Milton Bianchi, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSAL BUILDERS SUPPLY INC PARAMOUNT SAFETY INC (2026)

These three consolidated motions for summary judgment all arise from a personal-injury action brought under New York Labor Law.

On Motion Sequence 004, plaintiff, Milton Bianchi, moves for summary judgment on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) against all four defendants: The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Tishman Construction Corporation, JRM Construction Management, LLC, and Group M Worldwide, LLC.

On motion sequence 005, Defendants Port Authority, Tishman, Universal Builders Supply, Inc. (UBS), and Paramount Safety, Inc. move for summary judgment dismissing all claims, crossclaims, and third-party claims asserted against them. Specifically, Port Authority and Tishman each move to dismiss all of plaintiff's claims under Labor Law § 200 and 241 (6) and common-law negligence, as well as all crossclaims asserted against them by the other defendants. UBS and Paramount each move to dismiss all third-party claims asserted against them by ADCO Electrical Corporation.

On motion sequence 006, defendants JRM and Group M move for summary judgment: (1) dismissing the complaint and all crossclaims against them; and (2) on the issue of liability on their third-party claims against ADCO for breach of contract based on failure to procure insurance and for contractual indemnification, with any determination of the amount of defense costs and indemnification to be resolved at a subsequent inquest.

BACKGROUND

On January 19, 2018, plaintiff, an assistant superintendent employed by ADCO, was injured at 3 World Trade Center in New York. Plaintiff had completed his work on the Group M tenant floors and was leaving the job site when he traversed the hoist platform and loading dock on the east side of the building along Church Street. As he walked across the platform, his right foot caught on a raised and bent diamond-plate steel skid plate, causing him to trip and fall forward onto his hands and knees.

The project involved two overlapping construction operations. Defendant Tishman, as general contractor, was responsible for the construction of the shell and core of the 71-story Tower 3. Defendant Port Authority owned the land and was a party to a master development agreement governing the World Trade Center site. Defendant Group M was a tenant that had taken possession of floors 7 through 22 in January 2017 to begin a build-out for office space. Group M engaged JRM as the general contractor for the tenant build-out. JRM hired ADCO as the electrical subcontractor for that project.

Tishman had retained UBS to install and maintain the construction hoists and the loading dock platform on which the accident occurred. UBS installed the hoist platform using concrete planks and steel beams, then covered the surface with diamond-plate steel plates, fastened with screws and rivets, at Tishman's request. Once the initial installation was complete, UBS's daily presence on the site ceased; UBS would return only when notified by Tishman of a condition requiring attention (NYSCEF No.181 at 16-17, 25-26.) Tishman retained Paramount to provide additional site safety managers who worked under the supervision of Tishman's safety director, Everol Hill. (See NYSCEF No.182 at 9-11, 14-15.)

Following the accident, plaintiff filed this action in January 2019 against Port Authority, Tishman, JRM, and Group M. JRM later filed a third-party complaint against ADCO, and Group M filed a second third-party complaint against ADCO. ADCO filed a third third-party complaint against UBS and Paramount. The court previously granted ADCO's unopposed motion to dismiss all claims against it as plaintiff's employer, finding that plaintiff had not suffered a "grave injury" within the meaning of Workers' Compensation Law § 11. (See NYSCEF No. 83 [order on mot seq 002, Latin, J.].)

DISCUSSION

The proponent of a motion for summary judgment must demonstrate the absence of any material question of fact and set forth a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. (Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985].) The motion should be granted if the record establishes that "there are no issues to be resolved at trial." (Andre v Pomeroy, 35 NY2d 361, 364 [1974].) Critically, "[f]ailure to make such [a prima facie] showing requires a denial of the motion, regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers." (Winegrad, 64 NY2d at 853.) Once the movant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to produce evidentiary proof in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of a material issue of fact. (Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980].) "Mere conclusions, expressions of hope or unsubstantiated allegations or assertions are insufficient" to defeat a motion for summary judgment. (Id.)

In considering whether there is a material question of fact, the court views all evidence proffered in the light most favorable to the party opposing that motion, drawing all inferences in that party's favor. (See Ortiz v Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 NY3d 335, 339 [2011]; McNulty v City of New York, 100 NY2d 227, 230 [2003].)

