WE LOVE TO DRINK LLC v. NEW YORK STATE LIQUOR AUTHORITY (2026)

Petitioner, We Love to Drink LLC, operates a wine shop in Williamsburgh, Brooklyn. Petitioner believes that respondent State Liquor Authority (SLA) erroneously granted a retail liquor license in 2021 to a nearby competing wine/liquor store, non-party Kent Wines & Liquors Inc. According to petitioner, Kent Wines failed to disclose petitioner's store to the SLA when applying for its license; as a result, petitioner was not notified of Kent Wines's license application (as it otherwise would have been), and lost its chance to oppose the application. Petitioner alleges that it has suffered a substantial drop in sales due to Kent Wines's proximity to its store.

Petitioner has mounted efforts to persuade the SLA to reconsider its granting of a retail liquor license to Kent Wines. Most recently, in October 2025, petitioner, through counsel, wrote a letter to the SLA asking the SLA to commence a proceeding under Alcoholic Beverage Control Law (ABCL) § 119 (2) to revoke or cancel Kent Wines's license. The SLA has not acted on that letter.

Petitioner now brings this CPLR article 78 proceeding to require the SLA to act on petitioner's October 2025 letter. Petitioner contends that ABCL § 120 requires the SLA to have acted on the letter within 30 days; and that upon the expiration of that asserted 30-day deadline, mandamus will lie to compel a response under CPLR 7803 (1).

The petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.

DISCUSSION

Relief in the nature of mandamus to compel is available under CPLR 7803 (1) when the petitioner has “a clear legal right to the relief demanded,” and (2) “a corresponding nondiscretionary duty” is owed by “the administrative agency to grant that relief.” (Matter of Scherbyn v. Wayne-Finger Lakes Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 77 N.Y.2d 753, 757, 570 N.Y.S.2d 474, 573 N.E.2d 562 [1991].) The question here, therefore, is whether the SLA has a nondiscretionary obligation to have acted on petitioner's October 2025 letter within 30 days of its receipt. This court concludes that the SLA does not have such an obligation.

Petitioner relies on ABCL § 120. That statute provides that “[a] decision upon any application or hearing submitted to or held by the liquor authority shall be rendered within thirty days after such submission or hearing.” Petitioner contends that its October 2025 letter is an “application” within the meaning of § 120. This court disagrees.

The ABCL does not define “application,” whether in the statute generally or for purposes of ABCL § 120, in particular. Neither party provides authority addressing the scope of “application” as used in § 120. The SLA's papers reference the principle that an agency's interpretation of a statute that it administers is entitled to deference. (See NYSCEF No. 16 at ¶ 7.) But SLA's arguments about the meaning of “application” in ABCL § 120 are based on ordinary principles of statutory interpretation—not an existing, specialized reading of that term adopted by the agency.

Considering the matter for itself, therefore, this court concludes that petitioner's October 2025 letter is not an “application” for ABCL § 120 purposes.

“Application” is used as a term of art in numerous sections of the ABCL (see e.g. ABCL §§ 100, 105, 107-a, 109, 110, 110-a, 110-b, 110-c, 111-a, 114-a, 120-a, 123, 127-c, 127-d, 130), and in its implementing regulations in Title 9 of the NYCRR. In nearly every instance of its use in the ABCL and the regulations, the noun “application” refers to a formal request made by a regulated party to the SLA for some form of relief pertaining to the regulated party itself. The sole exception in the ABCL, § 123 (1) (a), is discussing a request to a court for an injunction. The sole exceptions in the SLA's regulations, at 9 NYCRR 52.4 and 52.8 (c), refer to requests for adjournments and rehearing in ongoing SLA administrative proceedings.

Neither the ABCL nor its implementing regulations contain any example of “application” being used as petitioner does here—i.e., to refer to a third party's request for relief from the SLA with respect to a regulated party.

Indeed, the very provision on which petitioner here, ABCL § 119 (2), describes a revocation/cancellation request by a member of the public not as an “application,” but instead as a “complaint.” And § 119 (2) does not impose requirements for the form that a public “complaint” must take. It would be odd to refer, for example, to a telephone call to the SLA as an “application.” Petitioner contends that it is arguing only that “formal communications sent via counsel to the SLA” should count as applications for ABCL § 120 purposes—not “every letter, telephone call, or other communication.” (NYSCEF No. 24 at ¶ 47 [emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted].) But that limitation appears neither in ABCL § 119 (2) or § 120.

Additionally, § 119 (2) gives the SLA discretion whether to act on a citizen complaint seeking revocation/cancellation of a license. Petitioner does not explain why the SLA should be required to use its limited resources to determine whether to exercise its discretion in this regard on a strict 30-day clock—subject to a petition for writ of mandamus once the 30 days have run.

Section 120 of the ABCL does not require the SLA to treat third-party demand letters as “applications” that must be determined within 30 days. Absent a nondiscretionary duty owed by SLA to petitioner, mandamus to compel does not lie.¹ (See CPLR 7803 [1]; Matter of Scherbyn, 77 N.Y.2d at 757, 570 N.Y.S.2d 474, 573 N.E.2d 562.)

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that petitioner's request for a writ of mandamus to compel the SLA to provide it a response to its October 22, 2025, letter is denied, and this proceeding is dismissed, with costs and disbursements as taxed by the Clerk upon the submission of an appropriate bill of costs; and it is further

ORDERED that respondent serve a copy of this order with notice of its entry on petitioner; and on the office of the County Clerk (using the NYSCEF document type “Notice to the County Clerk - CPLR § 8019 (c)”), which shall enter judgment accordingly.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On reply, petitioner expands the nature and scope of the relief that it seeks from this court. Petitioner adds a request for a declaration that the SLA's inaction on its October 22, 2025, letter, and the SLA's argument in this proceeding that “insufficient evidence” exists for it to bring a revocation proceeding against Kent Wines, are arbitrary and capricious. (See NYSCEF No. 24 at ¶¶ 5-6, 17, 29-30, 57 [internal quotation marks omitted].) And petitioner asks this court, in effect, to order the SLA to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Kent Wines. (Id. at ¶ 57.) This court declines to consider petitioner's request for relief that exceeds in degree and kind the relief sought in the petition—particularly because the new remedies have been sought for the first time only on reply. This court takes no position on whether petitioner would, or would not, be entitled to the relief it seeks on reply, had that relief been requested from the outset of this proceeding.

Gerald Lebovits, J.