Anonymous, Plaintiff, v. Anonymous, Defendant. (2026)

The following papers, numbered 1-3, were read and considered in connection with Defendant's Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 3) for an Order: (1) granting Defendant appropriate equitable relief, including a credit relating to childcare reimbursements previously paid without sufficient documentation demonstrating that such expenses were incurred during actual engagement of employment pursuant to the parties' Stipulation of Settlement, Judgment of Divorce, and Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)(c)(4); and (2) granting such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper:

Papers Numbered

Notice of Motion (Motion Seq. No. 3)/Exhibits A-D/Affidavit of Martin Dentini 1

Affidavit of Diana Dentini in Opposition/Exhibits A-G 2

Affidavit of Martin Dentini in Reply 3

Upon the foregoing papers, the Court now rules as follows:

This is a post judgment application made by Defendant Father for reimbursement of childcare expenses of $3,198.00 he alleges he paid May 2025 and February 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 113. The parties' matrimonial action was disposed with the undersigned's granting of the Judgment of Divorce on March 17, 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 96 and 99. The aforementioned Judgment of Divorce incorporated, but did not merge, the Stipulation entered into by the parties on February 20, 2026 (and includes a transcript from a proceeding before the Honorable Hal B. Greenwald, J.S.C. [retired] on May 1, 2025). See NYSCEF Doc. No. 79. According to the aforementioned Stipulation the parties agreed that statutory add-ons, such as childcare expenses, for the unemancipated children, would be paid pursuant to the agreed upon pro rata percentages. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 79, page 23, Section C(42). Section C(42)[d] addresses childcare expenses and delineates that "[t]h Parties shall share Child Care expenses, with the Father being responsible for 63% and the Mother being responsible for 47%, for expenses that are incurred during actual engagement of employment." See NYSCEF Doc. No. 79, page 23, Section C(42).

Prior to the Stipulation in February 2026, the parties entered into a Custody and Parenting Agreement on December 1, 2023, which does not address the cost of childcare expenses or the allocation of payment for same, as the parties specifically agreed to address provisions for child support in a separate financial agreement. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 79, page 77, Article V, Section 5.5. The May 1, 2025, transcript annexed to the Judgment of Divorce contains no discussion of childcare expenses other than the agreed upon pro rata percentages to be used to determine each party's responsibilities as to those expenses. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 79, pages 81-120.¹

ARGUMENTS

Defendant Father

Despite the foregoing, Defendant Father contends that he made payments for the childcare of his two (2) unemancipated children between May 2025 and February 2026 "without prejudice" and despite repeated requests for documentation that demonstrated that the childcare expenses were incurred by Plaintiff Mother during "actual engagement of employment" in an attempt to comply with the parties "Stipulation of Settlement." See NYSCEF Doc. No. 113, ¶¶ 2, 4-5. Further, the Defendant Father asserts that he requested the documentation through Our Family Wizard (hereinafter OFW) and has annexed copies of the OFW communications. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 113, ¶¶ 6-7. The crux of Defendant Father's argument for credits for the already paid childcare expenses is that the Plaintiff Mother has failed to provide documentation that childcare was required due to employment occurring at the time of the childcare.

Plaintiff Mother

In opposition, Plaintiff Mother contends that Defendant Father's application should be denied since she incurred the childcare expenses as the services were provided and she was actively engaged in paid employment at the time she sought reimbursement of the expenses, from May 2025 through February 2026, and has provided documentation of same. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, ¶ 3. According to Plaintiff Mother, during the period in question, she worked for her employer as a Media Planner and Buyer and had a flexible work schedule which varied from day to day depending on her client's needs, time of meetings, deadlines, deliverables and business requirements. See NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 117. ¶¶ 4-11. As such, Plaintiff Mother asserts that she has provided documentation of her work schedule that required childcare service, and that documentation includes compensation records and work longs. In addition, in support of her application, Plaintiff Mother has provided documentation of the childcare services in the amount of $3,198.00. See NYSCEF Doc. Nos. 117, ¶¶ 15-17

Plaintiff Mother avers that the childcare costs were incurred and reimbursed to her from Defendant Father during the period in which the parties were acting under the "May 1, 2025 Interim Agreement." The Plaintiff Mother has included the May 1, 2025, transcript (which this Court has reviewed in its entirety as it is annexed to the previously filed Judgment of Divorce) and asserts that the Agreement only established each of the party's allocation of statutory add-on expenses and provided no requirement that the Plaintiff provide "employer generated timesheets, minute-by-minute records, or similar documentation as a condition of reimbursement." See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, ¶¶ 20-21. Further, Plaintiff Mother argues that -- at the time the parties entered into the Financial Settlement Agreement in February 2026 -- they were both represented by counsel and the Agreement annexed to the Judgment of Divorce does not include any provision that addresses financial credits, offsets, reimbursement or retroactive adjustments of the acknowledged childcare reimbursements between May 2025 and February 2026. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, ¶¶ 23-25. Additionally, Plaintiff Mother contends that Defendant Father's current application for credits is based upon the February 2026 Financial Settlement Agreement, not the May 1, 2025, Interim Agreement and that the February 2026 Agreement supersedes the earlier agreement and as such its terms and conditions as to statutory add-ons controls. See NYSCEF Doc. No. 117, ¶¶ 26-27.

