Salvatore Napolitano, Plaintiff, v. SPECIALTY TRADES CONTRACTING LLC (2026)

The papers electronically filed in NYSCEF as documents numbered 63-90; 113- 117;146,147, 157 and 158 have been read and considered on the motion for summary judgment by Defendants, Good Samaritan Hospital of Suffern, NY and Bon Secours Charity Health System, Inc. (hereinafter collectively the "Hospital defendants") dismissing the complaint and all cross- claims insofar as asserted against them and for an order granting indemnification as against third- party defendant, Specialty Trades Contracting, LLC (hereinafter "STC") (Seq. #2); and documents numbered 91-111, 119-122, 148-146 have been read and considered on plaintiff's separate motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and so much of the Labor Law 241(6) cause of action predicated upon an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(b)(3) and 12 NYCRR 23-3.3(c) (Seq. #3).

Plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries, alleging, inter alia, violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6). Thereafter, the owner commenced a third-party action, asserting, among other things, a cause of action for contractual indemnification against the subcontractor. The alleged incident took place on January 18, 2019, while plaintiff was performing demolition work at an extensive renovation project at Good Samaritan Hospital in Suffern, New York, a facility that the Hospital defendants owned and operated. The Hospital defendants hired Holt Construction Corp. (hereinafter "Holt") as the Construction Manager for the work and Holt in turn entered into a subcontract with plaintiff's employer third-party defendant STC to perform the demolition portion of the project. Plaintiff alleges that he was assigned to take down a floor to ceiling masonry block chase wall that was veiling HVAC ductwork. Plaintiff alleges that while he was standing on the third rung of an eight-foot A-frame ladder, a one-foot extension wall that was at least five feet away from where plaintiff was working collapsed and fell, striking and knocking both plaintiff and the ladder causing him to fall. The Hospital defendants now move for summary judgment dismissing the compliant insofar as asserted against them and on the third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification. Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on the issue of liability of the causes of action alleging a violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against the Hospital defendants and Holt.

"It is well settled that 'the proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact.' " Pullman v Silverman, 28 NY3d 1060, 1062 [2016], quoting Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]. "Failure to make such showing requires denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers." Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985] [internal citations omitted]. "Once such a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to raise material issues of fact which require a trial of the action." Cabrera v Rodriguez, 72 AD3d 553, 553-554 [1st Dept 2010], citing Alvarez, 68 NY2d at 342.

"The court's function on a motion for summary judgment is merely to determine if any triable issues exist, not to determine the merits of any such issues or to assess credibility." Meridian Mgmt. Corp. v Cristi Cleaning Serv. Corp., 70 AD3d 508, 510-511 [1st Dept 2010] [internal citations omitted]. The evidence presented in a summary judgment motion must be examined "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party" Schmidt v One New York Plaza Co., 153 AD3d 427, 428 [1st Dept 2017], quoting Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335, 339 [2011] and bare allegations or conclusory assertions are insufficient to create genuine issues of fact. See Rotuba Extruders v Ceppos, 46 NY2d 223, 231 [1978]. If there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable fact, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. See id.

Plaintiff's Labor Law § 240 (1) Claim

Labor Law § 240 (1) mandates that building owners and contractors

in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed.

The statute imposes absolute liability on building owners and contractors whose failure to "provide proper protection to workers employed on a construction site" proximately causes injury to a worker. See Misseritti v Mark IV Constr. Co., 86 NY2d 847, 490 [1995]. "Labor Law § 240 (1) applies to both 'falling worker' and 'falling object' cases." Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d 259, 267 [2001]. With respect to falling objects, liability is not limited to cases in which the falling object is in the process of being hoisted or secured. See Quattrocchi v F.J. Sciame Constr. Corp., 11 NY3d 757, 758-759 [2008].

Rather, "a plaintiff must show that the object fell . . . because of the absence or inadequacy of a safety device of the kind enumerated in the statute" Narducci v Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 NY2d at 268. "To succeed on a cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1), a plaintiff must establish that the defendant violated its duty and that the violation proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries." Roblero v Bais Ruchel High Sch., Inc., 175 AD3d 1446, 1447 [2d Dept 2019]. The burden then shifts to the defendant to raise a triable issue of fact. See Bermejo v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 119 AD3d 500, 502 [2014]. A worker's comparative negligence is not a defense to a cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1). See Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of NY City, 1 NY3d 280, 289 [2003]. Rather, only where the worker's own conduct is the sole proximate cause of the accident is recovery under Labor Law § 240 (1) unavailable. See Luna v 4300 Crescent, LLC, 174 AD3d 881, 883 [2019].

