FRANCIS DELESSANDRO v. LYNELLE MAGINLEY LIDDIE (2026)

Petitioner Francis Delessandro was detained by respondent Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) for allegedly violating certain conditions of release during his community supervision. Petitioner seeks to challenge the legality of his detention through a writ of habeas corpus. In a prior order, this court remitted the matter for a new recognizance hearing. It directed that if DOCCS did not hold the hearing within the prescribed time, DOCCS must release petitioner on his own recognizance. In the remaining grounds of the petition, petitioner argues that the parole warrant was unlawfully issued after he posted bail in the related criminal case, that the recognizance court unlawfully remanded him, and that the charge established at the preliminary hearing was not a non-technical violation that could authorize his continued detention. For the reasons stated herein, the petition is DENIED, and the proceeding is DISMISSED.

Petitioner was arraigned on criminal charges on January 2, 2026, and the court set bail. Petitioner posted cash bail the following day. That same day, DOCCS issued a parole warrant based on the same alleged criminal conduct. Petitioner was arrested on the parole warrant on February 2, 2026. A recognizance hearing was held on February 3, 2026, at which petitioner was remanded.

Petitioner argues that DOCCS could not issue a parole warrant after he had posted bail. Release on a criminal case does not preclude the issuance of a parole warrant based on the same alleged conduct (Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [viii]). The statute addresses two relevant timing scenarios. If DOCCS has already issued a parole warrant and the criminal court then sets bail or otherwise authorizes release, then DOCCS may not continue detention "based solely on the [parole] warrant" (id.). If the criminal court has already issued a CPL article 530 securing order and DOCCS later issues a parole warrant based on that conduct, DOCCS must provide the releasee with a recognizance hearing within 24 hours of the warrant's execution (id.). This case falls within the second scenario. The criminal court issued a securing order setting bail on January 2, 2026. Petitioner posted bail on January 3, 2026, and DOCCS issued a parole warrant that same day. The warrant was executed on February 2, 2026, and petitioner received a recognizance hearing on February 3, 2026. Although petitioner contends that posting bail should preclude the subsequent issuance of a parole warrant, such a view overlooks the statutory distinction between the two scenarios outlined and fails to account for the legislative intent to address both. Indeed, petitioner could argue that subjecting a releasee to a parole warrant immediately after posting bail undermines the purpose of the criminal court's release decision and potentially subjects the individual to duplicative retention. However, this counterargument finds no support in the statutory text or controlling precedent, as the legislature has expressly provided that, in the timing scenario at issue here, the appropriate safeguard is a prompt recognizance hearing. Therefore, the statute expressly contemplates petitioner's circumstances and requires only a prompt recognizance hearing, not an absolute bar to the issuance of a new parole warrant after bail. As DOCCS complied with the statutory procedure, petitioner is not entitled to relief on the ground that DOCCS issued the parole warrant after he posted bail.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that, as outlined in this court's order dated February 11, 2026, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was GRANTED to the extent that the matter was remitted for a new recognizance hearing; and it is further

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the petition is otherwise DENIED, and the proceeding is DISMISSED.

Dated: August 13, 2026

Bronx, New York

HON. VERENA C. POWELL, A.J.S.C.

Verena C. Powell, J.