The People, etc., respondent, v. LLC (2026)

Argued—February 26, 2026

OPINION & ORDER

QUIRK, J.

This appeal presents issues with respect to CPL 420.45, a statute enacted in 2019 that permits a court, upon motion and after a hearing, to order that an instrument affecting real property be declared void ab initio when, as relevant here, a defendant has been convicted of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree and the instrument is material to the encumbrance, transfer, or purchase of real property.  Nonparty Bil–Man Asset Management, LLC (hereinafter the appellant), contends that CPL 420.45 applies only to deeds containing forged signatures and that the People failed to establish that the deed at issue here was forged.  The appellant further contends that it rebutted the presumption under CPL 420.45 that the deed at issue was void ab initio.  For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Supreme Court properly granted the People's motion, in effect, pursuant to CPL 420.45 to declare the deed void ab initio.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In September 2022, the defendant Elizabeth Merino (hereinafter the defendant) pleaded guilty to two counts of grand larceny in the third degree and one count of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree.  Her son, the defendant Bryan Merino (hereinafter the codefendant), pleaded guilty to two counts of grand larceny in the third degree.  Each guilty plea arose out of a scheme by the defendant and the codefendant to defraud the defendant's mother, Marta Merino, out of certain real property that she owned in Brooklyn (hereinafter the property).  Specifically, the defendant admitted that on June 4, 2019, she recorded a deed (hereinafter the fraudulent deed) with the Office of the City Register of New York that purported to transfer title to the property from her mother to herself.  She also admitted that, thereafter, on October 15, 2019, she recorded a second deed, transferring title to the property from herself to 523 73rd Street, LLC, of which she was a member, and that there was never any agreement between the defendant and her mother that the defendant would hold title to the property.  The defendant and the codefendant admitted that they stole loan proceeds from the appellant by means of a fraudulent mortgage on the property.  Specifically, a loan totaling $500,000 was secured by a mortgage on the property.  Of the $500,000, the sum of $300,000 was disbursed to the defendant and the codefendant.  As part of the plea agreements, the Supreme Court, inter alia, directed that the defendant and the codefendant pay restitution in the amount of $300,000.

In April 2023, the People moved, in effect, pursuant to CPL 420.45 to declare the fraudulent deed void ab initio.  In support, the People submitted, among other things, an affidavit from the defendant's mother, averring that there was no agreement between her and the defendant regarding the property.  The People noticed the appellant as an interested third-party, and the appellant opposed the People's motion.

In October 2023, the Supreme Court held a hearing pursuant to CPL 420.45.  After the hearing, by an order entered May 9, 2024, the court, inter alia, granted the People's motion.  This appeal ensued.

II. CPL 420.45

In 2019, the Legislature amended Criminal Procedure Law article 420, which is entitled “Fines, Restitution and Reparation,” to add section 420.45.  The version of CPL 420.45 in effect at the time of the guilty pleas and when the People made their motion provided, in relevant part:

“When a defendant has been convicted after a trial or pled guilty to violating either section 175.30 or 175.35 of the penal law in connection to an instrument that is material to the transfer or purchase of residential real property, the district attorney may file a motion in the supreme court in the county where the property that is subject to the instrument is located on behalf of the victim to void the instrument that is the subject of such criminal information or indictment.  Such motion must be in writing and provide reasonable notice to all persons who have an interest in the property affected by such instrument” (id. § 420.45[1], as added by L 2019, ch 167, § 7 [eff Aug. 14, 2019] ).

CPL former 420.45 further provided that, thereafter, the Supreme Court

“must conduct a hearing and make findings of fact essential to the determination whether to declare the instrument described in subdivision one of this section void ab initio.  All persons providing factual information at such hearing must testify under oath.  There will be a rebuttable presumption that where a party is convicted after a trial in criminal court or a guilty plea to either section 175.30 or section 175.35 of the penal law in connection with an instrument that is material to the transfer or sale of residential real property, that such instrument is void ab initio” (id. former § 420.45[3] ).

“Upon the defendant's conviction of or guilty plea to section 175.30 or section 175.35 of the penal law as described in subdivision one of this section, and after conducting a hearing pursuant to subdivision three of this section, a court shall make a determination and if appropriate shall order that the instrument described in subdivision one of this section be declared void ab initio or grant other appropriate relief to the victim.  The order of the court shall describe the nature of the false statement or false information contained in such instrument.  A copy of such instrument shall be attached to the order of the court” (id. former § 420.45[4] [emphasis added] ).

The legislative history reflects that the Legislature intended to provide for “a mechanism under which an aggrieved homeowner can seek to have title restored to his or her property in the event of a criminal conviction in relation to the instrument that transferred the property” by enabling “a district attorney [to] file a motion to quiet title in the supreme court of appropriate jurisdiction on behalf of the homeowner following such criminal conviction” (Assembly Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2019, ch 167 at 6).  The statute was amended, effective December 14, 2023, among other things, to apply “[w]hen a defendant has been convicted after a trial or pled guilty to any crime that affects the title to, encumbrance of, or the possession of, real property” (CPL 420.45[1] [emphasis added] ).  Similarly, under the amended version of the statute, the rebuttable presumption that an instrument is void ab initio applies “where a party is convicted after a trial or a guilty plea to any crime that affects the title to, encumbrance of, or the possession of, real property and where there is an instrument that encumbers or is material to the transfer or sale of real property” (id. § 420.45[3] [emphasis added] ).