I. Motion Sequence 004:

A. Law

Labor Law § 241(6) imposes a non-delegable duty on owners and general contractors to comply with the Industrial Code. Liability is absolute and does not require notice of the dangerous condition. (See Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contracting Co., 91 NY2d 343, 348 [1998]; Allen v Cloutier Construction Corp., 44 NY2d 290, 299 [1978].) However, plaintiff must also show that someone within the construction chain was negligent in failing to prevent or remediate the hazard. (Dyszkiewicz v City of New York, 218 AD3d 546, 550 [2d Dept 2023].)

Plaintiff invokes Industrial Code (12 NYCRR) § 23-1.7 (e) (1) and (e) (2). Section 23-1.7(e)(1) requires that "[a]ll passageways shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from any other obstructions or conditions which could cause tripping." Section 23-1.7 (e) (2) requires that "[t]he parts of floors, platforms and similar areas where persons work or pass shall be kept free from accumulations of dirt and debris and from scattered tools and materials and from sharp projections."

Section 23-1.7 (e) (1) applies here. The hoist platform was the sole means of ingress and egress to the Tower 3 construction site. All workers, including Bianchi, were required to pass through it to access or exit the building. It therefore constitutes a "passageway" within the meaning of the regulation. The raised steel plate, with its edge elevated approximately one inch above the surrounding surface due to missing rivets and screws along its edge, constituted an "obstruction or condition which could cause tripping" within the meaning of § 23-1.7 (e) (1). This is established by the admissions of defendants' own witnesses: Tishman's safety director Hill and UBS's foreman Espinoza both testified, when shown photographs of the condition, that they considered it to be a tripping hazard requiring repair. JRM's superintendent Cornyn similarly identified the condition as a tripping hazard. When defendants' own witnesses have acknowledged on the record that the condition was dangerous, there is no genuine dispute that the condition constituted an obstruction or condition which could cause tripping within the meaning of the regulation.

As to § 23-1.7 (e) (2), defendants correctly note that it is directed at "accumulations of dirt and debris" and "scattered tools and materials," and does not apply to intentionally installed structural components. (See Fonck v City of New York, 198 AD3d 874, 874 [2d Dept 2021].) This argument is well-taken with respect to the "debris" pathway. But plaintiff also argues that the raised steel plate constitutes a "sharp projection" within the meaning of § 23-1.7 (e) (2), a question that need not be resolved here because plaintiff's motion independently succeeds under § 23-1.7 (e) (1).

B. Motion Against Tishman

Plaintiff has established a prima facie case under Labor Law § 241(6). The record demonstrates without genuine dispute that Tishman was the general contractor for the Tower 3 project, making it a proper Labor Law defendant, and that the hoist platform constituted a passageway within the meaning of Industrial Code § 23-1.7 (e) (1). Tishman's own safety director Hill testified that he observed steel plates popping up on approximately six prior occasions, recognized each as a tripping hazard, and directed UBS to make repairs. (NYSCEF No. 174 at 46-48, 50-51, 59.) Tishman's own meeting minutes from December 14, 2017, documented that the steel plate on the loading dock ramp needed to be replaced. (NYSCEF No. 193 at 4.) This is sufficient to establish that someone within the construction chain was negligent in failing to prevent or remediate the hazard. (Dyszkiewicz, 218 AD3d at 550.)

The burden therefore shifts to defendants to raise a genuine issue of material fact. (Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562.) Defendants do not do so.

1. Defendants' Trivial Defect Argument

Defendants argue that all claims under Labor Law § 241(6) must be dismissed because the raised steel plate was a "trivial defect". To establish a prima facie case on trivial defect grounds, a defendant must demonstrate that the defect is physically insignificant and that its characteristics and surrounding circumstances do not increase the risks it poses. (Hutchinson v Sheridan Hill House Corp, 26 NY3d 66, 79 [2015].) Only then does the burden shift to plaintiff to establish an issue of fact.

Here, defendants' own witnesses: Tishman's safety director Hill and UBS's foreman Espinoza both testified that, when shown photographs of the subject condition, they considered it to be a tripping hazard that needed to be repaired (See NYSCEF No. 174 at 68-73 [Hill's deposition transcript]; NYSCEF No. 181 at 54-55 [Espinoza's deposition transcript].) Defendants cannot establish a prima facie case when its own witnesses have acknowledged on the record that the defect was dangerous. The cases defendants cite involving pedestrians tripping on sidewalk height differentials of 3/4 inch or less are distinguishable. Those decisions did not involve witnesses admitting the condition was a tripping hazard, and they arose in the context of general negligence, not construction-site Labor Law claims.