Here, plaintiff alleges that, while he was approximately 30 to 36 inches off the ground, he was struck in the hip by the extension wall -- that collapsed approximately 5 feet away from where he was working. Plaintiff concedes that there was nothing wrong with the ladder he was using. Plaintiff has not established that his fall was the proximate cause of an unsecured ladder or that it would have been prevented if he was using a baker scaffold. There is conflicting testimony as to whether there was more than one scaffold available for plaintiff to use. Further, the photos submitted indicate metal framing at least one foot in front of and approximately three feet to the right of the extension wall which could have prevented plaintiff from using a baker scaffold which is typically 6 feet in length. Nowhere in his deposition does the plaintiff indicate that the metal framing was removed before he began demolishing the wall. Plaintiff has failed to prove that proper protection was required and not provided.

Plaintiff also does not establish that an inspection of the extension wall would have revealed it was unstable and needed to be secured. He acknowledged that there was "no way to see any malfunction on that wall because it looked—it looked perfect." NYSCEF Doc. 80 Trans. p.123 l.22-25. Only after the extension wall fell, could one tell that it was never properly anchored. See id., p.156, l.13-25. More importantly, although the wall that fell was not the section that plaintiff was working on, it can reasonably be understood from the record that the wall also supposed to be demolished. Imposing liability for failure to provide protective devices to prevent the walls or objects from falling, when their fall was the ultimate goal of the work, would be illogical. See Wilinski v 334 East 92nd Housing Development Fund Corp., 18 NY3d 1 [2011]. Securing a wall that is slated for demolition would be contrary to the objectives of the work plan. While there is a potential "causal connection between the object[s'] inadequately regulated descent and plaintiff's injury, see Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 605 [2009], neither party is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Whether plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by the lack of a safety device of the kind required by the statute is an issue for a trier of fact to determine.

Plaintiff's Claims Under Labor Law § 241 (6)

Plaintiff's remaining claims arise under Labor Law § 241 (6), which provides:

All areas in which construction, excavation or demolition work is being performed shall be so constructed, shored, equipped, guarded, arranged, operated and conducted as to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety to the persons employed therein or lawfully frequenting such places.

As the statute is not self-executing, a plaintiff must set forth a violation of a specific rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to it. See Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec., Co., 81 NY2d 494, 503 [1993]. In this case, plaintiff invokes 12 NYCRR 23-3.3 (b) (3), which provides:

Walls, chimneys and other parts of any building or other structure shall not be left unguarded in such condition that such parts may fall, collapse or be weakened by wind pressure or vibration

and 12 NYCRR 23-3.3( c) which provides:

During hand demolition operations, continuing inspections shall be made by designated persons as the work progresses to detect any hazards to any person resulting from weakened or deteriorated floors or walls or from loosened material. Persons shall not be suffered or permitted to work where such hazards exist until protection has been provided by shoring, bracing or other effective means.

Defendants contend that this regulation is inapplicable because plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that an inspection of the extension wall would have revealed that it was not properly secured and needed to be reinforced. Plaintiff admits that an inspection would not have revealed the wall's malfunction. Notwithstanding, the thrust of subdivision (c) is to fashion a safeguard, in the form of "continuing inspections," against hazards which are created by the progress of the demolition work" Monroe v City of New York, 67 AD2d 89, 100 [2d Dept 1979]. Here, the accident occurred less than one hour from the time plaintiff began taking down the wall. The record is silent as to when such continuing inspections should take place according to industry standards and contrary to plaintiff's contention, there is no evidence that continuing inspections would have revealed the structural instability of the extension wall. Accordingly, both plaintiff and defendants fail to meet their burden of showing either compliance or noncompliance with the regulations or that defendants' noncompliance did or did not cause plaintiff's accident.

Since plaintiff has failed to meet his prima facie burden of demonstrating a violation of the scaffold law and that the violation was a proximate cause of his injuries, the Court need not address the issue of his comparative negligence, if any, as a defense. See generally, Lopes v County of Suffolk, 236 AD3d 883 [2d Dept 2025].

Plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 claim

Labor Law § 200 is the codification of a property owner's common-law duty to provide workers at a site with a reasonably safe place to work (see, Ross v. Curtis—Palmer Hydro—Elec. Co., supra.; Lombardi v. Stout, 80 NY2d 290, 294 [1992]). Where a premises condition is at issue, property owners may be held liable for a violation of Labor Law § 200 if the owner either created the dangerous condition that caused the accident or had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the accident. See Azad v. 270 5th Realty Corp., 46 AD3d 728, 730 [2d Dept 2007]; See also Kerins v. Vassar Coll., 15 AD3d 623, 626 [2d Dept 2005]; Kobeszko v. Lyden Realty Invs., 289 AD2d 535, 536 [2d Dept 2001]; Giambalvo v. Chemical Bank, 260 AD2d at 433 [2d Dept 1999].

By contrast, when the manner of work is at issue, "no liability will attach to the owner solely because [he or she] may have had notice of the allegedly unsafe manner in which work was performed" Dennis v. City of New York, 304 AD2d 611, 61 [2d Dept 2003]; See Ortega v Puccia., 57 AD3d 54 [2d Dept 2008]. Rather, when a claim arises out of alleged defects or dangers in the methods or materials of the work, recovery against the owner or general contractor cannot be had under Labor Law § 200 unless it is shown that the party to be charged had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work. See Id. Although property owners often have a general authority to oversee the progress of the work, mere general supervisory authority at a worksite for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work and inspecting the work product is insufficient to impose liability under Labor Law § 200. See Natale v. City of New York, 33 AD3d 772, 773 [2d Dept 2006]. A defendant has the authority to supervise or control the work for purposes of Labor Law § 200 when that defendant bears the responsibility for the manner in which the work is performed.

In this case, the plaintiff's accident involved a dangerous or defective condition on the defendants' premises as well as the way the plaintiff performed his work. The work was not supervised by the Hospital and was performed on equipment provided by the plaintiff's employer, not by the Hospital. As stated by the Court of Appeals, "the duty to provide a safe place to work is not breached when the injury arises out of a defect in the subcontractor's own plant, tools and methods, or through negligent acts of the subcontractor occurring as a detail of the work." See Persichilli v. Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 16 NY2d 136, 145 [1965]. In Persichilli, the Court of Appeals further stated that while a subcontractor must furnish safe ladders and scaffolds to its employees, a subcontractor's failure to provide safe appliances does not render the "premises" unsafe or defective. The allegedly defective scaffold should instead be viewed as a device involving the methods and means of the work. Under such circumstances, Labor Law § 200 imposes no liability upon owners, (see id. at 146), absent evidence of the owner's authority to supervise or control the manner and methods of the work.

Here, Plaintiff concedes that the defendants did not have the authority to control the manner or method by which the plaintiff performed his work. Further, the Hospital contends that it had no actual or constructive notice of the alleged defective extension wall. Plaintiff's own testimony reveals that the defective extension wall was not discoverable through a reasonable inspection. Thus, the Hospital has established, prima facie, that it did not have authority to exercise supervision or control over the means and methods of the plaintiff's work. In opposition, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. See Dupkanicova v. Vasiloff, 35 AD3d 650, 651 [2d Dept 2006]; See also Reilly v. Loreco Constr., 284 AD2d 384, 385 [2d Dept 2001].

Contractual Indemnification

The Hospital also moves for summary judgment on its contractual indemnification claim against third-party defendant STC. There is no dispute that the indemnification clause in the contract with STC provides that the Hospital, as owner, is entitled to indemnification only if plaintiff's damages were caused by the negligence or omission of STC. Because issues of fact exist as to its negligence, the Hospital is entitled to conditional summary judgment on its contractual indemnification claim against STC. See Herrero v 2146 Nostrand Avenue Associates, LLC, 193 AD3d 421 [1st Dept 2021].

In arriving at this decision the Court has reviewed, evaluated, and considered all of the issues framed by these motion papers and the failure of the Court to specifically mention any particular issue in this Decision and Order does not mean that it has not been considered by the Court in light of the appropriate legal authority.

In light of the above it is hereby

ORDERED, that the branch of Defendants, Good Samaritan Hospital of Suffern New York and Bon Secours Charity Health Systems, Inc., motion for summary judgment is GRANTED to the extent that plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 claim insofar as asserted against it is dismissed and its claim for contractual indemnification as against third-party defendant, Specialty Trades Contracting LLC, is conditioned on the finding of negligence or omission of third-party defendant, Specialty Trades Contracting, LLC. The motion is otherwise DENIED; and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety; and it is further

ORDERED that the parties shall appear for a pre-trial/settlement conference on September 30, 2026 at 9:30 a.m. pre-trial conference.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision & Order of this Court.

Dated: August 27, 2026

New City, New York

John P. Collins, Jr., J.