The People of the State of New York v. N.J., Defendant. (2026)

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant and 19 co-defendants have been charged, in a 208-count indictment, with the crimes of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, Criminal Use of a Firearm, Attempted Assault in the First Degree and related offenses. The indictment alleges that defendant conspired to commit violent acts with members of street gangs, known as "Thirdside", a "Cripps" affiliate and "9Raq", a "Bloods" set. Defendant is alleged to have been involved in a shooting on March 30, 2025 at approximately 3:30 p.m. on a public crowded street, where a bystander was grazed with a bullet and several motor vehicles were struck with gunfire. The People allege that that defendant, who self-identified as an associate of the "Thirdside" street gang on social media platforms and in a video posted on Instagram admitted to participating in the March 30, 2025 shooting.

The People served and filed their Certificate of Compliance, (COC), which included voluminous discovery including nearly one terabyte of data and a register/index of all material turned over to defense counsel. The People advised defense counsel, in writing, that certain material and information pertaining to the identities of alleged victims and civilian witnesses would be withheld or redacted pursuant to CPL § 245.20[1][c] which permits the prosecution to withhold the identity of such witnesses "where the defendant has substantial affiliation with a criminal enterprise" (emphasis added).

Defendant filed a motion to invalidate the People's COC. Defendant claimed that the People's reliance on CPL § 245.20[1][c] and PL § 460.10 for their non-disclosure of the witnesses' identities was improper because "the defendant is not charged with anything involving a criminal enterprise" (Def attorney aff, p 6). The People, in opposition, argued that the street gangs of "Thirdside" and "9Raq" are "criminal enterprises" within the meaning of Penal Law § 460.10[3] because they are composed of a group of people sharing a common criminal purpose with an ascertainable structure and a continuity of existence. As such, the People asserted that pursuant to CPL § 245.20[1][c], they were not required to disclose the witnesses' identities until jury selection.

The Court, denied defendant's motion to invalidate the People's COC and held, in pertinent part, that the prosecution, upon proper notice to defendant, withheld the disclosure of the witnesses' identities based upon on their good faith interpretation of the relevant statues regarding the meaning of "criminal enterprise" (see People v. Pardo, 81 Misc 3d 858 [Crim Ct Bronx County 2023]; People v. Soto, 80 Misc 3d 473 [Crim Ct. New York County 2023].

Subsequently, defense counsel consented to the People's application for a protective order whereby the identities of the witnesses were provided for "defense counsel's eyes only".

ISSUE PRESENTED

Although the protective order has resolved the discovery dispute, the Court will now address the novel issue as to whether the street gangs, "Thirdside" and "9Raq" as alleged in this indictment, qualify as "criminal enterprises" as defined in PL § 460.10[3] such that the People can unilaterally withhold the identities of the alleged victims and witnesses pursuant to CPL § 245.20[1][c] without the need for a protective order under CPL § 245.70.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

CPL § 245.20[1][c] provides, in pertinent part:

"Information . . . relating to the identity of . . . [the] victim or witness of a crime where the defendant has substantiated affiliation with a criminal enterprise, as defined in subdivision three of section 460.10 of the penal law . . . may be withheld . . . "

Penal Law § 460.10[3] sets forth that:

"Criminal enterprise means a group of persons sharing a common purpose of engaging in criminal conduct, associated in an ascertainable structure, distinct from a pattern of criminal activity, and with a continuity of existence, structure and criminal purpose beyond the scope of individual criminal incidents."

Penal Law § 460.20 sets forth that:

"A person is guilty of enterprise corruption when, having knowledge of the existence of a criminal enterprise and the nature of its activities, and being employed by or associated with such enterprise, he (a) intentionally conducts or participates in the affairs of an enterprise by participating in a pattern of criminal conduct; or (b) intentionally acquires or maintains any interest in or control of an enterprise by participating in a pattern of criminal activity or (c) participates in a pattern of criminal activity and knowingly invests any proceeds derived from that conduct or any proceeds derived from the investment or use of those proceeds, in an enterprise."

