LLC v. CITY OF NEWBURGH (2026)

The following papers filed electronically were read and considered on the motion by Plaintiff, Charles Tran Property LLC (Mot. Seq. #1) for an Order (1) pursuant to CPLR § 3212, granting summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor, and against Defendants with respect to Plaintiff's sole cause of action contained in the verified complaint; (2) vacating and/or cancelling, in its entirety, a certain deed dated October 28, 2024, and recorded in the Orange County Clerk's Office on November 13, 2024, in Liber 15648, page 1273 (Instrument No. 20240068277); and (3) granting summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor against Defendants with respect to Defendants' sole counterclaim, and dismissing said counterclaim; and on the cross-motion by Defendants Todd Venning, solely in his capacity as Director of Finance and Enforcing Officer of the City of Newburgh, and City of Newburgh (Mot. Seq. #2) for an Order (a) striking Plaintiff's Answer; (b) striking Plaintiff' Notice of Pendency; (c) granting Summary Judgment pursuant to CPLR§ 2215 and § 3212 in favor of Defendant City of Newburgh, and (d) dismissing Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment:

Notice of Motion, Affirmation in Support,

Affidavit in Support, Statement of Material Facts,

Memorandum of Law, Exhibit A Doc. 15-19

Notice of Cross-Motion, Affirmation in Support,

Statement of Material Facts, Exhibits A-D,

Memorandum of Law Doc. 23-30

Affirmation in Opposition/Reply, Exhibit A,

Response to Statement of Material Facts Doc. 36-38

Plaintiff brings this action to vacate and/or declare as void the deed purporting to convey title to certain real property located at 35 Bush Avenue, Newburgh, New York (the "Property") on the grounds it was signed and recorded in the absence of a default judgment, in violation of Article 11 of the New York Real Property Tax Law ("RPTL").

Factual Background and Procedural History

Plaintiff was previously the record owner of the Property. Due to the accrual of unpaid real property taxes, Defendant City of Newburgh ("City") commenced an in rem proceeding by a Petition and Notice of Foreclosure dated February 9, 2024, pursuant to Article 11 of RPTL, to foreclose tax liens against the Property  ¹ . Plaintiff, who was the Defendant property owner in the tax foreclosure case, failed to answer or appear in that action. Thereafter, the City moved for a default judgment based upon Defendant's failure to interpose an answer to the Petition and Notice of Foreclosure. The City's motion was granted by Decision and Order dated October 11, 2024 (Goldberg-Velazquez, J.) that directed the City's Comptroller or Enforcing Officer to convey to the City, by deed, full and complete title in fee simple absolute as provided by RPTL § 1136. The Decision and Order also directed the City to submit findings of fact and a proposed judgment within 10 days.

On October 25, 2024, as directed, the City submitted a proposed judgment, including findings of fact. As required by RPTL § l136, the proposed judgment provided: The City of Newburgh is entitled to Judgment that its Comptroller or Enforcing Officer convey to said City, by proper deed, full and complete title in fee simple absolute as provided by Section 1136 of the RPTL.

On October 28, 2024, the City prepared a deed, signed by Defendant Venning, the City's Director of Finance and Enforcing Officer, purporting to convey the Property  ² to the City, and the Deed was recorded in the Orange County Clerk's Office on November 13, 2024.

Thereafter, the City solicited bids for the sale of the property, which it claims were intended to be presented to the City Council for consideration at one of its regular meetings on either April 14 or April 28, 2025. On April 22, 2025, counsel contacted the court by telephone to inquire about the status of the proposed judgment, and on April 23, 2025, the proposed Judgment was signed by Justice Goldberg-Velazquez and uploaded to the docket for the tax foreclosure case as NYSCEF document 85, which was immediately filed with Notice of Entry on that same date.

The City alleges that, as a result of an attorney Alex Smith, who acts as Plaintiff's general counsel, becoming aware of the City's progress towards selling the Property, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Claim against the City on March 26, 2025 and thereafter filed its Summons and Complaint in this action two weeks later, on May 6, 2025 seeking to vacate the deed conveying the property as void.

Plaintiff now moves for summary judgment on its claim as well as dismissing the City's counterclaim for tortious interference with business relationships, and the City moves for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as well as affirmatively as to its counterclaim.