Defendants' argument on trivial defect ground is not successful. There is no genuine issue of material fact on trivial defect.

2. Defendants' Notice Argument.

Defendants also contend that all claims under Labor Law § 241(6) must be dismissed because defendants lacked notice of the dangerous condition. Defendants contend that plaintiff must prove actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition in order to establish liability under Labor Law § 241 (6), relying on O'Brien v Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (131 AD3d 823, 825 [1st Dept 2015]). This argument misstates governing law.

Notice is not a required element of § 241 (6) liability. An owner or general contractor's liability under § 241 (6) is absolute and does not depend on their actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition. (Allen, 44 NY2d at 300; Rizzuto, 91 NY2d at 350-352; Gallina v MTA Capital Construction Co., 193 AD3d 414, 414 [1st Dept 2021].)

Defendants misread O'Brien. The relevant language in O'Brien—that "issues of fact exist concerning whether someone within the chain of the construction project had notice of the hazardous condition"—does not establish notice as an independent element of § 241 (6) liability. O'Brien's citing authority, Booth v Seven World Trade Co. L.P. (82 AD3d 499, 501 [1st Dept 2011]), makes clear, that notice in that context is relevant only as evidence going to whether someone within the construction chain was negligent, that is, whether someone failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent or remediate the hazard. Notice is a factual circumstance that may bear on the negligence inquiry, not a standalone element that plaintiff must independently establish.

Even if notice were relevant to the negligence inquiry under § 241 (6), the record establishes that Tishman had both actual and constructive notice of the recurring condition. Hill personally observed steel plates popping up on approximately six prior occasions and recognized each as a tripping hazard. (NYSCEF No. 174 at 46-48, 50-51, 59.) Tishman's own meeting minutes from December 14, 2017, documented the need to replace the steel plate on the loading dock ramp. (NYSCEF No. 193 at 4.) UBS's foreman confirmed that rivets loosening from heavy traffic was a known and recurring condition. (NYSCEF No. 181 at 69-70.) The record therefore establishes that someone within the construction chain had notice of the condition and failed to exercise reasonable care to remediate it. That satisfies even the more-demanding reading of the negligence requirement under § 241(6).

Defendants' argument on notice ground is not successful. There is no genuine issue of material fact on notice.

Therefore, plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) based on violations of Industrial Code 12 NYCRR § 23-1.7 (e) (1) against Tishman is granted. The court finds that Tishman is liable to plaintiff under Labor Law § 241(6). The issue of damages remains to be determined at trial.

C. Motion Against Port Authority

The Port Authority argues there is a question of fact about whether it is a proper Labor Law defendant and or an out-of-possession landlord. Neither argument raises a genuine issue of fact sufficient to defeat plaintiff's motion.

First, Port Authority argues that plaintiff failed to annex the master development agreement to his moving papers and therefore has not established Port Authority's ownership interest in the property. It is true that the agreement was not annexed. But its absence is not fatal to plaintiff's prima facie showing. The general contractor agreement, which was submitted, references the master development agreement throughout and expressly identifies Port Authority as a "stakeholder" in the project. (NYSCEF No. 183.) The agreement further requires Tishman and all subcontractors to comply with Port Authority's safety rules and regulations, and Port Authority's own safety inspectors regularly walked the site. (NYSCEF No.174 at 14; NYSCEF No.175 at 66-67.) Taken together, these facts are sufficient to establish the requisite nexus between Port Authority and the project without relying on the master development agreement itself.

Second, Port Authority argues that it is out-of-possession landlord and had no nexus with plaintiff. An out-of-possession landlord is not liable for injuries caused by dangerous conditions on leased premises absent a contractual duty to repair, a statute imposing liability, or a course of conduct giving rise to a duty. (Lugo v Austin-Forest Assoc., 99 AD3d 865, 866 [2d Dept 2012].) Defendants further argue that ownership of land alone does not render a party a Labor Law defendant and that a nexus between the landowner and the plaintiff must be established. (Abbatiello v Lancaster Studio Associates, 3 NY3d 46, 51 [2004].)

