BIGICA v. STATE (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a claim to recover damages for personal injuries, the claimant appeals from an order of the Court of Claims (Javier E. Vargas, J.), dated December 19, 2023.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The claimant commenced this claim to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained when he was assaulted by a correction officer.  The defendant moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the claim, arguing that it could not be held liable for the assault under the doctrine of respondeat superior.  In an order dated December 19, 2023, the Court of Claims, among other things, granted that branch of the motion.  The claimant appeals.

“Under the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer—including the State—may be held vicariously liable for torts, including intentional torts, committed by employees acting within the scope of their employment” (Rivera v. State of New York, 34 N.Y.3d 383, 389, 119 N.Y.S.3d 749, 142 N.E.3d 641;  see Wood v. State of New York, 119 A.D.3d 672, 672, 990 N.Y.S.2d 76), provided that the tortious conduct is “ ‘generally foreseeable and a natural incident of the employment’ ” (Rivera v. State of New York, 34 N.Y.3d at 389, 119 N.Y.S.3d 749, 142 N.E.3d 641, quoting Judith M. v. Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 N.Y.2d 932, 933, 693 N.Y.S.2d 67, 715 N.E.2d 95;  see Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 304, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300, 391 N.E.2d 1278).  In determining whether an employee was acting within the scope of his or her employment for purposes of vicarious liability, courts look to several factors, including “ ‘the connection between the time, place and occasion for the act;  the history of the relationship between employer and employee as spelled out in actual practice;  whether the act is one commonly done by such an employee;  the extent of departure from normal methods of performance;  and whether the specific act was one that the employer could reasonably have anticipated’ (i.e., whether it was foreseeable)” (Rivera v. State of New York, 34 N.Y.3d at 390, 119 N.Y.S.3d 749, 142 N.E.3d 641, quoting Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d at 303, 418 N.Y.S.2d 300, 391 N.E.2d 1278).  Furthermore, “in cases involving a use of force, whether an employee is acting within the scope of employment requires consideration of whether the employee was authorized to use force to effectuate the goals and duties of the employment” (Rivera v. State of New York, 34 N.Y.3d at 390, 119 N.Y.S.3d 749, 142 N.E.3d 641).

Here, the defendant established, prima facie, that the correction officer was not acting within the scope of his employment when he assaulted the claimant (see id. at 389–390, 119 N.Y.S.3d 749, 142 N.E.3d 641;  Bracero v. State of New York, 247 A.D.3d 974, 976, 253 N.Y.S.3d 702.  In opposition, the claimant failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, the Court of Claims properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the claim.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHAMBERS, FORD and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.