PEOPLE v. HUFF (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vincent M. Del Giudice, J.), rendered January 12, 2023, convicting him of conspiracy in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant was convicted of conspiracy in the fourth degree based upon his involvement in the death of an alleged rival gang member.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of conspiracy in the fourth degree beyond a reasonable doubt.  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 348), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633).

The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in admitting evidence relating to the defendant's gang affiliations.  Such evidence was probative of the defendant's motive and to explain the relationships of the individuals involved (see People v. Bailey, 32 NY3d 70, 83;  People v. Brown, 224 AD3d 922, 923).  The probative value of the testimony outweighed any prejudice resulting from its admission (see People v. Argueta, 194 AD3d 857, 858;  People v. Sarkodie, 172 AD3d 909, 911).  Moreover, any prejudicial impact was minimized by the court's instructions that gang affiliation is not a crime, that the jury was not permitted to consider such testimony as evidence that the defendant had a propensity or predisposition to commit the crimes charged in this case, and that the testimony was only offered for the jury's consideration of the limited questions of identification, motive, and intent (see People v. Morris, 21 NY3d 588, 598;  People v. Jackson, 246 AD3d 761, 763–764;  People v. Hernandez, 186 AD3d 1246, 1247).  The jury is presumed to have followed those instructions (see People v. Morris, 21 NY3d at 598;  People v. Berg, 59 N.Y.2d 294, 299–300).

Because the defendant did not object to the Supreme Court's approach to the handling of a note from the jury, requesting to view a board that was displayed by a codefendant's counsel during summation, his contention that the court did not meaningfully respond to the note is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Williams, 208 AD3d 899, 902).  In any event, the defendant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to suggest a response to that note, as well as to an additional jury note asking whether the recording of a crime results in liability for the conspiracy charges.  The court's responses to both notes constituted a proper exercise of its discretion (see People v. Velasco, 77 N.Y.2d 469, 474;  People v. Rodriguez, 179 AD3d 844, 845;  People v. Cherry, 127 AD3d 879, 881;  People v. Smith, 4 AD3d 378, 379).  Furthermore, the defendant suffered no discernible prejudice from the court's handling of the notes (see People v. Lourido, 70 N.Y.2d 428, 435;  People v. Battle, 15 AD3d 413, 414).

The defendant's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ) and, in any event, without merit.

CONNOLLY, J.P., TAYLOR, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.