IN RE: Jean Danhong CHEN (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON MOTION

Respondent was admitted to practice by this Court in 1998 and previously operated an immigration law practice in California – where she does not appear to be admitted – seemingly on the strength of her New York law license alone.  In November 2025 , respondent pleaded guilty before the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to the federal crimes of visa fraud, witness tampering and obstruction of proceedings in full satisfaction of a 14–count indictment brought against her in connection with her conduct related to an extensive immigration fraud scheme that spanned numerous years (see 18 USC §§ 1505, 1512[b][3];  1546[a] ), whereafter she was sentenced to a term of incarceration and ordered to pay a $20,000 fine.¹  Respondent's conviction stemmed from her conduct between 2014 and 2017 wherein she engaged in a fraud scheme to obtain immigration benefits for over 100 foreign investors through the federal government's EB–5 Immigration Investor Program.  In furtherance of that scheme, respondent prepared fraudulent documents for submission to the U.S. Citizenship Immigration Services that knowingly contained material misrepresentations and false information.  She thereafter attempted to delay or hinder the investigations into her conduct by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC) by requesting that others delete information pertinent to the investigations, and that information was subsequently deleted, in part, by her business partner.  She further requested that another individual provide false information to the SEC or law enforcement in connection with the pending investigations.  After the initiation of the SEC complaint but prior to the filing of the federal indictment, respondent fled the country.  She was arrested in March 2025 and extradited to the United States for prosecution.

The Disciplinary Counsel for both the Executive Office for Immigration Review and Department of Homeland Security (hereinafter DHS) thereafter filed a Joint Notice of Intent to Discipline respondent, seeking her disbarment based upon her federal conviction, and jointly petitioned for her immediate suspension.  By March 15, 2026 order of the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals (hereinafter BIA), respondent was immediately suspended from practice before the BIA, the Immigration Courts and DHS. After respondent defaulted in that disciplinary proceeding, she was disbarred from practice.

The Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department (hereinafter AGC) now moves for an order striking respondent's name from the roll of attorneys, nunc pro tunc to the date of her guilty plea in federal court to the crimes of visa fraud and witness tampering (see Judiciary Law § 90[4][a], [b];  Rules for Atty Disciplinary Matters [22 NYCRR] § 1240.12[c][1];  Rules of App.Div., 3d Dept [22 NYCRR] § 806.12) or, alternatively, for the imposition of discipline based upon her commission of a serious crime (see Judiciary Law § 90[4][d];  Rules for Atty Disciplinary Matters [22 NYCRR] § 1240.12[c][2];  Rules of App.Div., 3d Dept [22 NYCRR] § 806.12).  Otherwise, AGC moves to impose discipline as a consequence of her disbarment from practice before the BIA, Immigration Courts and DHS (see Rules for Atty Disciplinary Matters [22 NYCRR] § 1240.13;  Rules of App.Div., 3d Dept [22 NYCRR] § 806.13).  Respondent has not responded to the instant motion.

Judiciary Law § 90(4)(a) states that, if an attorney is convicted of a felony offense as defined in Judiciary Law § 90(4)(e), upon such conviction, the attorney is no longer competent to practice law.  Felony offenses that suffice for automatic disbarment pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(a) include “any criminal offense classified as a felony under the laws of this state or any criminal offense committed in any ․ district ․ of the United States and classified as a felony therein which if committed within this state, would constitute a felony in this state” (Judiciary Law § 90[4][e] ).  While “[t]he predicate foreign felony need not be a ‘mirror image’ of the New York felony,” it “must have ‘essential similarity,’ which is determined through a comparison of the language of the applicable statutes along with any precedent pertaining to the foreign felony at issue” (Matter of Hand, 164 A.D.3d 1006, 1107–1008, 81 N.Y.S.3d 683 [3d Dept 2018], quoting Matter of Margiotta, 60 N.Y.2d 147, 150, 468 N.Y.S.2d 857, 456 N.E.2d 798 [1983] ).  Although “such similarity may be based on established facts in the record, including any plea allocution” (Matter of Nazor, 228 A.D.3d 1058, 1059, 213 N.Y.S.3d 477 [3d Dept 2024] ), we have previously found in comparable cases that the “respondent's plea agreement with the United States along with a judgment of conviction ․ does not provide the necessary admissions directly from [the] respondent as part of his [or her] plea confirming that he [or she] engaged in the charged conduct” (Matter of Patel, 194 A.D.3d 1245, 1247, 145 N.Y.S.3d 208 [3d Dept 2021] ).

