IN RE: Abas KUPI (2026)

DECISION & JUDGMENT

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Administrative Appeals Board dated January 30, 2024, affirming the determination of an administrative law judge dated October 26, 2023, which, after a hearing, found that the petitioner refused to submit to a chemical test in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 and revoked his driver license.

ADJUDGED that the determination dated January 30, 2024, is confirmed, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed on the merits, with costs.

The petitioner was arrested for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.  After a hearing, an administrative law judge (hereinafter the ALJ) determined that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 by refusing to submit to a chemical test and imposed the mandatory revocation of the petitioner's driver license.  Thereafter, in a determination dated January 30, 2024, the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles Administrative Appeals Board (hereinafter the Appeals Board) affirmed the ALJ's determination.  The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review the determination of the Appeals Board.  In an order entered October 23, 2024, the Supreme Court transferred the proceeding to this Court pursuant to CPLR 7804(g).

“To annul an administrative determination made after a hearing directed by law at which evidence is taken, a court must conclude that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the determination” (Matter of Ball v. Schroeder, 235 AD3d 862, 863 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Khan v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 215 AD3d 844).  “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact’ ” (Matter of Kirch v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 232 AD3d 791, 791, quoting 300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176, 180).  “Substantial evidence is a minimal standard that requires less than a preponderance of the evidence and demands only that a given inference is reasonable and plausible, not necessarily the most probable” (Matter of Rodriguez v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 237 AD3d 1202, 1203 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Roenbeck v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 221 AD3d 1013, 1014).  “ ‘Where substantial evidence exists, the reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, even if the court would have decided the matter differently’ ” (Matter of Kirch v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 232 AD3d at 792, quoting Matter of Haug v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 32 NY3d 1044, 1046), since “ ‘[i]t is the function of the administrative agency, not the reviewing court, to weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses' ” (id. at 792, quoting Matter of Phelps v State of N.Y.-Unified Ct. Sys., 208 AD3d 880, 881).

Here, the ALJ's determination that the petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 by refusing to submit to a chemical test is supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Rodriguez v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 237 AD3d at 1204;  Matter of Kirch v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 232 AD3d at 792).  The evidence adduced at the hearing, including the testimony of an arresting officer and the officer's written report of the petitioner's refusal to submit to a chemical test, as well as the negative inference drawn from the petitioner's failure to testify, demonstrated that the officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 (see Matter of Roenbeck v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 221 AD3d at 1015;  Matter of Schoonmaker v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 165 AD3d 677, 678).  Moreover, the hearing evidence demonstrated that the officer lawfully arrested the petitioner and that the petitioner refused the officer's request to submit to a chemical test after having been given sufficient warnings of the consequences of such refusal (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194[2][c];  Matter of Kirch v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 232 AD3d at 792).

DUFFY, J.P., WOOTEN, LOVE and QUIRK, JJ., concur.