"Northside" and "9Raq" Street Gangs Do Not Have an Ascertainable Structure, Distinct from a Pattern of Criminal Activity"

"In order for a group of persons to be associated in an ascertainable structure distinct from a pattern of criminal activity, although their association need not be rigid or 'resemble the formalistic corporate flow chart", there needs to be evidence there were certain people at the top of the structure, planning the objectives of the enterprise and directing how the objectives would be achieved, and others at the middle and bottom levels (see People v Wakefield Financial Corp.,155 Misc 2d 775 [Sup Ct, New York County 1992]). "While "[c]rimes committed by individuals who engage in a brief series of criminal acts in an ad hoc and unstructured group are not subject to prosecution [under OCCA]", if "the group demonstrates a structure- such as the hierarchy of a 'Cosa Nostra' family, (e.g. , boss, underboss, soldiers and associates) or the specialization of a narcotics, loansharking or gambling operation- the criminal enterprise requirement is satisfied", Governor Cuomo's Approval Memorandum, quoted in Donnino, "Practice Commentary" to Article 460, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 39).

Examples of cases with detailed evidence of structure include People v. Jones (149 AD3d 407, [1st Dept 2017]), where "[t]here were procurers like defendant, who stole the bikes on the streets, distributors or brokers who found a market for the bikes, and dealers who resold the stolen bikes in the United States and abroad" and People v. Congiliaro (290 AD2d 87 [2nd Dept 2002]), where the gambling organization employed a "bookmaker" who oversaw the operation, a "controller" who conducted day-to-day business and account information, "clerks" who accepted bets, and "runners" who met with bettors to settle accounts.

Here, the evidence presented to the grand jury did not reveal a sufficiently detailed infrastructure of the alleged street gangs, as indicated in the cases cited above. Although there was evidence that suggests that a particular older member of the street gangs had a leadership role, there was no evidence presented as to who in the street gangs had middle or bottom roles. Additionally, although, there was evidence of telephone and Instagram communications between street gang members that referenced the terms "baby bros" - meaning younger members of the street crew, "loc in" - which meant enlisting younger persons to join the street gangs and "big G status . . . boot you up" - implying that the younger member would be rewarded for their loyalty with an elevation in status, no evidence was adduced as to what, if any, distinct roles younger or older members actually played in these street gangs. Moreover, the indictment alleges that gang members -younger and older- were present together and acted in concert during the commission of violent crimes. Evidence that two or more people committed several crimes acting in concert does not alone, in the absence of an established structure, establish a "criminal enterprise", even if the crimes constituted a "pattern" (see People v. Joseph Stevens & Co., Inc, supra; People v. Cantarella, 160 Misc 2d 8 [Sup Ct, New York Co 1993]; People v.Moscatiello, 149 Misc 2d 752 [Sup Ct, New York County 1990]).

Thus, based on the foregoing, evidence that members of "Northside" and "9Raq" conspired to commit a pattern of violent crimes - mainly against opposing gangs to maintain territorial dominance - does not transform these street gangs into a "criminal enterprise" under the definition in Article 460 of the Penal Law, with a structure that transcends the pattern of criminal activity.

Continuity of Existence, Structure and Criminal Purpose Beyond the Scope of Individual Incidents

As to this definitional requirement of a "criminal enterprise", "[n]o matter how clear a group's criminal purpose, and no matter how structured it may be, it is not a criminal enterprise unless it displays such continuity. To satisfy this continuity requirement, it is not enough that a group of people engaged in a series of criminal acts. The evidence must also show that they did so while associated in a group that over time shared a general criminal purpose and had the same general structure, a showing that is not defeated by changes in personnel over time (see People v. Pustilnik, 14 Misc 3d 1237(A) [Sup Ct, 2007] [" the structure of the criminal enterprise, including its system of authority, remained virtually unchanged over an approximately two-year period; People v. Marquez, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1996, p.25, col 6 [Sup Ct. New York County][ the Marquez Organization "did not come into existence for the purpose of committing one or more of the criminal acts and its existence did not depend upon the continuation of any particular transaction. The disruption or even the loss of a particular gambling location had little discernable effect upon the organization's fortunes"].