As to the out-of-possession landlord argument, Port Authority's safety personnel walked the site regularly, the general contractor agreement expressly subjects Tishman and all subcontractors to Port Authority's safety rules and regulations, and the project required Port Authority's approval. These facts distinguish this case from a typical out-of-possession landlord scenario involving a building not under active construction.

As to the nexus argument, Abbatiello is readily distinguishable. In Abbatiello, the Court of Appeals found no nexus because the landowner had no involvement in the construction project giving rise to the injury. Here, Port Authority was not a passive landowner, it was an active participant in the project whose safety rules governed every contractor and subcontractor on site, whose personnel conducted regular safety inspections, and whose approval was required for the work to proceed. These facts establish a direct and sufficient nexus between Port Authority and the plaintiff as a worker on the project. (Musse v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 210 AD3d 434, 434-435 [1st Dept 2022]; Celestine v City of New York, 86 AD2d 592, 593 [2d Dept 1982] [holding that title holder was an "owner" under § 241(6) even when property was subject to easements granted to others].)

The same analysis as to Tishman applies to Port Authority's liability under § 241 (6): the Industrial Code violation has been established, and someone in the construction chain was negligent. Port Authority is liable as owner under § 241(6).

Therefore, plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) against Port Authority is granted. The court finds that Port Authority is liable to plaintiff under Labor Law § 241 (6). The issue of damages will be determined at trial.

D. Motion Against JRM and Group M

To be liable under Labor Law § 241 (6) as an "owner," a lessee must have an interest in the property and must have contracted for the work being performed. (Glielmi v Toys R Us, Inc., 62 NY2d 664, 666 [1984]; Kane v Coundorous, 293 AD2d 309, 311 [1st Dept 2002].)

Plaintiff relies on Bazdaric v Almah Partners LLC (41 NY3d 310, 317 [2024]), arguing that JRM and Group M are liable "regardless of whether they had control over the construction and maintenance of the hoist platform." (NYSCEF No. 159 at 30.) This reliance is misplaced. Bazdaric confirmed that owners and general contractors bear vicarious liability for Industrial Code violations on their own worksites without regard to their control over the specific injury-producing work. It did not extend § 241(6) liability to parties who exercise no control over the area where the accident occurred and bear no contractual or operational responsibility for that area. The cases plaintiff cites all involved plaintiffs injured while actively performing work for the tenant's benefit. That is not the case here.

Plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing. Plaintiff's own statement of material facts cites no evidence establishing that JRM or Group M owed any duty with respect to the loading dock. The hoist platform was a common area constructed and maintained exclusively by Tishman and UBS, not part of Group M's leased space. (NYSCEF No. 174 at 25; NYSCEF No. 181 at 36-37; NYSCEF No. 175 at 23.) Bianchi was not performing any work for the Group M project at the time of his accident; he had completed his work for the day and was leaving the building.

Therefore, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) against JRM and Group M is denied. Neither JRM nor Group M qualifies as an "owner," "general contractor," or "agent" within the meaning of Labor Law § 241 (6). Plaintiff's claims against JRM and Group M are addressed in Motion Sequence 006 below.

II. Motion Sequence 005

A. Plaintiff's Labor Law § 241 (6) claim

Port Authority and Tishman' arguments regarding Labor Law § 241 (6) liability have been fully addressed in the discussion of motion sequence 004 above and will not be repeated here. The motion to dismiss plaintiff's § 241 (6) claim is denied.

B. Plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and Common-Law Negligence Claims

1. Trivial Defect and Out-Of-Possession Landlord Theory

Port Authority and Tishman argue that all claims under Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence must be dismissed because the raised steel plate was a "trivial defect." This argument fails at the threshold because Port Authority and Tishman have not made a prima facie showing that the defect was trivial. This issue has been fully addressed in the discussion section of motion sequence 004 above.

The out-of-possession-landlord issue has also been fully addressed in the discussion section of motion sequence 004 above.

2. Lack of Notice

Port Authority and Tishman also contend that all § 200 and negligence claims must be dismissed because Port Authority and Tishman lacked notice of the dangerous condition.

