KENYAH BRICKHOUSEHAZER v. Stanley Richards, Commissioner, New York City Department of Correction, Respondent. (2026)

Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Civil Procedure Law and Rules (CPLR) §§ 7002(a) and 7002(b)(5) contending that he is "unlawfully detained and restrained of his liberty at Rikers Island, Otis Bantum Correctional Center, 16-00 Hazen Street, East Elmhurst, NY 11370" (Verified Petition, 2).

Petitioner claims that his detention is illegal because, on June 4, 2026, the nisi prius court, Judge Jung Park, incorrectly denied his oral Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 30.30(2)(a) motion for release, after finding that fewer than 90 days of includable time had elapsed since the commencement of this case, before adjourning the case to September 12, 2026 for hearings and trial (Verified Petition, ¶¶ 3-5).

Judge Park found 86 days of includable time, based on the following time periods:

December 10, 2025 — February 4, 2025 (56 days)

March 30, 2025 — April 23, 2026 (24 days)

May 12, 2026 — May 18, 2026 (6 days)

(June 4, 2026 Minutes, pp. 4-5).

Petitioner, however, contends that in addition to those time periods, Judge Park erroneously excluded the following:

February 4, 2026 — March 30, 2026 (54 days)

April 23, 2026 — May 12, 2026 (19 days)

May 18, 2026 — May 28, 2026 (10 days)

May 28, 2026 — June 4, 2026 (7 days)

(Verified Petition, ¶ 28).

On July 1, 2026, this court heard argument from the parties and reserved decision. For the reasons that follow, this court finds that Judge Park did not abuse her discretion in denying petitioner's CPL § 30.30(2)(a) motion and correctly determined that 86 days of includable time have elapsed since the commencement of this case.

Law

CPL § 30.30(2)(a) provides that a defendant charged with a felony offense who is "committed to the custody of the sheriff... must be released on bail or on his own recognizance, upon such conditions as may be just and reasonable," if the People are not "ready for trial" within 90 days of the defendant's commitment.

"When making a motion pursuant to CPL 30.30(2)(a) to be released on bail or his own recognizance, a defendant who has been committed to the custody of the sheriff has the initial burden of demonstrating, by sworn allegations of fact, that there has been an inexcusable delay beyond the time set forth in the statute [citation omitted]. Once a defendant has alleged that more than the statutorily prescribed time has elapsed without a declaration of readiness by the People, the People bear the burden of establishing sufficient excludable delay" (People ex rel Nieves v Molina, 207 AD3d 797, 798 [2d Dept 2022] [citing People v Santos, 68 NY2d 859 [1986], see People v Berkowitz, 50 NY2d 333, 348-349 [1980]; CPL § 30.30[4][a]).¹

"Habeas corpus will lie only when the petitioner is entitled to immediate release" (People ex rel DeFlumer, 212 AD2d 555, 555 [2d Dept 1995]; see also People ex rel Cassar v Margiotta, 150 AD3d 1254, 1256 [2d Dept 2017]; People ex rel Kaplan v Commr of Corr of City of NY, 60 NY2d 648, 649 [1983]), and may not be used to present claims that either could be raised in a pretrial motion, at trial, or on direct appeal (see People ex rel Goss v Smith, 69 NY2d 727 [1987], affirming 116 AD2d 968 [4th Dept 1986]; People ex rel McNair v Bantum, 123 AD2d 800 [2d Dept 1986]).

The denial of a CPL § 30.30 release application is subject to review in a habeas corpus petition because "the defendant has no way to effectively appeal an adverse ruling" (People ex rel Chakwin v Warden, 63 NY2d 120, 125 [1984]). In People ex rel Bullock v Barry, 2002 WL 31720977, *2 (NY County, Nov 13, 2002), the court noted that such a review is analogous to the habeas corpus review of a bail determination, which is also not appealable. "A defendant may obtain the collateral review of the bail conditions set on the ground that there was an abuse of discretion by the court which resulted in an unconstitutional deprivation of the defendant's liberty" (Bullock, *2). Rather than a de novo review, "[t]he scope of the collateral review of a defendant's bail status in a habeas corpus proceeding is limited to a consideration of whether the bail determination was supported by the facts presented in the lower court proceeding" (People ex rel Klein v Krueger, 25 NY2d 497, 501 [1969]).

The court in Bullock went on to say, "Logic dictates the same rationale be applied in habeas reviews of speedy trial release violation claims. That is to say, that the habeas review is limited to a determination of the correctness of the calendar or trial court's findings of excludable time which resulted in the denial of the 30.30 release motion" (Id).²

Conclusions of Law

February 4, 2026 — March 30, 2026

With respect to the February 4, 2026 — March 30, 2026 adjournment, Judge Park noted that the People filed their COC on February 4th and the case was adjourned to March 18th for any COC challenges; petitioner did not challenge the COC and the case was adjourned to March 30th for hearings and trial. Judge Park identified that period as a "reasonable time" for the People to prepare (June 4, 2026 minutes, p. 5).

