PEOPLE v. GUILBAULT (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Rensselaer County (Debra Young, J.), rendered December 20, 2022, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of grand larceny in the third degree, and (2) from a judgment of said court, rendered December 20, 2022, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of grand larceny in the third degree, and (3) from a judgment of said court, rendered December 20, 2022, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of failure to register or verify as a sex offender.

In January 2022, defendant was charged in a two-count indictment with offenses connected to the July 2021 theft of a motor vehicle.  In April 2022, he was charged in another two-count indictment with offenses connected to the September 2021 theft of a motor vehicle.  Defendant thereafter entered into a global agreement to resolve the charges in those indictments as well as an assortment of other pending charges.  He agreed to plead guilty to two counts of grand larceny in the third degree, one from each of the two indictments, as well as to waive indictment and plead guilty to a superior court information (hereinafter SCI) charging him with failure to register or verify as a sex offender based upon his June 2022 failure to notify authorities of a change in his registered address.  The plea agreement, which included a waiver of his right to appeal in each matter, contemplated that defendant would be sentenced, as a second felony offender, to concurrent terms of 21/212 to 5 years in prison upon the grand larceny convictions and a concurrent term of 11/212 to 3 years in prison upon the failure to register conviction.  County Court imposed the agreed-upon sentences in 2022.  After learning that defendant could not be sentenced as a second felony offender upon the failure to register conviction, County Court resentenced him upon that conviction to a concurrent term of 1 to 3 years in prison (see People v. Stabb, 207 A.D.3d 948, 949 n 2, 172 N.Y.S.3d 224 [3d Dept 2022] ).  Defendant appeals from the 2022 judgments of conviction.

We affirm.  To begin, County Court explained during the plea colloquy as to how defendant was expected to waive his right to appeal as a component of the plea agreement, how the right to appeal was separate and distinct from the trial-related rights he was forfeiting by pleading guilty and that some appellate issues, several of which were named, would survive a waiver.  Defendant acknowledged that he understood, had spoken to counsel about the issue to his satisfaction and was voluntarily waiving his right to appeal, then executed detailed written waivers in open court after reviewing them with counsel.  As such, “[a]lthough the written waivers contained some overbroad language when read in isolation, the oral and written waivers clearly reflect that the counseled defendant was aware of the fact that not all appellate rights can be waived, and we are satisfied that ‘defendant understood the distinction that some appellate review survived’ ” (People v. Snipes, 243 A.D.3d 1065, 1066, 245 N.Y.S.3d 465 [3d Dept 2025], quoting People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d 545, 561, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970 [2019] ).  We are therefore satisfied that defendant waived his right to appeal in a knowing, intelligent and voluntary manner (see People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 563, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970;  People v. Martinez, 245 A.D.3d 1071, 1072, 246 N.Y.S.3d 830 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 N.Y.3d 998, 259 N.Y.S.3d 438, 282 N.E.3d 165 [2026];  People v. Snipes, 243 A.D.3d at 1066, 245 N.Y.S.3d 465).  His further challenge to the sentences imposed upon the grand larceny convictions as unduly harsh or severe is foreclosed as a result (see People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 255–256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006];  People v. Snipes, 243 A.D.3d at 1066–1067, 245 N.Y.S.3d 465).

Defendant's further challenges to the voluntariness of his guilty plea survive his appeal waiver, but would ordinarily be unpreserved given his failure to advance them in an appropriate postallocution motion that he had ample time to make (see People v. Leigh, 247 A.D.3d 1315, 1316, 254 N.Y.S.3d 304 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 N.Y.3d 1017, 260 N.Y.S.3d 741, 283 N.E.3d 357 [2026];  People v. Clark, 246 A.D.3d 1150, 1152, 250 N.Y.S.3d 701 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 N.Y.3d 969, 257 N.Y.S.3d 221, 280 N.E.3d 440 [2026] ).  Defendant suggests that preservation was not required for his argument that he was misled as to his maximum sentencing exposure upon the failure to register conviction, pointing out that County Court erroneously advised him that he faced a maximum of 2 to 4 years in prison when, in reality, he could not be sentenced as a second felony offender and faced a maximum of 1 to 4 years in prison (see People v. Scott, 44 N.Y.3d 302, 306, 246 N.Y.S.3d 634, 273 N.E.3d 208 [2025];  see also Correction Law §§ 168–f [4];  168–t;  Penal Law § 70.00[2][e];  [3][b] ).  Even assuming that preservation was not required for that argument, however, County Court still accurately advised defendant that he faced an indeterminate sentence of up to four years in prison upon that conviction.  He then pleaded guilty upon the expectation that he would receive an agreed-upon sentence of 11/212 to 3 years that would run concurrently to the lengthier sentences imposed upon the grand larceny convictions, and his resentencing to a concurrent term of 1 to 3 years in prison “comported with [his] reasonable understanding and legitimate expectations” since that sentence maintained the agreed-upon maximum and had no impact upon the overall prison time he was to serve (People v. Madison, 248 A.D.3d 943, 943, 253 N.Y.S.3d 735 [2d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 N.Y.3d 1017, 260 N.Y.S.3d 717, 283 N.E.3d 332 [2026];  see People v. Collier, 22 N.Y.3d 429, 434, 982 N.Y.S.2d 34, 5 N.E.3d 5 [2013], cert denied 573 U.S. 908, 134 S.Ct. 2730, 189 L.Ed.2d 770 [2014] ).  Defendant “received the benefit of his bargain” under those circumstances despite the initial misstep, and his plea remained knowing, voluntary and intelligent (People v. Collier, 22 N.Y.3d at 434, 982 N.Y.S.2d 34, 5 N.E.3d 5;  see People v. Madison, 248 A.D.3d at 943, 253 N.Y.S.3d 735;  People v. Jabot, 156 A.D.3d 954, 955–956, 66 N.Y.S.3d 719 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1116, 77 N.Y.S.3d 341, 101 N.E.3d 982 [2018] ).