Continuity of structure exists where there is an organizational pattern or system of authority that provides a mechanism for directing the group's affairs on a continuing rather than ad hoc basis . . . The continuity of these elements need not be absolute; the groups system of authority may be modified, old members may leave, and new members may join . . . That some changes in structure and personnel occur does not mean that there is no mechanism for continuing direction of group affairs; both the structure and the personnel of an enterprise may undergo alteration without loss of the enterprise's identity as an enterprise" (Wakefield Financial Corporation, 155 Misc 2d at 786 citing United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F2d 647[8th Cir 1982]; see also United States v Lemm, 680 F2d 1193 [8th Cir 1982]). On the state appellate level, [t]he First Department made it clear, that the "continuity" requirement is satisfied when "the enterprise, if undetected by law enforcement, could have continued indefinitely" (see Richard A. Greenberg, NY Prac § 36.7 citing People v Guardino, 62 AD3d 544 [1st Dept 2009] ["[a]lthough the enterprise ended upon the arrests of its members, the continuity requirement was satisfied by evidence that defendant committed predicate criminal acts while 'operating as part of a long-term association that exist[ed] for criminal purposes' and had no obvious preplanned termination date . . . "]).

Here, evidence that the street gangs of "Northside" and "9Raq" were in existence for at least 4 years would arguably satisfy the "continuity of existence" aspect of this requirement. However, that alone is not dispositive since this requirement also includes the term "continuity of structure". Inasmuch as, indicated above, there was insufficient evidence of a legally defined ascertainable structure with distinctive roles of gang members, it cannot be said that a continuity of structure existed where there was an organizational pattern or system of authority that provided a mechanism for directing the group's affairs on a continuing basis.

Designating the Street Gangs, "Northside" and "9Raq" as "Criminal Enterprises" is Not Consistent with the Legislative Findings Behind the "Enterprise Corruption" Statute (Penal Law § 460.00)

In any event, to analyze the underlying issue presented in this matter on a deeper level, it requires a close look at the "Legislative Findings" behind the definition of "criminal enterprise" under Penal Law § 460.10[3] which are codified in PL § 460.00. Firstly, when interpreting the language of a statute, the Court's primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature, (see McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92[a]). The legislative findings behind, "Title X- "Organized Crime Control Act" (OCCA) Article 460- Enterprise Corruption," which was inspired by the RICO statute, (18 USC § 1961 et. seq), describe "organized crime" as involving "highly sophisticated, complex and widespread forms of criminal activity . . . through illegal enterprises engaged in such criminal endeavors such as the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, arson for profit, hijacking, labor racketeering, loansharking, extortion and bribery, the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes, syndicated gambling, trafficking in stolen securities, insurance and investment frauds, and other forms of economic and social exploitation. The money and power derived by organized crime through its illegal enterprises and endeavors is increasingly being used to infiltrate and corrupt businesses, unions and other legitimate enterprises and to corrupt our democratic processes", (Penal Law§ 460.00).

Thus far, New York courts have found a "criminal enterprise" to encompass the groups in the following cases: Wakefield Financial Group, supra [securities professionals rigging the public trading of certain securities; People v D.H. Blair & Co, Inc, 2002 WL 766119 (NY Sup 2002) ["the defendants each engaged in a pattern of criminal activity with the common purpose of using the legitimate enterprise of D.H. Blair as a device for defrauding members of the investing public under the guise of running a legitimate securities firm"]; Pustilnik, 14 Misc 3d 1237(A) at *5 ["[t]he evidence allowed the Grand Jury to conclude that each member of the Pustilnik Group engaged in a pattern of activity the common purpose of profiting by defrauding no fault insurance companies and the NYCTA under the guise of operating legitimate medical offices; People v. Nicelli, 74 AD3d 1235 [2nd Dept 2010] [a human tissue harvesting business where funeral directors participated in and profited and defendant played a key role, supplying cadavers to the enterprise, which then harvested tissue and forged medical and social histories of the decedents;]; People v. Giordanao, N.Y.L.J. 12/7/92, p. 28, col 5 [Sup Ct, New York County] [ a bookmaking business]; People v. Cantarella, 160 Misc 2d 8 [Sup Ct, 1993] [a "crew" in the circulation department of the New York Post]).

