HAMPSHIRE RECREATION LLC v. VILLAGE OF MAMARONECK (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for a regulatory taking of property without just compensation, the defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (William J. Giacomo, J.), dated November 15, 2023.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3214 to compel the defendants to comply with certain discovery demands.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In 2010, the plaintiff purchased certain real property located in the Village of Mamaroneck.  In 2015, the plaintiff submitted a proposal to redevelop the property into a 105–unit residential development.  In May 2020, following a State Environmental Quality Review Act statement, the defendant Village of Mamaroneck Planning Board (hereinafter the Planning Board) denied the proposal and declined to issue the necessary permits, approvals, and variance (see Hampshire Recreation, LLC v Village of Mamaroneck, ––– AD3d –––– [Appellate Division Docket Nos. 2022–04513, 2023–07878;  decided herewith] ).  Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action, alleging that the denial of its proposal constituted a regulatory taking without just compensation (see Hampshire Recreation, LLC v Village of Mamaroneck, ––– AD3d –––– [Appellate Division Docket Nos. 2022–04513, 2023–07878;  decided herewith] ).

After the defendants objected to certain discovery demands made by the plaintiff, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel the defendants to comply with those discovery demands.  The Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the motion.  The defendants appeal.

CPLR 3101(a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof.”  “A party seeking discovery must satisfy the threshold requirement that the request is reasonably calculated to yield information that is ‘material and necessary’—i.e., relevant” (Forman v Henkin, 30 NY3d 656, 661;  see Lurie v Lurie, 226 AD3d 992, 994–995).  “The words material and necessary as used in section 3101 must be interpreted liberally to require disclosure, upon request, of any facts bearing on the controversy which will assist preparation for trial by sharpening the issues and reducing delay and prolixity” (Smith–Percival v MTA Bus Co., 232 AD3d 928, 929 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Chacon v New York City Tr. Auth., 231 AD3d 1008, 1010).  “The supervision of discovery, and the setting of reasonable terms and conditions for disclosure, are within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court's discretion is broad because it is familiar with the action before it, and its exercise should not be disturbed on appeal unless it was improvidently exercised” (Cavounis v Azour, 218 AD3d 434, 434–435 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Ortega v New York City Tr. Auth., 237 AD3d 1211, 1213).  Courts “look[ ] to several factors to determine whether a [regulatory] taking occurred, including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action” (Matter of Master Built Homes II Corp. v New York City Dept. of Bldgs., 220 AD3d 867, 873 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Penn Central Transp.  Co. v New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3124 to compel the defendants to comply with certain discovery demands.  The plaintiff established that access to the requested materials may yield information material and necessary to the prosecution of the action (see Ortega v New York City Tr. Auth., 237 AD3d at 1213;  Chacon v New York City Tr. Auth., 231 AD3d at 1010), including information relating to the plaintiff's reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of the challenged government action (see Blue Is. Dev, LLC v Town of Hempstead, 131 AD3d 497, 502;  Sherman v Town of Chester, 752 F3d 554, 565–566 [2d Cir];  see generally Matter of Gazza v New York State Dept. of Envtl.  Conservation, 89 NY2d 603, 617–618).

Contrary to the defendants' contention, the discovery sought was not overly broad or unduly burdensome (see Olmann v Willoughby Rehabilitation & Health Care Ctr., LLC, 186 AD3d 837, 839–840;  Leibowitz v Babad, 175 AD3d 639, 641).  Contrary to the defendants' further contentions, they failed to establish the applicability of either the legislative or deliberative process privileges (see Matter of 853–855 McLean, LLC v City of Yonkers, NY, 237 AD3d 1189, 1190;  Coads v Nassau County, 231 AD3d 902, 905;  Matter of Madera v Elmont Pub. Lib., 101 AD3d 726, 727;  cf.  Mecca v Shang, 55 AD3d 570, 571).

LASALLE, P.J., CONNOLLY, TAYLOR and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.