The Parties' Contentions

In support of its motion, Plaintiff contends summary judgment is warranted in its favor because the deed purporting to convey the Property to the City was signed and recorded in the absence of a final judgment, thus rendering it void. Plaintiff argues RPTL § 1136 provides that a final judgment must be entered before a municipality may obtain possession of and title to real property subject to a tax lien, and before the property may be conveyed to the municipality. Plaintiff argues unless and until such a default judgment is entered, the property owner does not lose its rights to the property and its right to redemption, the municipality does not acquire full and complete title to the property, and the owner's time to reopen the default does not begin to run. Plaintiff contends the City's conveyance of the Property, occurring without having first obtained a judgment permitting the conveyance to occur, is a threshold, jurisdictional defect, arguing that the statute under which the conveyance occurred specifically and undisputedly required such a judgment to be entered prior to the conveyance.

With respect to the City's counterclaim for tortious interference with prospective business relations, Plaintiff argues summary judgment is warranted because the City has not pleaded and cannot prove the elements of this cause of action, that (1) it had a business relationship with a third party; (2) Plaintiff knew of that relationship and intentionally interfered with it; (3) Plaintiff acted solely out of malice or used improper or illegal means that amounted to a crime or independent tort; and (4) Plaintiff's interference caused injury to the relationship with the third party. Plaintiff emphasizes that in order to make out a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations, Defendants must allege Plaintiff had knowledge of these prospective business relationships. Plaintiff argues Defendants failed to allege Plaintiff had any knowledge of any of the alleged business relationships, and Plaintiff specifically denies having any such knowledge.

Plaintiff further argues that in order to state a claim for tortious interference with prospective business relations, Plaintiff must have engaged in conduct directed at the third party with whom Defendants allegedly enjoyed prospective business relations but here, Defendants neither allege, nor can they demonstrate any conduct by Plaintiff directed at any of the parties allegedly interested in purchasing the Property.

Lastly, Plaintiff asserts in order to state a cause of action for tortious interference with prospective business relationships, Defendants must establish Plaintiff either used wrongful means or acted for the sole purpose of inflicting harm upon Defendants. "Wrongful means" involves conduct that amounts to a crime or independent tort but can include commencement of a civil suit only if the suit is frivolous or brought in bad faith. Plaintiff denies the present action is frivolous or was commenced to harm Defendants.

Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion and cross-move (1) for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR§ 2215 and § 3212; (2) to strike Plaintiff's answer to the counterclaim, and (3) to dismiss Plaintiff's Notice of Pendency. Defendants argue the Court's Decision and Order in the City's tax foreclosure case effectively terminated Plaintiff's right, title and interest in the Property. Defendant argues Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish between an Order and a Judgment is unavailing as the underlying issue for purposes of resolving cases is finality — a final adjudication of the issues raised in the legal papers. Defendants argue a "final" order or judgment is one that disposes of all of the causes of action between the parties in the action or proceeding and leaves nothing for further judicial action apart from mere ministerial matters, and that in the underlying tax foreclosure case, the Court issued an Order for a Judgment awarding the City of Newburgh title and possession of the Premises in the Decision and Order on October 11, 2024.

Defendants further argue the Court's administrative issuance of the Judgment on April 23, 2025 does not affect the adjudication of the substantive issues underlying the tax foreclosure case. Defendants contend that whether the specific document in the tax foreclosure case was labeled "Decision and Order" that included a substantive directive and authority to the City to convey title to the tax-foreclosed properties, or labeled "Judgment" is an argument over semantics since Plaintiff's right, title, and interest was effectively extinguished by the Court in its October 11, 2024 Decision and Order.

The City further argues that even should this Court deem it appropriate to vacate the City's Deed, this would not relieve the default in the tax foreclosure case and Plaintiff remains without recourse to vacate the default. The City specifically argues since Plaintiff failed to file an Answer or otherwise redeem, it is still in default for failure to pay its delinquent tax liens and only if Plaintiff had filed an Answer would it have an opportunity to contest substantively the issues raised in the tax foreclosure case.

The City also notes the only complete defenses that would have been available to Plaintiff at such a trial were either that the taxes were paid or that the property was not subject to tax, neither of which defense would have been applicable. Thus, the City argues Plaintiff's current application to vacate the deed is an academic exercise because even if Plaintiff were to prevail, it remains in default on the underlying tax foreclosure case and does not have an available defense.

