SUAREZ v. RANKIN (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Keenan Rankin appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Karina E. Alomar, J.), dated May 1, 2025.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied that branch of that defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him and granted the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 306–b to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint upon the defendant Keenan Rankin.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, with costs, that branch of the motion of the defendant Keenan Rankin which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him is granted, and the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 306–b to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint upon the defendant Keenan Rankin is denied.

The plaintiff, Norma M. Suarez, commenced this action on April 3, 2023, against, among others, the defendant Keenan Rankin (hereinafter the defendant) to recover damages for personal injuries she alleged she sustained on October 25, 2021, when she was operating her motor vehicle in Queens County and it was struck by a motor vehicle towing a flatbed trailer operated by the defendant.  Although the plaintiff delivered a copy of the summons and complaint to the Secretary of State, the copy of the summons and complaint mailed to the defendant was returned undelivered, and the plaintiff thereafter failed to complete service pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 253 and did not serve the defendant within 120 days as required by CPLR 306–b.

In January 2025, the defendant moved, inter alia, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him.  In April 2025, the plaintiff opposed the motion and moved pursuant to CPLR 306–b to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint upon the defendant.  In an order dated May 1, 2025, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied that branch of the defendant's motion and granted the plaintiff's motion.  The defendant appeals.

“Pursuant to CPLR 306–b, a court may, in the exercise of discretion, grant a motion for an extension of time to effect service for ‘good cause shown’ or ‘in the interest of justice’ ” (BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Tessler, 208 A.D.3d 619, 621, 171 N.Y.S.3d 894, quoting CPLR 306–b;  see Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 N.Y.2d 95, 104, 736 N.Y.S.2d 291, 761 N.E.2d 1018).  “To establish good cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable diligence in attempting service” (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Fameux, 201 A.D.3d 1012, 1014, 162 N.Y.S.3d 421;  see Marzan v. Petit–Frere, 220 A.D.3d 852, 198 N.Y.S.3d 714;  Bumpus v. New York City Tr. Auth., 66 A.D.3d 26, 31–32, 883 N.Y.S.2d 99).  Here, the plaintiff failed to establish that she exercised reasonably diligent efforts in attempting to effectuate proper service upon the defendant and, thus, failed to show good cause to warrant an extension of time to effect service (see Marzan v. Petit–Frere, 220 A.D.3d at 853, 198 N.Y.S.3d 714;  Marjam Supply Co., Inc. v. Warwick Props., Inc., 217 A.D.3d 853, 855, 191 N.Y.S.3d 670).

“ ‘If good cause for an extension is not established, courts must consider the broader interest of justice standard of CPLR 306–b’ ” (Duckett v. Stringer, 231 A.D.3d 1122, 1123, 222 N.Y.S.3d 96, quoting State of New York Mtge. Agency v. Braun, 182 A.D.3d 63, 66, 119 N.Y.S.3d 522).  Under the interest of justice standard, “the court may consider diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of the Statute of Limitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff's request for the extension of time, and prejudice to defendant” (Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 N.Y.2d at 105–106, 736 N.Y.S.2d 291, 761 N.E.2d 1018;  see Gooden v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 216 A.D.3d 1143, 1145, 191 N.Y.S.3d 79).  Here, the plaintiff failed to establish that an extension was warranted in the interest of justice, since the plaintiff exhibited a lack of diligence, having failed to seek an extension of time until two years after filing the summons and complaint and failing to offer a reasonable excuse for the delay (see Butters v. Payne, 176 A.D.3d 1028, 1029, 112 N.Y.S.3d 245).  Further, the plaintiff failed to establish a potentially meritorious cause of action (see Duckett v. Stringer, 231 A.D.3d at 1123, 222 N.Y.S.3d 96;  Fink v. Dollar Mart, 186 A.D.3d 1197, 1199, 127 N.Y.S.3d 909).  Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 306–b to extend the time to serve the summons and complaint upon the defendant, and the court should have granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

GENOVESI, J.P., WARHIT, LOVE and QUIRK, JJ., concur.