of interim counsel fees ultimately made upon Motion Sequence No. 009, the services compensated being appellate in character, is without prejudice to further applications for counsel fees as the litigation may require, and shall be subject in all respects to reallocation at the time of trial or upon settlement; and it is further

ORDERED that so much of Motion Sequence No. 016 as sought appellate counsel fees in excess of the sum awarded herein is DENIED as academic in light of the resolution of the appeal by the Stipulation and Agreement dated July 13, 2026 (NY St Cts Filing [NYSCEF] Doc No. 875), without prejudice to an application, upon proper proof, for appellate fees actually incurred through the date of that Stipulation and not compensated by this Decision and Order; and it is further

ORDERED that branch B of Defendant's Order to Show Cause bearing Motion Sequence No. 016, seeking such other, further and different relief as is just, proper and equitable, is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that any relief requested upon Motion Sequence Nos. 012 and 016 and not expressly granted herein is DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendant shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order with notice of entry upon Plaintiff's counsel and upon the Attorney for the Children, by uploading to NYSCEF, within ten (10) days of the date of entry hereof; and it is further

ORDERED that Motion Sequence Nos. 012 and 016 are hereby disposed in their entirety.

This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: August 13, 2026

New York, New York

HON. RONALD CASTORINA, JR.

JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT

Ronald Castorina, Jr., J.