The People, etc., respondent, v. Shaun Williams, appellant. (2026)

Argued—May 29, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Cassandra M. Mullen, J.), rendered November 4, 2021, convicting him of assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that his convictions were based on legally insufficient evidence and were against the weight of the evidence.  The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is partially unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Leggio, 237 AD3d 856, 856).  In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  “ ‘There is no preservation requirement for weight-of-the-evidence appellate review’ ” (People v. Rafikian, 247 AD3d 794, 795, quoting People v. Rose, 191 AD3d 697, 698).  In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 NY3d 383, 410;  People v. Pearsall, 171 AD3d 1096, 1096).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 NY3d 633;  People v. Pearsall, 171 AD3d at 1096).

The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court improperly disqualified his counsel is without merit.  A determination to substitute or disqualify counsel falls within the trial court's discretion (see People v. Watson, 26 NY3d 620, 624;  People v. Wilkinson, 185 AD3d 734, 738).  “Criminal courts faced with counsel who allegedly suffer from a conflict of interest must balance two conflicting constitutional rights:  (1) the defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel;  and (2) the defendant's right to be represented by counsel of his or her own choosing” (People v. Addimando, 197 AD3d 106, 120;  see People v. Watson, 26 NY3d at 624).  “[D]oubts as to the existence of a conflict of interest are resolved in favor of disqualification in order to avoid even the appearance of impropriety” (Matter of Janczewski v. Janczewski, 169 AD3d 795, 797).  Here, the public defense organization representing the defendant had previously represented the victim in another matter.  Defense counsel likely would have had to cross-examine the victim in this case regarding the incident that was the basis for the public defense organization's prior representation of the victim.  Under the circumstances presented, the court properly determined that the potential conflict resolved in favor of disqualification (see People v. Watson, 26 NY3d at 628;  People v. Addimando, 197 AD3d at 120).

The defendant contends that the Supreme Court erred in instructing the jury only with respect to the defense of the justified use of deadly physical force, rather than the justified use of ordinary physical force.  Contrary to the People's contention, this issue is preserved for appellate review, since defense counsel objected to the charge as given (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Dubarry, 215 AD3d 689, 690).  However, the contention is without merit.  “[T]he particular justification instruction given to the jury must be consistent with the facts and, where it can be determined as a matter of law that the physical force used by the defendant was in fact, deadly, that is, readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury, the trial court may limit the justification instruction to authorizing the use of deadly physical force” (People v. Mothon, 284 A.D.2d 568, 569 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Penal Law § 10.00[11];  People v. Lugg, 124 AD3d 679, 679–680).  Here, the defendant's use of a sharp object to slash the victim's eye constituted deadly physical force because it was “readily capable” of causing death or serious injury, regardless of the degree of injury the defendant actually intended or inflicted (see People v. Lugg, 124 AD3d at 680;  People v. Steele, 19 AD3d 175, 176).  Accordingly, the court properly instructed the jury only with respect to the defense of the justified use of deadly physical force (see People v. Vega, 33 NY3d 1002, 1005).

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of due process and his right to a fair trial because of the poor living conditions on Rikers Island during the COVID–19 pandemic is based on matter dehors the record and, therefore, cannot be addressed on direct appeal (see People v. Dennis, 244 AD3d 997, 999).

The defendant's contention that he was deprived of a fair trial by certain remarks made by the prosecutor during summation is partially unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2];  People v. Spencer, 244 AD3d 1254, 1255).  In any event, the defendant's contention is without merit.  The majority of the challenged comments made by the prosecutor during summation were within the bounds of permissible rhetorical comment (see People v. Ashwal, 39 N.Y.2d 105, 109), fairly responsive to arguments made in defense counsel's summation (see People v. Spencer, 244 AD3d at 1255), or constituted fair comment on the evidence (see People v. Escalona, 237 AD3d 968, 970).  The prosecutor's stray comment to defense counsel during summation, reflecting the prosecutor's frustration with defense counsel's objections, while unprofessional, was struck from the record and any prejudice that resulted was alleviated by the Supreme Court's curative instructions (see People v. Chandler, 237 AD3d 1105, 1106).  Moreover, to the extent that any of the challenged comments were improper, they were not so pervasive or egregious as to have deprived the defendant of his rights to a fair trial or due process (see People v. Basnight, 248 AD3d 1048, 1049;  People v. Spencer, 244 AD3d at 1255).

BARROS, J.P., WOOTEN, DOWLING and LANDICINO, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court