IN RE: NASSAU HEALTH CARE CORPORATION (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to modify or vacate an arbitration award dated September 11, 2023, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., A.F.S.C.M.E., Local 1000, A.F.L.-C.I.O., by its Local 830, and Constantinos Sofronis appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (R. Bruce Cozzens, J.), entered June 20, 2024.  The judgment, upon an order of the same court entered April 3, 2024, granted the petition and vacated the arbitration award.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the petition is denied, the arbitration award is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of an appropriate judgment (see CPLR 7511[e];  7514[a] ).

On June 17, 2022, the petitioner issued a notice of personnel action terminating the employment of Constantinos Sofronis, who had been employed for several years as a materials movement specialist at a hospital operated by the petitioner, for misconduct/incompetence.  Thereafter, Sofronis's union, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., A.F.S.C.M.E., Local 1000, A.F.L.-C.I.O., by its Local 830 (hereinafter CSEA), commenced an arbitration proceeding challenging the termination.  In an award dated September 11, 2023, the arbitrator found, inter alia, that Sofronis “committed misconduct and/or incompetency as he did not ‘develop and implement procedures and methods for the movement of stored materials' to avoid the expiration of supplies.”  However, the arbitrator reduced the penalty imposed from termination of employment to suspension without pay, with loss of time served, which equated to an unpaid suspension of approximately 15 months, and directed the petitioner to return Sofronis to his employment.

Thereafter, the petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to modify or vacate the arbitration award.  In an order entered April 3, 2024, the Supreme Court determined that the termination of Sofronis's employment was warranted and proper and that the petitioner was not obligated to return Sofronis to his employment.  On June 20, 2024, the court entered a judgment, upon the order, granting the petition and vacating the arbitration award.  CSEA and Sofronis appeal.

“Collective bargaining agreements commonly provide for binding arbitration to settle contractual disputes between employees and management, and in circumstances when the parties agree to submit their dispute to an arbitrator, courts generally play a limited role” (Matter of Village of Spring Val. v Civil Serv. Empls.  Assn., Inc., 214 AD3d 818, 819 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Nassau County Sheriff's Corr. Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v Nassau County, 238 AD3d 876, 877).  An application to vacate an arbitration award may be granted only in narrow circumstances, including where “an arbitrator ․ exceeded his [or her] power” (CPLR 7511[b][1][iii] ).  “Such an excess of power occurs only where the arbitrator's award violates a strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power” (Matter of Nassau County Sheriff's Corr. Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v Nassau County, 238 AD3d at 878 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Dedvukaj v. Shkreli, 180 AD3d 895, 897).  “The scope of the public policy exception to an arbitrator's power to resolve disputes is extremely narrow, existing only where a court concludes that there are strong and well-defined policy considerations embodied in constitutional, statutory, or common law that the final result creates an explicit conflict with” (Matter of Adams v. Veolia Transp.  Servs., 242 AD3d 1196, 1197 [alteration, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of County of Nassau v Nassau County Sheriff's Corr. Officers' Benevolent Assn., 223 AD3d 660, 663).

“The burden is on the movant to establish grounds for vacatur by clear and convincing evidence” (Matter of Long Beach Professional Firefighters Assn. v City of Long Beach, 214 AD3d 735, 736–737;  see Matter of Village of Spring Val. v Civil Serv. Empls.  Assn., Inc., 214 AD3d at 819–820).  “Courts are bound by an arbitrator's factual findings, interpretation of the contract and judgment concerning remedies.  A court cannot examine the merits of an arbitration award and substitute its judgment for that of the arbitrator simply because it believes its interpretation would be the better one.  Indeed, even in circumstances where an arbitrator makes errors of law or fact, courts will not assume the role of overseers to conform the award to their sense of justice” (Matter of Village of Spring Val. v Civil Serv. Empls.  Assn., Inc., 214 AD3d at 820 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Verille v. Jeanette, 163 AD3d 830, 831).  “An arbitration award must be upheld when the arbitrator offers even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached” (Matter of Adams v. Veolia Transp.  Servs., 242 AD3d at 1197 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted];  see Matter of Gassman Baiamonte Gruner, P.C. v Katz, 164 AD3d 790, 790).

Here, the petitioner failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the arbitration award should have been vacated on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his power.  Contrary to the Supreme Court's determination, the arbitrator properly declined to consider evidence of misconduct that occurred before June 17, 2021.  The collective bargaining agreement (hereinafter CBA) governing this dispute provided that “[f]or any incompetence or misconduct alleged to have occurred on or after January 1, 1995, ․ no discipline may be imposed more than one (1) calendar year after such occurrence unless said incompetence or misconduct would, if proved in a court of competent jurisdiction, constitute a crime.”  None of Sofronis's misconduct or incompetence was alleged to have been criminal or to have prevented the petitioner from timely bringing charges (cf.  Matter of Steyer, 70 N.Y.2d 990, 992–993;  Matter of Longo v. Dolce, 192 A.D.2d 157, 162).  The arbitrator therefore properly adhered to the CBA by disregarding evidence of misconduct that occurred outside the limitation period (see Matter of De Guzman v State of N.Y. Civ. Serv. Commn., 129 AD3d 1189, 1192;  Matter of Sigle v. Slavin, 161 A.D.2d 644, 645;  see also Matter of Bayer v New York State Dept. of Labor, 28 AD3d 865, 866).  Further, the petitioner failed to identify any public policy, statute, or regulation that required the termination of Sofronis's employment rather than a lengthy suspension (see Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 100, AFL–CIO, 99 N.Y.2d 1, 9–12;  Matter of County of Nassau v Nassau County Sheriff's Corr. Officers' Benevolent Assn., 223 AD3d at 663;  see also Matter of New York State Nurses Assn. [Mount Sinai Hosp.], 275 A.D.2d 538, 540).

Similarly, in light of the broad powers granted to the arbitrator in the CBA and the detailed explanation of the award, including that the presence of expired items in the hospital was not solely attributable to Sofronis and that some of his other misconduct was mitigated by his candor with his supervisors, the award was not irrational (see Matter of Nassau County Sheriff's Corr. Officers Benevolent Assn., Inc. v Nassau County, 238 AD3d at 878;  Matter of New York State Nurses Assn. [Mount Sinai Hosp.], 275 A.D.2d at 540–541).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the petition.  We reinstate the arbitration award and remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Nassau County, for the entry of an appropriate judgment (see CPLR 7511[e];  7514[a] ).

The remaining contention of CSEA and Sofronis is not properly before this Court.

IANNACCI, J.P., FORD, VENTURA and QUIRK, JJ., concur.