With respect to its claim for tortious interference with business relations, Defendant argues Plaintiff's own factual allegations demonstrate Plaintiff interfered with the prospective sale of the Property, which was listed for sale on February 14, 2025 and received 14 offers from prospective buyers by March 21, 2025. Plaintiff's Notice of Claim was filed on March 26, 2025 and a conversation the following week with Attorney Alex Smith, who purportedly acts as general legal counsel to Plaintiff, revealed awareness the City was poised to sell the Property. Defendant argues this knowledge prompted the filing of Plaintiff's Notice of Claim and ultimately the Summons and Complaint to cloud the title and prevent the sale of the Property.

In reply to Defendants' arguments concerning the validity of the City's deed to the Property, Plaintiff challenges Defendants' contention there is effectively no difference between the Decision and Order and the final judgment because the Decision and Order permitted the City to do the same things the judgment would have permitted. Here, Plaintiff reiterates its argument that strict construction of RPTL Article 11 demands there to be a final judgment before the deed is conveyed, arguing issuance of a final judgment is a jurisdictional condition precedent to the City obtaining possession and ownership of real property it seeks to foreclose, and because no final judgment was obtained here, the deed conveying the property is void and must be vacated. Plaintiff again argues the decision and order merely granted the City's motion. Plaintiff acknowledges the Decision and Order directed the City's Comptroller or Enforcing Officer to convey the Property to the City as provided by RPTL § 1136 but argues that since RPTL § 1136 requires that a final judgment be entered before any real property can be conveyed, the deed issued before the judgment was signed is void and must be cancelled.

In response to Defendants' argument that a grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff is nevertheless academic because Plaintiff remains in default and has no remedy in the underlying tax foreclosure action, Plaintiff argues if summary judgment is granted it has two options. First, Plaintiff contends it will have 30 days from the date of entry of the final judgment to vacate the default, and alternatively, Plaintiff will seek to "repurchase" the Property pursuant to Section 93 of the Newburgh City Code.

In reply to Defendants' contentions and in further support of its motion concerning the claim for tortious interference, Plaintiff argues this claim should be dismissed for at least three reasons: (1) because Defendants failed to allege Plaintiff knew of the prospective business relationships with which it is accused of interfering; (2) because there is no evidence Plaintiff engaged in any conduct directed at any third party who may have had a prospective business relationship with the City; and (3) because any action alleged to have been taken by Plaintiff was neither frivolous nor commenced solely to harm defendants. Plaintiff argues Defendants simply contend that, because Plaintiff was aware the City was offering the Property for sale to third parties, and because Plaintiff later commenced this action against the City and filed a notice of claim, Plaintiff tortiously interfered with the City's prospective business relationships with these potential buyers.

Discussion

The proponent of a summary judgment motion must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any triable issues of fact. Chavez v. Morales, 232 AD3d 757, 759 (2d Dept. 2024) (citing Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider all of the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and afford that party the benefit of every favorable inference. Wilson v. Rye Family Realty, LLC, 218 AD2d 836, 838 [2d Dept. 2023]).

Turning first to Plaintiff's action to cancel and/or vacate the deed to the Property, Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on its claim and Defendants also move for summary judgment dismissing the claim. As to this cause of action, the underlying facts are not in dispute. Rather, the Court is called upon to decide a question of law as to whether the Decision and Order granting the default in the prior tax foreclosure action between these parties constituted a final judgment that divested Plaintiff herein of its rights to the Property, permitting conveyance of the Property to the City.

RPTL Article 11 governs tax foreclosure actions and provides a summary method of judicial enforcement which the taxing municipality, as owner of the tax lien, may pursue once the redemption period has passed. Upon commencement of a tax foreclosure action, the property owner is given a further opportunity to redeem or to interpose an answer, however, the failure to do results in a conveyance of full and complete title to the municipality. Anderson v. Pease, 284 AD2d 871, 873 (3d Dept. 2001) (citing Matter of Valente v. Culver, 124 AD2d 950 [3d Dept. 1986], lv. den. 69 NY2d 611[1987]).

RPTL § 1136(3) provides that, where an answer has not been filed with respect to particular parcels of real property sought to be foreclosed, the Court "shall" issue a final judgment awarding to the municipality possession of those parcels and directing an officer of the municipality to prepare, sign and record a deed conveying those parcels to the municipality. RPTL § 1136(3)(a).

