IN RE: CONGREGATION BAIS TORAH (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR article 75 to compel arbitration, the petitioner appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Rolf M. Thorsen, J.), dated August 12, 2021.  The order, insofar as appealed from, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

In 1984, the parties entered into a lease relating to certain premises located in Suffern.  The lease provided that “[i]n the event of any disagreement or dispute between the parties ․ said disagreement shall be submitted to arbitration to the President of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada.”  In October 2020, the petitioner informed the respondent that due to violations of the lease, the petitioner was terminating the same.  In December 2020, the petitioner filed a claim seeking arbitration with Beth Din of America.  Thereafter, the respondent filed a claim for arbitration with the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada (hereinafter the Union of Orthodox Rabbis), noting that the lease between the parties provided that any dispute shall be submitted to the president of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis for arbitration, and seeking to have any dispute related to the lease arbitrated in front of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis.  Although the petitioner filed a letter response to the first summons issued by the Union of Orthodox Rabbis, it did not respond to a second or third summons and did not appear before the Union of Orthodox Rabbis for arbitration.  On March 24, 2021, the president of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis issued an injunction restraining the petitioner from interfering with the respondent's rights to the premises until such time as the dispute was adjudicated and decided by the president of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis, as per the lease.  The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 7503(a) to compel arbitration through a neutral Beis Din or, alternatively, through a Zabla proceeding, and vacating the injunction.  In the order appealed from, the Supreme Court, inter alia, in effect, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

As an initial matter, we do not reach the petitioner's contention that the Supreme Court erred in enforcing the arbitration provision of the lease because the lease was void or invalid due to a violation of Religious Corporations Law § 12, as this contention is improperly raised for the first time on appeal and “does not present a pure question of law appearing on the face of the record which could not have been avoided by factual showings or legal countersteps if raised at the proper juncture” (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wercberger, 244 A.D.3d 1029, 1030, 248 N.Y.S.3d 615 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Wells Fargo Bank v. Islam, 174 A.D.3d 670, 672, 106 N.Y.S.3d 76).

“Parties to an arbitration agreement typically have the right to ‘name those who are to be the arbitrators’ or ‘to choose the way in which they are to be selected’ ” (Matter of TCR Sports Broadcasting Holding, LLP v. WN Partner, LLC, 40 N.Y.3d 71, 84, 214 N.E.3d 1137, quoting Matter of Siegel [Lewis], 40 N.Y.2d 687, 689, 389 N.Y.S.2d 800, 358 N.E.2d 484).  However, “in an appropriate case, the courts have inherent power to disqualify an arbitrator before an award has been rendered” (Matter of Astoria Med. Group [Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y.], 11 N.Y.2d 128, 132, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 182 N.E.2d 85;  see Rabinowitz v. Olewski, 100 A.D.2d 539, 540, 473 N.Y.S.2d 232).  Thus, “ ‘during the pendency of an arbitration proceeding, the court has the discretion to consider an application of a party challenging the misconduct or bias of the arbitrator’ ” (Matter of Uniformed Firefighters Assn., Local 287 v. City of Long Beach, 307 A.D.2d 365, 365, 762 N.Y.S.2d 819, quoting Blistein v. Felderman, 154 A.D.2d 416, 417, 546 N.Y.S.2d 2).  “[A]n arbitrator may not be disqualified solely because of his [or her] relationship to a party, but rather, upon facts demonstrating partiality to a litigant” (Matter of Cuomo v. JAMS, Inc., 242 A.D.3d 448, 448, 242 N.Y.S.3d 602;  see Matter of Astoria Med. Group [Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y.], 11 N.Y.2d at 136–137, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 182 N.E.2d 85).

Here, the lease provides that any dispute shall be submitted to arbitration to the president of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis.  Although the petitioner contended that the president of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis, Rabbi Ralbag, was granted immunity in a criminal proceeding related to a conspiracy involving the respondent's representative, Rabbi Wolmark, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that Rabbi Ralbag's judgment in the arbitration would be compromised due to his past relationship with Rabbi Wolmark and/or that the Supreme Court should have stayed the arbitration and disqualified Rabbi Ralbag on the basis of bias and/or misconduct (see Matter of Astoria Med. Group [Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y.], 11 N.Y.2d at 138, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 182 N.E.2d 85;  Matter of Cuomo v. JAMS, Inc., 242 A.D.3d at 448, 242 N.Y.S.3d 602).  Similarly, to the extent that the injunction can be considered to be an “award,” the petitioner failed to demonstrate that such award should have been vacated due to the partiality of the arbitrator (see CPLR 7511[b][1];  Matter of Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. HBC U.S. Holdings, Inc., 234 A.D.3d 465, 466, 225 N.Y.S.3d 212).

The petitioner's remaining contentions are without merit.

BARROS, J.P., WAN, MCCORMACK and HOM, JJ., concur.