OORAH INC v. YOUNG ISRAEL OF ELTINGVILLE INC (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, for declaratory and injunctive relief, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Catherine M. DiDomenico, J.), dated August 26, 2024.  The order denied the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Sidney Stadler, who allegedly was the president of Young Israel of Eltingville, Inc. (hereinafter YIE), a religious corporation, executed, purportedly on behalf of YIE, a memorandum of understanding (hereinafter MOU) between YIE and Oorah, Inc. (hereinafter Oorah).  Stadler subsequently executed an arbitration agreement on behalf of YIE stating that YIE's dispute with Oorah and two related entities regarding the MOU would be decided by a Beth Din. The Beth Din later issued an arbitration award in favor of Oorah and the two related entities.  YIE commenced a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the arbitration award, and Oorah and the two related entities commenced a proceeding to confirm the award.  The Supreme Court granted the petition to vacate the arbitration award and denied the petition to confirm the arbitration award.  On appeal, this Court affirmed (see Matter of Young Israel of Eltingville, Inc. v. Oorah, Inc., 186 A.D.3d 1698, 1699, 131 N.Y.S.3d 662).

Thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced this action against YIE, seeking, inter alia, a declaration that the MOU is enforceable based on certain alleged conduct that occurred after the conclusion of the prior CPLR article 75 proceedings and for related injunctive and equitable relief.  YIE moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) to dismiss the complaint.  In an order dated August 26, 2024, the Supreme Court denied the motion.  YIE appeals.

“ ‘On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), the court is required to accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true and accord the plaintiff the benefit of every possible favorable inference’ ” (Yu Chan Li v. City of New York, 240 A.D.3d 832, 834, 239 N.Y.S.3d 588, quoting Jacobson Dev. Group, LLC v. Grossman, 198 A.D.3d 956, 958, 156 N.Y.S.3d 363).  “ ‘Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5), a party may move to dismiss a [complaint] based on the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel’ ” (Babad v. Oratz, 242 A.D.3d 807, 808, 242 N.Y.S.3d 749, quoting Joseph v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 219 A.D.3d 596, 597, 194 N.Y.S.3d 275).

“ ‘Under res judicata, or claim preclusion, a valid final judgment bars future actions between the same parties on the same cause of action’ ” (Sunny v. Hossain, 236 A.D.3d 699, 700, 228 N.Y.S.3d 658, quoting Simmons v. Trans Express Inc., 37 N.Y.3d 107, 111, 148 N.Y.S.3d 178, 170 N.E.3d 733).  “ ‘The doctrine of res judicata operates to preclude the reconsideration of claims actually litigated and resolved in a prior proceeding, as well as claims for different relief against the same party which arise out of the same factual grouping or transaction, and which should have or could have been resolved in the prior proceeding’ ” (Gregg v. Lan Zhen Chen, 220 A.D.3d 697, 698, 197 N.Y.S.3d 285, quoting Jacobson Dev. Group, LLC v. Grossman, 198 A.D.3d at 959, 156 N.Y.S.3d 363).  Here, the complaint alleged, among other things, that the parties ratified the MOU by their conduct and actions after the prior CPLR article 75 proceedings had concluded.  As the claims could not have been resolved in the prior proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply (see Silberstein, Awad & Miklos, P.C. v. Spencer, Maston & McCarthy, LLP, 43 A.D.3d 902, 903, 841 N.Y.S.2d 623;  Roggio v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 106 A.D.2d 3, 4, 484 N.Y.S.2d 382, affd 66 N.Y.2d 260, 496 N.Y.S.2d 404, 487 N.E.2d 261).

“ ‘The doctrine of collateral estoppel ․ precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action ․ and decided against that party or those in privity, whether or not the tribunals or causes of action are the same’ ” (Matter of Harbourview Realty, LLC v. Village of Roslyn, 242 A.D.3d 749, 752, 240 N.Y.S.3d 234, quoting Altman v. Orseck, 235 A.D.3d 818, 819, 227 N.Y.S.3d 438).  “The doctrine applies only ‘if the issue in the second action is identical to an issue which was raised, necessarily decided and material in the first action, and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the earlier action’ ” (Harco Constr., LLC v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 239 A.D.3d 610, 613, 236 N.Y.S.3d 250, quoting City of New York v. Welsbach Elec. Corp., 9 N.Y.3d 124, 128, 848 N.Y.S.2d 551, 878 N.E.2d 966).  “The party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel bears the burden of proving that the identical issue was necessarily decided in the prior action ․ and is decisive of the present action or proceeding, and the party against whom preclusion is sought bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination” (L.T. Motors Auto Sales, Inc. v. Kaplon–Belo Assoc., Inc., 230 A.D.3d 1309, 1311, 217 N.Y.S.3d 229 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Comalgri Holding Corp. v. SC Crossfit, Inc., 241 A.D.3d 632, 634, 238 N.Y.S.3d 630).  Here, YIE failed to establish that the issues necessarily decided in the prior proceedings were identical to the issues raised in this action (see Harco Constr., LLC v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 239 A.D.3d at 614, 236 N.Y.S.3d 250;  Villaver v. Paglinawan, 230 A.D.3d 533, 535, 216 N.Y.S.3d 242).

YIE's contention that the action is untimely is improperly raised for the first time on appeal and does not involve a pure question of law that appears on the face of the record and could not have been avoided if brought to the Supreme Court's attention (see Lautman v. 2800 Coyle St. Owners Corp., 223 A.D.3d 658, 660, 203 N.Y.S.3d 357;  Twitchell Tech. Prods., LLC v. Mechoshade Sys., LLC, 227 A.D.3d 45, 55, 208 N.Y.S.3d 657).

IANNACCI, J.P., FORD, LANDICINO and QUIRK, JJ., concur.