More specifically, RPTL § 1136(3)(a) provides that the final judgment shall contain a direction to the enforcing officer of the tax district to prepare, execute and cause to be recorded a deed conveying to such tax district full and complete title to such parcel. Upon the execution of such deed, the tax district shall be seized of an estate in fee simple absolute . . . and all persons, including . . . those who may have had any right, title, interest, claim, lien or equity of redemption in or upon such parcel shall be barred and forever foreclosed of all such right. Anderson, supra, 284 AD2d at 873. (emphasis added). Seizing on this language, Plaintiff argues the City had no right to execute the deed until the judgment was signed. The Court disagrees.

Upon Plaintiff's failure to answer or redeem in the tax foreclosure action, and upon the City's motion for default, the Court's issued its Decision and Order dated October 11, 2024 that contained a specific direction that the City Comptroller or Enforcing Officer convey to the City, by deed, full and complete title in fee simple absolute as provided by Section 1136 of the Real Property Tax Law of the State of New York. This language parrots that of the statute and, as argued by Defendant, whether the specific document was labeled "Decision and Order" that included a substantive directive and authority to the City to convey title to the tax-foreclosed properties, or labeled "Judgment" is an argument over semantics. Plaintiff's right, title, and interest was effectively extinguished by the Court in its Decision and Order.

Despite this clear language, Plaintiff argues the Decision and Order does not constitute a judgment within the meaning of the statute such that its issuance did not divest Plaintiff's right to the Property or its right to redemption, the City did not acquire full and complete title to the Property, and Plaintiff's time to reopen the default did not begin to run. Plaintiff contends since entry of the judgment is a statutory condition precedent to its relinquishment of possession and ownership of the Property and its ability to reopen the judgment, that time never began to run. Plaintiff also maintains that, because entry of the judgment is a condition precedent to the preparation and recording of a deed to the property, the deed is invalid. Here again, the Court disagrees. In the tax foreclosure action, the Court's Decision and Order served as the final determination as it left no issues remaining to be decided and was dispositive of the matter.

As correctly argued by Defendants in reliance on Burke v. Crosson (85 NY2d 10 [1995]), the Court's October 11, 2024 Decision and Order left nothing for further judicial action apart from the ministerial act of signing the judgment with no need of further adjudication of the controversy. Accordingly, the Decision and Order was final and binding. Burke, supra; Rivera v. Skanska USA Civ. Northeast, Inc., 179 AD3d 455, 455 [1st Dept. 2020]) (order was final where it disposed of all causes of action between parties and left nothing for further judicial action); see also, Romanoff v. The Trustees of the Sheryl Romanoff Irrevocable Grantor Trust, 2020 WL 2114182 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2020) (applying doctrine of res judicata to prior order dismissing a matter on merits as final and binding). The Court thus agrees that, regardless of whether the specific document in the tax foreclosure case was labeled "Decision and Order" or "Judgment", Plaintiff's right, title, and interest to the Property was effectively extinguished by the Court in its Decision and Order and there was nothing left to be adjudicated. See also, Geronimo v. Guzman, 216 AD3d 455 (2023) (holding order granting defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing complaint was final and disposed of all of the causes of action between the parties and left nothing for further judicial action apart from ministerial entry of the judgment).

Plaintiff relies on cases that, while citing the statutory language for its general proposition, do not address the specific question presented by current controversy - whether the Decision and Order granting the default in the tax foreclosure action was final and binding such that entry of the judgment was a ministerial act. We hold that it is, noting this was addressed by the Court of Appeals in Burke (supra) and by the First Department in Rivera and Romanoff (both, supra) and that in all instances, the test for finality rested on whether the court's directive disposed of all causes of action between the parties and left nothing for further judicial action, but rather a ministerial act of signing the judgment. It is clear to this Court that the October 11, 2024 Decision and Order in the tax foreclosure action fully and finally disposed of the matter on the merits and, by its express language, divested Plaintiff of its right and title to the Property.

Plaintiff's reliance on In Re Anzelmo (2022 WL 4396865 [S.D.NY 2022]) is misplaced. In Anzelmo, no deed was executed or delivered and the Court was instead required to analyze the effect of the default judgment in determining whether the subject property was part of the appellant's bankruptcy estate. The Anzelmo court cited the judgment that directed, inter alia, "that the [Commissioner of Finance], prepare, execute and cause to be recorded a deed conveying [to the County] full and complete title" and that "upon execution of such deed [the County] shall be seized of an estate in fee simple absolute".

