SOUGSTAD v. Dave Sandel Cranes, Inc., defendant-respondent, et al., defendant (and third-party actions). (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, and the defendants OLP Hauppauge, LLC, and LMJ Management & Construction, Inc., cross-appeal, from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Joseph Farneti, J.), dated June 18, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those branches of the plaintiff's motion which were for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against the defendants OLP Hauppauge, LLC, and LMJ Management & Construction, Inc., and on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging common-law negligence insofar as asserted against the defendant Dave Sandel Cranes, Inc. The cross-appeal was deemed dismissed pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1250.10(a).

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof denying that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against the defendants OLP Hauppauge, LLC, and LMJ Management & Construction, Inc., and substituting therefor a provision granting that branch of the motion;  as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the defendant Dave Sandel Cranes, Inc., payable by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, an ironworker, allegedly was injured while working at a construction site while in the process of moving a steel I-beam using “spreader hooks” attached to a crane.  The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries, asserting causes of action alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6).

At his deposition, the plaintiff testified that on the date of the accident, he and a coworker were unloading a delivery of steel beams and were “shaking out” the steel, a process which involved using spreader hooks attached to the crane to lift the beams up and off the truck and placing them on the ground.  The plaintiff and his coworker were using the spreader hooks “like a pendulum” to grab a steel beam from one pile to swing it over to another pile.  According to the plaintiff, at the time of his accident, the piece of steel that the plaintiff and his coworker were moving was five feet off the ground.  As the plaintiff and his coworker guided the beam, his coworker “let go” of the beam, at which time the beam began swinging, dragging the plaintiff.  A crane operator confirmed that the beam swung out five to six feet away from the crane after he lifted the beam.  After the steel moved, the plaintiff put his arm around it.  According to the plaintiff, when the steel moved away from him, it was no longer at the height of five feet above the ground, it was more “like 3 feet.”  The beam hit a pile of steel beams on the ground, which caused the plaintiff to be “jerked ․ forward” and suffer injuries.

The plaintiff moved, among other things, for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) insofar as asserted against the defendant OLP Hauppauge, LLC (hereinafter OLP), which owned the construction site, and the defendant LMJ Management & Construction, Inc. (hereinafter LMJ), which was the general contractor, and on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging common-law negligence insofar as asserted against the defendant Dave Sandel Cranes, Inc., which owned the crane and employed its operator.  In an order dated June 18, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied those branches of the plaintiff's motion.

“Labor Law § 240(1) imposes upon owners, contractors, and their agents a nondelegable duty to provide workers proper protection from elevation-related hazards” (Zoto v. 259 W. 10th, LLC, 189 A.D.3d 1523, 1524, 134 N.Y.S.3d 728;  see Cruz v. 451 Lexington Realty, LLC, 218 A.D.3d 733, 735, 193 N.Y.S.3d 238).  “Liability is contingent upon ‘the existence of a hazard contemplated in section 240(1) and the failure to use, or the inadequacy of, a safety device of the kind enumerated therein’ ” (Cruz v. 451 Lexington Realty, LLC, 218 A.D.3d at 735, 193 N.Y.S.3d 238, quoting Narducci v. Manhasset Bay Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d 259, 267, 727 N.Y.S.2d 37, 750 N.E.2d 1085).  In cases involving falling objects, the applicability of the statute does not “depend upon whether the object has hit the worker” but rather “whether the harm flows directly from the application of the force of gravity to the object” (Runner v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d 599, 604, 895 N.Y.S.2d 279, 922 N.E.2d 865;  see Cruz v. 451 Lexington Realty, LLC, 218 A.D.3d at 735, 193 N.Y.S.3d 238).  “In falling object cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate that at the time the object fell, it either was being hoisted or secured, or required securing for the purposes of the undertaking” (Cruz v. 451 Lexington Realty, LLC, 218 A.D.3d at 736, 193 N.Y.S.3d 238 [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

Here, the plaintiff established, prima facie, OLP's and LMJ's liability under Labor Law § 240(1) by submitting, among other things, transcripts of the plaintiff's deposition testimony and the crane operator's deposition testimony, which established that the beam being hoisted at the time of the incident was an object that required securing for purposes of the undertaking, and the harm flowed “directly from the application of the force of gravity to the” beam (Runner v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 N.Y.3d at 604, 895 N.Y.S.2d 279, 922 N.E.2d 865;  see Harris v. City of New York, 83 A.D.3d 104, 923 N.Y.S.2d 2;  cf.  Giraldo v. Highmark Ind. LLC, 226 A.D.3d 874, 209 N.Y.S.3d 518;  Cruz v. 451 Lexington Realty, LLC, 218 A.D.3d at 736, 193 N.Y.S.3d 238).  In opposition, OLP and LMJ failed to raise a triable issue of fact.  Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1) insofar as asserted against OLP and LMJ.

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.

DILLON, J.P., DOWLING, TAYLOR and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.