Robinson Chavez Gonzalez, Plaintiff, v. MARIA AYALA ERICK SOSA OLEO (2026)

In accordance with CPLR 2219 (a), the decision herein is made upon consideration of all papers filed in NYSCEF regarding the motion by defendant ERICK B. SOSA D'OLEO ("Movant") [Mot. Seq. 1], made pursuant to CPLR 3212, seeking an order dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims alleged against Movant.

This is a personal injury action arising out of a two-car accident that occurred at 3:45 a.m. on December 13, 2025 at a traffic light ("the Accident"). Movant's vehicle was the lead car in the accident ("Movant's Vehicle" or "the Lead Vehicle"). The second vehicle, which was behind Movant's Vehicle at the traffic light, was owned by defendant MARIA T. AYALA and operated by defendant SILVIO SANCHEZ-CASARRUBIAS ("the Second Vehicle"). Plaintiff was a passenger in the Second Vehicle. The Second Vehicle hit the Lead Vehicle in the rear.

The motion for summary judgment is supported by an attorney affirmation, a statement of material facts, copies of the pleadings, a memorandum of law, Movant's personal affidavit, and a certified copy of the police report. Movant also provides attorney affirmations in reply with accompanying caselaw.

In opposition to the motion, plaintiff submits an attorney affirmation and a personal affidavit. While co-defendants Sanchez-Casarrubias and Ayala submit an attorney affirmation in opposition with a material statement of facts, they do not provide personal affirmations.

Movant avers that, at the time of the Accident: "[w]hile stopped at a red light with my foot on the brake, I was struck from behind. I did not change lanes in the 10 seconds prior to the accident. I did not come to a sudden stop for a red light. My foot was on the brake the entire time that I was stopped. I was entirely within one lane of travel when the accident occurred. I did not make contact with any other vehicles prior to being rear ended or after I was rear ended. I did not cause or contribute to the accident in any manner".

In the personal affidavit submitted by plaintiff, plaintiff states that, at the time of the Accident, plaintiff was a passenger in the Second Vehicle. Plaintiff avers that the Lead Vehicle "made a short and abrupt stop after attempting to beat a red traffic light. Immediately before the accident, the traffic light controlling our direction of travel had turned yellow. It appeared as though [Movant] was going to proceed through the intersection and then changed his mind at the last second and he hit his brake hard causing [the Second Vehicle] to strike his vehicle from behind". Plaintiff contends that the Second Vehicle "struck the [Lead Vehicle] after he stopped short for a traffic light".

As for the submitted certified police report, it contains a statement by the co-defendant driver of the Second Vehicle, recorded by the reporting police officer, in which the driver of the Second Vehicle admitted that he was driving straight ahead when the Lead Vehicle came to a stop causing the Second Vehicle to collide with the Lead Vehicle. Initially, the Court notes that the police report is certified and is therefore appropriately considered by the Court. Yassin v Blackman, 188 AD3d 62 (2d Dep't 2020); Dong v Cruz-Marte, 189 AD3d 613 (1st Dep't 2020). Furthermore, the out-of-court statement within the report by co-defendant is admissible as the statement satisfies an exception to hearsay as a party admission or a declaration against interest. Wilson v City of New York, 221 AD3d 438 (1st Dep't 2023); see Gambel v MTA Bus Company, 242 AD3d 577 (1st Dep't 2025).

Analysis

Since there can be more than one proximate cause of an accident, a defendant or third-party defendant moving for summary judgment is required to make a prima facie showing that he or she is free from fault. see Harrigan v Sow, 165 AD3d 463 (1st Dep't 2018); Hilago v Vasquez, 187 AD3d 683 (1st Dep't 2020). In order for a defendant driver to establish entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of liability in a motor vehicle collision case, therefore, the driver must demonstrate, prima facie, that he or she kept the proper lookout, or that his or her alleged negligence, if any, did not contribute to the accident. see Harrigan v Sow, supra; Hilago v Vasquez, supra.

Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129(a) provides that, a "driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway. Urena v GVC Ltd., 160 AD3d 467, 467 (1st Dep't 2018). It is well settled, therefore, that a rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle, and imposes a duty on the part of the operator of the rear moving vehicle to come forward with an adequate non-negligent explanation for the accident. see Cabrera v Rodriguez, 72 AD3d 553 (1st Dep't 2010); Tutrani v County of Suffolk, 10 NY3d 906, 908 (2008); Agramonte v City of New York, 288 AD2d 75, 76 (1st Dep't 2001). Furthermore, in a chain reaction collision, responsibility presumptively rests with the rearmost driver and there is a presumption of non-negligence of the driver of the lead vehicle. Mustafaj v Driscoll, 5 AD3d 138 (1st Dep't 2004); Chuk Hwa Shin v Correale, 142 AD3d 518, 519 (2d Dep't 2016); Skura v Wojtlowski, 165 AD3d 1196, 1199 (2d Dep't 2018).