Interestingly, the Anzelmo court noted that "while RPTL § 1136(3) expressly provides that any default judgments issued under it must "contain a direction to the enforcing officer of the tax district to prepare, execute, and cause to be recorded a deed conveying to such tax district full and complete title to such parcel," several courts have held that "the recording of a new deed pursuant to [the statute] is a mere ministerial act." (2022 WL 4396865, at *3) (citing Wisotzke v. Ontario Cnty., 409 B.R. 20, 23 (W.D.NY 2009), aff'd, 382 F. App'x 99 (2d Cir. 2010); accord In re DuVall, AP 19-2011-PRW, 2021 WL 646802, at *6 (Bankr. W.D.NY Feb. 18, 2021), order aff'd, appeal dismissed sub nom. DuVall v. Cnty. of Ontario, New York, 21-CV-6236L, 2021 WL 5199639 (W.D.NY Nov. 9, 2021); In re Haynes, BR 19-20601-PRW, 2019 WL 7945834, at *2 (Bankr. W.D.NY Aug. 1, 2019); In re Johnson, 449 B.R. 7, 10 (Bankr. W.D.NY 2011).

In considering whether the missing deed affected the appellant's title to the property, the Anzelmo court cited Wisotzke, supra, acknowledging "the Second Circuit [has] noted that the execution and delivery of a deed is not determinative of which party holds title; rather, title passes simultaneously with the extinguishment of the debtor's right to redeem, and not when a deed is recorded." Despite the factual distinction of Anzelmo to the instant case, this statement in the decision is significant in that it supports this Court's conclusion that title to the Property herein passed to the City upon the extinguishment of Plaintiff's right to redeem, and not when the subsequent ministerial act (here, execution of the Judgment) was undertaken. The extinguishment of Plaintiff's right to the property occurred upon entry of the Court's October 11, 2024 Decision and Order.

As to whether Plaintiff has available any remedy in the event this Court was inclined to grant its motion, Anzelmo is again instructive where it continues to explain that "to obtain relief at that stage, tax debtors must file a motion to reopen the default judgment entered, which may not be brought later than one month after entry of the judgment. (2022 WL 4396865, at *4) (citing In re Bouchard, 29 AD3d 79, 81 [3d Dept. 2006] and quoting RPTL § 1131.) But if tax debtors fail to file such motion within that timeframe, any subsequent motion to do so will be time barred. Id. (citing In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by Cnty. of Clinton, 17 AD3d 914, 915 (3d Dept. 2005); see also RPTL § 1136(3) ("[A]ll persons ... who may have had any right, title, interest, claim, lien or equity of redemption in or upon such parcel shall be barred and forever foreclosed of all such right, title, interest, claim, lien or equity of redemption."). To the extent this action sought only to vacate the deed recorded on November 13, 2024, it would still leave intact the judgment that was signed on April 23, 2025. Plaintiff has not pleaded or moved to vacate that judgment. Thus, contrary to Plaintiff's argument, it no longer has the right to open the default as the judgment was entered ten months ago.

Regarding the sole instrument at issue here, it is the holding of this Court that Plaintiff is not entitled to vacatur of the deed and that, insofar as Plaintiff was a non-appearing property owner in the tax foreclosure case, the October 11, 2024 Decision and Order extinguished Plaintiff's rights to the Property in accordance with RPTL § 1136(3). On this basis, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment as to its cause of action. Conversely, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment dismissing the sole cause of action in Plaintiff's Complaint.

Turning next to Defendants' counterclaim against Plaintiff for tortious interference with prospective business relations, the City makes a circumstantial argument that Plaintiff, by and through its general counsel, had knowledge of the City's process and used litigation in an attempt to stifle the City Council from authorizing a contract to sell the Property to a third party.

The City notes the coincidental timing of the discussion with Attorney Smith who works for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff's filing of the Notice of Claim just after purportedly learning the Property had received multiple bids that were to be presented to the City Council for consideration, and posits Plaintiff filed the Notice of Claim, and later this lawsuit, to continue to frustrate the City's purpose.

The City argues Plaintiff's motives are further evidenced by its inability to substantiate any claims beyond its request to vacate the City's tax foreclosure deed, especially considering Plaintiff asserted no substantive claims in the tax foreclosure case. The City argues it is reasonable to conclude Plaintiff tortiously interfered with the City's prospective business interests.

