PARTIAL v. MOVAHEDIAN (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for fraud and misrepresentation, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Joy F. Campanelli, J.), dated September 11, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint is denied.

In 2024, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for fraud and misrepresentation.  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant misappropriated certain funds that the plaintiff transferred to the defendant for the purpose of a real estate investment.  The defendant moved, among other things, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was barred by a release.  The plaintiff opposed the motion.  In an order dated September 11, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted that branch of the defendant's motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release” (Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d 269, 276, 929 N.Y.S.2d 3, 952 N.E.2d 995 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).  A release affecting a claim may be the basis for a CPLR 3211(a)(1) motion to dismiss where the terms are clear and unambiguous and conclusively dispose of the matter (see Huli Ma v. Hui Chen, 221 A.D.3d 869, 871, 201 N.Y.S.3d 70;  Burgos v. New York Presbyt. Hosp., 155 A.D.3d 598, 599, 65 N.Y.S.3d 45).  Furthermore, CPLR 3211(a)(5) allows a party to move for dismissal on the ground that a cause of action may not be maintained because of a release (see Huli Ma v. Hui Chen, 221 A.D.3d at 871, 201 N.Y.S.3d 70;  Miller v. Brunner, 164 A.D.3d 1228, 1231, 84 N.Y.S.3d 264).  On a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss based on a release, “[a] defendant bears the initial burden of establishing that he or she has been released from any claims” (Burgos v. New York Presbyt. Hosp., 155 A.D.3d at 600, 65 N.Y.S.3d 45;  see Centro Empresarial Cempresa S.A. v. América Móvil, S.A.B. de C.V., 17 N.Y.3d at 276, 929 N.Y.S.2d 3, 952 N.E.2d 995).

Here, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the release (see Burgos v. New York Presbyt. Hosp., 155 A.D.3d at 600, 65 N.Y.S.3d 45).  The release submitted in support of the defendant's motion does not clearly and unequivocally express the intention of the parties to relieve the defendant of liability for the claims asserted herein (see Huli Ma v. Hui Chen, 221 A.D.3d at 872, 201 N.Y.S.3d 70;  United Airconditioning Corp. v. Axis Piping, Inc., 194 A.D.3d 981, 983–984, 149 N.Y.S.3d 163).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the plaintiff's remaining contention.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHAMBERS, FORD and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.