IN RE: John DOE (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an arbitration award dated June 1, 2022, the petitioner appeals from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Robin K. Sheares, J.), dated May 18, 2023.  The order and judgment, insofar as appealed from, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.

ORDERED that the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The petitioner, a Hearing Officer and Administrative Law Judge employed by the respondent New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (hereinafter OTDA), was served with a notice of discipline by which the OTDA sought to terminate his employment based on 11 charges of misconduct and insubordination.  The petitioner, represented by his union, filed a grievance, and the matter was disputed at an arbitration proceeding.  In an award dated June 1, 2022, the arbitrator, inter alia, determined that the respondents followed the procedures mandated by a collective bargaining agreement with respect to the issuance of the notice of discipline, rejected the petitioner's challenge to the respondents' service of the notice of discipline as untimely, determined that termination of the petitioner's employment was the appropriate penalty, and denied the grievance.  Thereafter, the petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the arbitration award.  In an order and judgment dated May 18, 2023, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.  The petitioner appeals.

“ ‘Judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited’ ” (Matter of Henry v. New York State Workers' Compensation Bd., 230 A.D.3d 1241, 1242, 216 N.Y.S.3d 737, quoting Matter of Barrella v. State of New York Off. of Mental Health, 175 A.D.3d 495, 496, 103 N.Y.S.3d 853).  “It is well settled that a court may vacate an arbitration award only if it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power” (Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 N.Y.3d 530, 534, 914 N.Y.S.2d 67, 939 N.E.2d 1197;  see CPLR 7511[b][1][iii];  Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v. Transport Workers' Union of Am., Local 100, ALF–CIO, 6 N.Y.3d 332, 336, 812 N.Y.S.2d 413, 845 N.E.2d 1243;  Matter of Henry v. New York State Workers' Compensation Bd., 230 A.D.3d at 1242, 216 N.Y.S.3d 737).

Here, contrary to the petitioner's contention, he failed to demonstrate that the arbitration award violated a strong public policy, was irrational, or clearly exceeded a specifically enumerated limitation of the arbitrator's power (see CPLR 7511[b][1][iii];  Matter of City of Peekskill v. Local 456, Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, 49 A.D.3d 730, 731, 855 N.Y.S.2d 563).  Moreover, the petitioner failed to present evidentiary proof of actual bias or the appearance of bias on the part of the arbitrator, and the award discloses no bias (see CPLR 7511[b][1][ii];  Matter of Tauber v. Gross, 216 A.D.3d 1066, 1068, 190 N.Y.S.3d 408;  Matter of Heller v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 154 A.D.3d 754, 755, 63 N.Y.S.3d 64), and the penalty of termination was not so disproportionate to the offenses charged as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness (see Matter of Bolt v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 30 N.Y.3d 1065, 1068, 69 N.Y.S.3d 255, 91 N.E.3d 1234;  Matter of Russo v New York City Dept. of Educ., 25 N.Y.3d 946, 948, 6 N.Y.S.3d 549, 29 N.E.3d 896;  Matter of Henry v. New York State Workers' Compensation Bd., 230 A.D.3d at 1242, 216 N.Y.S.3d 737).

The petitioner's remaining contentions are either without merit or not properly before this Court.

DILLON, J.P., BRATHWAITE NELSON, DOWLING and QUIRK, JJ., concur.