First Department case law is also clear that a claim by the rear driver that the lead vehicle made a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence. Bajrami v Twinkle Cab Corp., 147 AD3d 649 (1st Dep't 2017); Cabrera v Rodriguez, supra; see Ly Giap v Hathi Son Pham, 159 AD3d 484, 485 (1st Dep't 2018) ("A claim that the lead driver came to a sudden stop, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut the presumption that the rearmost driver was negligent, and the stopped vehicle was not negligent"). Hence, the happening of a rear-end collision with a vehicle slowing in traffic is itself a prima facie case of negligence of the rearmost driver. Vasquez v Chimborazo, 155 AD3d 432 (1st Dep't 2017); see Smyth v Murphy, 177 AD3d 492 (1st Dep't 2019); Corrigan v Porter Cab Corp., 101 AD3d 471 (1st Dep't 2012); LaMasa v Bachman, 56 AD3d 340 (1st Dep't 2008).

On this motion, Movant establishes prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence showing that: the Lead Vehicle was travelling safely in traffic when it was struck in the rear by the Second Vehicle; Movant did not act negligently; and any negligence on Movant's part did not contribute to causing the Accident. Vasquez v Chimborazo, supra; Smyth v Murphy, supra; Corrigan v Porter Cab Corp., supra; LaMasa v Bachman, supra; see Martinez v Kuhl, 165 AD3d 774 (2d Dep't 2018). Of note, an "innocent driver exists in a case where the driver did not contribute to the happening of the accident in any way. A typical example is the case at bar where [the] driver, while stopped, was rear-ended by the following driver". Oluwatayo v Dulinayan, 142 AD3d 113, 119 (1st Dep't 2016).

Plaintiff and co-defendants, in turn, fail to raise an issue of material fact as to Movant's contribution to causing the Accident. The attorney affirmations submitted in opposition to the motion have no evidentiary value (see Conti v City of Niagara Falls Water Bd., 82 AD3d 1633, 1634 (1st Dep't 2011) ("It is well established . . . that an affirmation submitted by an attorney who has no personal knowledge of the facts is without evidentiary value")), and are thus insufficient to defeat the motion. In addition, any contention that the car in front stopped short or suddenly is insufficient to generate an issue of fact as a matter of law. Bajrami v Twinkle Cab Corp., supra; Cabrera v Rodriguez, supra; see Ly Giap v Hathi Son Pham, supra.

Moreover, plaintiff's explanation for the co-defendants' car striking the Movant's Vehicle in the rear, as set forth in plaintiff's affirmation in opposition, that Movant's Vehicle stopped abruptly at a yellow light, is insufficient to generate an issue of fact as to Movant's negligence because Movant was entitled to stop at the yellow light. Toledo v Pascal, 242 AD3d 1039 (2d Dep't 2025); Yawagyentsang v Safeway Construction Enterprises, LLC., 225 AD3d 827 (2d Dep't 2024); Grier-Key v Lyons, 195 AD3d 798 (2d Dep't 2021); Hakakian v McCabe, 38 AD3d 493 (2d Dep't 2007). As such, the claim that Movant "wrongfully" stopped at a yellow light does not constitute a nonnegligent explanation for the Accident. Acevedo v Akhtar, 204 AD3d 596 (1st Dep't 2022); see Yawagyentsang v Safeway Construction Enterprises, LLC., supra; Grier-Key v Lyons, supra; Hakakian v McCabe, supra.

Furthermore, any argument that Movant's motion for summary judgment is premature also lacks merit as the mere hope that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is an insufficient justification to deny such a motion, and the information as to why co-defendant's vehicle hit the Lead Vehicle is within defendant's own knowledge. See Gamble v MTA Bus Company, 242 AD3d 577 (1st Dep't 2025); Baxter v Gosh, 241 AD3d 1144 (1st Dep't 2025); Downey v Mazzioli, 137 AD3d 498, 499 (1st Dep't 2016); Mirza v Tribeca Auto Inc., 189 AD3d 448 (lst Dep't 2020). The motion is therefore granted.

The Court has considered the additional contentions not specifically addressed herein. To the extent any contention was not addressed by the Court, it is hereby rejected.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that the motion by defendant ERICK B. SOSA D'OLEO ("Movant") [Mot. Seq. 1], made pursuant to CPLR 3212, seeking an order dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims alleged against him is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendant D'Oleo dismissing the complaint and all cross-claims alleged against him and severing the remaining action; and it is further

ORDERED that the caption of this action shall henceforth read as:

ROBINSON CHAVEZ GONZALEZ,

Plaintiff,

Index No. 804146/2026E

against

SILVIO SANCHEZ-CASARRUBIAS and

MARIA T. AYALA,

Defendants.

;and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiff shall by October 1, 2026, file to NYSCEF a completed form EF 23  ¹ to facilitate the amendment of the caption in NYSCEF; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk shall mark motion seq. 1 decided in in all court records; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk shall promptly issue a Preliminary Conference Order.

The foregoing constitutes the Decision/Order of the court.

Dated: August 12, 2026

Bronx, New York

E N T E R,

HON. VERONICA G. HUMMEL, A.J.S.C.

FOOTNOTES

1.   NYSCEF Form EF 23 can be found at the following link: https://iappscontent.courts.state.ny.us/NYSCEF/live/forms/notice.county.clerk.amend.caption.pdf

Veronica G. Hummel, J.