AGC first contends that respondent's conviction for visa fraud is essentially similar to the class E felony of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree.  18 USC § 1546(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a person is guilty of visa fraud when that person “knowingly ․ falsely makes any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa, ․ or other document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States, ․ knowing it to be ․ falsely made, or to have been procured by means of any false claim or statement, or to have been otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully obtained.”  Pursuant to Penal Law § 175.35(1), on the other hand, a person is guilty of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree where the individual offers the false instrument “knowing that [the] written instrument contains a false statement or false information, and with intent to defraud ․ any political subdivision, ․, he or she offers or presents it to a ․ public authority ․ with the knowledge or belief that it will be filed with, registered or recorded in or otherwise become a part of the records of such ․ public authority.”  On their face, we find that the two offenses are not direct analogues for purposes of automatic disbarment, as the state statute contains an intent element not present in the federal statute (see generally Matter of Garcia, 52 A.D.3d 1017, 1018, 860 N.Y.S.2d 235 [3d Dept 2008];  but see Matter of Tsirlina, 127 A.D.3d 1, 2, 1 N.Y.S.3d 850 [2d Dept 2015];  Matter of Philwin, 108 A.D.3d 129, 133, 965 N.Y.S.2d 424 [1st Dept 2013] ).  Further, on this record, we cannot find that essential similarity exists, given that we require more than the allegations in the accusatory instrument, and the record only otherwise relevantly contains respondent's plea agreement with the United States along with a judgment of conviction (see Matter of Patel, 194 A.D.3d at 1247, 145 N.Y.S.3d 208).  Accordingly, we find that respondent's conviction for visa fraud cannot serve as a predicate conviction for automatic disbarment on this record.

In this same vein, we are constrained to a similar finding related to respondent's conviction for witness tampering.  18 USC § 1512(b)(3) states that a person is guilty of witness tampering where the person “knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, ․ with intent to ․ hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer ․ of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a[f]ederal offense.”  Conversely, the state statute provides that a person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence when, “[b]elieving that certain physical evidence is about to be produced or used in an official proceeding ․, and intending to prevent such production or use, he [or she] suppresses it ․ by employing force, intimidation or deception against any person” (Penal Law § 215.40[2] ).  Critically, the state statute requires that the person “employ[ ] force, intimidation or deception” against another individual whereas the federal statute simply requires that the person “corruptly persuade another person.”  Therefore, we conclude Penal Law § 215.40(2) has elements that must be met beyond the elements of the purported federal analogue, and the record before us insufficiently demonstrates that respondent committed the crime while employing force, intimidation or deception.  Accordingly, we deny the part of AGC's motion seeking to strike respondent's name from the roll of attorneys based upon her conviction of a felony offense as defined in Judiciary Law § 90(4)(e) (see Matter of Garcia, 52 A.D.3d at 1018, 860 N.Y.S.2d 235).

AGC alternatively moves for the imposition of discipline based upon respondent's conviction of a serious crime as defined by Judiciary Law § 90(4)(d).  A “serious crime” is defined as “any criminal offense denominated a felony under the laws of any state, district or territory or of the United States which does not constitute a felony under the laws of this state,” as well as “any other crime a necessary element of which, as determined by statutory or common law definition of such crime, includes interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, ․ deceit, ․ or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit a serious crime.”  Inasmuch as visa fraud and witness tampering both constitute federal felonies, and the plain language of those felonies also contains a requisite “necessary element” as contemplated by Judiciary Law § 90(4)(d) – namely, that visa fraud includes a material element of fraud and that witness tampering includes a material element of hindering, delaying or preventing communication to law enforcement – we find that respondent has been convicted of a serious crime warranting the imposition of discipline.  We additionally find that respondent's conviction has been finalized by the imposition of, among other penalties, a term of incarceration imposed in January 2026.  Therefore, we dispense with the interim suspension provision as required by Judiciary Law § 90(4)(f) and proceed to the imposition of a final order of discipline (see Matter of Gillman, 237 A.D.3d 1309, 1312, 231 N.Y.S.3d 263 [3d Dept 2025] ).

