Nathan Sakeni, etc., respondent, v. Kathrin Sakni, etc., et al., appellants, et al., nominal defendant. (2026)

Argued—January 30, 2026

DECISION & ORDER

O/

In an action, inter alia, for injunctive and declaratory relief, the defendants Makan Delrahim and Baharak Amirian appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Sharon M.J. Gianelli, J.), entered October 9, 2024.  The order, insofar as appealed from, denied those defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

This action arises from a dispute over the ownership of the nominal defendant, Rockville Corp. (hereinafter Rockville).  The underlying facts of the case are set forth more fully in this Court's decision and order on a related appeal (see Sakeni v. Sakni, _ AD3d _ [Appellate Division Docket No. 2022–09312;  decided herewith] ).  As relevant here, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendants Makan Delrahim and Baharak Amirian (hereinafter together the appellants), and another, inter alia, for a declaration of the plaintiff's ownership interest in Rockville.  The complaint alleged, among other things, that the appellants either were or had been co-trustees of a trust that held interest in Rockville.  In an order entered October 3, 2022, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the appellants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint.

Subsequently, the appellants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.  In an order entered October 9, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied the motion on the ground that the court had previously issued an order entered October 3, 2022, denying summary judgment dismissing the complaint.  This appeal ensued.

The Supreme Court erred, in effect, in concluding that the doctrine of the law of the case precluded review of the appellants' motion for summary judgment.  The prior motion that was denied in the order entered October 3, 2022, was to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a), not for summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3212.  The denial of a motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) does not preclude a subsequent motion for summary judgment (see Mobarak v. Mowad, 55 AD3d 693, 694;  Kidd v. Delta Funding Corp., 299 A.D.2d 457, 457).  Nevertheless, upon considering the merits of the motion in the interest of judicial economy (see generally Schmidt v. Capone, 243 AD3d 709, 712;  Souffrant v M & K Real Estate Assoc., LLC, 225 AD3d 914, 916), we conclude that denial was proper on the merits.

A defendant moving for summary judgment “must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issue of fact” (Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d 320, 324;  see Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d 851, 853).  If this showing is made, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact (see Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 68 N.Y.2d at 324;  Winegrad v. New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 N.Y.2d at 853).

Here, the appellants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.  In support of their motion, the appellants submitted an affirmation of Amirian, in which he affirmed that the trust held no ownership interest in Rockville.  In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the trust held an interest in Rockville.  Therefore, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the trust holds an interest in Rockville and whether the appellants, as trustees, are proper defendants in this dispute over Rockville's ownership.

The appellants' remaining contentions are without merit.

BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., WAN, LOVE and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court