To establish entitlement to summary judgment on the grounds of lack of notice, a general contractor must submit proof establishing when the area was last inspected before the accident. (Quigley v Port Authority of New York, 160 AD3d 65, 68 [1st Dept 2018]; Ladignon v Lower Manhattan Dev. Corp., 128 AD3d 534, 534 [1st Dept 2015].) Port Authority and Tishman have not pointed to any evidence in the record identifying the date or time of the last inspection of the hoist platform prior to the accident.

Having failed to submit this required showing, Port Authority and Tishman have not made a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment on the notice issue.

3. Espinal Framework

Port Authority and Tishman invoke Espinal v Melville Snow Contractors, Inc. (98 NY2d 136, 137 [2002]). Under Espinal, a party who enters into a contract to render services can be said to have assumed a duty of care to non-contracting third persons only in limited circumstances. The moving parties argue that, according to Espinal, none of them owed a duty of care to plaintiff. This argument is misplaced.

Espinal addressed a narrow question in the context of general common-law negligence: whether a party that enters into a contract to render services to a property owner thereby assumes a tort duty of care to third parties who are not parties to that contract. The Court of Appeals identified three limited exceptions under which that duty might arise: "(1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties, launches a force or instrument of harm; (2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party's duties and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain the premises safely." (Id. at 40 [internal citations and quotation marks omitted].)

The Espinal framework has no application here. Plaintiff's claims do not rest on common-law duty principles derived from contract. Labor Law § 200 and § 241 (6) impose statutory duties on owners and general contractors at construction sites by operation of law, entirely independent of any contractual relationship between the defendant and plaintiff. These duties exist because the Legislature has determined that owners and general contractors, by virtue of their role and authority at a construction site, shall bear responsibility for worker safety, not because of anything they agreed to do by contract. (Rizzuto, 91 NY2d at 350; Allen, 44 NY2d at 300.)

Accordingly, the threshold question in Espinal—whether a contracting party assumed a tort duty to a non-contracting third party—is not the question presented here. Plaintiff does not need to establish that any defendant voluntarily assumed a duty to him through contract. The duty arises from the statute itself. The motion for summary judgement dismissing plaintiff's Labor Law claims on Espinal grounds is denied.

Therefore, the motion for summary judgement dismissing Plaintiff's § 200 and common-law negligence claims is denied. Plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims against Port Authority and Tishman shall proceed to trial.

4. Crossclaims and Third-Party Claims

a. Crossclaims

Port Authority and Tishman seek to dismiss all crossclaims asserted against them. As discussed above, Port Authority and Tishman are liable to plaintiff. Accordingly, the crossclaims asserted against them by JRM and Group M may not be dismissed at this stage. The allocation of responsibility among the liable parties remains to be determined. JRM and Group M's claims against Port Authority and Tishman shall proceed to trial.

b. Third Parties: UBS and Paramount

UBS and Paramount, third third-party defendants brought into this action by ADCO's third third-party complaint, now seek to dismiss ADCO's claims against them.

As to UBS, ADCO's claims against UBS are grounded in common-law indemnification and contribution, neither of which requires a direct contractual relationship between ADCO and UBS. With respect to the indemnification claim, ADCO alleges that UBS's failure properly to maintain the steel plate platform pursuant to its contract with Tishman was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, and that ADCO itself bears no actual fault for the dangerous condition. With respect to the contribution claim, ADCO alleges that UBS failed properly to install and/or maintain the steel plates, giving rise to UBS's proportionate share of liability. As genuine issues of material fact remain about whether UBS's initial installation was performed in a non-negligent manner, whether UBS's maintenance obligations were properly discharged, and the relative fault of each party in contributing to the dangerous condition, summary judgment is inappropriate at this stage. Accordingly, UBS's motion for summary judgement is denied. ADCO's common-law indemnification and contribution claims against UBS shall proceed to trial.

As to Paramount, its role on the project was limited to providing supplemental safety personnel who reported directly to Tishman's safety director. Paramount neither installed nor maintained the hoist platform, and its president testified at his deposition that he did not recall observing or receiving complaints about the steel plates popping up. (See NYSCEF No. 182 at 17-18.) The record does not establish that Paramount had any independent authority over the loading dock area beyond its contractual reporting obligation to Tishman. Accordingly, Paramount's motion for summary judgment dismissing ADCO's claims against it is granted. ADCO's claims against Paramount are dismissed with prejudice.