As to the appropriate sanction, we initially note that the sanction of disbarment is consistent with our precedent regarding misconduct involving extensive fraud schemes (see e.g. Matter of Gillman, 237 A.D.3d at 1312–1313, 231 N.Y.S.3d 263;  Matter of Adler, 211 A.D.3d 1166, 1167, 178 N.Y.S.3d 643 [3d Dept 2022];  Matter of Farrace, 173 A.D.3d 1422, 1422–1423, 100 N.Y.S.3d 585 [3d Dept 2019];  Matter of DeMelo, 162 A.D.3d 1303, 1305, 78 N.Y.S.3d 497 [3d Dept 2018];  Matter of Hernandez, 156 A.D.3d 1109, 1110–1111, 66 N.Y.S.3d 577 [3d Dept 2017] ).  Moreover , respondent's participation in serious illegal conduct, her dishonest motives and her engagement in multiple acts of wrongdoing serve to aggravate her conduct (see ABA Standards for imposing Lawyer Sanctions standard 9.22[b], [c], [k] ).  She has also failed to notify this Court and AGC of her criminal conviction or her subsequent suspension and disbarment by the BIA (see Matter of Singh, 245 A.D.3d 1061, 1063, 249 N.Y.S.3d 297 [3d Dept 2026];  Matter of Gillman, 237 A.D.3d at 1313, 231 N.Y.S.3d 263), and she is presently not in compliance with this State's attorney registration requirements for the 2026–2027 biennial period (see Matter of Mason, 228 A.D.3d 1126, 1128, 212 N.Y.S.3d 861 [3d Dept 2024];  Matter of Lynum, 208 A.D.3d 1449, 1450, 174 N.Y.S.3d 486 [3d Dept 2022] ).  Respondent has not presented any factors for this Court to consider in mitigation, further demonstrating her disregard for her fate as an attorney in this state (see Matter of McCullough, 213 A.D.3d 1136, 1138, 183 N.Y.S.3d 621 [3d Dept 2023];  Matter of Ugwuonye, 209 A.D.3d 1254, 1255, 176 N.Y.S.3d 379 [3d Dept 2022] ).  Therefore, in light of the seriousness of respondent's unchallenged misconduct, we find that, in order to protect the public, maintain the honor and integrity of the profession and deter others from committing similar misconduct, respondent should be disbarred in this state, effective immediately (see e.g. Matter of Gillman, 237 A.D.3d at 1313, 231 N.Y.S.3d 263;  Matter of Adler, 211 A.D.3d at 1167, 178 N.Y.S.3d 643;  Matter of Farrace, 173 A.D.3d at 1423, 100 N.Y.S.3d 585).²

ORDERED that the motion of the Attorney Grievance Committee for the Third Judicial Department is granted in part and denied in part in accordance with the findings set forth in this decision;  and it is further

ORDERED that respondent is disbarred and her name is stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors-at-law of the State of New York, effective immediately;  and it is further

ORDERED that respondent is commanded to desist and refrain from the practice of law in any form in the State of New York, either as principal or as agent, clerk or employee of another;  and respondent is hereby forbidden to appear as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, judge, justice, board, commission or other public authority, or to give to another an opinion as to the law or its application, or any advice in relation thereto, or to hold herself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law in this State;  and it is further

ORDERED that respondent shall comply with the provisions of the Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters regulating the conduct of disbarred attorneys and shall duly certify to the same in her affidavit of compliance (see Rules for Atty Disciplinary Matters [22 NYCRR] § 1240.15).

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to the Federal Bureau of Prisons website, respondent does not appear to be incarcerated presently.

2.   In light of this result, AGC's alternative request for the imposition of discipline pursuant to Rules for Attorney Disciplinary Matters (22 NYCRR) § 1240.13 has been rendered academic.

Per Curiam.

Clark, J.P., Pritzker, Fisher, McShan and Ryba, JJ., concur.