Defendant acknowledges that preservation was required for his further contention “that his plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary because County Court did not ensure that he was aware of the constitutional trial-related rights that he was forfeiting by pleading guilty,” and our review of the record confirms that “the narrow exception to the preservation requirement is not implicated” (People v. Devarnne–Walls, 211 A.D.3d 1232, 1232, 180 N.Y.S.3d 351 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 1078, 184 N.Y.S.3d 298, 204 N.E.3d 1079 [2023] ).  We decline defendant's invitation to take corrective action in the interest of justice.  County Court was not obliged to name every right defendant would waive by pleading guilty during its colloquy, and it adequately ensured here that defendant had spoken to counsel about the plea agreement to his satisfaction and understood that he would give up a number of specific trial-related rights by pleading guilty, “affirmatively demonstrat[ing] defendant's understanding and waiver of his constitutional trial-related rights” (People v. Babilenko, 204 A.D.3d 1225, 1227, 167 N.Y.S.3d 574 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 38 N.Y.3d 1069, 171 N.Y.S.3d 450, 191 N.E.3d 402 [2022];  see People v. Kimball, 213 A.D.3d 1028, 1030, 183 N.Y.S.3d 198 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 929, 192 N.Y.S.3d 518, 213 N.E.3d 661 [2023];  People v. Crampton, 201 A.D.3d 1020, 1023, 159 N.Y.S.3d 263 [3d Dept 2022], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1160, 160 N.Y.S.3d 690, 181 N.E.3d 1118 [2022] ).

Defendant finally contends that the waiver of indictment was invalid, and the SCI charging him with failure to register or verify as a sex offender was jurisdictionally defective as a result, because the waiver cited the wrong statutory provision for that offense and did not specify the time that he allegedly committed it (see CPL 195.20).  Although “a jurisdictional defect would survive both defendant's guilty plea and the waiver of his right to appeal,” we do not perceive such a defect here (People v. Quinones, 51 A.D.3d 1226, 1227, 857 N.Y.S.2d 372 [3d Dept 2008], lv denied 10 N.Y.3d 938, 862 N.Y.S.2d 345, 892 N.E.2d 411 [2008] ).  In view of the facts that the waiver correctly named the offense to be charged in the SCI as required by CPL 195.20 and the SCI itself accurately identified that offense and the relevant section in the Correction Law, the citation to the wrong statute in the waiver was a typographical and nonjurisdictional error (see People v. McKenzie, 221 A.D.2d 743, 744, 633 N.Y.S.2d 652 [3d Dept 1995];  see also People v. Llewelyn, 221 A.D.3d 1060, 1060–1061, 199 N.Y.S.3d 724 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 N.Y.3d 1093, 204 N.Y.S.3d 786, 228 N.E.3d 599 [2024] ).  Similarly, the absence of “nonelemental information” like the time of the charged offense, “to which defendant did not object, does not render the waiver of indictment jurisdictionally defective” (People v. Minaya, 206 A.D.3d 1161, 1162, 169 N.Y.S.3d 728 [3d Dept 2022];  see People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y.3d at 569–570, 122 N.Y.S.3d 226, 144 N.E.3d 970;  People v. Perry, 235 A.D.3d 1041, 1042–1043, 226 N.Y.S.3d 663 [3d Dept 2025], lv denied 43 N.Y.3d 965, 232 N.Y.S.3d 442, 258 N.E.3d 1215 [2025] ).  Thus, both challenges were forfeited by his guilty plea (see People v. Perry, 235 A.D.3d at 1042, 226 N.Y.S.3d 663;  People v. Devarnne–Walls, 211 A.D.3d at 1232–1233, 180 N.Y.S.3d 351).

ORDERED that the judgments are affirmed.

Corcoran, J.

Garry, P.J., Fisher, Powers and Ryba, JJ., concur.