N. C., etc., appellant, v. GONZALES (2026)

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (David T. Reilly, J.), dated December 18, 2024.  The order granted the renewed cross-motion of the defendant Anthony Gonzales for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff commenced this action on behalf of her infant son, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice.  The plaintiff alleged that, in November 2019, her son sustained injuries as a result of an inappropriate rectal examination performed by the defendant Anthony Gonzales, then a third-year medical student doing a rotation at the defendant Peconic Pediatrics (hereinafter Peconic) and being supervised by the defendant Douglas Friedfeld.

In September 2023, Gonzales cross-moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.  In an order dated July 8, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, denied Gonzales's cross-motion without prejudice to renewal on the basis that it was jurisdictionally defective.  Subsequently, Gonzales made a renewed cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.  In an order dated December 18, 2024, the Supreme Court granted Gonzales' renewed cross-motion.  The plaintiff appeals.

“When supervised medical personnel are not exercising their independent medical judgment, they cannot be held liable for medical malpractice unless the directions from the supervising superior or doctor so greatly deviates from normal medical practice that they should be held liable for failing to intervene” (Bellafiore v. Ricotta, 83 A.D.3d 632, 633, 920 N.Y.S.2d 373;  see Nasima v. Dolen, 149 A.D.3d 759, 760, 51 N.Y.S.3d 189).  Supervised medical personnel, such as a resident or medical student, do not exercise independent medical judgment during a procedure or care of a patient if the resident is under the direction and supervision of an attending physician, even if the resident takes an “active role” in the procedure or care (France v. Packy, 121 A.D.3d 836, 837, 994 N.Y.S.2d 364;  see Muniz v. Katlowitz, 49 A.D.3d 511, 513–514, 856 N.Y.S.2d 120).

Here, Gonzales made a prima facie showing of his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him through his deposition testimony and Friedfeld's deposition testimony, which showed that Gonzeles was acting under the direction and supervision of Friedfeld and, further, that Gonzales's conduct did not deviate from normal medical practice (see France v. Packy, 121 A.D.3d at 837, 994 N.Y.S.2d 364;  Muniz v. Katlowitz, 49 A.D.3d at 513–514, 856 N.Y.S.2d 120;  Soto v. Andaz, 8 A.D.3d 470, 471, 779 N.Y.S.2d 104).  In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Guctas v. Pessolano, 132 A.D.3d 632, 635, 17 N.Y.S.3d 749;  Poter v. Adams, 104 A.D.3d 925, 927, 961 N.Y.S.2d 556).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted Gonzales's renewed cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

In light of the foregoing, we need not reach the plaintiff's remaining contentions.

BARROS, J.P., VOUTSINAS, GOLIA and HOM, JJ., concur.