III. Motion Sequence 006

1. Plaintiff's Complaint

JRM and Group M have made a prima facie showing that they are entitled to summary judgement dismissing plaintiff's direct claims. The record establishes without genuine dispute that (1) the hoist platform and loading dock were constructed and maintained by UBS under contract with Tishman (NYSCEF No.174 at 25, 59); (2) all testimony establishes that Tishman was responsible for daily inspection, safety oversight, and remediation of conditions on the hoist platform (NYSCEF No.174 at 28-31, 43-44; NYSCEF No.181 at 69-70); (3) JRM's contractual scope was limited to the interior build-out of Group M's tenant floors (NYSCEF No.175 at 78; NYSCEF No.199); (4) neither JRM nor Group M had any contractual or operational responsibility for the loading dock area (NYSCEF No.175 at 23; NYSCEF No.177); and (5) no witness testimony identifies any act or omission by JRM or Group M that contributed to the creation or continuation of the dangerous condition.

Plaintiff fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Courts may not "ferret out speculative issues" to defeat an otherwise meritorious motion. (Andre, 35 NY2d at 364.) Plaintiff's arguments do not clear that bar. The sole means-of-access argument fails as a matter of law. A common area serving as the only access point to a tenant's space does not impose a duty on the tenant or its contractor to maintain that area. (Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317-318 [1981].) Plaintiff relies upon Kane v Coundorous, (293 AD2d 309, 309-310 [1st Dept 2002]) and Karwowski v 1407 Broadway Real Estate LLC, (160 AD3d 82, 84 [1st Dept 2018]), which are distinguishable. In each, plaintiff was injured while actively performing work for the tenant's benefit. Here, Bianchi had completed his work and was commuting home through a common area entirely under Tishman's control. Plaintiff's reliance on § 3.3.1 in general conditions of the contract for construction agreement between JRM and Group M is likewise unavailing. The capitalized term "Work" is a defined term limited to the Group M build-out and does not extend to common areas maintained by others.

JRM and Group M's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint against them shall be granted. Plaintiff's complaint as against JRM and Group M is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice.

2. Crossclaims Against JRM and Group M

The motion for summary judgment dismissing the crossclaims for common-law indemnification and contribution is granted. Port Authority and Tishman's crossclaims for common-law indemnification and contribution against JRM and Group M shall be dismissed with prejudice.

Common-law indemnification requires proof that the indemnitee was free from negligence and that the indemnitor was actively negligent. (Naughton v City of New York, 94 AD3d 1, 10 [1st Dept 2012].) Contribution requires that the contributing party's breach of duty had a part in causing the injury for which contribution is sought. (Guerra v St. Catherine of Sienna, 79 AD3d 808, 809 [2d Dept 2010].) Here, the record is devoid of any evidence of active negligence or breach of duty on the part of JRM or Group M with respect to the loading dock condition. Port Authority and Tishman have not pointed to any specific evidence that would raise a genuine issue of fact on this question. Absent such evidence, there is nothing to submit to a jury, and summary judgment is appropriate.

The motion for summary judgment dismissing the crossclaims for contractual indemnification and breach of contract for failure to procure insurance is granted. Port Authority and Tishman's crossclaims for contractual indemnification and breach of contract against JRM and Group M shall be dismissed with prejudice.

The Group M lease (NYSCEF No.223 at 182-183) contains an indemnification provision that may be triggered by claims arising out of Group M's use or occupancy of the premises. However, to the extent Port Authority was itself negligent, the indemnification obligation cannot exceed what is permitted under General Obligations Law § 5-322.1. In this case, Port Authority was itself negligent. Therefore, the Port Authority's crossclaim against JRM for contractual indemnification, and Tishman's crossclaims against both JRM and Group M for contractual indemnification shall be dismissed, as neither Port Authority nor Tishman has identified any contractual provision directly obligating JRM or Group M to indemnify them.

As to the crossclaims for failure to procure insurance, the operative endorsement required under the Group M lease is ISO Form 20380413, which conditions additional insured coverage on a finding of negligence by JRM or Group M. Because JRM and Group M have been found not liable to plaintiff, the coverage would not be triggered regardless whether the required insurance was procured. Accordingly, the crossclaims for failure to procure insurance shall be dismissed.