While the Court agrees it would be reasonable to conclude Plaintiff's actions were taken with intent to interfere with the City's sale of the Property, such inference is insufficient to warrant summary judgment.

A claim for tortious interference with business relations requires a showing (1) that the claimant had a business relationship with a third party; (2) that the alleged interferer knew of that relationship and intentionally interfered with it; (3) that the alleged interferer acted solely out of malice or used improper or illegal means that amounted to a crime or independent tort; and (4) that the interference caused injury to the relationship with the third party. Stuart's, LLC v. Edelman, 196 AD3d 711, 713 (2d Dept. 2021) (quoting 106 N. Broadway, LLC v. Lawrence, 189 AD3d 733, 741 [2d Dept. 2020]). This standard is met where the interference with prospective business relations was accomplished by wrongful means or where the offending party acted for the sole purpose of harming the other party. Id. (citing Law Offs. of Ira H. Leibowitz v. Landmark Ventures, Inc., 131 AD3d 583, 585 [2d Dept. 2015]; 106 N. Broadway, LLC, supra at 733). "Wrongful means" has been defined to include "physical violence, fraud or misrepresentation, civil suits and criminal prosecutions, and some degrees of economic pressure. Id, (citing Carvel Corp. v Noonan, 3 NY3d 182, 191 [2004]). As a general rule, the defendant's conduct must amount to a crime or an independent tort but conduct that is not criminal or tortious will generally be 'lawful' and thus insufficiently 'culpable' to create liability for interference with prospective contracts or other nonbinding economic relations. (Carvel, supra at 190; Law Offs. of Ira H. Leibowitz, supra, 131 AD3d at 586). In addition, conduct which is motivated by economic self-interest cannot be characterized as solely malicious. (Law Offs. of Ira H. Leibowitz, supra, at 586).

Plaintiff argues this counterclaim should be dismissed because Defendants failed to plead that Plaintiff had knowledge of the specific business relationships with which it is accused of having interfered, and there is no allegation or fact from which it can be inferred that Plaintiff engaged in conduct directed at any third party with whom the City allegedly enjoyed prospective business relations. Carvel, supra, at 192 (2004). Lastly, Plaintiff's principal affirmed he was never aware of any such third party and never had any communications with such party. Plaintiff further argues Defendants failed to plead or prove that the present lawsuit was either wrongful or was commenced for the sole purpose of inflicting harm upon the City. The Court agrees. Certainly, while the timing of Plaintiff's actions raises suspicion as to its motive, there is insufficient evidence beyond Defendants' conjecture that it engaged in conduct directed at any third party or that it commenced this action for the sole purpose of frustrating the City's attempt to sell the property. Accordingly, the mere fact of this lawsuit, without more, cannot be characterized solely as malicious. Under the articulated standard of Carvel, supra, this claim does not survive.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, dismissal of Plaintiff's cause of action to vacate the deed is warranted and Defendants' counterclaim alleging Plaintiff's tortious interference with business relationships is likewise dismissed.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that to the extent the motion by Plaintiff Charles Tran Property LLC (Mot Seq. #1) seeks summary judgment on its sole cause of action in the Complaint, the motion is DENIED, and it is further

ORDERED that to the extent the motion by Plaintiff Charles Tran Property LLC (Mot Seq. #1) seeks summary judgment dismissing Defendants' counterclaim for tortious interference the motion is GRANTED, and this counterclaim is dismissed, it is further

ORDERED that to the extent the cross-motion by Defendants Todd Venning, solely in his capacity as Director of Finance and Enforcing Officer of the City of Newburgh, and City of Newburgh (Mot Seq. #2) seeks summary judgment dismissing the sole cause of action in the Complaint, the motion is GRANTED and the Complaint is dismissed, and it is further

ORDERED that to the extent the cross-motion by Defendants Todd Venning, solely in his capacity as Director of Finance and Enforcing Officer of the City of Newburgh, and City of Newburgh (Mot Seq. #2) seeks summary judgment as to their counterclaim for tortious interference, the motion is DENIED.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court.

Dated: February 10, 2026

E N T E R:

HON. KYLE C. McGOVERN, J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The proceeding also included 10 other parcels of real property.

2.   and other parcels of real property

Kyle C. McGovern, J.