In People v Green, 90 AD2d 705 (1st Dept 2015), the First Department rejected the contention that the People should have been expected to go forward with hearings on the date that such hearings were ordered, noting that "the People could hardly be expected to be prepared for a hearing even before they were aware that the court was ordering one" (90 AD2d at 705). Indeed, depending on the content of the motion papers, the court may summarily grant or deny the application on the papers alone without conducting a hearing (see People v Taylor, 16 Misc 3d 339, 343-344 (NY County 2007) (Mandelbaum, J). Green has thus been interpreted to stand for the general proposition that the People are entitled to a reasonable period of time to prepare for trial after the court has issued a decision on defense motions, since the People cannot be expected to predict the outcome of the court's decision (see Taylor, 16 Misc 3d at 341).³

Petitioner contends, however, that this period should be charged to the People because the case was in a pre-readiness posture and notes that unlike in Green, the People did not request "a short and reasonable post-readiness period to prep for hearings" because the "delay" was caused by the "prosecution's inability to declare readiness in part because the [ ] assigned ADA was about to begin a trial and in part because of the later internal transfer of the case to a newly assigned ADA" (Verified Petition, ¶ 31). On March 18th, defense counsel asked that the case be adjourned for hearings and trial in two weeks, which would have been April 1st; the People noted that the assigned ADA was beginning a homicide trial and instead asked for March 30th, two days earlier. Counsel agreed to that date and the case was adjourned (March 18, 2026 minutes, pp. 3-4).

Regardless of whether the People were ultimately ready on March 30th, the previous adjournment was, as Judge Park found, a reasonable period of time for the People to prepare for hearings and trial (see eg, Green; Bullock v Barry, 2002 WL 31720977, *2; People ex rel Farbman v Brann, 197 AD3d 1054 [1st Dept 2021] ["We agree that the motion court (April A. Newbauer, J.) providently exercised its discretion in excluding the initial 31-day adjournment period following the prosecutor's announcement of her intention to move for a protective order as it constituted 'a reasonable period of delay resulting from... pre-trial motions' within the meaning of CPL 30.30(4)(a)"]; People v Torres, 205AD3d 524 [1st Dept 2022] [determining, inter alia, that "the ensuing period, when the People obtained a ruling and filed a second certificate after complying with that ruling, is excludable under CPL 30.30(4)(a), as a 'reasonable period of delay resulting from... pretrial motions' "]).

Notably, when the People were not ready on March 30th (the case was adjourned for hearings and trial to May 12th), the 24-day period that followed, when the People filed their COR on April 23rd, was included in Judge Park's calculation of includable time.

To the extent that Petitioner argues that a so-called Green adjournment does not apply when a case is in a pre-readiness posture, after reviewing the limited, relevant caselaw, the discovery and speedy trial statutes, and the applicable legislative history, this court agrees with Judge Park and those courts that have determined that Green does still apply following the enactment of CPL § 245.50 when a case is in a pre-readiness posture (see eg People v Howard, 83 Misc 3d 1255(A), *5 (Suffolk County July 18, 2024) (Sachs, J); People v Banks, 83 Misc 3d 559 (NY County March 14, 2024) (Beller, J); People v Aiken, 168 NYS3d 679 at *3 (NY Cty Sup Ct 2022) (Kiesel, J); People v Daoud, 85 Misc 3d 1249(A) (NY County March 14, 2024) (Beller, J) ("... the Court would typically find this adjournment excludable, as the adjournment would, in this Court's view, constitute a reasonable time for the People to prepare for trial ...").

The amendments to the discovery statute were made separate and apart from the CPL § 30.30 "speedy-trial" requirements. Indeed, the legislature's decision to amend the discovery statute but leave CPL § 30.30 as is, indicates its intention to preserve the parameters and exclusions of CPL § 30.30, notwithstanding the discovery amendments. Whereas the People's duty to provide discovery continues irrespective of the application of the recognized exclusions of CPL § 30.30(4), the People remain bound by the requirements of the discovery statute even when certain periods of time are statutorily excluded from their requirement to state ready. Nothing in either statute dictates otherwise. This court therefore finds that the amendments to the discovery statute do not render Green inapplicable to cases that are in a pre-readiness posture.⁴

April 23, 2026 — May 12, 2026

In his petition, Petitioner summarily contends that the time period between April 23rd and May 12th should be charged to the People because "their COR was invalid and illusory" (Verified Petition, ¶ 19). Petitioner did not raise this specific claim before Judge Park (see June 4, 2026 minutes), and did not press this claim during oral argument before this court on July 1st. Nevertheless, Judge Park did a thorough analysis of the validity of the People's COR and COCs on June 4th, which encompassed the time spanning February 4th to June 4th. That analysis is addressed below.