3. JRM's Third-Party Claims Against ADCO

JRM also seek summary judgment on its third-party claims against ADCO for (a) common law indemnification, (b) contractual indemnification, and (c) breach of contract based on failure to procure insurance. (NYSCEF No.186.)

JRM 's motion for summary judgment on its common law indemnification claim against ADCO is denied. JRM's claim against ADCO is dismissed with prejudice. The court has previously determined that ADCO, as plaintiff's employer, is shielded from third-party claims by Workers' Compensation Law § 11, as Plaintiff did not sustain a "grave injury." This statutory bar precludes JRM from maintaining a common-law indemnification claim against ADCO regardless of any alleged negligence on ADCO's part.

As to contractual indemnification, under GOL § 5-322.1, an indemnity clause in a construction contract is void as against public policy to the extent it requires a party to indemnify another for the latter's own negligence. Because plaintiff's complaint against JRM and Group M is dismissed and JRM has been found not liable to plaintiff, the predicate for enforcing the indemnification obligation cannot be satisfied. Accordingly, JRM and Group M's motion for summary judgment on the contractual indemnification claim against ADCO is denied. The contractual-indemnification claim shall be dismissed with prejudice. The trigger condition for enforcement of the indemnification obligation cannot be met.

As to breach of contract for failure to procure insurance, JRM has made a prima facie showing that ADCO breached its contractual obligation. The JRM/ADCO purchase order expressly required ADCO to name JRM as an additional insured under ISO Form CG 2010 1185, which provides broad, unconditional additional insured coverage. (NYSCEF No.186.) ADCO has submitted no evidence establishing that it procured insurance naming JRM as an additional insured under that specific form or its equivalent. ADCO's opposition consists solely of the statement that JRM has its own insurance, which is an irrelevant response that does not address ADCO's independent obligation to provide the required coverage.

Having failed to raise a genuine issue of fact, ADCO's opposition is insufficient under Zuckerman. An obligation to procure insurance is independent of the indemnification provisions and need not await a determination of fault before it can be enforced. (Inchaustegui v 666 Fifth Ave. Ltd. Partnership, 96 NY2d 111, 114 [2001].) JRM's motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract/failure to procure insurance claim against ADCO shall be granted. ADCO breached its contractual obligation to name JRM as an additional insured under ISO Form CG 2010 1185 as required by the JRM/ADCO purchase order, and ADCO is thus liable to JRM for all damages resulting from that breach. The determination of damages, including the cost of defense and any deductible or co-payment obligations, is referred to an inquest.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability under Labor Law § 241 (6) (mot seq 004) is granted as against Tishman and Port Authority, with the issue of damages to be determined at trial; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as against JRM and Group M (mot seq 004) is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Port Authority, Tishman, UBS, and Paramount's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Labor Law § 200, § 241(6) and common-law negligence claims and JRM and Group M's crossclaims as asserted against Port Authority and Tishman (mot seq 005) is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Port Authority, Tishman, UBS, and Paramount's motion for summary judgment dismissing ADCO's third-party claims against Paramount (mot seq 005) is granted, and those claims are dismissed with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of Port Authority, Tishman, UBS, and Paramount's motion for summary judgment dismissing ADCO's third-party claims against UBS (mot seq 005) is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of JRM and Group M's summary-judgment motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint as against them (mot seq 006) is granted, and plaintiff's complaint as against JRM and Group M is dismissed in its entirety with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of JRM and Group M's summary-judgment motion to dismiss Port Authority and Tishman's crossclaims for common-law indemnification, contribution, contractual indemnification, and failure to procure insurance against JRM and Group M (mot seq 006) is granted, and those crossclaims are dismissed with prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of JRM and Group M's motion for summary judgement on JRM's third-party claim for common-law indemnification and contractual indemnification against ADCO is denied; and it is further

ORDERED that the branch of JRM and Group M's motion for summary judgment on JRM's third-party claim for breach of contract based on failure to procure insurance against ADCO (mot seq 006) is granted, with the damages determination to be made at trial; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff shall serve notice of entry on all parties in this action and in the third-party actions; and shall serve notice of entry on the office of the County Clerk (using the NYSCEF filing event "Notice to the County Clerk - CPLR § 8019 (c)"), which shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATE 5/28/2026

GERALD LEBOVITS, J.S.C.

Gerald Lebovits, J.