III. ANALYSIS

The appellant's contention that CPL 420.45 applies only to deeds containing forged signatures is without merit.  When interpreting a statute, the “ ‘primary consideration ․ is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature’ ” (People v. Hernandez, 44 NY3d 630, 634 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting People v. Galindo, 38 NY3d 199, 203).  “ ‘[T]he plain language of the statute ․ is the clearest indicator of legislative intent’ ” (Matter of Aaron Manor Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr., LLC v Zucker, 42 NY3d 46, 54, quoting Matter of T–Mobile Northeast, LLC v DeBellis, 32 NY3d 594, 607;  see People v. Hernandez, 44 NY3d at 634).

Here, the plain language of CPL 420.45 does not limit its application to deeds containing forged signatures.  The version of the statute in effect during the relevant time period provided for a rebuttable presumption that an instrument is void ab initio where a party is convicted of offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree under Penal Law § 175.30 or offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree under Penal Law § 175.35 (see CPL former 420.45[3] ).  Penal Law § 175.30 provides that a person is guilty of offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree when, “knowing that a written instrument contains a false statement or false information,” the person “offers or presents it to a public office or public servant with the knowledge or belief that it will be filed with, registered or recorded in or otherwise become a part of the records of such public office or public servant.”  Penal Law § 175.35 provides that a person is guilty of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree when, as relevant here, “knowing that a written instrument contains a false statement or false information, and with intent to defraud the state or any political subdivision, public authority or public benefit corporation of the state,” that person

“offers or presents it to a public office, public servant, public authority or public benefit corporation with the knowledge or belief that it will be filed with, registered or recorded in or otherwise become a part of the records of such public office, public servant, public authority or public benefit corporation” (id. § 175.35[1] ).

Neither of the crimes specifically identified in CPL former 420.45(3) is limited to instruments containing forged signatures, but instead include instruments containing false statements or false information (see Penal Law §§ 175.30, 175.35;  Matter of Jacques, 247 AD3d 40 [fraudulent acquisition of affordable housing and false information on applications to rent and own housing units];  People v. Decker, 218 AD3d 1026, 1036 [false information regarding income on tax returns] ).  The provision in CPL 420.45(4) requiring that the order of the court describe “the nature of the false statement or false information contained in such instrument” tracks the language in Penal Law sections 175.30 and 175.35 and further demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend to limit CPL 420.45 to deeds containing forged signatures.

Similarly, the current version of CPL 420.45 applies to “any crime that affects the title to, encumbrance of, or the possession of, real property and where there is an instrument that is material to such encumbrance, transfer or purchase of said real property” (id. § 420.45[1] ).  The Legislature opted to amend the statute so that it would apply even more broadly, rather than more narrowly only to deeds containing forged signatures.

There is no merit to the appellant's contention that, in light of principles of New York property law, the application of CPL 420.45 must be limited to deeds containing forged signatures.  In the context of real property law, a forged deed that contains a fraudulent signature is void ab initio (see Faison v. Lewis, 25 NY3d 220, 224–225).  A deed containing the actual signature of the title holder, which was obtained by fraudulent means, is merely voidable, and a voidable deed, “until set aside, ․ has the effect of transferring the title to the fraudulent grantee, and the latter, being thus clothed with all the evidences of good title, may [e]ncumber the property to a party who becomes a purchaser [or encumbrancer] in good faith” (Marden v. Dorthy, 160 N.Y. 39, 50;  see Faison v. Lewis, 25 NY3d at 225).  However, CPL former 420.45 presents a separate issue.  The question is not whether the signature on a deed was forged or was obtained by fraudulent means, but whether the defendant was convicted after a trial or pled guilty to violating section 175.30 or 175.35 of the Penal Law in connection to the deed.  To the extent that CPL former 420.45 could create a result that is inconsistent with principles of real property law that distinguish between deeds containing forged signatures and deeds with signatures obtained by fraudulent means, the plain language and legislative history of the statute reflect that the Legislature intended such a result.  Moreover, as the People note, where an instrument is deemed void ab initio under CPL 420.45, there may be other remedies available to a bona fide lender or purchaser for value (see People v. Morgan, 78 Misc.3d 1122, 1129 [Sup Ct, Queens County] ), such as where, like here, there is a judgment order of restitution in the lender's favor.

Contrary to the appellant's contention, the People established that the statutory presumption that the fraudulent deed was void ab initio applies (see CPL former 420.45[3];  People v. Morgan, 78 Misc.3d at 1128).  The defendant was convicted, upon her plea of guilty, of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree pursuant to Penal Law § 175.35 in connection with the fraudulent deed, an instrument that is material to the transfer or sale of residential real property.  The appellant's speculative contentions regarding the familial relationship between the defendant and her mother were insufficient to rebut the statutory presumption that the fraudulent deed was void ab initio.  Further, contrary to the appellant's contentions, neither the grand jury testimony of the notary, who testified that he had never seen the defendant's mother before the day of the grand jury proceeding, nor the complaint in a civil proceeding commenced by the defendant's mother, rebutted the presumption.

The appellant's contention that the People were required to rebut a presumption of due execution arising from the fact that the signatures on the fraudulent deed were notarized is without merit.  As discussed at length above, the issue here was not whether the signature on the deed was forged but whether the defendant was convicted of offering a false instrument for filing in the first or second degree, and both crimes require that the instrument contain a false statement or false information, not necessarily a forged signature.

IV. REMAINING CONTENTIONS

The appellant's contention that CPL 420.45 is unconstitutional on its face is not properly before this Court, and we decline to exercise our interest of justice jurisdiction to reach the issue (see id. § 470.15[6][a];  People v. Lawrence, 226 AD3d 827, 827).

The parties' remaining contentions either are not properly before this Court, are without merit, or need not be addressed in light of our determination.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Supreme Court properly granted the People's motion, in effect, pursuant to CPL 420.45 to declare the fraudulent deed void ab initio.

Accordingly, the order is affirmed.

DUFFY, J.P., WOOTEN and LOVE, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court