May 18, 2026 — May 28, 2026

On May 12th, the People were not ready for hearings and trial and requested an adjournment to May 18th, which apparently was not a good date for defense counsel. The case was ultimately adjourned to June 4th for hearings and trial. Judge Park correctly found that only the 6-day period between May 12th and May 18th - the People's requested adjourn date — is chargeable to the People given that the case was in a post-readiness posture (see People v Brown, 28 NY3d 392, 404 [2016]; People v Bruno, 300 AD2d 93 [1st Dept 2002]).

May 28, 2026 — June 4, 2026

Off-calendar, on May 28th, the People filed and served a new COR and COC, as well as additional discovery in accordance with their continuing duty. Petitioner contends that this COR was invalid and illusory (Verified Petition, ¶ 23).

On June 4, 2026, the parties appeared before Judge Park and the People stated their readiness for trial on the record; defense counsel made the oral CPL § 30.30(2)(a) application for release that is at issue here.

After a third call, Judge Park stated that she had reviewed the discovery list and all of the supplemental materials disclosed after the People filed the February 4th COC, which consisted in large part of material that did not exist at the time of the filing of the original COC, "including communication between the ADA and the complainant, the subpoena returns from Hudson River Park, and phone records and Rikers calls", as well as updated law enforcement disclosures and an updated CV for the doctor (June 4, 2026 minutes, pp. 6-7, 12). Judge Park indicated that she had considered the totality of the People's efforts in complying with their automatic discovery obligations, as well as the factors set forth in CPL § 245.50(5)(a), including the volume of discovery provided versus the volume outstanding, the explanations for any delayed disclosure, "whether the belated discovery was insignificant or easily remedied, whether it was correct, and whether the People's delayed disclosure was prejudicial to the defendant" (June 4, 2026 minutes, p. 13).

Upon consideration, Judge Park determined that the People had filed their COC after exercising due diligence and good faith in complying with their automatic discovery obligation and thus, she denied petitioner's application to invalidate the COC and find their subsequent COR illusory (June 4, 2026 minutes, p. 13). With respect to Parks Department photographs and a video compilation from surveillance video that had been turned over that morning, and the People's belated decision to call additional witnesses, Judge Park determined that the appropriate remedy would be to either give petitioner more time to prepare or a defense application seeking preclusion made to the trial judge. She further found that dismissal would not be appropriate (June 4, 2026 minutes, pp. 13-14).

As such, based on the lengthy record made and the thorough analysis undertaken, Judge Park correctly determined that this period of time is excludable.

Conclusion

Whereas this court finds that the periods of time contested by petitioner are excludable as set forth above, this court also finds that Judge Park did not abuse her discretion in so finding. Accordingly, Petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

This opinion constitutes the Decision and Order of this court.

Dated: July 7, 2026

New York, New York

Ellen Biben, JSC

FOOTNOTES

1.   The statutory exclusions apply to both CPL § 30.30 motions for release and indictment dismissal.

2.   Notably, the court in Bullock determined that habeas corpus relief was not available to the petitioner in that case where he had not previously filed a CPL § 30.30(2)(a) release motion (and received an adverse ruling) before seeking a writ of habeas corpus. It then stated, "Even assuming that this Court can properly reach the merits of [the] Petitioner's claim, the court concludes that [the] Petitioner is not being illegally detained because less than ninety days of includable time has elapsed since his commitment to custody;" and the court addressed each adjournment in turn (id at *2-3).

3.   Notably, the courts in People v Taylor, 16 Misc 3d 339, People v Asmal-Aucapina, 21 Misc 3d 168 (NY County July 24, 2008) (Mennin, J), and several others, have determined that an adjournment for hearings does not fall under Green but is instead a statutory exclusion under CPL § 30.30(4)(a) as the period of time while a defendant's motion is under consideration by the court since, at that point and until the hearings are conducted, no ultimate conclusion on the motion has been made. "In determining that suppression hearings must be held, however, a court does not decide a defendant's motions, but rather holds them in abeyance pending necessary fact-finding" (Taylor, 16 Misc 3d at 342). Taylor also noted "[t]hat the matter has been adjourned for hearings and trial together, rather than for hearings alone, does not change the analysis" (id at 344 n. 5).Taylor observed, however, that if the People are not ready on the hearing date, the clock begins to run again, as "their nonreadiness[ ] will have prevented the court from rendering its decision on the defendant's motion to suppress, thereby impeding the case from proceeding to trial" (Taylor, at 344; see CPL 710.40 [3] [when a suppression motion is made before trial, the trial may not be commenced until determination of the motion]).

4.   To the extent that a court of concomitant jurisdiction takes the opposite view in People v Crawford, Sup Ct, Bronx County March 6, 2025, Indictment No. 72831/2023 (Collins, J), this court disagrees.

Ellen Biben, J.