GUERRERO v. PORT ROYAL DISTRIBUTION LLC (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Port Royal Distribution, LLC, appeals, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal, from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Katherine Levine, J.), dated December 5, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendant Port Royal Distribution, LLC. The order, insofar as cross-appealed from, granted the cross-motion of the defendant Port Royal Distribution, LLC, for leave to amend its answer.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, and that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendant Port Royal Distribution, LLC, is denied;  and it is further,

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from;  and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant Port Royal Distribution, LLC.

The plaintiffs commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries they allegedly sustained in a rear-end collision on the Brooklyn–Queens Expressway.  The defendant Port Royal Distribution, LLC (hereinafter the defendant), interposed an answer in which it admitted that it owned the vehicle (hereinafter the rear vehicle) that allegedly struck the plaintiffs' vehicle from the rear.

Prior to the completion of discovery, the plaintiffs moved, inter alia, for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendant.  The defendant cross-moved for leave to amend its answer to correct an inaccuracy regarding ownership of the rear vehicle.  In an order dated December 5, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion and granted the defendant's cross-motion.  The defendant appeals, and the plaintiffs cross-appeal.

“Permission to amend pleadings should be freely given” (Greene v. Esplanade Venture Partnership, 36 N.Y.3d 513, 526, 144 N.Y.S.3d 654, 168 N.E.3d 827 [internal quotation marks omitted];  see CPLR 3025[b] ), “unless the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, or unless prejudice or surprise to the opposing party results directly from the delay in seeking leave to amend” (Seidman v. Industrial Recycling Props., Inc., 83 A.D.3d 1040, 1041, 922 N.Y.S.2d 451).  “ ‘The burden of demonstrating prejudice or surprise, or that a proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit, falls upon the party opposing the motion’ ” (First Natl. Bank of Long Is. v. Four Keys Realty, LLC, 213 A.D.3d 639, 641, 182 N.Y.S.3d 274, quoting Shields v. Darpoh, 207 A.D.3d 586, 587, 169 N.Y.S.3d 850).  “ ‘Whether to grant leave to amend is within the trial court's discretion’ ” (id., quoting Johnson v. Ortiz Transp., LLC, 205 A.D.3d 696, 697, 165 N.Y.S.3d 735).

Here, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the defendant's cross-motion for leave to amend its answer.  A lease agreement that the defendant entered into for 10 unidentified vehicles did not establish that the proposed amendment was palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit (see Vides v. Knapp's Landscaping, Inc., 239 A.D.3d 790, 792, 236 N.Y.S.3d 281).  Moreover, the plaintiffs failed to establish that they were prejudiced or surprised by the delay in seeking leave to amend, as no note of issue had been filed, and the plaintiffs' submissions demonstrate that they had commenced an action against the other alleged owner of the rear vehicle before the statute of limitations expired (see Cirillo v. Lang, 206 A.D.3d 611, 612, 169 N.Y.S.3d 651).  Under these circumstances, the defendant was not required to establish a reasonable excuse for its delay in seeking leave to amend its answer (see CPLR 3025[b];  Shields v. Darpoh, 207 A.D.3d at 587, 169 N.Y.S.3d 850;  cf.  Cohen v. Ho, 38 A.D.3d 705, 706, 833 N.Y.S.2d 542).

However, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendant.  “ ‘A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the rear vehicle, thereby requiring that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision’ ” (Rezza v. Chen, 237 A.D.3d 764, 764, 230 N.Y.S.3d 671, quoting Yearwood v. New York City Tr. Auth., 227 A.D.3d 843, 844–845, 210 N.Y.S.3d 489).  “ ‘Vehicle and Traffic Law § 388(1) provides that, with the exception of bona fide commercial lessors of motor vehicles, which are exempt from vicarious liability under federal law, the owner of a motor vehicle is liable for the negligence of one who operates the vehicle with the owner's express or implied consent’ ” (Madrigal v. Paragon Motors of Woodside, Inc., 236 A.D.3d 885, 888, 230 N.Y.S.3d 316, quoting Rodriguez v. Morales, 217 A.D.3d 695, 696, 190 N.Y.S.3d 452).  Here, since the defendant's admission in its original answer that it owned the rear vehicle has been superseded (see Oceancrest Homes v. Golfbay Country Club, 2 A.D.2d 756, 756, 153 N.Y.S.2d 331), that admission was inadequate to establish, prima facie, that the defendant was the owner of the rear vehicle.  Accordingly, that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability against the defendant should have been denied regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853, 487 N.Y.S.2d 316, 476 N.E.2d 642).

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, VENTURA and GOLIA, JJ., concur.