Angel Lopez Ramos, respondent, v. LLC (2026)

Submitted—February 27, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the third-party defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Leon Ruchelsman, J.), dated September 23, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order striking a notice to admit.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

In July 2022, the plaintiff allegedly was injured after falling at a construction site owned and operated by the defendants.  The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries, and the defendants subsequently commenced a third-party action against Defalco Construction, Inc. (hereinafter Defalco).

In June 2024, Defalco served the plaintiff with a 15–item notice to admit.  Thereafter, the plaintiff moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order striking the notice to admit.  In an order dated September 23, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion.  Defalco appeals.

CPLR 3123(a) provides, in relevant part, that “a party may serve upon any other party a written request for admission by the latter ․ of the truth of any matters of fact set forth in the request, as to which the party requesting the admission reasonably believes there can be no substantial dispute at the trial and which are within the knowledge of such other party or can be ascertained by him [or her] upon reasonable inquiry.”  The purpose of a notice to admit is only to eliminate from contention those matters that are not in dispute in the litigation and that may be readily disposed of (see American Bldrs.   & Contrs.  Supply Co., Inc. v Vinyl is Final, Inc., 222 AD3d 708, 709;  Jet One Group, Inc. v. Halcyon Jet Holdings, Inc., 111 AD3d 890, 892).  A notice to admit is not to be employed to obtain information in lieu of other disclosure devices or to compel admissions of fundamental and material issues or contested ultimate facts (see American Bldrs.   & Contrs.  Supply Co., Inc. v Vinyl is Final, Inc., 222 AD3d at 709;  Ramcharran v New York Airport Servs., LLC, 108 AD3d 610, 610–611).

CPLR 3103(a) provides, in relevant part, that a “court may at any time ․ make a protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any disclosure device.”  “The supervision of disclosure and the setting of reasonable terms and conditions therefor rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and, absent an improvident exercise of that discretion, its determination will not be disturbed” (Morrow v. Gallagher, 163 AD3d 804, 805 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Jet One Group, Inc. v. Halcyon Jet Holdings, Inc., 111 AD3d at 891).

Here, the notice to admit improperly either sought the plaintiff's admissions to legal conclusions or went to the heart of the matter (see American Bldrs.   & Contrs.  Supply Co., Inc. v Vinyl is Final, Inc., 222 AD3d at 709–710;  32nd Ave. LLC v. Angelo Holding Corp., 134 AD3d 696, 698–699;  Lolly v Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 45 AD3d 537, 537).  Moreover, the information sought may be obtained through discovery, including, among other things, depositions (see Altman v. Kelly, 128 AD3d 741, 743;  Jet One Group, Inc. v. Halcyon Jet Holdings, Inc., 111 AD3d at 893).

Defalco's remaining contention is without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3103 for a protective order striking the notice to admit.

LASALLE, P.J., CONNOLLY, TAYLOR and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court