LAW/ANALYSIS

" 'A stipulation of settlement which is incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce is a contract subject to principles of contract construction and interpretation.' " Barrezueta v Barrezueta, 230 AD3d 459, 461 [2d Dept 2024] quoting Matter of Murphy v Murphy, 166 AD3d 779, 779 [2d Dept 2018]; See Herman v Herman, 220 AD3d 849 [2d Dept 2023]. Further, "[w]here the intention of the parties is clearly and unambiguously set forth, effect must be given to the intent as indicated by the language used." Matter of English v Smith, 173 AD3d 1022, 1023 [2d Dept 2019]. Moreover, a court should not, in an attempt to interpret a contract, imply a term that the parties failed to insert and as a result rewrite the contract. See Matter of Murphy v Murphy, 166 AD3d 779, 779 [2d Dept 2018]; See also Penavic v Penavic, 88 AD3d 671, 672 [2d Dept 2011].

" 'The fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is that agreements are construed in accord with the parties' intent, and the best evidence of what parties to a written agreement intend is what they say in their writing.' " Barrezueta v Barrezueta, 230 AD3d at 461 quoting Del Vecchio v Del Vecchio, 219 AD3d 572, 575 [2d Dept 2023]. "Where the stipulation is clear and unambiguous on its face, the intent of the parties must be gleaned from the four corners of the instrument, and not from extrinsic evidence." Herman v Herman, 220 AD3d at 850 quoting Oakes v Oakes, 38 AD3d 865, 865 [2d Dept 2007]. " 'Parol evidence-evidence outside the four corners of the document-is admissible only if a court finds an ambiguity in the contract.' " Del Vecchio v Del Vecchio, 219 AD3d at 575 (quoting Schron v Troutman Sanders LLP, 20 NY3d 430, 436 [2013]).

The Court's review of the February 2026 Financial Agreement (Stipulation of Settlement) demonstrates that the Plaintiff Mother was not required prospectively or retroactively to provide any specific documentation of her employment status or more specifically the hours in which she was employed to seek reimbursement of childcare expenses. The Stipulation of Settlement also does not provide in that there would be any credit or reimbursement for childcare expenses paid by Defendant Father to Plaintiff Mother from May 1, 2025, through February 2026. Nonetheless, Defendant Father is seeking reimbursement or credits for childcare expenses for a period that pre- dates the parties' Financial Agreement dated February 2026.

Additionally, contrary to Defendant Father's contentions, there is no statutory requirement set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)(c)(4) requiring specific proof or documentation of an employment schedule or work hours for a party to seek childcare expenses on a pro rata basis. The statute merely requires that -- when childcare expenses are sought as reimbursed add-ons -- the expenses be the result of work-related need and be actually incurred, instead of speculative. See Domestic Relations Law § 240(1-b)(c)(4). If the parties intended for Plaintiff Mother to provide documentation of her employment and work hours, then the statute does not prohibit or limit that express provision from being included in their agreement. However, the parties did not include any language in their agreement -- other than the general statutory language of § 240(1- b)(c)(4) -- and this Court cannot imply more.

In as much as Defendant Father may rely upon the May 1, 2025, record in Court before Judge Greenwald, neither party was sworn or allocuted during the court proceeding, and there was no specific discussion or record made by either the attorneys or the Court as to how the childcare expenses incurred by Plaintiff Mother at that time were to be documented, or how the necessity for those childcare expenses was to be determined.

The only discussion before Judge Greenwald that remotely related to the ongoing childcare expenses was the consent agreement between the parties as to the pro rata shares for all add-on expenses, which the attorneys noted was to be determined based upon a combined household income of either $200,000 or $225,000 (the final agreed upon amount is unclear to this Court based on the record). Nonetheless, any financial agreement that the parties believe they may have entered into on May 1, 2025, was superseded by their signed Financial Agreement in February 2026. The February 2026 Financial Agreement does not provide for any credits, reimbursements or adjustments retroactively to childcare expenses.

In essence, Defendant Father is seeking a modification of the February 2026 Financial Agreement as to retroactive childcare expenses from May 2025 through the agreement in February 2026 but has failed to demonstrate that the parties' intent was different than the express language of the agreement. Since Defendant Father is seeking a modification, the Court must consider the February 2026 Financial Agreement/Stipulation of Settlement pursuant to contract principles. In that light, the Court finds that the parties' intentions -- within the February 2026 Financial Agreement as to reimbursement of childcare expenses -- are clear and unambiguous.

Therefore, consistent with prevailing contract law, to make a determination as to Defendant Father's application, this Court need not look further than the four (4) corners of the agreement. In as much as the OFW messages included with Defendant Father's motion differ from the parties' written agreement, the messages are extrinsic evidence which this Court need not consider. As such, the Court finds no basis to modify the February 2026 Financial Agreement to allow for credits or reimbursements for childcare expenses paid by Defendant Father from May 1, 2025, through February 2026 and Defendant Father's application is denied in its entirety.

In arriving at this decision the Court has reviewed, evaluated, and considered all of the issues framed by these motion papers and the failure of the Court to specifically mention any particular issue in this Decision and Order does not mean that it has not been considered by the Court in light of the appropriate legal authority.

Accordingly, it is hereby,

ORDERED, that the Defendant's motion seeking credits or reimbursement of childcare expenses (Motion Seq. No. 3) is denied in its entirety.

The foregoing is the Court's Decision and Order as to Motion Seq. No. 3.

Dated: August 25, 2026

New City, New York

Hon. John P. Collins, Jr., J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The basis for inclusion of the May 1, 2025, transcript with the Judgment of Divorce is unclear to the undersigned as the parties were not allocated and did not agree to anything specific on the divorce as to the payment for child support, "add-ons," or even equitable distribution.

John P. Collins, Jr., J.