Here, the indictment does not allege the types of sophisticated illegal activity associated with organized crime, as detailed above. Rather, the charges, as described in the indictment, allege a group of individuals between the young ages of 17 to 24, who are members of street gangs who have conspired together to "embark upon a certain course of criminal conduct including murder, assault, weapons possession, robbery, and other crimes in order to maintain their dominance of their geographical areas . . . [and] to commit various crimes, [which included] "acts of retributive violence, including beatings, and shooting against members and associates of opposition gangs" (Preamble to Indictment).

Thus, when analyzing the term "criminal enterprise," in the context of the legislative findings behind the Enterprise Corruption statute under Article 460.00, it is apparent that the "street gangs" of "Thirdside" and "9Raq," at least as alleged in this indictment, are not the kind of groups that the legislature contemplated when drafting the "Enterprise Corruption" statutes. Instead, the "street crews" of "Thirdside" and "9 Raq," appear to fall under the crude category of a "gang" as defined in Miriam Webster Collegiate Dictionary as "a group of persons working towards unlawful or antisocial ends, especially a band of adolescents" (emphasis added).

The only case that this Court could find that dealt with a "street gang" that qualified as a "criminal enterprise", is People v. Wright, (39 AD3d 1094 [3rd Dept 2016]). However, significantly, the nature of that street gang, "G-shine," is distinguishable from the street gangs, "Thirdside" and "9Raq" in the instant case. In Wright, "[t]he People submitted proof of the activities and organizational structure of "G-Shine", a sect of the Bloods street gang that was engaged in the common purposes of making money through narcotics trafficking in and around Albany . . . [m]embers of the Albany group had specialized functions in supplying and selling various drugs and obtaining customers, and certain members occupied leadership roles with the authority to schedule meetings, enforce rules and punish violations".

Here, one of the critical distinctions between the nature of the "G-Shine" street gang in Wright and the "Thirdside" and "9Raq" street gangs is that the main purpose of "G-Shine" was to engage in a profit-making business of acquiring money through illicit narcotics trafficking. As such, consistent with the legislative intent behind the term "criminal enterprise" as defined in Penal Law § 460.10(3), members of "G-Shine" were charged with the crime of "Enterprise Corruption" pursuant to Penal Law§ 460.20. In the instant case, although, some members of "Thirdside" and "9Raq" allegedly committed a gun point robbery of a local grocery store and a knife wielding robbery of an individual on the street, the purpose was to "utilize the proceeds to further the criminal activities of the gang" (Preamble to Indictment) and to provide money for incarcerated gang members.¹ Further, evidence of a gun for sale in the amount of $550 and a weekly stipend given to gang members in the meager amount of $20 is de minimis and hardly adequate proof of a sophisticated profit-sharing "criminal enterprise" as contemplated by the Legislature.

Finally, contrary to the People's position, it is significant that the defendants in this conspiracy indictment were not charged with the crime of "Enterprise Corruption" nor any offense relating to the sale of firearms or other contraband. This is particularly relevant with respect to theinitial discovery dispute in this case. The discovery statute CPL 245. 20[1][c], confined the meaning of the term "criminal enterprise" to the definition contained in Penal Law § 460.10[3] — which relates back to the crime of "Enterprise Corruption" under Article PL § 460.00. Thus, it logically follows that since the defendants were not charged with the crime of "Enterprise Corruption" the People's reliance on the term "criminal enterprise", in this particular case, to explain their non-disclosure of the witnesses' identities to the defense, is misplaced.

Accordingly, this Court concludes that the street gangs, "Thirdside" and "9Raq", as alleged in this indictment, do not qualify as "criminal enterprises" as defined in Penal Law § 460.10[3] such that the identities of the alleged victims and witnesses can be unilaterally withheld by the prosecution pursuant to CPL § 245.20[1][c] without the need for a protective order under CPL § 245.70.

This constitutes the decision and order of this Court. The Clerk of the Court is directed to forward a copy of this order and decision to the attorney for defendant and the District Attorney's Office.

Dated: August 24, 2026

JEFFREY ROSENBLUETH, A.S.C.J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Evidence was presented that the term "provide" used by members of the "Northside" and "9 Raq" gangs referred to gathering money from their criminal activities in a "pot or fund" to provide for gang members that were in custody.

Jeffrey Rosenblueth, J.